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A
HISTORY
OF
THE CAMPAIGNS
OF THE
BRITISH FORCES
IN
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL,
Undertaken to relieve those Countries
FROM THE FRENCH USURPATION;
COMPREHENDING
MEMOIRS OF THE OPERATIONS OF THIS INTERESTING
WAR,
CHARACTERISTIC REPORTS
OF THE
SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE TROOPS,
AND
ILLUSTRATIVE ANECDOTES OF
Distinguished Military Conduct in Individuals,
Whatever their Rank in the Army.

Tros tyriusve mihi nullo discrimine agetur. VIRG.

VOL. IV.

MILITARY STATE OF THE PENINSULA, IN 1809.
DEFENCE OF THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF PORTUGAL.
ADVANCE OF AN ARMY UNDER SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
(MARQUIS WELLINGTON,) INTO SPAIN.
THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

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1813.

HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE BRITISH FORCES IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

FROM THE FRENCH INVASION;
CONTAINING
MEMOIRS OF THE OPERATIONS OF THIS INTERESTING
WAR,
CHARACTERISTIC BEHAVIOUR
OF THE
SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE TROOPS,
AND
DISTINGUISHED MILITARY CONDUCT IN INDIVIDUAL
BATTLES AND SIEGES.

THE FIRST PART OF THE HISTORY OF THE
CAMPAIGN OF 1762.

VOL. IV.
MILITARY STATE OF THE PENINSULA IN 1762
DEFENCE OF THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF PORTUGAL
ADVANCE OF AN ARMY UNDER SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY
(MARCHES WELLINGTON) INTO SPAIN
THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA

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PREFACE

TO THE

FOURTH VOLUME.

ARRIVED at a fourth division of the annals of the peninsular war, it is agreeable to find that its progress should be marked by an advancement of the general cause, and the increased glory of the British arms; notwithstanding the various reverses sustained by the one and the obstructions which have impeded the other.

In the present volume, a greater variety of circumstances have perhaps occurred than in any of those which have preceeded it; and a greater variety of documents have been employed in it which cannot fail to be interesting to the active soldier; and in respect to which, the writer will have greatly deceived himself, if they do not bring him

intimately acquainted with the service of this period in the Peninsula ; and no less so, if the experience of that various service be not highly advantageous to those who may be employed in future armies.

The character of the partisan will be seen here in a new and important point of view ; that of the defence of an extensive frontier, against a regular army skilfully commanded. Let the troops employed in this arduous and extraordinary service be called corps of observation, out-posts, or even reconnoitring parties, or piquets ; if vanguard of the army be too lofty a name,—or, indeed, be incorrect, since they had no army to support them !—Never was there a finer illustration of the elements of war ;—never did partisan so much resemble the first duties of the general ;—never did general attain more perfect success ;—never did heroes more modestly return to comparative obscurity of rank ;—never were soldiers *less ostentatiously* rewarded. In the latter duty, as in the former, all concerned appear exemplary : the young officer is not only taught the best parts of his profession, but he is also inspired

with patience of promotion, and forbearance from undue exultation. The people of England are shewn that the sovereign can form a body of officers and soldiers, with no other reward than the impulse of honour, unalloyed by inordinate ambition, and yet capable of coping with "*an army constituted like that of France.*"*

The mingled mass of matter from the seat of war, hitherto unarranged, has been admitted from these views; as well as several documents of the commander-in-chief, as they were presented to Parliament, but hitherto unpublished. They familiarize the reader with the peculiar circumstances of the army:—he partakes, through them, of the alternations of hope and doubt; experiences, in imagination, all the embarrassments of the general, and all the evils of the army, and then turns to the experience of of their remedy.

* This phrase, so often repeated, whatever its justice, in regard to the French, cannot be too soon exploded. It may be often wise to learn from an enemy, but never to despair of competition.

In this, as in the former volumes, the writer has avoided any beaten track of vulgar popularity, and equally guarded against the vaccillations of opinion. The splendid achievements of a Wellington, or the exalted services of a Beresford, must not induce an over-weening fondness for their defects, (and who is without them,) any more than the established reputation of a Burrard or a Dalrymple, or the immortality of a Moore!

In remarks of this kind, however, inconsiderate spleen, or personal rancour, is no where to be found; for, whence could the writer derive them? Equally unknown to them all, and independent of them all, he has no view to serve, but to furnish instruction from their experience; and to collect and digest, as far as may be, the materials which this unprecedented war has produced, into a faithful depository for future reference to its facts, whose decent fidelity shall ultimately remunerate the bookseller, the expense of his laudable endeavours for the service; nor would either dare to obtrude such unworthy principles before

that illustrious person, who, solely from a desire to further every useful object, was graciously pleased to grant to it the sanction of his name.

Notwithstanding the extent of the documents inserted in the present volume, there are some by no means unimportant, of which from their length, and still more as keeping alive a disputed point between the allies,* the omission was deemed expedient. These chiefly relate to the correspondence, which took place between December, 1808, and March 24, 1809, relative to the occupation of Cadiz by British troops.

The points upon which this correspondence chiefly hinge are the opinions of the allies, expressed in a letter from M. Garay to Mr. Frere, on the 1st of March, as he says, “ particularly after the events in Galicia ;” the desire on both sides of Cadiz, to cover a retreat ; and the doubts entertained, by both, of each other : the neces-

* The same may be said with respect to a letter of Mr. Perceval, among other documents, relating to the immense expenditure of sir John Moore’s army, and other subjects.

sity in the junta of respecting public opinion ; and the difference of sentiment as to the safety of Cadiz, the Spaniards conceiving it to be out of danger, and the British ministers from the fears of the merchants, urging the inexpediency of risking an army, “ where wools and cottons were deemed unsafe.”

Some original anecdotes, both personal and local, will be found in this volume, which it is wished to increase. The military antiquary may be also referred to a letter of general Cuesta, which, in the absence of any other information on the subject, states the arch of the bridge of Trajan, at Alcantara, that was destroyed, to be one hundred and twenty feet wide.

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THE hapless retreat of sir John Moore, while it could not fail to influence the affairs of the allies

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and Portugal.

in a very particular manner, as soon as its circumstances should become generally known, did not, from its rapidity, extend the news of its disasters beyond the line of march, and its vicinity, for a considerable time. It was, indeed, rumoured, that the British army was retiring in some places, and known in others; but the effect was rather doubt and consternation than any positive results, particularly when reports became prevalent of the final battle and embarkation.

Along the line of march, unhappily, were left sufficient proofs of the disasters of that army, which erewhile approached in such gallant array to aid the cause of Spain; while the wretched troops of Romana, in the state in which they have been described, wandered for shelter and repose, or rather retired to die; and the British stragglers from an army, no longer seeking the enemy, who found their way into Portugal, gradually confirmed all the fears which had been formed. Nor were the tirades of the boastful enemy wanting, much quicker than either, to tell how the English had been driven into the sea, and French eagles had overtopped Corunna!

The hopes of Spain, however, were not repressed, still less the spirit of those British troops which remained in Portugal; and, with the natives of that kingdom, anxiously looked to the moment

when in their turn they should advance against the common enemy.

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The armies of count Palafox, the duke del Infantado, the marquis del Palaicio, and general Cuesta, were recruited and re-organized during the diversion which, whatever the nature or causes of sir John Moore's retreat, was evidently created in his pursuit; and during the absence of the French army, also, in that pursuit, La Mancha, Estremadura, and a great number of towns in the south of Spain, either possessed or overawed by it, were occupied with the greatest advantage. The French garrisons were chased from Catalonia to the fortresses of the neighbouring passes of the Pyrennees, to Figueras and Rosas. New depôts in this quarter were, in course, formed with the greatest agility to the cause. Saragossa, which, in the former books has been seen to more than emulate the highest deeds of antient story, resumed her vigour, as well as Gerona, dear to the Catalonians.

And when even the views of the French army, whose overwhelming columns had been intended to complete the subjugation of the peninsula, were called to the banks of the Rhine and Vienna, the advantage of these operations became apparent, from engrossing the whole attention of the concentrated French armies, which still remained in Spain. This exception may be admitted, that

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those which were intended to occupy Lisbon drew towards Madrid, and endeavoured to secure the simple communication between the capital and the direct transit to France through Bayonne.

Previous to entering upon the subject of a new campaign under all the circumstances which have been exhibited, it is proper to shew the feelings of the government as they were expressed by lord Castlereagh, previously to any positive knowledge of the close of sir John Moore's disastrous campaign. The letters are pregnant with facts, and shew that the objects of Mr. Frere's anxiety were no less those of the minister at home.

Downing-street, Jan. 3d, 1809.

Viscount Castlereagh to sir John Moore.

Sir,

Your letters of the dates stated in the margin,* have been received and laid before the king.

* December 10, 12, and 13,

His majesty has observed, with the highest satisfaction, the measures adopted by you for uniting your army with that under sir David Baird, and for directing the British force thus concentrated against the enemy's line of communications. His majesty trusts, that so seasonable and vigorous a demonstration in the rear of the enemy may be productive of the best effects.

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Viscount Castlereagh to sir John Moore.

The change that has taken place in the position of the British army since my letters of the 24th ult. were written (duplicates of which are herewith transmitted) has determined his majesty to order the 5000 infantry, then destined to the Tagus, to proceed in the first instance to Corunna, leaving it to your judgment to make such an appropriation of this force as, under all the circumstances of the war in the peninsula, you may deem the most advisable.

The 15th regiment of light dragoons, and 300 artillery-horses, are ordered to embark, and will proceed immediately to Corunna.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

To lieutenant-general sir John Moore, K. B. &c.

Downing-street, Jan. 3, 1809.

Sir,

Under a full persuasion of the importance of a large force of cavalry being attached to your army, for the purpose of giving effect to the operation in which you are at present engaged, I cannot but regret that the services, even of a single regiment of dragoons, have at the present moment been diverted from your immediate support: but you will recollect, that, when the 14th regiment sailed from hence, sir David Baird was at that

Viscount Castlereagh to John Moore

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Viscount Cas-
tlereagh to sir
John Moore.

moment actually advanced upon his retreat towards Vigo; in consequence of which, and an intimation from that officer, that you had ordered him to proceed without delay to the Tagus, this regiment, together with the 600 horses for the artillery, was directed, instead of calling at Vigo (as before ordered) to go at once to the Tagus.

My former letters will have explained to you that the requisition for tonnage, for the reception of 2000 horses at Vigo, arising out of the intended re-embarkation of sir David Baird's corps, alone prevented your receiving from hence the four regiments of cavalry, and two troops of horse-artillery, at that time embarked and nearly ready to sail; and although, had this force proceeded to its destination, it would not, in addition to what had preceded it, have carried your cavalry to the full amount which might at the present moment enable you to do much, viz. 7 or 8,000 men; yet, it would have added, in the first instance, not less than 3,500 rank and file to your present numbers: and if the transports which were to convey the above regiments, together with the other empty cavalry-transports then in the Tagus and at Corunna, (capable of transporting not less than 5,500 horses,) had been immediately sent back, we should have had the means of detaching from

hence the remaining five regiments of cavalry under orders, with a full proportion of horse-artillery, which would have fully accomplished, so far as depended on numbers, the object we had both equally at heart.

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Viscount Castlereagh to sir John Moore.

I trust you will be persuaded, that this statement is not brought forward for the purpose of questioning the propriety of any thing that has been done, but simply for the purpose of explaining why you are not at present supplied with all the means you might wish for and expect, if nothing had occurred to interrupt the ordinary progress of the service, and which I am the rather led to make, as I observe sir David Baird, in a letter of the 17th, from Benevente, to admiral de Courcy, writes as confidently of the immediate approach of not less than four regiments of cavalry, as if he never had made a requisition; to comply with which, his majesty's government had no other option, but instantly to disembark a considerable force of cavalry then on the point of sailing.

Your experience in the difficulty as well as expense of extensive equipments of cavalry will make it no matter of surprise to you, that we should endeavour to assign some limit to our establishment under this head; in truth, such has been the extent of the efforts already made, and the means of supply have in consequence been so much nar-

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John Moore.

rowed, that we find it difficult at present to procure the necessary tonnage for meeting the other demands of the army. I feel it necessary, therefore, to repeat, that if you deem an addition of cavalry important to the operations in which you are likely to be engaged, it can only be obtained by your sending back a proportion of empty horse-transporters now with you. I am aware that it must depend on the prospect which presents itself, according to the nature of the service, of cavalry being wanted, and also to the general turn of the campaign, how far it may be prudent, with a view to augment the army, to deprive yourself of the immediate use of the transports in question; this is a military consideration we must trust to your judgment on the spot. If the prospect of rendering service to the cause in which we are engaged is encouraging, we ought not to be discouraged from making this effort, by an apprehension of ultimately losing a number of horses, provided we retain the means of re-embarking the men themselves; and, as bearing upon this part of the question, it may be worth your consideration whether, by previously strengthening positions upon the harbour of Vigo, and establishing magazines on the Bayonne islands, the security of such of the cavalry and draught horses of the army might not be provided for, by throwing them into those

islands, which admit of naval protection, as could not be carried by a single operation, with the tonnage you possess, to any part of the peninsula, to which the circumstances of the war may induce you, by sea, to direct the operations of the army.

To meet any demand for reinforcements of cavalry you may have occasion to make, two regiments will be held in readiness for immediate embarkation at Falmouth, and two at Portsmouth, with a proportion of horse-artillery attached to each.

With respect to the general nature of the war, and the difficulties imposed upon the British army, by the disasters and defective co-operation of the Spanish armies, I beg to offer you my sincere acknowledgments for the plain and candid manner in which, with a fixed determination to omit no effort within the ability of your own army to make, you state to me the considerations which preclude you from forming any sanguine expectations with respect to the issue of the present contest. It is difficult in so complicated a question to arrive at any precise conclusion with regard to the probable result of such a struggle. We can only usefully aim at doing our own duty with the means we possess, and trust the rest to the exertions of those in whose behalf we have to contend. Our efforts with those means must be regulated by the

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John Moore.

military discretion of your officers commanding on the spot ; and I am confident, however delicate the decision on certain occasions may be, that you will fulfil the task imposed on you with ability and judgment.

In adverting to the extent of the means which it is in our power to employ, I think it right distinctly to apprise you, that, with the exception of the cavalry now under orders, and the 5,000 infantry about to sail, I do not consider that any further force can at present be conveniently spared ; nor, indeed, could we calculate in prudence, until supplies of silver from South America shall be assured, upon the means of realising in Spain the funds necessary for bringing a larger force into the field. On this subject you are already in possession of the limits imposed upon our exertions.

On this part of the question, nothing further occurs to me, unless it is to remark upon the estimate which I have received from you of the force now under your orders, which you state at not more than 28,000 men, including the three regiments ordered to join you from Portugal. Comparing this with the enemy's force, taken at 80,000 men, exclusive of their force in Catalonia, it appears taken as high as I should suppose relative numbers would justify ; but as compared with the

return of effective rank and file of the British army on service in Spain, it is much lower than by any deductions which occur to me to be made from the returns I can explain. In the adjutant-general's return for December, for the army of Spain and Portugal, the effective rank and file, exclusive of artillery, are stated at 45,273. The 14th light dragoons have since sailed, *making a total of 47,649, not reckoning the 5,000 infantry now ordered to Corunna.*

By the latest accounts from sir John Cradock, he had *only the four regiments of the King's German Legion and two British regiments at Lisbon*; he had one at Santarem, one at Abrantes, and one at Elvas; *in the whole not more than 6,000 men.* The remainder of the force, with the exception of what you may have left at Almeida, I consider either assembled or assembling under your orders; and although an allowance must be made for sick and detachments, your gross force, in rank and file, *amounts to not less than 40,000 men.* *I certainly had hoped that your effective force under arms in the field would have been much more considerable than you have stated it is likely to amount to.*

Whilst I am upon this subject, it may bewell to observe that the two regiments from Gibraltar can only be considered as an exchange with two

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Estimate of 52,000 British troops in the Peninsula.

Sir John Moore's army estimated at 40,000.

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John Moore.

from Portugal, of less strength and efficiency ; and in this view, in forming your decision of what it may be wise under all circumstances to do, you must not count upon these regiments as disposable, independent of and in addition to the force in Portugal. It is left to you to apply the whole, or such proportion, of the 5,000 men as you may think fit, either directly to strengthen your own army—to strengthen it collaterally, by adding to sir J. Cradock's means of protecting Portugal, through which, if carried, the enemy would probably push a corps northward, along the coast, to threaten Vigo, and thereby compel you to retire for the security of your re-embarkation, whilst they pressed you with another corps in front,—or, if your information should lead you to consider a British force could be more advantageously employed than in either of the modes above stated, you will send your orders accordingly to major-general Sherbrook, who is directed to wait for your directions at Corunna; he sails on Thursday with the two battalions of guards, the 87th and 88th, from Portsmouth. The 83d is ordered to meet him at Corunna.

If you should take only a part of this force for your own immediate operations, I conclude it will be the guards; in that case you will give di-

rections to major-general Sherbrooke, whether he is to join you, or to proceed with the troops elsewhere. I shall apprise sir J. Cradock of the change which, in consequence of the alteration in your plan of operations, has been made in the first destination of this corps. The considerations which would have influenced its disposal, will still, I have no doubt, be taken equally into your consideration, and have their due weight in your decision: and I have only to request that you will lose no time in apprising sir J. Cradock and Mr. Frere, to whom the former arrangement was communicated, of the determination you have formed.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

To licut.-general sir John Moore, K. B. &c.

The feelings of his majesty's government must be infinitely better conceived than described, on the results which followed the arrangements thus in contemplation. The utility of these arrangements, however, it will appear, was not destroyed.

As first in order of the procedure, which followed the capitulation of Corunna to marshal Soult, upon the evacuation of the British army,

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the articles of that treaty, sufficiently mild in its stipulations, may be here added.*

* Though, from their intrinsic interest, notwithstanding the general outcry against the capitulation of Madrid, the capitulation of that capital was not deemed necessary to be introduced to these pages, it may not be improper to shew that the stipulations were not more extraordinary in point of favour than those even of the battle of Corunna.

Treaty of capitulation of Madrid.

Article 1.—The preservation of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion, without any other being legally tolerated. Ans.—Granted.

2.—The liberty and security of the lives and properties of the citizens and other persons residing in Madrid, as well as of those in public employments: the preservation of their situations, or the option of their retiring from this court, if they should prefer it. Likewise, the lives, privileges, and properties, of the secular and regular ecclesiastics, of both sexes, together with the respect due to the churches, all in conformity to our laws and customs. Ans.—Granted.

3.—The lives and properties of all military officers of rank are likewise to be safe. Ans.—Granted.

4.—No person shall be liable to persecution, on account of their political opinions or writings, any more than those employed in a public capacity, for what they may have done hitherto in the exercise of their employments, or in obedience to the former government; nor shall the people suffer for the efforts which they have made for their defence. Ans.—Granted.

5.—No other contributions shall be exacted beyond the ordinary ones that have hitherto been paid. Ans.—Granted, till the realm shall definitively be organized.

6.—Our laws, customs, and courts of justice, shall be preserved in their present constitution. Ans.—Granted, until the kingdom undergoes its definitive organization.

7.—The French troops and their officers shall not be quartered

Art. 1.—The place of Corunna, the fortified works, the batteries and ports which depend on

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in private houses, but in military lodging-houses and tents, and by no means in convents or monasteries; the privileges allowed to the respective classes by the laws being preserved. Ans.—Granted; it being well understood that both the officers and privates must have quarters and tents that are furnished conformably to the military regulations, unless the said buildings be insufficient.

Treaty of capitulation of Madrid.

8.—The troops shall march out of the town with the honours of war, and be at liberty to retire whithersoever they choose. Ans.—The troops shall march out with the honours of war: they shall march off by files to-day, at four o'clock in the afternoon, and leave their arms and cannon; the armed peasants shall also leave their arms and artillery; after which the inhabitants shall retire to their houses, and those from without the town, to their villages. All the individuals that have enlisted among the troops of the line, four months ago, shall be free from their engagements, and retire to their villages. All the rest shall continue prisoners of war till an exchange takes place, which will commence immediately between equal numbers, and rank for rank.

9.—The public debts and engagements of the state shall be faithfully and constantly discharged. Ans.—This being a political object, belongs to the cognizance of the assembly of the realm, and depends on the general administration.

10.—Those generals who wish to continue in the capital shall preserve their rank; and such as are desirous of quitting it, shall be at liberty so to do. Ans.—Granted; they shall remain in their station, although their pay can only continue till the kingdom receives its ultimate organization.

Additional Art. 11.—A detachment of guards shall this day, at four o'clock, take possession of the palace gates. The different gates of the city shall, about the same time, be delivered up to the French army. The guard-house of the body guards, and

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it, artillery, ammunition, magazines, charts, plans, and memoirs, shall be given up to the troops of his majesty the emperor and king, Napoleon. For this purpose his excellency the marshal duke of Dalmatia shall be at liberty to take possession of the gate, called the Lower Tower, (*la tour d'en bas*,) this evening.

2.—The Spanish garrison which is in Corunna; the persons in civil authority, as well judicial as administrative or financial; the clergy, and the inhabitants in general, shall take the oath of fidelity and homage to his majesty the king of Spain and the Indies, Don Joseph Napoleon.

Treaty of capitulation of Madrid.

the general hospital, shall be surrendered at the same time. At the same hour the park of artillery, and the arsenals, together with the engineers, shall be surrendered to the French artillery and engineers. The works and entrenchments shall be levelled, and the streets repaired. The French officer about to take the command of Madrid, shall, about mid-day, repair, under a military guard, to the house of the principal, (governor,) in order to concert with government, regulations of police, and measures for the re-establishment of good order and public security in all parts of the town.

We, the undersigned commissioners, authorised by full powers for settling and signing the present capitulation, have agreed upon the faithful and entire execution of the above measure.

FERNANDO DE LA VERAY PANTOGA.

THOMAS DE MORLA.

ALSEANDRO.

Imperial Camp, Madrid, the 4th of Dec. 1808.

3.—The persons concerned in the civil administration, as well judicial as financial; the intendant general of the kingdom of Galicia and of the province of Corunna, the corregidores, alcaides, and other functionaries, shall be provisionally preserved in their employments, and shall exercise their functions in the name of his majesty king Joseph Napoleon. All the acts of the civil administration shall be made in the name of his said majesty.

4.—The military of the garrison, whatever be their rank and employment, may enter into the service of his majesty, king Joseph Napoleon, and be allowed to retain the same rank, after having taken the customary oaths of fidelity and allegiance, as is provided in the second article. For this purpose a list of the names of the principal and inferior officers and soldiers shall be made out. This list shall be certified by his excellency general Don Antonio D'Alzedo, governor of Corunna, to the end that a particular destination may be given to the military, according to the orders of his excellency the minister of war in the kingdom of Spain; but, in the mean time, the military shall wait at Corunna. The means of subsistence and quarters shall be furnished to them as to the French troops. The officers, and those employed in the royal marine, who are at

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Corunna, are included in the present article, and must await at Corunna the orders of the minister of marine.

5.—The military of the garrison, whatever their rank, who wish to quit the service, shall be at liberty to retire to their respective habitations, after they shall have received their dismissal in due form, under the authority of his excellency the minister at war; and on taking the oath of fidelity described in the second article.—Such as refuse to take such oath, shall be considered prisoners of war.

6.—The property of the inhabitants shall be respected, and no contribution shall be levied on them, but a subsistence for the troops in garrison shall be provided by the province. That the places of public worship, and the government, shall be placed under safe custody; religion shall be respected, and its ministers shall be protected in the exercise of their functions.

7.—The administration of the royal revenues shall be continued as heretofore, but in the name of, and to the use of, his majesty king Joseph Napoleon; and, to that effect, all the ecclesiastical and civil authorities, as well as those employed for the king, shall continue to fulfil their respective functions, and shall be paid according to their several appointments.

8.—If any one employed in the courts, or in the administration, shall be desirous of resigning his office, his resignation shall be accepted, and no one shall prevent such measure; and if he should desire to leave the town with his effects and property, he shall be permitted so to do, granting him proper sureties, and a passport for that purpose.

9.—The deputies of towns, and all other individuals, called to form a part of the Junta of the kingdom of Galicia, may return to their houses, with their equipages and their property, if they shall so wish; and an escort shall be granted to them for their personal security, on their requiring it.

10.—Every inhabitant of the place shall be at liberty to retire whithersoever he pleases, with his moveables, effects, and whatever belongs to him, provided the place of his retirement be in the interior of the kingdom.

11.—The houses and effects of all persons who may be absent by order or leave, business, or any other cause, shall be respected, and the proprietors shall be at liberty to return when they find it convenient.

12.—The benefit of a general amnesty, granted by the emperor and king in his own name, as well as in the name of his majesty king Joseph Na-

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poleon, shall be extended to the garrison and the inhabitants of Corunna, as also to persons who have filled official situations. For this purpose no individual shall be prosecuted, arrested, or punished, for any share they may have had in the disturbances which have agitated the kingdom, nor for their speeches, writings, or actions, the measures, resolutions, or orders, which have been adopted or executed during the commotions. The benefit of the same general amnesty shall be extended to all the towns, villages, and communes, of the kingdom of Galicia, as soon as they shall have submitted, and as soon as the inhabitants shall have taken the oath of fidelity to his majesty the king Joseph Napoleon.

13.—The laws, customs, and dress of the people, shall be preserved without any infringement, or modification: the laws shall be those which are, or shall be, established by the constitution of the kingdom.

Done at Corunna, the 19th day of January, 1809.

(Signed) Marshal the duke of DALMATIA.

ANTONIO DE ALZEDO.

Decrees had already been issued from Madrid, for securing the imports and the administration of justice to such parts of Spain as were under the

influence of the French, abrogating monopolies, reducing to one-third the religious in monastic seclusion, and for the destruction of the barriers between the provinces.

As to Portugal, to which attention will now necessarily be drawn in the first instance, among the early steps of its government, for which it had also the advantage of leisure from the diversion created by the disastrous expedition of sir John Moore, was the following ordinance for a general armament of the people.

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The defence of the country being the first duty which honour, reason, and even nature itself, impose on all men, when a barbarous nation, despising the most sacred rights acknowledged in the world, aims at enslaving a country, plundering its property, destroying its religion, violating its temples, and committing the greatest atrocities that the perversity of manners or inhumanity can invent. Portugal, unfortunately, is threatened with all these evils; and its inhabitants have no means to avoid the horrors to which they are exposed, but by having recourse to arms, to repel by force the odious and wicked designs of their enemies.

Proclamation
of the govern-
ment of Portu-
gal, 11th Dec.
1808.

We have, therefore, resolved, that the whole Portuguese nation shall be armed in the manner

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which to each inhabitant may be practicable ; that all the males, without exception of person or class, shall provide themselves with a pike, twelve or thirteen palms (six or seven feet) in length, and such other arms as their circumstances may permit.

That all the cities, towns, and considerable villages, shall be fortified by blockading the entrances and principal streets with two, three, or more, cross-beams, in order that all the inhabitants may be enabled to defend themselves vigorously when the enemy shall present himself.

That all the officers in Lisbon, and administrators of districts, shall, within the space of eight days from the date of this decree, deliver in to the military-governor-general of their respective provinces, a list of such persons as from their activity, ability, good conduct, and the respect they are held in by the people, are qualified to take a command, always preferring, in similar circumstances, those who are already military officers, and pointing out such of the said officers as by their age, incumbrances, or other circumstances, ought no longer to fill the posts they occupy.

That all the generals charged with the military government of provinces, shall divide their governments into districts, and appoint an officer of known activity and probity, whether of the

troops of the line or militia, whom the chief and other officers shall obey in consequence of the said appointment, who shall visit the different villages of their district, examine the state of the several companies, and from the persons recommended to them, appoint such for officers as they shall judge deserving and capable; who shall immediately begin to exercise their companies, which shall assemble on all Sundays and saints' days in their respective districts, in order to render themselves expert in the use of the arms they have, and in military evolutions: comprehending all the males from fifteen to sixty.

Lastly, we have resolved, that every person who shall not take up arms, but refuse to concur with the nation in general, to the defence of our country, shall incur and suffer the punishment of death; and the same punishment shall await all those who shall furnish any succour or aid to the enemy, by supplying them with provisions, or assisting them in any other mode.

In like manner, any village which shall not defend itself against the assailants of the kingdom, but permit their entrance without making every possible resistance, shall be burnt and levelled with the ground.

And we hereby order all generals, military governors of provinces, the intendant-general of

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police, and all corregidores, auditors, and in general all officers, military and civil, to aid and assist in carrying into effect the provisions of this royal decree, which shall be affixed up in all the public places, all the cities, towns, and villages, of this kingdom, in order that it may be made known by every inhabitant.

Approved by the council of war, who will cause it to be executed.

From this proclamation the regular army and militia were numerically recruited to seventy thousand men; but of those arms were not to be had for ten thousand, nor of the remaining equipments for one. The French had employed their leisure previous to, and perhaps after, the convention of Cintra, in breaking the stocks, and bending the barrels, of the small arms, of which ten thousand stand remained in Almeida, and many depôts in the minor garrisons, useless, in January, 1809.

This was among the unavoidable effects of the nature and political origin of the war;—the embarrassments of converting nations, (at best scarcely more than neutral,) into, if not principals, at least allies.

From the same principle, also, was to be endured the evil, that of the numerical force, very

properly called into notice, if not action, by the preceding order, scarcely any part could be deemed absolutely efficient; for the levies were only to be marched from their several parishes on an actual invasion of their country, and were no otherwise embodied than for drill on particular days.

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The British army remaining under the command of sir John Cradock, in Portugal, could not have brought into the field ten thousand troops. To these, however, were added, the detachments and the brigade, under brigadier-general Cameron, which, from the intelligence of the embarkation of the British army at Corunna, returned to Lisbon.

Brigadier-general
Cameron's
brigade.

These were aided in the organization of the new Portuguese levies, by those enterprising officers who had been appointed under the auspices of lord Castlereagh, to the formation of a body of troops from the loyal Portuguese, who had been induced to emigrate to England. In September, 1808, sanctioned by the chevalier de Souza, ambassador to Great Britain, they landed at Oporto; and, welcomed by the patriotic bishop, proceeded to recruit for active service, ultimately forming the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, under the chief command of sir Robert Wilson.

Origin of the
Lusitanian Legion.

The hardy peasantry from which the legion was

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recruited, were the same which, united with the inhabitants of Oporto, in the preceding June, favored by a position, had attacked the French general, Loison, on his march against that place, and taken his baggage. The discipline and true military subordination of a part of these troops, had also been evinced in restraining the vengeance of their countrymen against the French at Oporto, on their embarkation.

Colonel Mayne joined this body, as colonel-commandant of the first battalion, in the end of September, and continued employed in organizing the new levy till December, by which time were effective three battalions of light infantry, some cavalry, and a brigade of artillery, with four six-pounders, and two howitzers, amounting to two thousand men, well disciplined, clothed, and appointed: the uniform of the infantry was green, to which were added white facings for the cavalry, and black for the artillery. The legion might have been soon increased to ten thousand men, but means for their equipment were wanting, and recruits were therefore obliged to be rejected daily. No men, says colonel Mayne, could more deserve praise by every good quality of recruits and soldiers, whether of diligence, obedience, &c. to learn our discipline, or of zeal, spirit, &c. to exercise it when taught. This corps formed

Documents of
the legion by
col Mayne.

a model for the regeneration of the Portuguese army. There was a fine enthusiasm which ran in rapid improvement from man to man, from rank to rank.

The energies of sir Robert Wilson, and the officers next in command, would not suffer this efficient body of men to lie idle, when the necessity for their activity became apparent. At a notice of thirty six hours, therefore, agreeably to the orders of lieut.-general sir John Cradock, the first division of the loyal Lusitanian Legion, had marched from Oporto on the 14th of December, 1808, in the direction of the eastern frontier, leaving the second division to await there the arrival of its equipments from England, under baron Eben, who was as quickly as possible to march it as a corps of reserve to the first, but which did not take place.

The march of this little army, under its active and intelligent partizans, is thus forcibly described by the narrator of its circumstances in a recent sketch.*

Sir Robert Wilson and the British officers† at-

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* Narrative of the Campaigns of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, &c. p. 39.

† These British officers were colonels Mayne, baron Eben, baron Perponger, lieut.-col. Grant, captain Charles, aide-de-camp to sir Robert, captain Lillie, who had been with the Bri-

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tached to the legion, marched with the first division, and took, it seems, the direction of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, through which places the British army, under sir John Moore, had passed a short time before. The line of march was through Penifiel and Amaranthe, along the right bank of the river Douro, through Mezon Frio to Passa de Regoa, where (says col. Mayne) we crossed the Douro and proceeded to Lamago; the reception we met with from the Portuguese, during our march, was truly hospitable, having brought us in the kindest manner to their houses; and the gratitude and attention evinced particularly to the British officers, for the interest they seemed to take in their cause, was to them particularly flattering. The weather had hitherto been very fine; however, on our march from Lamago, the rain poured on us in torrents, continuing for several days without intermission; but, as it was conceived that affairs at that period would not permit us to delay our march, we were obliged to proceed, notwithstanding the floods. The roads we passed were deemed nearly impassable; and to many who may be unacquainted with the state of them in

fish army under sir Arthur Wellesley, and volunteered to remain with the Legion, and captains Ruman and Western, Drs. Milengen and Bolman.

this country, at certain periods of the year, it may appear extraordinary to state that we were actually obliged to swim our horses; and it was with the greatest exertion and difficulty we were enabled to bring forward our artillery, being obliged to take the beasts from the guns, and officers and men, hand in hand, pulled them through the waters, which in many places reached up to their shoulders; and, as an example to junior ranks, we remarked our leaders among the number. We at length arrived, with considerable difficulty and inconvenience, at Pinhel, a bishop's see, three leagues west of Almeda, and four of the Spanish frontier; here the corps halted for a few days, to make the necessary arrangements for the commencement of active operations, as well as to *descansar* after their severe and fatiguing march from Oporto, which they bore with great patience and fortitude, and only seemed anxious to come in contact with the enemies of their country, manifesting such confidence in their officers as gave us every reason to anticipate the subsequent bravery they displayed when opportunities offered. However, the unfavourable change which took place at this period in the cause of the peninsula cast an universal damp on the Spaniards and Portuguese, by the retrograde movement of the main British force under sir

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John Moore, on which the patriots of the peninsula had cast their eyes as the means of their salvation from the French yoke.

The few British troops and stores that had been then on their way to join the British army, were immediately countermanded; some to Oporto, and others to Lisbon, for which places they proceeded with all possible despatch.

Under such circumstances the situation of the loyal Lusitanian Legion may be easier conceived than expressed. Orders had been received from British general officers for our retreat, and intimation had been received likewise by sir Robert Wilson, from lieutenant-general sir John Cradock, commander of the forces in Portugal, of its having been his wish that the British officers of the legion should withdraw and provide for their own personal safety: we, therefore, were rather awkwardly circumstanced, having entered the Portuguese service and embarked in their cause, and finding the country on the eve of evacuation by the British, and invaded by the French. And if the British army had embarked at Lisbon, in all probability the retreat of the corps would have been cut off by marshal Soult; for, marshal Soult, on the 28th of February, with 16,000 men, did capture Oporto; and another French corps then at Placentia, were expected to move down the

Orders for retreat to the officers of the Lusitanian Legion.

Tagus. Sir Robert Wilson communicated their situations to the British officers with him, leaving it at their option either to go or stay. But they considered that as they then conceived themselves really to be in the service of Portugal, that it would be highly disgraceful at this critical juncture, and inconsistent with the character of a British soldier, and with the principles by which their conduct had hitherto been guided, to leave this service; they all consequently determined on not abandoning their brave brethren in arms, but to remain and share the fate of the Portuguese officers and men, whose confidence they had gained, and whom they had brought to the frontiers for the purpose of defending their country, well armed, and perfectly equipped, for active and immediate service.

On the evacuation of the garrison of Almeida, by the British troops, under Brigadier-general Cameron, consisting of the 45th and 97th regiments, retiring to Lisbon, colonel Mayne was by that officer appointed his successor, to secure the removal of the valuable British stores deposited in this fortress, for the expected campaigns of sir John Moore's army. The garrison consisted of the Portuguese troops of the line already there, and a detachment of the loyal Lusitanian Legion.

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Sir Robert immediately marched into Spain, moving in the direction of Ciudad Rodrigo; his advance, consisting of two companies of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and two guns, commanded by captain Lillie. Sir Robert having pushed across the Spanish frontier, resolved on placing his corps in front of the garrisons of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, in the direction of Salamanca, where he occupied a very extensive line of country.

The documents of colonel Mayne convey not only the following spirited account of his commands, during this campaign, which deserve to be read and studied by every military man, liable in this variegated war to become a partizan, but also a liberal detail of the services of his superiors and inferiors; and memoirs of those of the troops at different times under his command (*in effect*) as brigadier-general; which cannot fail to be equally interesting to the soldier, and important to anything which approaches to the form of history.

I remained (says colonel Mayne) in Almeida in charge of British stores, from the 5th of January to the 16th of February; during which time, under my immediate direction and superintendence, stores were conveyed to Lamago, to

the valuable amount of £150,000 sterling. The remainder was preserved by the advance of the legion into the plains of Salamanca.

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The following documents, alluding to these transactions, as well as some others which will be inserted in their place, will exhibit the circumstances of this short campaign.

Sir,

In consequence of despatches which brigadier-general Cameron has just received, he desires me to request that you will, with all possible despatch, forward the ordnance and hospital stores that are in Almeida, to Lamago. The general requests also that you will acquaint sir R. Wilson, that he recommends it to him to fall back on Oporto without delay. Should any of the Shrapnell shells still remain in Almeida, you will have them completely destroyed; and all stragglers from the British army must be forwarded to Lamago, to wait further orders.

Col. Guard,
45th regiment;
dated Torre de
Monrero, Jan.
9, 1809, to col.
Mayne, com-
manding the
fortress of Al-
meida, &c. &c.

W. GUARD,

Lieut.-col. 45th Regt.

Of the importance of this trust, and the conduct of the respectable officer to whom it was confided, the following will afford the best testimony.

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General orders,
Lisbon, Jan. 2,
1809, relative
to the occupa-
tion of the for-
tress of Al-
meida.

From the increase of expense that must attend the situation of commanding officers of Elvas, Almeida, &c. &c. the commander of the forces (sir John Cradock) directs, until the pleasure of government shall be known, that the officers in actual command shall receive an extraordinary allowance according to their rank: colonel, 24*s.* per diem; lieutenant-colonel, 20*s.* per diem: and these allowances to take place from the time of their actually holding the command.

THOMAS REYNELL,

Lieut.-col. Adjutant-general.

Sir R. Wilson's
certificate on
these orders

I hereby certify, that colonel Mayne, of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, was placed with a detachment of this corps in the command of the fortress of Almeida, from the 5th of January to the 16th of February, 1809, inclusive, to superintend the transportation of valuable artillery-stores, and other arrangements relating to the commissariat and hospital stores; which duty he completely executed with the greatest zeal, and to the great advantage of his majesty's service.

(Signed) ROBERT WILSON,
Cheffe L. L. L.

Upon the British troops leaving Almeida, the fort was occupied by a division of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, commanded by colonel Mayne, who acquitted himself in that duty much to my satisfaction ; and it appears to me, that from whatever source the money can be issued, that that officer has just pretensions to the allowances enjoyed by his predecessors, for such period as he commanded the fortress of Almeida.

(Signed)

J. F. CRADOCK,

Lieut-general.

Hereford-street, Nov. 20, 1809.

My dear Mayne,

Amidst all your other hard duties, I have the cruelty to employ you still more : the officer with the prize-cotton (worth £20,000,) taken by the 18th light dragoons, is here in great distress. I would have sent this cotton to Seville, but it would have taken three or four months to transport it, and I have now desired him to get it transported to Almeida, and from thence to the Douro ! It requires 120 carts : will you employ your interest with Azeido* to get this work completed ? Send it to Lamago, or the point the ammunition went from : I prefer Lamago ; but at all events there is much

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Lieut-general
sir J. Cradock's
certificate re-
lative to these
orders.

Brigadier-gen.
sir R. Wilson,
relative to the
removal of the
prize-cotton
from Almeida :
dated Ciudad
Rodrigo, Jan.
16, 1809, to co-
lonel Mayne,
commanding the
fortress of Al-
meida.

* A general in the Portuguese service.

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Brig.-general
sir R. Wilson to
colonel Mayne.

hazard, as the Portuguese will not like to see the property move out of their country.

Believe me, most faithfully yours,

(Signed) ROBERT WILSON.

After the most valuable of these British stores and the prize-cotton had been removed by the greatest exertions, colonel Mayne marched his division to join sir R. Wilson in Spain.

At this time, continues the colonel, sir R. Wilson and his officers were again strongly recommended to withdraw, as it was supposed, as general sir John Moore's army had actually retreated; that the remains of the British army would embark at Lisbon; and that in all probability the retreat of the corps would be cut off by marshal Soult. [For marshal Soult, on the 28th February, with 16,000 men, did capture Oporto! and another French corps, then at Placentia, was expected to move down the Tagus!] But it would have been highly disgraceful at this critical juncture to have thus abandoned our Spanish allies, and wholly inconsistent with the principles which had hitherto guided our conduct, and had gained us their approbation and confidence!

The legion therefore did persevere, and in the presence of 12,000 of the enemy did maintain their posts in the plains of Salamanca! This French

force was under the command of general Lapisse, of which force there were above 1,500 dragoons!

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The legion, in the presence of this very superior force, surprised Ledesma on the Tormes, only six miles from Salamanca! and re-captured, and restored to the junta of Ciudad Rodrigo the horses and the public money which the French had put in requisition there!

The legion were most critically placed; their services were most effectual and important, for all the very great objects in view! And such were the happy effects from his bold, though certainly hazardous, resolution, of thus maintaining their positions in advance of Ciudad Rodrigo. Many people in Portugal, and almost all out of Portugal, apprehended that we were surrounded and lost; for this adventure was certainly full of peril. But the peril passed, the rewarding results from it were conspicuous; and the legion enjoyed the British praise, for having thus saved, from French investment and possession, the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida! and Almeida then had not a garrison! and had great quantities of provisions, indispensable stores.

In the generous allowance of our countrymen, it was confessed also that the gallant determination of the legion prevented the immediate irruption of the enemy into Portugal! when they would have

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thrown the British subjects in Lisbon into the greatest alarm, and excited popular clamours and discontents among the Portuguese ; to which, even to explosion, they then seemed so formidably prone ! And this must have been most fatal to all our future operations.

Let here also be added the fair enhancement of these attending circumstances, as to time and place ! That these arduous and successful movements of our Portuguese legion were achieved at the moment, when all were depressed by sir John Moore's lamented death ; when the British armies were in retreat from Corunna ! when the cause itself was drooping, almost out of hope, if not into despair ; and Spain and Portugal appeared to be almost, if not altogether, irrecoverably lost !

It was in the depths of gloom like this that the legion revived the dying campaign, when Buonaparte, already returned to Paris, flattered himself that he had thoroughly extinguished the little national spirit that remained in these devoted countries !—when, not only private individuals, and a large part of the population, but what remained of the British army in Portugal, were preparing and prepared, to seek for safety, by quitting the shores of the peninsula !—when all confidence seemed extinct ! not more by the retreat before-mentioned, than by the apathy of those who had authority in

Portugal and Spain!—when, according to every thing in human foresight, nothing remained but for the French to march, to overrun, and, ravage to the whole!

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This eventful period, and these momentous circumstances, fixed the legion's claim to military estimation and regard! For, besides the preservation of Almeida and Ciudad Roderigo, and their stores; the movements of the legion successfully regenerated the public spirit and confidence, and relieved the combined armies from the most serious difficulties and dangers.

At Alcantara, and at Puerte de Baines, as well as on the Agueda, and in the plains of Salamanca, the legion contrived to defeat the purposes of the enemy, and that enemy of very superior force.

All this while, the legion had nothing!—no commissariat!—no carts!—no tents!—not even camp-kettles! Sir R. Wilson had no money! no, not even to pay for the subsistence of this small corps!—no means of horsing; no, not even the artillery nor dragoons!

The legion, for themselves and by themselves, contrived to do or suffer all! They DID all! They supplied all, as far as supplies could be taken from the enemy; and the supplies were for the most part such as to suffice.

Nay, even at Alcantara, there was no commis-

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sariat ! &c. &c. and Alcantara was apart, from the nearest post of the allied army, 150 miles ! where two bodies of Portuguese, one of 1,800, and the other of 2,500, were subsisted for almost two months, with little or no expense to either government, by the exertions of lieut.-col. Grant and myself, in securing the cattle, &c. &c. that would otherwise have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

The legion must lay claim to good consideration for another species of service of avail, not flight,* to the interesting cause ! This was, intercepting the enemy's despatches and mails ; and securing the transit of our own !

For, the intercourse growing with the emergencies on both sides, was great between both—between our ministers, our officers, and all the juntas, &c. &c. and between Paris and Madrid.

Proofs of this service happily abound in the official correspondence and reports, as well as in the intercepted despatches, frustrating movements of the enemy, who thence were led to over-rate very greatly the numbers of the legion according to the official narrative from the *Moniteur*, from the varieties and character of their

* So far from this negative merit attributed by the enlightened commandant to this service being at all overcharged, the common sense of every military man will decide that it is yet underrated.

enterprises. For the legion never were more than 5,000; they were, very often, less!

Far, very far indeed, be it from any officer of the British service to slight any other's claim; and such a claim as that of the brave and patriot Portuguese officers! They had, every one of them, their full share with each British officer of the legion, wherever there might be any trial, of hardship and of hazard, for merit and fame.

The men too, all, in each battalion, did their best, with a patience, an alacrity, zeal, and courage, well worthy to support and decorate any cause! And that, too, at the moment when all was doubt or difficulty, despondence or despair! when every struggle seemed the last; and the enemy, unresisted or irresistible, hovered over all!

The British officers serving with the legion, were, as already stated:—col. sir R. Wilson, brig.-general in Portugal col. Mayne, lieut.-col. Grant, captains Lillie, Western, Dubrawa, surgeons Mel-lingen, Bollman; and those of the British officers reconnoitring in advance of the British army, who at times attached themselves to the legion, were, colonel D'Urban, lieut.-col. Wilson, major L'Estrange, major Ruman, lieutenant L'Estrange.

The names of the officers remaining with a division of the corps in the northern provinces of

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Portugal, were,—colonel baron Eben, major Dursbach.

Major and lieutenant L'Estrange were unfortunately taken prisoners and carried to Paris; the one reconnoitering on the bridge of Ecla, the other in an affair of posts, in the plains of Salamanca.

The following shews the enemy's calculation at one time of the strength of the legion.

Joseph Buonaparte's account of the position of the imperial army, and the enemy's army.

On the 22d of July, says the *Moniteur*, his majesty received intelligence, from marshal duke of Belluna, that the English army had formed a junction between the Tagus and the Tietar, with that of Cuesta's, while a corps of 10 or 12,000 men, commanded by general Wilson, was advancing towards Escalona, along the right bank of the Alberche, the danger was imminent, and it was necessary to take decided measures.

In proceeding to Naval Carniero, his majesty had a two-fold object to check; the march of general Wilson (who endeavoured to get in the rear of the first corps by Escalona,) and to form a junction with marshal Belluna.

Fortune certainly favoured the exertions of the legion, which, with the efforts of our Spanish allies, gave a happier and more promising appearance to the campaign.

The contest was resumed with additional vigour.

At this time I was entrusted with the largest division of the legion at the Puerte de Bainos, keeping that pass in aid of general Cuesta's army : in this we were successful, by mining the bridge, roads, &c. &c. and for some time prevented the junction of general Hammerstein and 10,000 men, with the corps of Victor, in Estremadura, for which I received general Cuesta's thanks ; and at the same time being employed in planning, &c. &c. the fortifications of the town of Bejar, the vaunted residence of the dukes, the junta of Bejar presented me with the sword of the dukes of Bejar, as a token of their gratitude and regard.

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The nature and importance of this present will be perceived by its inscription.

" This is the sword, according to tradition, of Senhor Don Diego O Unigo Lopez, a most brave captain, who fought against the Moors, as was seen in the miraculous battle of the Nauas de Toloza, where he was found in the service of the king of Navarre, his uncle, Don Sancho !

The sword of
Bejar.

" He was the first who forced the iron chains which king Miramolim had barricaded his camp with ; and, in commemoration of this action, he joined to his arms the chains, which were kept by his descendants down to the house of Bejar, which originated in him."

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The sword of
Bejar.

This sword, marshal Beresford honoured by accepting from me ! And still more honoured is it now, (where it may well gratify even the House of Bejar,) for it is, I underst and, in Carlton House !

After this, the legion united and moved to Salvatierra, and Castello Branco, in Portugal, when sir R. Wilson was ordered by marshal Beresford to another Portuguese brigade, and the command of the legion was conferred on me by marshal Beresford.

What has hitherto been said of the Lusitanian legion, cannot be better concluded at present than by the following brief but eloquent recapitulation of its conduct to this period. It is a document of accredited estimation, at Lisbon, and of date March 1, 1809.

Account of the
brave conduct
of the Lusita-
nian legion.

On the 15th of December, one division of the legion left Oporto, in a direction towards Almeida, with a view to occupy the attention of the French, and cover the removal of stores from the above place, to maintain the communications with the adjacent provinces and sir J. Moore, then supposed to have no idea of abandoning the peninsula.

After a march that the best European troops could not have struggled through without loss and murmuring, the battalions arrived at their destination without having a single straggler ; and let it

be observed, at the same time, it was the first march they had made after being embodied. Every day the rain fell in torrents: continually they passed the precipices' edge; or, breast-high, the swollen torrents of the mountains. Cannon and waggons were drawn up steep before deemed inaccessible to such carriages, by manual exertion, and brought through the rapid stream, to the imminent danger frequently of horses and men. Sometimes, where, from the depth, the carriages would have swam, the wheels were taken off, and they were slid over on the foot-bridges. Over other bridges which overhung the vast hills, and connected the almost perpendicular sides of mountains, cannon, &c. were transported, when, from the extreme narrowness of the passage, half of the felly of each wheel only had any support, and this only was that of angular stones placed point upwards, which formed the edge of the road. This passage was most awful and terrific: yet under these and other very trying circumstances, the troops marched twenty or thirty miles a day, cheering each other with their songs, and entered their nightly resting-place with their spirits unflagged.

Ciudad Rodrigo became the head-quarters; the infantry were put in cantonments until the other division should arrive, and arrangements could be combined for effective operations against the enemy.

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In the mean time, several excursions were made ; and a large district, in a semicircle, from the Portuguese frontier, by Salamanca, &c. was either occupied or kept in continual alarm, to the loss and interruption of the enemy, whose collections of money, horses, and provisions, were frequently stopped, and their posts carried in the open day. This continual harassing, it appears by an intercepted letter from the French general, had rendered his tenure of Salamanca precarious, and his situation unpleasant altogether, while it had the effect of reviving the confidence of the peasantry, who had thought themselves abandoned. In approbation of this and other measures, the supreme junta have conferred on sir R. Wilson, the rank of brigadier-general, and placed at his disposal all the troops in the province and garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. The appearance of the Spanish infantry is reported to be equal to that of any troops, and their steadiness and coolness remarkable. The few dragoons, or cavaliers, under sir Robert's orders, though a motley group, and rather resembling the knights and warriors of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, have, with the severe and fierce aspect, the courage and constancy, of their ancestors. At present there are 200, but an addition of British cavalry would be eminently useful in the present partizan movements. As yet but few have been engaged with

the enemy ; yet, on all sides, their quarters and parties have been disturbed and forced back.

The disposition of the country is now excellent, ever ready to point out opportunities and to encourage enterprize, which they enjoy ; and ever willing to turn out to attract the attention of the enemy, and give time for our patrols when pursued by a superior force. When they perceived they were not *flying friends* who came to share their danger and had resolution to defend the country, even without the assistance of the inhabitants, and to hold their ground in every extremity, their confidence and regard awoke. Sir Robert issued a proclamation, advising the peasants not to be intimidated by the declaration of the French, that they would put to death those who did not obey the requisitions, as he had informed the enemy that if that atrocious threat was executed, he would hang a Frenchman for every Spaniard. Late in the month of February several skirmishes took place, and the enemy always suffered loss and retreated. Every one now perceives the happy consequences of sir Robert's bold and gallant resolution to maintain this country till the last, though at the time at which it was taken (the period of alarm and danger,) it was considered the height of temerity. To his devotion to the cause, may, in some degree, be attributed the backwardness of the French in their

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proceedings against Portugal. They have been confined to the walls of Salamanca, instead of ravaging the country, and entering Portugal on its weak side. Had they pushed forward to Almeida, and thence to Porto, Romana must have been cut off, and all the forces on this side the Douro; but Portugal is now defended on all sides, and the enemy checked in his attempts on Cuesta, by the position sir R. Wilson had just moved to in the Sierra Frania. A few days march may carry a British army to Madrid, for the heart of the country is open to us. Several couriers and mails have been intercepted, with important and curious despatches, letters, &c. Sir Robert has addressed a proclamation to all the foreigners in the French army, (of whom the proportion is one half in Spain,) inviting them to quit the standard of the tyrant and oppressor of their respective nations, promising gratuities and a safe asylum to those who adopt that resolution. Above fifty came over directly, and assured us that a battalion of 700 would follow in a body the next week.

It should appear that the enemy's force in Spain does not amount to a third of what the alarmists have created, and their apprehensions of being overwhelmed are continual. All their preparations have retreat in view. On the appearance of a re-

spectable British force, these ideas will be soon manifested, and Spain once again be free.

The marquis Romana had the intention of uniting himself with sir Robert's corps immediately ; but it is now reported, from the late favourable appearance in Galicia, it will not take place.

Whatever may have been the cause of the subsequent fate of this corps, nothing can be more certain than that it effected a diversion of great importance to the Spanish armies, prevented the junction of a powerful force of the enemy, and even for a time protected the frontier of Portugal in a manner almost incredible.

And this, too, at a time when apprehensions in respect to the enemy were so well founded, that sir John Cradock took the precaution of embarking the heavy baggage of the army, dismantling even the batteries of Lisbon, and making the dispositions necessary to the evacuation of Portugal.*

* Sudden as this resolution may appear in addition to other evidence, it will be seen from the following document, included among the papers presented to parliament ; that it was anticipated by those who had the control of the campaign, when a minister was ordered to that point to which it was probable the British force might be successfully directed :

Sir,

Under the reverses the Spaniards have sustained, and

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Viscount Castlereagh to col.
sir G. Smith,
Downing-Street
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Appointment of
gen. Beresford.

His majesty's ministers, watchful of the success of this mode of ascertaining the value and steadiness of the Portuguese troops, notwithstanding the disheartening picture afforded by sir John Moore, in his answer to the inquiry made of him with respect to the probability of creating a Portuguese force,* sent, in March, major-general Beresford to Lisbon, with more British officers, arms, and appointments,

the position the enemy now occupies at Madrid, I consider it of much importance to have a confidential officer stationed at Cadiz, who knows the leading individuals, and can keep our naval and military officers in that quarter informed of the events that are passing in that important place. With this view, I am desirous, if your health will permit of it, that you should immediately proceed in the vessel which carries this letter to Cadiz. Your own sagacity and experience render it unnecessary for me to furnish you with detailed circumstances for the direction of your conduct. You will watch the events that are passing, and keep sir J. Cradock and sir J. Moore informed of them. Mr. Duff will assist you in explaining to him the object of your mission, as far as his means will enable him. You will feel the delicacy of avoiding any step which might excite jealousy or alarm; but if such a crisis should be approaching as may make the Spaniards desirous of receiving either naval or military aid from us for the security of Cadiz, you will lose no time in forwarding any requisition they may be disposed to make to the Tagus. Proper directions should be given to the naval and military commanders, to furnish every possible aid in their power, should it become necessary.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREACH.

* See Book II. chap. v. 461.

for the reorganization of the whole Portuguese army. General Beresford received his appointment under the prince regent of Portugal, with the rank of field-marshal.

Events, in which the Lusitanian legion cannot but be allowed the most prominent share; continuing to warrant a spirited support of the war in the peninsula; in the beginning of April, landed at Lisbon, major-general Hill, with 6,000 British troops, which entirely altered the military face of affairs; this, however, was but the prelude to universal spirit, and the most animated expressions of joy, which announced the arrival of sir Arthur Wellesley, (afterwards lord Wellington,) on the 22d of the same month, appointed marshal-general of the Portuguese troops, by the prince regent of Portugal.

Of the exertions made on the part of Spain, whatever the hapless nature of their results, the second siege and capitulation (for such it must be called,) of Saragossa, will naturally form the most leading feature.

Saragossa capitulated on the 19th of February, 1809, after a defence the most glorious and obstinate which occurs in modern military history. Don Pedro Maria Ric, regent of the royal au-

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dience of Arragon, in an exposition, dated Fonz,* the 4th of June, has given a memoir, which with that for which this work has been indebted to Mr. Vaughan,† form memoirs quite worthy of the subject.‡ On the 10th of January, the French began to bombard Saragossa, with such fury, that the bravest and most intrepid men concurred in the necessity of taking precautions, and even the clergy suspended the administration of the sacraments. By this may easily be conceived the impracticability which the audience experienced of continuing its functions, since there were neither plaintiffs nor defendants, nor subordinate officers of the court, who had courage to remain there during the term of audience; and at last the members themselves were afraid, because the building being contiguous to that occupied by the general, occasioned the enemy to direct his fire principally to that quarter; and so many bombs and grenades fell that ultimately they consumed that precious monument of antiquity with whatever it contained, except the registers and papers,

* A town in Arragon.

† See Book II. c. ii. 78.

‡ The origin of this account was first published in a weekly patriotic publication at Seville, (*Seemanario Patriótico*) and of a correct translation, of which the English reader is indebted to the liberal and intelligent Mr. Bay, of the Post-Office.

which were in the offices, and which were all that could be saved, notwithstanding the most efficacious measures.

Of Saragossa, attacked so vigorously, and constantly bombarded for forty-two days, oppressed by disease, and exhausted by famine; the fall was inevitable, especially without succours from any quarter.

Saragossa had almost exceeded the limits of possibility by her unwearied fidelity and love to her sovereign; and affairs had reached such a deplorable crisis, that, as early as the 1st of February, persons, says Don Ric, of accredited honour and loyalty came to suggest to me the necessity of capitulating, in order that I should represent it to the captain-general; and, doubtless, according to military rules, the city might, and ought to have, surrendered several days before; since, besides possessing nothing of a fortified town but the name, and even that only in the report of strangers, the batteries, which had been constructed, were demolished, and there were not only open breaches, but the enemy was already among us, occupying various points within the city. But to surrender, when our cause was so just and necessary, appeared so hard, that I improved the charge which the general had given me of rousing the people, and even availed myself of some of those

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who were inclined to capitulate, for carrying into effect the measures I judged proper, according to the knowledge I possessed of that people, which knowledge also afforded me many ideas which I proposed, and were adopted by the general with so good an effect, that, in spite of impossibility, the city held out till destitute of all resource. The captain-general, being himself attacked by the epidemy, transferred all his authority, and civil and military powers, to a supreme junta of government, which he formed in the night between the 18th and 19th of February, naming me president of it. I immediately summoned all its members, and they began their functions at one o'clock in the morning.

Nobody was ignorant of the lamentable desolation of the city ; all called for a capitulation ; and although the junta saw and thought the same, it endeavoured to see if it was possible to save it, and, in duty to the king our sovereign, to accomplish the services it desired ; but, on investigating the real state of affairs, there was not a heart capable of sustaining so deplorable a situation. The chiefs of the army were called for, to give their opinions verbally, and in writing ; the major-general of cavalry represented the impracticability of further defence, there remaining only sixty-two weak and unserviceable horses, the rest having

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died of hunger; the major-general of infantry presented a statement of the army, by which it appeared there were only two thousand and eight hundred and twenty-two men fit for service. The commandant of artillery urged the surrender, on account of the ammunition being nearly exhausted, and not having any more than was manufactured in the inquisition, which manufacture would vanish the moment a bomb or grenade fell there. The commandant of engineers reported the fortifications unserviceable, and the means of repairing them wanting, as there were neither men nor materials, and all the cloth which could serve for bags of earth was consumed.*

All these chiefs not only gave their opinion for the surrender of the place, but held the junta responsible to God and the king for the many lives which were every moment sacrificed, as it was morally impossible to save the city, whose surrender would not prevent it from returning to the dominion of its legitimate sovereign, if the nation triumphed over him who so unjustly oppressed it.

The junta, appalled by so melancholy a representation, wished to hear the opinion of lieutenant-general Don Philip San Marc, who was one of its members. This worthy general had so signally

* See *ante*, Mr. Vaughan's Narrative, p. 12.

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manifested his loyalty, valour, and military talents, that his vote could not fail to satisfy the general-in-chief, the junta, and all the people, since all were witnesses of those estimable qualities; and I should be deficient in my duty if I did not declare, that, in my opinion, many and great rewards are necessary to recompense the extraordinary merits of Don Philip San Marc.*

This discreet and brave general stated ingenuously, that if the enemy made a general attack, as was to be feared from the preparations which were observable, the utter ruin of Saragossa was inevitable, together with all that accumulation of horror and calamity consequent on the fury with which the French troops treat every town they conquer, and which would be greater in that city, on account of the wrathful hatred with which it was viewed by them, their chiefs, and their emperor; but that, if the attacks were partial, like those they repeatedly made every day, the city might hold out for two, or four days at most, provided that more people were furnished for defence, and for the works; it being understood that this defence was to be attempted only in case of there being well-founded expectations of speedy relief,

* Alas! these are moments when the merit of dying for one's country, with the sentiments which ought to impress every military man, must form one's chief reward.

since otherwise it would be highly reprehensible to sacrifice so many persons as perished daily; the surrender of the city being unavoidable within the short term mentioned.

In order to proceed with due knowledge, the duke of Villahermosa went to inquire of the general what intelligence he had respecting succours, and as he was so seriously ill that he could give no account of any thing, they demanded of the secretary the letters and documents he might have on that subject, who transmitted an enigmatical scrap of paper, necessity so requiring it, as it had had to pass through the enemy's line: it appeared to be from the Conde de Montijo: in it he informed the general that himself and the duke del Infantado wished to come to the relief of Saragossa, but that the central junta had ordered that "the Swiss should go,"* and they were to fall upon Madrid. By the Swiss, the junta understood Don Theodore Reding; and, although the fame of this brave general was sufficient to encourage it, it could not rely much on his assistance, because, being in Catalonia, he had to cross the Ebro, which was more

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* This designation, it may, in passing, be observed, (though it were to have been wished some other mode of writing in cipher had been used amongst the naturally fertile resources of military men,) was characteristic of the state of Spanish politics at the time.

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than difficult, on account of the enemy having possessed himself of the suburb,* thereby preventing the passage over the Stone Bridge. Another letter was sent by the secretary, which was from Don Francisco Palafox to his brother the general of Arragon: that zealous representative manifested, in the most striking manner, how many and great exertions he had in vain made to collect troops, and that, destitute of the resources he wished for, he was then at Tortosa assembling the peasantry and some troops of the garrisons on the coast, which he designed to reinforce with some gunboats that were to ascend the Ebro.

These papers were of a very anterior date; and, all circumstances considered, induced the belief that the nation had suffered misfortunes in common with Saragossa, which prevented it from affording relief. It was known that the brave and intrepid Perena had collected a body of peasantry, but it was thought to be certain that they had been defeated, as the French general had stated in his last summons; and besides, it was not likely that a body of inexperienced peasants, in want of arms and ammunition, could encounter so formidable an army as that which besieged Saragossa.

While the junta was deliberating on the part it

* Vide Mr. Vaughan's Narrative, p. 1.

ought to take, the enemy renewed the bombardment in a tremendous manner: no one believed that the city could or ought to hold out any longer; but to all it was distressing to abandon a treasure like Saragossa, which had acquired the esteem of all Spain, and even of all Europe! Of thirty-four members, who composed the junta, only eight were of opinion with me that the city should be maintained; not because the grounds on which the others voted were unknown, but with the desperate resolution of braving the last danger, in the hope that it was within the bounds of possibility that some relief might arrive. It was at length agreed to acquaint the general with the deplorable state of the city, in order that he should send a flag of truce to the French general, requesting a suspension of hostilities for three days, which he did, assigning for his object, the sending of officers to ascertain the situation and condition of our armies, and to treat for the surrender of the place, according to the intelligence they might bring.* This mode had been proposed by marshal Lannes himself, in the above-named summons, notwithstanding which, he replied that *it offended*

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* This is entirely to be attributed to the unacquaintance, practically, of those who proposed *the mode*, not to the Spanish general.

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him exceedingly, and vented several threats against the city, unless it surrendered immediately—our flag returned with a second letter, in which he was reminded that the proposal came from himself, and was invented by the French, who practised in one of the towns of Portugal—to this he gave no other reply than a shower of grenades, bombs, and shot; and, at a favourable time, ordered his troops to make the attack in several places in a manner that was irresistible.* We lost that evening the quarter of the Tanneries, and a part of the Strand leading to the Stone Bridge, and the Puerta-del-Angel, which point, if in possession of the enemy, facilitated to him the massacre of the inhabitants, without having recourse to mines and explosions, of which he had made use, ever since, mixed with our troops. The acquisition of each house had cost him a struggle. That same evening we had the misfortune to have four cannon spiked, which were in the battery of the wooden bridges; and, notwithstanding this was supposed to be treacherously done, it could not be ascertained, circumstances not affording the opportunity for investigation.

General San Marc, knowing the small number of men that remained for the defence of the city, requested of me only two hundred for the points

* Nothing could be more natural or proper in a military view.

attacked; I immediately took measures, which, at another time, would have produced a thousand armed peasants within a quarter of an hour, since, besides, having that same day charged Don Miguel Marraco, beneficed priest of Pilar, and commissioned by the general with the organization of the peasantry, to form a reserve of a thousand armed men, and another thousand for the works, I sent him an impressive note, capable of inflaming the most lukewarm; a similar one I addressed to Don Mariano Cerezo, an honourable citizen, who, from the commencement of the war, had known how to improve his influence with the people; a third I sent to a priest named Laborde, who, a short time previously, had united with several ecclesiastics and friars, for the purpose of training and encouraging the peasants; I likewise ordered the *générale* to be beaten, in the new Tower, and profiting by a favourable moment when the enemy was driven by the bayonet from the Convent del Sepulchro, directed the public crier to run through the streets, proclaiming that we contended successfully; and, by the sound of the trumpet, calling on the people to complete the victory!

This ended, general San Marc came to inform me that seventeen men only had joined him, which clearly shewed the diminution of inhabitants; and, indeed, the few who remained alive were either

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sick, or attending those that were attacked by the disorder. Never were the reports from the various commanders so melancholy as on that day; one complained of being cut off; another that the enemy were about to do so; another that they had undermined him; and in the same manner the others; all called for troops, ammunition, and labourers, at a time when all were wanting; in short, the painful moment arrived when every one was convinced of the necessity of surrendering, since the contrary, so far from benefiting the city, gave greater advantages to the enemy in the effects he would have made himself master of by entering with fire and sword.

The junta despatched a flag of truce to marshal Lannes, requesting a suspension of hostilities for twenty-four hours, to negotiate the capitulation, and, at the same time, ordered the almoners of each parish to acquaint their parishioners with the state of the city, and to transmit to the junta the opinion they formed in consequence. In this situation of affairs, a French officer, said to be commandant of the besieging-artillery, was brought to me, who informed me that his general, in consequence of the flag of truce, had determined that the junta should wait upon him within two hours. I instantly ordered it to assemble; and, as all the members could not be collected with that prompt-

titude which the French officer desired, (who assured me that, after the time was expired, the general would not listen to us,) I resolved to proceed with some of those who had met, leaving three or four to acquaint the others with the result of the flag of truce, and to take such measures as circumstances might require.

The firing continued with vigour on both sides, and it seemed expedient to take a trumpeter with us to announce the parley; but, notwithstanding this, the enemy's battery at Trinitarios discharged a royal grenade at me and my companions; which violation of the rights of men, I directly remonstrated against, refusing to proceed further, unless assurance was given that the laws of war should be observed; an aid-de-camp of the French general, who, a little while before, had come to announce that the junta was to repair to the Casa Blanca,* and not to the suburb, whither it had been ordered, was immediately despatched, who gave directions that the junta should be respected; and, for greater security, brought an escort of infantry to conduct it to the presence of marshal Lannes.

The marshal was surrounded by general of-

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* The Casa Blanca is a large "white house," situated near the end of the canal of Arragon, between two and three miles from Saragossa.

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ficers, and various persons of inferior rank: he received the junta with extraordinary gravity, and, after the usual formalities on both sides, took some turns about the room, treating it with the greatest indifference, *and even contempt*.*

At length, addressing himself to me as president, he began to reprove Saragossa with much severity, enlarging on the little consideration it deserved, especially for not having credited his assertion when he summoned it to surrender.

I cut him short, by saying, that he disquieted himself to no purpose, because the junta had commenced its sessions only on the preceding day, and could not be responsible for what was not under its direction: that to have surrendered, without ascertaining the necessity of it, would have been a madness which the marshal himself ought to consider as such, but that, informed of the real state of affairs, and bearing in mind that summons of which he made so much merit, it had considered of a capitulation, for which purpose the letter he stated to have given so much offence, had been sent by the captain-general: that this had been repeated, at the same time acquainting him

* This is given literally for the purpose of stating how contemptible is a conduct of this kind, in any of the relations of military service whatever, when compared with that practised by Don Ric, in opposition to this miserable French general.

with the reasons for demanding a suspension of hostilities, and that some of our officers might go out to investigate the state of the nation: which, not having merited a reply from him, the junta had of itself despatched a third flag, requesting a suspension for twenty-four hours, which term was necessary for ascertaining the will of the people, to whom it was accountable; because Saragossa, which had so eminently distinguished itself in the mode of carrying on the war, ought also to distinguish itself in the mode of capitulating; since, among all the places conquered by the French, none had been found possessing the honour, sincerity, and good faith, of Saragossa; and that, acting on these principles, it was my duty to represent that I brought neither powers nor instructions, nor did I yet know the will of the people, but that I supposed they would accept a capitulation, if it was reasonable, and becoming the heroism with which the city had defended itself.*

This discourse, it appears, disarmed the marshal; since, laying aside the bitter reproaches he had used, he said that the women and children should be respected, and that the negotiation was concluded. But, I replied, it was not yet begun;

* Although of a *pristine simplicity*, it is scarcely possible not to admire the manner in which this excellent patriot endeavoured to *out-diplomatize* the subtle French officer.

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because that was surrendering at discretion, which was very far from the intentions of Saragossa; and if the marshal insisted on that idea, he might follow up his attacks on the city, whither I should return with my companions, and continue to defend ourselves, since there were yet arms, ammunition, and daggers; and, as the fortune of war was precarious, it would finally be seen for whom victory declared.

He then called his secretary, and dictated the preamble of the capitulation, and some of the articles; which, when read, I proposed an addition to be made to the first, stipulating that the garrison should, as became it, march out with military honours, to be stated by the major-general of infantry, whom I had taken with me for that purpose. Lannes would *not* consent to the article being expressed in any other terms than those he had prescribed; but promised, on his word of honour, that the garrison should not only march out with military honours, but that the officers should retain their baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks. I also proposed the articles respecting religion and the laws, which were granted, though not with the specification suggested relative to the privileges of this kingdom.

I likewise proposed another article, by which liberty should be guaranteed to general Don Jo-

seph Palafox, to go wherever he pleased with all his staff; the marshal replied that a particular individual never was the subject of capitulation, but that he pledged his word of honour, general Palafox should go wherever he wished, to Mallen, to Toledo,—and on my saying these places would not suit him, on account of being occupied by French troops, whose presence could not be agreeable, and, moreover, that I had understood he thought of proceeding to Majorca; *Lannes gave his word of honour that he should go to whatever place was convenient to him.*

On the same security he offered to give a passport for myself, and as many as wished to leave Saragossa, in order to avoid the contagion; adding, that the article I proposed on this head was *unnecessary, as he was desirous of terminating the capitulation, and that all who wished it might go out.*

Whilst two copies of the capitulation were drawing up, Lannes produced a topographical plan of Saragossa, pointing out the part which would have been blown up that night, for which purpose 44,000 lbs. of powder were already lodged;* this

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* The subterraneous war, and the horrible effects of the mines, induced Saragossa to surrender: not the 21,000 bombs and grenades, which fell in the city, says the editor; but the

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was to be followed by a bombardment from thirty mortars and seventy pieces of cannon, which at that time they were mounting in the suburb; (it was in fact known, that a number of batteries and embrasures had been constructed in that quarter.) Immediately he changed his discourse, and desecanted on the benefits lavished by the emperor and his brother Joseph, whose speech, in reply to that of the auxiliary bishop of Madrid, he read. Nothing could be said against the account he gave of their conquests and victories, because the siege having been so rigorous, nothing was known of what occurred out of Saragossa. He then held out a parcel of papers, which appeared to be French journals, but *not one of the junta took or even noticed them.* Duplicates of the capitulation being signed, I withdrew with my companions, carrying a copy to lay before the other members of the junta, who accepted, ratified, and signed it, assured of the wish of the city.*

soldier will conceive the possession of the plan, and the means of operation sufficient.

* Unfortunate city! adds the worthy judge;—scarcely did it contain, in the middle of February, 4000 men capable of bearing arms: the sick exceeded 14,000, others were convalescent; the rest had died by the explosions or the destructive contagion which devoured the inhabitants and garrison, and which originated in, or was increased by, the want of beds, of clothing, and

The junta resolved that I should try if the French general would grant some additions they considered necessary, which were a statement in the capitulation of the honours of war, which, on his word, he had promised to the garrison; since, otherwise, they would not be mentioned in the gazettes, where the written capitulation only appears. It was also required that the peasants, who had been compelled to take arms, in order to form temporary corps, should not be prisoners of war, since they ought not to be considered as regular soldiers, and, besides, would be a severe loss to manufactures and agriculture.

Lastly, on the petition of the clergy, an additional article was solicited, stipulating the punctual payment of their revenues from the funds assigned by the government; which, to the junta, appeared very proper, as, without it, the clergy would be reduced to indigence; and as, in fact, they have been, not receiving any dues except those arising from funerals.

But hardly had I begun my proposals, in terms which neither could or ought to have offended any one, when marshal Lannes flew into a violent rage, and snatching the paper from me, threw it behind

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of food, in which condition the soldier saw himself from the commencement of the siege.

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him into the fire, of which action it appears one of his generals was ashamed, since he stooped to rescue it from the flames.*

Lannes strongly insisted on the prompt surrender of the city; and I, with the rest of the junta, returned to it, after having requested, that, as the capitulation had been ratified, the corresponding copy should be delivered to us, which was done.

It seems that they well knew our honour and magnanimity; for, before the surrender took place, several French officers and soldiers entered in search of wine, and to walk about the city, and were received in a manner answerable to the capitulation, in the expectation that they would on their part observe it as they ought; but, so far from that, they began that night the most atrocious pillage imaginable, continuing it with such effrontery, that the day following they robbed publicly, and without the least reserve;† their licentiousness went still

* In the whole compass of antient or modern history, there is not a fact more simple or illustrative than this in a military or political view.

† In respect to the garrison, an order was communicated on the 22d, by general Frere, for all the officers to quit Saragossa within twenty-four hours, under pain of being shot if they remained after that time; this was obeyed by those who were still there; uniting themselves to the column of the other prisoners of the garrison, which amounted to about 2500 men, and was escorted by a French regiment under the command of general

further, since the governor, whom they had placed in Saragossa, having ordered the metropolitan chapter, prelates, curates, &c. to go and compliment the marshal, which was faithfully performed; the most painfully-cruel violations followed: the curate of San Lorenzo, was robbed of his gown, in the Plaza del Carmen, a friar of his hood, and another priest of his cape, tearing from him even his shoes. I ceased not from making repeated and strong remonstrances; but either I received no answer, or was told that the evil was unavoidable, because the troops had to indemnify themselves for the plunder they looked upon as certain, and which they would have had the next day; but in my opinion, and that of many others, they stole, particularly mules, in concert with the French generals: since redress could not be obtained, notwithstanding that many times restitution of the mules was demanded before the completion of the robbery; and a Frenchman, from whom they had stolen twelve, succeeded, on account of being a Frenchman, in getting them restored; but with the hint that one of them was adapted for the coach of the general-in-chief, to whom he had to present it. They took possession

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Morlot; marching over 270 dead bodies of the prisoners taken in the suburb on the 18th, whom the barbarians had immolated, because fatigue and weakness prevented those unfortunate men from keeping up with their rapid march.

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of the public funds, plundered the magazines even of the army, and introduced into the city confusion and disorder, at the same time that they wished to be treated with kindness and attention.

They demanded of me* 50,000 pair of shoes, 8,000 pair of boots, and 1,200 shirts, the whole new; a large quantity of medicines, with every requisite for a hospital; an service of china for general Junot, and that a tennis-court should be fitted up where he might play. Several officers demanded table-equipage and linen; even curtains, pens, paper, &c. &c. there not being a single article which they did not exact, with injunctions that it might be good and abundant, and, above all, at the expense of the unhappy Spaniards.

It may easily be inferred how much I had to dispute and suffer, in order to avoid these exorbitant demands, which would for ever have completed the ruin of Saragossa, and of this unfortunate kingdom. I contended with firmness against maintaining the chiefs of the French army, who so eagerly wished to support their pompous titles at the cost of others, till, after several debates, they threatened me with sending in a squadron of hussars, to which I re-

* These details are not copied here either in a military or political view, but that it may be seen how highly superior is an English command on such an occasion.

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plied that well they might, since the gates of the city were demolished and in their power ; but, that the nation would avenge the outrage, and from that moment they would not advance a foot of ground without first moistening it with French blood. *A member* of the junta, who ought to have shuddered at the discourse, had the weakness to promise that the junta should take upon itself the expense from the following day. How it contrived to bear such enormous profusion I know not, because I returned to my house, as I designed, from the day of the capitulation, there demanding the liberty of going where I pleased, as has been said ; and having moreover determined to resign my employments, I had the satisfaction of obtaining my wishes, the French having reinstated, in the post of regent, my predecessor.* restoring me to that of

* Don Joseph de Villa y Torre, who was confirmed in the functions of regent of the audience, by a decree of Junot, dated the 26th of March, and inserted in the Saragossa gazette of the 30th idem. On the same day, the 26th, this intrusive governor of the kingdom nominated don Mariano Dominguez, corregidor of Saragossa and its district, adding shortly afterwards the appointment of commissary-general of police, the duties and prerogatives of which are specified in another decree of the 17th of April ; in this he assigns for the expenses of the police the duty of one quarto on every pound of meat sold, and 16 reals on each lamp, in addition to the duties already appropriated to them. Thus did a French general, in the centre of a kingdom which they suppose independent in the person of Joseph, alter and new-model

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auditor, and having officially renounced that also, as they understood it, since all the members were summoned except myself.*

It would tire the attention too much to relate all that occurred respecting passports, and various other subjects, wherein the chiefs and others of the French army proved their meanness, their extravagant ideas, their avarice, bad faith, and, above all, their pride, which is their predominant vice, and in which they chiefly differ from the rest of mankind, each one appearing a Lucifer clothed in blue, and

the government; by his own authority, imposed taxes; in a word, exercised all the attributes of sovereignty, and loaded with new extortions the wretched inhabitants who occupied the ruins of Saragossa. Junot left us yet another monument of his legislative talents, and of the mild administration with which he endeavoured to suppress the noble and patriotic efforts of the invincible Arragonese. In a decree, inserted in the same gazette of the 30th of March, he speaks thus, "The carrying of arms being wholly prohibited in the kingdom of Arragon, the inhabitants who shall be found with muskets or any fire-arms whatsoever will be considered as brigands and assassins, and tried by a military commission." The subsequent armaments of Arragon, and the glorious energy with which it still resists the French yoke, shew clearly how much attention those brave Spaniards have paid to the furious and barbarous threats of the *Duke of Abrantes*.

* The members of the audience, who, having been out of Saragossa during the siege, voluntarily returned to that capital, called by the French governor, and who remain in it, having taken the oath of fidelity to Joseph Napoleon are Ruiz de Celada, Quintana, Pastoret, March, and Riego; according to the last official accounts.—*Editor*.

covered with eagles, almost all of them being thus dressed; but I ought not to omit stating, that, notwithstanding that word of honour given to our general, don Joseph Palafox, he was immediately made a prisoner, surrounded by French, and destitute of necessary food; for although I remonstrated, both verbally and by writing, against such treatment, I could only obtain very scanty relief, and soon afterwards he was carried towards France; but they were obliged to return with him on account of the illness he laboured under, from which he had not recovered when they tore him away from the town. It was said that they had put to death father Basilius de Santiago, who was his first master, and that the same fate befel Presbyter don Santiago Sass, for whom the general had a particular esteem, owing to the bravery with which he had behaved during the war: the fact is, that the French took them by means of an alcaide mayor, (chief magistrate,) and they have never been seen since.

Although I have the satisfaction of having in great measure restrained French ferocity, by adopting means suited to circumstances, and the character of the people I had to deal with, I could not prevent the removal of the principal jewels belonging to *our Lady of Pilar*, which by order of the marshal were carried to the Casa Blanca, and returned again, with the specious pretext, that they wished to

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make an offering of them to *Maria Santissima*, and to worship her with the greatest splendour, especially on the day of the marshal's entry; but, soon afterwards, the governor sent for me to wait upon him, accompanied by a member of the junta, who understood the French language: he did not explain the object of this order, nor could I go, on account of being ill, but the member of the junta having gone, he told him that it was necessary to make a present to the principal officers of the army, intimating the sum or value of about eighty thousand dollars, for the commander-in-chief, and in the same proportion for the rest.

This shock was terrible to a town like Saragossa, particularly at a time when all was misery, desolation, and wretchedness; the metropolitan chapter continuing its great services in favour of the king and the people, and desirous of ransoming these from farther troubles at the expense of any sacrifice whatsoever, afforded the means of surmounting the difficulty, by bestowing the jewels that might be requisite, from our Lady of Pilar, which in every respect were considered as very insecure from French rapacity; some members of the said chapter and of the junta conveyed the resolution to me, and I had to carry into effect the measures agreed to by them; but not one of the French generals accepted the jewel assigned him; and the

affair terminated in ordering me to remain in my house, and that one member only of the junta should go with the jewels to the French governor, where a commissary, who occasionally acted as intendant, met him; and, taking the jewels, proceeded with the member to the church of Pilar, to carry away the remainder, marshal Lannes, as was reported, retaining the whole.

The two or three times that I waited on the marshal, in order to tender the resignation of my employments, and treat of public concerns, I was never received; and it seems that on the day of his entry into Saragossa, he did not wish even to hear me, notwithstanding the attachment which the French have for harangues, since the above-mentioned commissary informed me, before-hand, that he would address the marshal in my name, so that I had not to speak a word.

Saragossa contended for sixty-two days, in the midst of the melancholy events which internally oppressed her; exhibiting one of the most heroic examples that have ever been given by men. Not so with those who, against an open city, with natural and weak defences, employed subterraneous warfare, the last recourse for subduing a city, unconquerable by other means. More than thirty thousand soldiers, the flower of our armies, one

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hundred and sixty pieces of artillery, sixty thousand muskets, all was lost with Saragossa; five hundred officers lie beneath those venerable ruins.

So many sacrifices, such enormous losses of houses and property, besides the lives of numberless inhabitants, which have left the streets of that august capital desert, delivered the southern provinces of Spain from the invasion of the enemy, and will ever cause the name of Saragossa to be pronounced with enthusiasm and affection, by patriots of all ages and countries.

Saragossa! a name of terror, of shame, of reproach, to that monster who thought himself omnipotent!—A name of example to every town in Spain. In thy ashes and ruins; in thy stately edifices, shattered by bombs or blown up by mines; in thy streets, drenched with French blood; in thy cemeteries, which inclose as many heroes as dead bodies there;—there, and not in the obsolete accounts of Sparta, of Athens, and of Rome, is where should in future be sought the sacred fire of liberty; where should be cherished the flame of patriotism, and where the whole world should learn lessons of sacrifice, fidelity, and greatness.

Thus fell Saragossa! and thus did the French government announce the acquisition it had made. The bulletin confirms, in every material respect,

the preceding account ; and, if possible, goes farther in exhibiting its own armies altogether in the most disreputable point of view.

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Paris, 4th March, 1809.

Saragossa has surrendered ! the calamities which have befallen this unhappy town are a terrifying example to the people. The peace which has been restored in Saragossa, extends to the whole of Arragon ; and the two armies which were around the town have been set at liberty. Saragossa was the centre of the insurrection of Spain ; it was in this town that the party was formed, which wished to call in a prince of the house of Austria to reign on the Tagus. The individuals of this party had partly inherited these notions, which were irrecoverably destroyed, from their ancestors during the war of the succession.

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The battle of Tudela was won on the 23d of November ; and, after the 27th, the French army was encamped at a small distance from Saragossa ; the people of this town were armed, the peasants of Arragon had repaired thither, and Saragossa contained fifty thousand men, formed into regiments of one thousand, and companies of one hundred ; the general officers and subalterns, consisted of monks. A body of ten thousand men, who had escaped from Tudela, had thrown themselves into

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the town, which was furnished with provisions heaped up in innumerable magazines, and defended by two hundred pieces of cannon. The image of our Lady of Pilar wrought miracles at the will of the monks, who, by such means, animated the zeal and preserved the confidence of the multitude. In the field, these fifty thousand men would not have withstood three regiments; but, shut up in their town, and wrought upon by the leaders of parties, how could they escape the miseries which ignorance and fanaticism heap upon the heads of so many wretches? Every thing possible was done to enlighten them, and bring them to reason. Immediately after the battle of Tudela, the belief entertained at Saragossa that Madrid held out, and that they might be relieved; and that the armies at Somosierra, Guadarrama, Estremadura, Leon, and Catalonia, might furnish a pretext for the chiefs of the insurgents to keep alive the fanaticism of the inhabitants. It was resolved not to surround the town, but to permit it to maintain a communication with all Spain, in order that they might be informed of the annihilation of the Spanish armies, and of the circumstances which attended the entrance of the French into Madrid: but all this intelligence came to the ears of the ringleaders alone, and was unknown by the body of the people. The truth was not only concealed

from them, but their courage was kept up by lies: at one time, the French had lost forty thousand men before Madrid;—at another time, Romana had entered France, and the French eagles were compelled to fly before the terrible leopard. This period, sacrificed to political objects, in order to allow a multitude to come to reason, who were infatuated by fanaticism, and a terror inspired by their enraged leaders, was not lost to the French army.

The general of engineers, Lacoste, aid-de camp of the emperor, and an officer of the greatest merit, collected, at Alagon, the materials and instruments for mining, in order to carry on the *subterraneous war** which the emperor had commanded. The general of division, Dedon, who commanded the artillery, collected a great quantity of mortars, bombs, and howitzers, of every calibre; all these were brought from Pampeluna, seven days march from Saragossa. In the mean while, it was observed, that the enemy had availed himself of this delay, in order to fortify Monte Torrero, and

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* Though it were certainly not to be wished that the British mode of warfare should be changed to that which is here exhibited; yet it is extremely desirable that these operations should enter more into contemplation of the British army than at present. In them it is deficient in an unaccountable degree when the numerous mines of this country are considered; similar to this is the defectiveness of our commissariat in a commercial nation.

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other strong positions. On the 20th of December, the division of Suchet drove him from the heights of San Lamberto, and from two outworks, which were within reach of the town. The division of general Gazan, drove the enemy from the heights of San Gregorio, and, with the 21st regiment of light infantry, and the 100th regiment of the line, took the redoubts which were thrown up in the suburb, and defended the roads of Sueva and Barcelona. He also made himself master of a great laboratory, near Galliego, in which five hundred Swiss had entrenched themselves. On the same day the duke of Cornegliano made himself master of the works and position of Monte Torrero; he took all the cannon, made a great number of prisoners, and did great injury to the enemy. The duke of Cornegliano being sick, the duke of Abrantes came, at the beginning of January, and took command of the third division: he signalized his arrival by taking the monastery of San Josef, and pursued his advantages on the 16th of January, by taking the bridge of La Hueba, where his troops fixed themselves; the chief of battalion, Stahl, of the 14th regiment of the line, distinguished himself in the attack on the monastery of San Josef, and the lieutenant, Victor de Buffon, was first in the assault. The circumvention of Saragossa was not yet resolved upon; that was considered as in-

expedient; and a free communication was still left open, in order that the insurgents might be informed of the defeat of the English, and their infamous flight out of Spain. It was on the 16th of January that the English were driven into the sea at Corunna, and it was on the 26th that the operations before Saragossa were seriously begun. The duke of Montebello* arrived there on the 20th, in order to assume the command of the siege. As soon as he was assured that the intelligence which was brought into the town had no effect, and that a few monks governed the minds of the people, he resolved to put an end to these indulgences; fifty thousand peasants were collected on the left bank of the Ebro; at Pardiguera, the duke of Treviso attacked them with three regiments, and, notwithstanding the fine position they possessed, the 64th regiment routed them, and threw them into disorder; the 10th regiment of hussars was on the plain to receive them, and a great number remained upon the field of battle. Nine pieces of cannon, and several standards, were the trophies of this victory. At the same time the duke of Montebello had sent the adjutant-commandant, Guesquet, to Zuera, in order to disperse an assemblage of insurgents; this officer attacked four thousand of

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them with three battalions, overthrew them, and took four pieces of cannon, with their carriages and horses. General Vattier was at the same time sent with three hundred infantry and two hundred cavalry towards Valencia; he met five thousand insurgents at Alcaniz, compelled them, even in the town, to throw down their arms; in their flight he killed six thousand men, and seized magazines, provisions, and arms; among the latter were one hundred English muskets. The adjutant-commandant, Carrion Nizos, conducted himself gloriously at the head of a column of infantry. Colonel Burthe, of the 4th regiment of hussars, and the chief of battalion, Camus, of the 28th regiment of light infantry, distinguished themselves. These operations took place between the 20th and 26th of January. On the 26th, the town was seriously attacked, and the batteries were unmasked, and at noon on the 27th the breach was practicable in several places; the troops were lodged in the monastery of Santa Engracia. The division of Grandjean entered some thirty houses. The colonel Caloiscki, and the soldiers of the Weixel, distinguished themselves: at the same moment the general of division, Morlat, in an attack upon the left wing, made himself master of the whole foreground of the enemy's defence. Captain Guettemar, at the head of the pioneers and thirty-six

grenadiers of the 44th regiment, had, with a rare intrepidity, ascended the breach. Mr. Babieski, an officer of the Voltigeurs of the Weixel, a young man 17 years of age, and covered with seven wounds, was the first who appeared upon the breach. The chief of battalion, Lejeune, aid-de-camp to the prince of Neufchatel, distinguished himself, and received two slight wounds; the chief of battalion, Haxo, is also slightly wounded and likewise distinguished himself. On the 30th, the monasteries of the Monique and the Greek Augustines were occupied. Sixty houses were possessed by undermining. The miners of the 14th regiment distinguished themselves. On the 1st of February, general Lacosta received a ball, and died in the field of honour; he was a brave and distinguished officer; he has been lamented by the whole army, but more especially by the emperor. Colonel Regniat succeeded him in the command of the engineers, and in the management of the siege. The enemy defended every house; three attacks were made by mines, and every day several houses were blown up, and afforded the troops an opportunity of stationing themselves in other houses. Thus we proceeded to the Cozo, (a great street nearly in the centre of Saragossa) where we made ourselves masters of the buildings, of the public school and university. The enemy endeavoured to op-

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pose miners to miners; but, less used to this sort of operation, their miners were every day discovered and suffocated. This mode of besieging rendered its progress slow, but sure and less destructive to the army. While *three companies of miners* and *eight companies of sappers* carried on this subterraneous war, the consequences of which were so dreadful, the fire on the town was kept up by mortars. Ten days after the attack had begun, the surrender of the town was anticipated; the army had possessed itself of one third of the houses and fortified itself in them. The church which contained the image of our Lady of Pilar, which by so many miracles had promised to defend the town, was battered down by bombs and no longer inhabitable. The duke of Montebello deemed it necessary to take possession of the left bank of the river, in order that his fire might reach the middle of the town. The general of division, Gazan, made himself master of the bridge by a sudden and impetuous attack on the morning of the 17th (February); a battery of fifty pieces was played off at three o'clock in the afternoon; a battalion of the 28th regiment attacked and took possession of a very large monastery, the walls of which were of brick, and from three to four feet thick. General Gazan then repaired with rapidity to the bridge, over which the insurgents made their retreat to the

town ; he killed a vast number, made four thousand prisoners, amongst whom were two generals, twelve colonels, nineteen lieutenant-colonels, and two hundred and thirty officers. He also took thirty pieces of artillery. Nearly all the troops of the line in the town had beset this important part, which had been threatened since the 10th. At the same moment the duke of Abrantes entered the Cozo through the several covered ways, and by means of two small mines blew up the extensive buildings of the Schaals. After these events, terror spread throughout the town ; the junta, in order to precure delay and obtain time to abate the terror of the inhabitants, sought a parley ; but their bad faith was known, and this artifice was useless. Thirty other houses were possessed by undermining or by mines. At length, on the 21st of February the whole town was possessed by our troops. Fifteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry laid down their arms at the gate of Portillo, and forty flags and one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon were delivered up. The insurgents lost twenty thousand men during the siege, thirteen thousand were found in the hospitals ; five hundred died daily.

The duke of Montebello would allow no capitulation to the town of Saragossa. He only published the following provisions :

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Thirty-third
French
bulletin of the
army of Spain

“The garrison shall, at noon, on the 21st lay down their arms at the gate of Portillo, where they shall remain prisoners of war. Those of the troops of the line, who are willing to take the oath to King Joseph, may be allowed to enter into his service. In case this entrance shall not be permitted by the minister of war to King Joseph, they shall be prisoners of war, and sent to France. The worship of God shall be revered. All the artillery and ammunition of every kind shall be delivered up. All the arms shall be deposited at the doors of the different houses, and collected by the respective alcaides.”

The magazines of corn, rice, and fruit, which have been found in the town, are very considerable. The duke of Montebello has nominated general Laval, governor of Saragossa. A deputation of the priesthood and different inhabitants has set out for Madrid. Palafox is dangerously ill; *he was the object of contempt of the whole hostile army, who accused him of arrogance and meanness. He was never seen where there was any danger.* The Conde de Fuentes, grandee of Spain, who had been arrested by the insurgents two months ago on his estates, was found in a dungeon of eight feet square, and released; no idea can be formed of the miseries he had undergone.

If any thing were wanting to render this memoir or bulletin contemptible, nothing could effect it, as a powerful decree, more completely than this personal abuse of the brave Palafox.

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To abuse an enemy, is surely one of the last resources of meanness; to resort to falsehood for the purpose, something, for which there is yet no expression in language.

On the subject of this glorious and important example to the Spanish cause, it is impossible not to add the following worthy recognizance of the Body, executing the supreme authority of the state.

Glorious decree on the fall of Saragossa.

Decree on the Surrender of Saragossa.

“Spaniards!—The only boon which Saragossa implored of our unfortunate king, when at Victoria a mark of royal favour was, tendered, was that she should, among the Spanish cities, be the first sacrificed in his defence. You do not want, nor does Europe want, to recollect this generous incident, in order to add motives of interest and admiration in favour of that illustrious city. But when we behold the grand sacrifice actually offered upon the altars of loyalty and patriotism, the mind swells whilst it looks back upon the fearful

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and sublime path of immortality and glory, which was then opening upon Saragossa.

“ More than two months of this most sanguinary and cruel siege had passed away; nearly all the edifices were destroyed, and the rest were undermined; the living were exhausted, and provisions were consumed; more than 16,000 sick were struggling with a sharp and mortal disease, which hurried every day hundreds to the grave; the garrison was reduced to less than a sixth part; the general was dying of the contagion; his second, O’Neill, had already perished; and St. Marc, upon whom the command next devolved, was also sick, and weakened by a fever. All these things were requisite, Spaniards, to make Saragossa yield to the rigour of fate, and suffer herself to be occupied by the enemy. The surrender took place on the 20th of last month, on the same conditions upon which the French have entered other towns, and which have been kept as usual. It is thus the enemy was able to take possession of those glorious precincts, incumbered with prostrate edifices and temples, and peopled only by the dying and the dead, where every street, every ruin, every wall, every stone, seemed mutely to say to the beholder, Go and tell my king, that Saragossa, faithful to her word, has sacrificed herself with joy, displaying her loyalty!

“A series of events, as mournful as they are notorious, frustrated all the exertions which were made to relieve the city ; but the imaginations of all the good, fixed upon her lot, accompanied her defenders in all their dangers, fought with them all their combats, compassionated their privations and labours, and attended them in all the terrible vicissitudes of their fortune ; and when at last the means failed them of continuing a resistance, which they had prolonged almost beyond belief, the intelligence of the disaster has so afflicted every heart, that, in the first moment of anguish, it seemed as if the torch of liberty were at once extinguished, and the column of independance overthrown.

“But, Spaniards, Saragossa is still standing, and lives in imitation and in example ; she survives still in public spirit, which is ever imbibing lessons of valour and constancy from energies so heroic ; for who is the Spaniard, proud of that name, who would be less than the brave Saragosans, and not seal the proclaimed liberty of his country, and his promised fidelity to his king, at the cost of the same perils and the same labours ? Let vile ego-tists, and men without courage, be alarmed at these, but not the other towns of Arragon, who are ready to imitate and deliver their capital—not the firm and loyal patriots who behold in that town

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a model to imitate, a vengeance to take, and the sole path of conquest. Forty thousand Frenchmen, who have perished before the feeble walls which defended Saragossa, cause France to deplore the barren and ephemeral triumph she has gained, and evince to Spain that three towns, of equal constancy and resolution, will save the country and disconcert her tyrants. Valour springs from valour; and when the unhappy, who have suffered there, shall hear that their fellow-citizens, following them in the paths of glory, have been more favoured by fortune, they will bless their destiny, however hard, and look forward with joy to new triumphs.

“Europe, reflecting on the circumstances of this singular event—estimating the means of defence, and those of attack—and comparing the resistance which Saragossa made to the ravagers of the world, with that which was exhibited by fortifications of the first rank—will determine to whom belongs the palm of valour, and whether they are the vanquished who tore it from the conquerors. Time passes away, and days will come when those desolating earthquakes will subside with which the genius of iniquity has tormented the earth; the friends of virtue and loyalty will then come to the shores of the Ebro, to visit those majestic ruins; and, contemplating them with admiration

and envy, will say, "Here stood that town which, in modern ages, realised, or even excelled, those ancient prodigies of self-devotion and constancy, which are scarcely credited in history." At first, without a single regiment, or other defence than a weak wall, or other resources than the energies of its inhabitants, it dared to provoke the rage of the tyrant, and twice withstood the impulse of his conquering legions. The subjection of this open and defenceless town cost France more blood, more tears, and more deaths, than the conquest of whole kingdoms. It was not French valour which subdued it, but a deadly and universal contagion, which deprived its defenders of their strength; and the enemy, when he entered the city, triumphed over a few who were dying and diseased, but he did not vanquish warriors, or conquer citizens.

"These considerations of merit, glory, and public enthusiasm, have induced the supreme junta of government to pass the following decree:—

Royal Decree of His Majesty.

"His majesty, our sovereign, Don Ferdinand VII. and in his name the supreme junta of govern-

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ment, considering that the services rendered to the country ought to be estimated more from valour and sacrifice than from the issue, which often depends upon fortune; considering that Saragossa was not only not impregnable, but, in reference to military rules, was not even capable of defence, and that it has, notwithstanding made a defence, such as no fortress, however strong, can boast of; and that honours and rewards, which are granted to a people who have deserved so well of their country, are, with respect to those who have perished, the just reward of their valour and martyrdom; with respect to those who have survived, a motive of consolation and resource necessary to abate the rigour of their calamity; and, with respect to others, a powerful stimulus to follow their example; knowing that Saragossa will, in the memory of Spaniards, be an ever-flowing spring of heroic actions and civic virtues, which are to save the state from the desolating tempest; estimating, as is due, the singular glory which results to the Spanish nation from the admirable defence this city has made, as precious in the eyes of virtue and patriotism as the most glorious victory; and desiring, finally, as a mark of the high estimation in which he holds Saragossa and its inhabitants, to grant a testimony of its merit as singular and as

great as the deserts it treats of, has been pleased to decree as follows:—

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Glorious decree on the fall of Saragossa.

“ 1. That Saragossa, its inhabitants, and garrison, have deserved well of their country, in an eminent and heroic degree.

“ 2. That as soon as the worthy and brave captain-general of Arragon shall be restored to liberty, for the obtaining of which no means shall be spared, the junta, in the name of the nation, will grant him that reward which will be most worthy of his invincible constancy and ardent patriotism.

“ 3. That every officer employed in the siege be promoted one degree, and that every soldier possess the rank and pay of a serjeant.

“ 4. That all the defenders of Saragossa, and its inhabitants and their heirs, enjoy personal nobility.

“ 5. That all the widows and orphans of those who have perished in the defence, enjoy a pension suited to their rank and circumstances.

“ 6. That the having been within the walls during the siege, be considered as a claim, on occasion, of pretensions to future employment.

“ 7. That Saragossa be free from all contributions, for the term of ten years from the date of the peace.

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“ 8. That, at that period, the rebuilding of the public edifices be begun with all possible magnificence, and at the expense of the state.

“ 9. That a monument be erected in the square of the city, in perpetual memory of the valour of its inhabitants, and its glorious defence.

“ 10. That in the squares of all the cities in the kingdom an inscription be erected, containing the most heroic circumstances of the two sieges which Saragossa has sustained.

“ 11. That a medal be struck in its honour, as a testimony of national gratitude for such eminent services.

“ 12. That to every city of Spain, which shall resist a like siege with like constancy and tenacity, the same honours and prerogatives shall be granted.

“ 13. That Spanish poets and orators be stimulated to exercise their talents upon this sublime subject; and that a reward be offered in the name of the nation, of a medal of gold and 100 doubloons to him who shall present the best poem, and the like to him who shall compose the best prose essay, on this immortal siege: in both, the object being, not only to recommend to the admiration and memory of the present age and posterity, the valour, constancy, and patriotism, of Saragossa; but to inflame, with like warmth, the enthusiasm of the nation, and fill Spanish hearts with the

same love of liberty, and the same detestation of tyranny.

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“ The Marquis of ASTORGA, Vice-President.

“ *Royal Castle of Seville, March 9, 1809.*

“ MARTIN DE GARAY.”

It only remains to notice, that the furtherance of the organization of the Portuguese army, became regularly pursued under general Beresford, now field-marshal and generalissimo of Portugal. To this end greatly contributed the issuing of bulletins, in which the events of the campaign were generally communicated to the army and nation, and through which were shewn the advantages of discipline and good order, and the evils of anarchy and insubordination.

Utility of bulletins of the Portuguese army.

The Spanish troops, under Silveira, in the mean time, cut off the communications of the French in the north of Portugal, by the successful siege of the important frontier-town of Chaves, in the province of Tralos Montes. Notwithstanding its being supposed to possess a garrison of 10,000 men, it capitulated on the 25th of March, and greatly tended to inspirit troops, which had already suffered every discouragement, and prepare them to bear up against the reverses to which they were unhappily more liable.

Siege of Chaves

This spirit became shortly put to the test by the

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failure of an attack on Victor, who had drawn up his army of 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry in front of Medellin, a town on the Guadiana, in Estremadura. In close columns, prepared for attack or defence, the flanks covered by cavalry, and in front six batteries, the enemy was vigorously attacked by Cuesta, who failed by the defection of the cavalry, which supported his left wing on an attack from that of the French: it was consequently thrown into disorder, and compelled to leave the whole brunt of the action on the right. The infantry, nevertheless, evinced great steadiness; a great loss of officers and men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was the result, and general Cuesta cashiered some others. A much more important result, however, ensued in the celerity with which he was enabled to re-assemble the army after his retreat, and render it again formidable to the enemy.

Nothing could exceed the many formed exaggerations of the soi-disant king Joseph on this action, which tended to shew the importance attached to it; an importance, nevertheless, which could not but be decreased by the speedy reformation of the broken army.

The Spanish general and his troops were pronounced, by a decree of the supreme junta, to have deserved well of their country. Those who

particularly distinguished themselves were honoured and promoted; and the pay for one month of two regiments of cavalry, and two of Chasseurs, which accompanied them, was mulcted, and applied to the reward of those who had given so much promise to the future energies of Spain.

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APPOINTMENT OF SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, (AFTERWARDS LORD WELLINGTON) TO THE COMMAND OF THE BRITISH ARMY, AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEW CAMPAIGN.

Instructions of Sir Arthur Wellesley, Commander-in-Chief.—Intimations in regard to Cadiz.—Correlative Instructions to the British Minister.—Arrival of Sir Arthur Wellesley.—His Staff, and the new Force placed under his Command.—Communication with the British Minister in Spain, on a Plan of Operations.—Intelligent Anticipation of Mr. Frere.—Intercepted Communications of the Enemy.—Reports of the Spanish Generals.—French Force in Estremadura.—Sir Arthur Wellesley assumes the Command.

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THE result of all that has been described in the preceding chapter, was very properly a determination, on the part of the British ministry, neither to abandon the cause of Europe in its demonstra-

tions on the peninsula, nor to alter the course it had pursued in respect to this war; nor, what is more, to displace, prematurely, its active and intelligent minister there.

The effects of the campaign, recited in the last book, were, nevertheless, evidently felt, both in the operations of the field and the cabinet; and were even, as will be seen, found to affect, to a certain degree, one little likely to be influenced by ordinary impulses against the strongest energies of war.

The employment of sir Arthur Wellesley, whose genius, according to the opinions of some, had overstepped his orders, and anticipated his superiors in the first instance, and been found but too compliant* in the second, could not but be expected as soon as the vague procedure, which took place upon the convention of Cintra, should be put into a complectional form; and those arrangements which, notwithstanding all that facility of principle which can, occasionally, elevate or depress, without any obvious reason for either one or the other, were necessary previously to

* The allusion, here made, affords a splendid instance of the necessity of a certain discretion, in respect to military obedience, and a judicious discrimination between "lawful" and *unlawful* orders.

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enabling sir Arthur Wellesley to ensue to the command held by sir John Cradock:

Accordingly, (the public mind having been long directed to, by a variety of means, and every arrangement completed,) sir Arthur Wellesley received the following instructions, which will shew the importance attached by the British government to this new expedition, and the undiminished vigour with which it continued its determination to prosecute, as far as compatible with the national interests, the peninsular war:—

Despatch from
lord viscount
Castlereagh to
lieut.-general
sir A. Welles-
ley.

Downing-street,
2d April, 1809.

Sir,

His majesty having been graciously pleased to nominate lieut.-general sir John Cradock to the chief command, at Gibraltar, has thought fit to select you to replace that officer in the command of his majesty's forces at Portugal.

You will receive inclosed a return of all the troops, either actually arrived, or under orders for Portugal; and it is his majesty's pleasure that you do proceed, without loss of time, to Lisbon, in execution of the orders which I am now to convey to you by his majesty's command.

Your attention will be directed, in the first instance, to prepare and equip the British army for the field. You will, in the next place, direct

your utmost exertions to the bringing forward the Portuguese army, and rendering it capable of co-operating with his majesty's troops.

In the furtherance of this latter object, in addition to the arrangement already made, you will make such requisitions from time to time, either to the Portuguese government, or to the government at home, as, upon communication with general Beresford, you may deem requisite for rendering the Portuguese troops fit for service. The defence of Portugal you will consider as the first and immediate object of your attention. But, as the security of Portugal can only be effectually provided for in connection with the defence of the peninsula in a larger sense, his majesty, on this account, as well as from the unabated interest he takes in the cause of Spain, leaves it to your judgment to decide, when your army shall be advanced on the frontier of Portugal, how your efforts can best be combined with the Spanish, as well as with the Portuguese, troops, in support of the common cause.

In any movements you may undertake, you will, however, keep in mind, that, until you receive further orders, your operations must necessarily be conducted with a special reference to the protection of that country.

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Despatch from
lord viscount
Castlereagh to
lieut.-general
sir A. Welles-
ley.
Downing-street,
2d April, 1809.

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Despatch from
lord viscount
Castlereagh to
lieut.-general
sir A. Welles-
ley.

Mr. Villiers will be instructed to procure for you every necessary assistance from the Portuguese government, and you will consider him as the proper channel for such communications as you may have to make to the regency.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

To these instructions, on the next day, were added the following, on the subject of precautions to be used for the necessary preservation of Cadiz:—

Lord viscount
Castlereagh to
lieut.-general
sir A. Welles-
ley, K. B.
Downing-street,
3d April, 1809.

Sir,

Upon the fall of Madrid, and the retreat of the Spanish armies, in the south of Spain, his majesty was pleased to signify, through his majesty's ministers, to the central government of Spain, that his majesty was ready to send an auxiliary army, to sustain the Spanish efforts in that quarter, provided the British troops were assured of the port and fortress of Cadiz, as a secured point of retreat, in case of disaster in the field.

The government of Spain not having thought fit to accede to this preliminary and indispensable condition, and having actually declined to permit the British troops, under major-generals Sherbrooke

and Mackenzie, (who were sent as the advance-guard of the British army,) to land at Cadiz, his majesty does not feel that he can, in justice to the safety of his own troops, again employ an auxiliary army in Spain, till the Spanish government and nation shall cease to entertain those feelings of jealousy, which are equally inconsistent with their own interests, and the effectual prosecution of the war.

You will, therefore, understand, that it is not his majesty's intention, in authorising you to co-operate with the Spanish armies in the defence of Portugal, and of the adjacent Spanish provinces, that you should enter on a campaign in Spain, without the express authority of your government, and in any consent you may form with the armies in Spain, you will cause it to be understood, that it is to be confined to the specific objects in view; and that the service of your army (under the orders you have received) cannot be employed in general operations in Spain, as the force under sir John Moore was intended to have been, without a previous arrangement being settled to that effect between the two governments.

Should the enemy penetrate, in force, towards Cadiz, it is not improbable that the reluctance of the Spanish government, to admit a British

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Lord viscount
Castlereagh to
sir A. Welles-
ley, K. B.

Precautions for
the preservation
of Cadiz.

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Precautions for
the preservation
of Cadiz.

force into Cadiz, may yield to the sense of immediate danger. Should such a change of sentiment take place, every effort should be made to assist in the preservation of that important place; and I am to convey to you the king's commands, that in case Mr. Frere should, at any time, notify to you the actual consent of the Spanish government to admit a British garrison into Cadiz, you do detach an adequate force for that purpose, notifying immediately to me the amount of such force, that measures may be adopted for supporting the corps so detached, and for replacing it in Portugal.

Should you receive a requisition to the above effect from the governor of Cadiz, or other competent authority, you are authorised to act, without waiting for a communication through the British minister.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

And to these were again added the following decisive instructions, in regard to the appropriation of the British forces in the event of the evacuation of Portugal, a circumstance which could not but enter into consideration from the advance of the French, of which his majesty's government had received accounts.

Sir,

I am to acquaint you, that, upon a full consideration of the state of the affairs in Portugal, as communicated in the despatches received up to the 24th ultimo inclusive, from Lisbon, it does not appear to his majesty's ministers expedient that any alteration should take place in the measures now in progress for reinforcing the British army in that country.

Should the British army be unfortunately compelled to evacuate Portugal, his majesty, notwithstanding the late refusal to admit his troops into Cadiz, is, nevertheless, prepared to renew that offer on the same conditions; and, in the event of its acceptance, it is the king's pleasure that the whole force now in Portugal, including the cavalry, should be disembarked at Cadiz, from thence to be employed in such manner as may appear to you expedient for the support of the common cause.

Should this proposal of generous and disinterested aid be again declined by the government of Spain, it is his majesty's intention, (unless you receive orders to the contrary,) that, after reinforcing the garrison of Gibraltar to 8,000 British infantry, (the detailed arrangements of which you will concert with sir John Cradock,) you do return home with the remainder of the force.

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Lord viscount
Castlereagh to
lieut.-general
sir A. Welles-
ley, K. B.
Downing-street,
11th Apr. 1809.

The question of
British embark-
ation at Cadiz.

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April.

A copy of these instructions will be sent to Mr. Frere, through whom, in the above contingency, you will make the offer, hereby directed, to the central government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

To these were added the following:—

Sir,

Lord viscount
Castlereagh to
lieut.-gen. sir
Arthur Wel-
lesley, K.B.
Downing-street,
14th April,
1809.

Should you, in the execution of my orders of the 11th instant, have occasion to proceed with the whole of your force to the southward, before the determination of the Spanish government, as to your reception, is ascertained, it is the king's pleasure, in that case, that you do repair in the first instance to Gibraltar, and not to Cadiz, unless previously assured of being admitted.

As it is material, however, that the intentions of the Spanish government should be known without delay, Mr Frere will be directed to press for a decision on this point, in order that his majesty's government may know how far they are to consider the force now in Portugal as required for the service of Spain; or disposable, in the event of the evacuation of Portugal, for other services.

Mr. Frere will communicate to you, for your

guidance in the execution of the orders you have received, the result of his inquiries.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

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The whole of these are explained and confirmed by the following correlative instructions to the British minister in Spain.

Sir,

Your despatches, No. 32 to 35, inclusive, have been received this day, and will be forthwith laid before the king.

Mr secretary
Canning to the
right hon. J. H.
Frere,
April 12, 1809.

The immediate departure of sir Arthur Wellesley, who is actually embarked at Portsmouth, and by whom I forward this despatch, only allows me time to inclose to you copies of the additional instructions, which his majesty has directed to be given to him by his majesty's secretary of state for the war department, in consequence of the intelligence received yesterday from Lisbon of the advance of the French armies under marshals Victor and Soult, towards the northern and eastern provinces of Portugal.

You will observe, that in the alternative (for which it is necessary to provide, though I trust, nevertheless, it is not likely to take place) of the evacuation of Portugal by his majesty's forces;

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April.

Mr. Canning to
Mr. Frere.

sir Arthur Wellesley is directed to proceed with the army to Cadiz, to be landed there on the acceptance by the Spanish government of the condition, which you have already been instructed to propose, of the admission of British troops into the garrison of the fortress of Cadiz.

The repetition of this offer is intended to afford one more opportunity to the Spanish government to decide upon a question, the delicacy of which is felt and acknowledged ; and their answer to which has been received here without the smallest resentment or surprise.

But as that answer was founded on circumstances of a local and temporary nature, which may have varied with the succession of events in the peninsula, as the prejudices of the people of Cadiz do not in fact appear to have run, as the junta apprehended, against the admission of British troops, but rather in a contrary direction ; as the readiness with which those troops were withdrawn, upon the refusal of the junta to receive them, must have created a strong impression of the sincerity and disinterestedness with which they were offered ; as the arrival at Cadiz, subsequently to that event, of large quantities of arms and military stores, must have renewed and confirmed the confidence which previously subsisted in the good disposition of his majesty towards the Spanish nation ; as the fall of

Saragossa, and the defeat of general Reding, have considerably changed the face of military affairs and prospects in the peninsula as the military security of the south, and therewith of Cadiz itself, must be in no small degree impaired by the occupation of Portugal by the French; and lastly, as his majesty's army being once altogether withdrawn from the peninsula, there would be great difficulty, if not an entire impossibility, of renewing this offer again at any future period: I am commanded by his majesty to direct you to lay the subject thus once more before the supreme junta, with the same frankness and temper which you have manifested in the conduct of this delicate discussion on a former occasion, and to bring them, with as little delay as possible, to a final decision upon it.

You will understand, however, that these instructions apply only to the specific case of the evacuation of Portugal actually taking place, and the troops thereby becoming actually disposable, of which event you will receive due notice from his majesty's commanders in Portugal, and upon receipt of that notice only you will open the subject to the Spanish government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

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Mr. Canning to
Mr. Frere.

Sir Arthur Wellesley accordingly having sailed

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from Portsmouth on Saturday, the 15th of April, in the *Surveillante*, capt. sir George Collier arrived at Lisbon the 22d of the same month, and on the 24th made his first communication with the British minister, Mr. Frere.

In the same ship with sir Arthur Wellesley sailed the honourable major-gen. Stewart, major-gen. Murray, lord Fitzroy Somerset, the hon. Fitzroy Stanhope, and lieutenant Fitzclarence.

The staff of the commander-in-chief and general officers serving under him were nearly as follows :

The right honourable sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.
commander of the forces,

Lieut.-col. Bathurst, military secretary.

Lord Fitzroy Somerset,

The hon. Fitzroy Stanhope,

Lieutenant Fitzclarence,

} Aides-de-camp.

Brigadier-gen. the hon. Charles Stewart, adjutant-general.

Col. Murray, quarter-master-general.

Major Colin Campbell,—Major Berkeley, assistant-adjutant-general.

Generals of division and brigade.

Lieutenant-gen. Cartwright,

Major-gen. Sherbrooke,

Lord William Bentinck,

The hon. Edward Paget,
Hill,
Payne,
Cotten,
John Murray,
M'Kenzie,
Beresford,
Alexander Campbell.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

1809.
March.

Staff of the
army.

The whole force to be estimated about	30,000	Estimation of the forces.
Of this remaining in Portugal (of which are to be reckoned 2,700 of the stragglers from sir John Moore, preserved by the peasants of the Gal- licias)	13,000	
Embarked from Ireland, under general Hill, about . . .	5,000	
To follow cavalry, about . . . besides artillery, &c.	4,000	

Of the forces embarked at Portsmouth there
were, in the following order :

3d dragoon guards,
4th light dragoons,
Battalions of 48th, 52d, 95th,
Squadrons of the 16th, &c. &c.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.1809.
March.

Of the force collected at Cork, the following might be the staff-return :

Major-gen. Hill, commander of the forces,
Lient. Hill, capt. Currie 90th reg. aids-de-camp,
Capt. Fordyce, major of brigade,
Brig.-gen. Alexander Campbell, second in command,

Capt. Campbell, 7th regiment, aid-de-camp,
Capt. Hunter Blair, 91st regiment, brigade-major,
Lient.-col. Hinaber, 68th regiment, ass. adjut.-gen.
Bat.-major Williamson, 30th reg. } D. A. ad.-gen.
Capt. Elliot, 48th regiment, }
Lient.-col. William Delaney, assist. quarter-master-general,

Capt. Scovell, 57th foot, } D. A. qr.-master-gen.
Capt. Waller, 103d foot, }

The following regiments composed the force which sailed from Cork under general Hill:

MEN. COMMANDED BY

1st bat. guards	say	1000	lieut.-colonel
2d bat. 7th foot,		700	lieut.-col. sir W. Myers,
2d bat. 30th foot,		660	lieut.-col. Minnett,
2d bat. 48th foot,		800	Duckworth,
53d foot,		800	Bingham,
66th,		680	major Murray,
83d,		900	lieut.-col. Gordon.

5540

This force moved under major-gen. Hill's orders till it arrived at Coimbra, when (1st May) lord Wellington succeeded sir J. Cradock in command; and the army was divided into divisions and brigades; a Portuguese regiment and a rifle company of the 60th being attached to each brigade.

The 1st bat of 3d or buffs, lt.-col. div.	700	} effec- tive men.
2d, 48th regiment,	690	
2d, 66th regiment,	600	
1 company 5th bat. 60,	70	
	<hr/> 2060 <hr/>	

This force, under general Hill, formed the advance of the army, and afterwards, consequently, engaged the enemy at Oporto: three troops of the 14th, 16th, and 20th light dragoons, followed up the defeat.

Sir John Cradock having advanced with the army will account for the first paragraph of the commander-in-chief's despatch to Mr. Frere. It was as follows:

My dear sir,

I arrived here the day before yesterday, and I propose to take the command of the army in this country as soon as I shall have communicated with sir John Cradock.

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to Mr.
Frere.—Lisbon,
April 24, 1809.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

1809.

April.

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to Mr.
Frere.

I conclude that sir John has kept you informed of the movements of the French in the north of Portugal. I do not find that there has been any material alterations lately in their position. They have not passed the Vanga to the south ; nor have they extended themselves into Tralos Montes, since the loss of Chaves ; but they have made some movements towards the Tamaga, which divides Tralos Montes from Minho, and it is supposed they intend to acquire for themselves the option of retreating into Spain through Tralos Montes, if they should be passed by the British troops.

I intend to move towards Soult, and attack him, if I should be able to make any arrangement in the neighbourhood of Abrantes which can give any security for the safety of this place during my absence to the north.

I am not quite certain, however, that I should not do more good to the general cause by contributing with general Cuesta against Victor ; and I believe I should prefer this last, if Soult was not in possession of a part of Portugal which is very fertile in resources, and of the town of Oporto ; and if the operation with general Cuesta would not take up time which might be profitably employed against Soult.

It is probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego, and

if he should, I shall attack ; if he retires, I am sure that it will be most advantageous for the common cause that we should remain on the defensive, in the north of Portugal, and act vigorously with Cuesta against Victor.

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CHAP. II.

1809.
April.

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to Mr.
Frere.

In the first place, I do not know that singly I should be equal to the French force in Galicia ; and I am convinced, that a movement of the British force into that province, inasmuch as it would oblige the French to collect their force, would put an end for the present to the war of the peasantry, which has been so successful hitherto, has been so distressing to the enemy, and, in fact, prevents them from doing all the mischief which their position enabled them to do.

An operation against Victor is attended by these advantages :—if successful, it relieves effectually Seville and Lisbon ; and in case affairs should take such a turn as to enable the king's ministers to make another effort for the relief of Spain, the corps under my command in Portugal will not be removed to such a distance from the scene of operations as to render co-operation impossible, and we might hope to see an effectual effort made by a combined and concentrated force.

It is true that Galicia and other parts, which might be relieved by a different and more dispersed application of our force, will continue for some

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CHAP. II.

1809.

April.

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to Mr.
Frere.

time longer in the possession of the enemy ; but it must be recollected, that the relief of Galicia is certain, if this great effort should be successful, and it is probable that the relief, provided by these means, will be permanent.

I am assured that the French will be in great danger in Spain only when a great force will be assembled, which may oblige them to collect their force ; and this combined operation of the force in this country with that under general Cuesta may be the ground-work of further measures of the same sort.

I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate to me any accounts you may have of the strength and position of the different French corps in Spain.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The intelligence thus frankly desired by the commander-in-chief, immediately on his arrival in Portugal, had been in a great degree already furnished, by the steady vigilance of Mr. Frere ; as will appear from the following despatch :

Sir,

The copies of intercepted letters which I have the honour to transmit, will enable you, upon your own judgment, to form a satisfactory con-

Mr. Frere to
sir John Cra-
dock
Seville, 21st
April, 1809.

clusion upon the point respecting which, in your last letter, you express yourself so particularly anxious; namely,—The intention of the enemy with regard to a movement into Portugal from the side of Estramadura. The letters of latest date, and greatest authority, seem to speak decidedly of the march of an army against this city; but as it is probable the destruction of a British army, and the rescue of marshal Soult would, at the present moment, be considered as objects preferable to any other, I have much satisfaction in informing you, that general Cuesta's army, which consists at this moment of 24,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, and which, by the arrival of daily reinforcements, will be increased to the amount of 25,000 infantry and at least 4,000 cavalry in the course of a week, have received orders to preserve a strict defensive system, from the consideration that a second defeat on the part of this army might enable general Victor to march himself, or to detach considerably against the British forces, while advancing northward to the attack of marshal Soult. If general Victor should evacuate the country which he now occupies, and undertake a march to the relief of marshal Soult, general Cuesta would advance in proportion, and endeavour to harass and detain him as far as possible, without making a general action. This latter point I consider as agreed, and with respect

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April.

Mr. Frere to
sir John Cra-
dock.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

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Mr. Frere to
sir John Cra-
dock.

to the first, I have the honour to enclose copies of the instructions transmitted to general Cuesta.

I have been urged by the junta to represent, in the strongest terms, the necessity of some immediate active operation on the part of the British; but ignorant as I am, even of the number of our troops in Portugal, and without any pretension to judgment in a case which must depend entirely on military combination, I can only represent to you their wishes, and the arrangements which they have made, in the expectation that it may be found possible to realize them. Enclosed, I find a statement of the enemy's force, which appears detailed with sufficient exactness.

The detention of the 40th has not proceeded from any inattention to your repeated instances on that subject, but from the idea which I found likewise entertained by the officers, that under the then situation of things, military delicacy would hardly admit of their abandoning a point so immediately menaced. I shall be entirely guided by them, having no wish, and being very far from the pretension of interfering with, or deferring that execution of, your orders upon any other ground.

At the instances of the government, I took upon myself to sound colonel Kemmis upon the subject of an advance to Santa Olalla, but I found his opinion so decided, and his reasons so satisfactory, against a movement of that kind, that I did not

think it proper to propose the subject to him in a formal shape.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. H. FRERE.

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CHAP. II.

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April.

The following are the enclosures of intercepted papers :

I have received your letter. Marshal Victor is to keep between Merida and Badajos, till he shall have had news from marshal Soult, and have been joined by general Pisse.

Joseph Buona-
parte to general
Sebastiani.
Madrid,
6th April, 1809.

I shall undertake nothing against Valenera, until I have news from marshal Ney, and am apprised of the total *destruction* of Romana's corps.

Rely upon it, my dear Sebastiani, that I shall ever do what is agreeable to you, and that I shall solicit myself your departure from Spain, the moment that I think you may be better employed for your glory, elsewhere than in Spain; till then, I keep you. You know my long friendship for you.

Intercepted let-
ters describing
the situation and
projects of the
enemy.

Yours affectionately,

(Signed) JOSEPH.

Sir,

I have received the letter which you have done me the honour to write to me on the 8th inst. and I have submitted it to the king. His majesty directs me to have the honour of informing you, that he does not think proper to have the intrench-

Marshal Jour-
dan to general
Sebastiani.
Madrid, 10th
April, 1809.

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CHAP. II.

1809.

April.

Marshal Jourdan to general Sebastiani.

ments of the Sierra Morena attacked, before the moment when the duke of Belluno shall march against Seville; and that the duke of Belluno is not to commence his march, till he shall have been joined by the division of La Pisse, and when he shall have intelligence from the duke of Dalmatia.

Meanwhile, general, his majesty wishes you would endeavour to disperse those bodies which appear from time to time in the rear of the army; to render your communications as sure as possible, to disarm the province which you occupy, and restore order and confidence. This, general, I am expressly commanded by his majesty to write to you.

The marshal of the empire,

Major-general of H. C. M.

(Signed) JOURDAN.

*To general Sebastiani, commander-in-chief,
ad interim, of the 10th corps of the army.*

My dear General,

I thank you for your kind remembrance.

General Bel-
liard to general
Sebastiani.
Madrid, 10th
April, 1809.

I have learnt, with pleasure, the re-establishment of your health. Why would you not put an end to the rabble? The opinion of the inhabitants of Madrid does not improve. It is true that the *priests** do not take much pains to form it. You are

* La Sacré Ministère.

right in saying the priesthood****. How is it that La Mancha is not organised? Why not make them recognise king Joseph and Napoleon? Why not establish the new system? I believe that you would do well, my dear general, to profit of a moment of tranquillity to over-run the country with two moveable columns; and disarm it entirely.

(Signed) BELLIARD.

General Sebastiani,

&c. &c. &c.

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1809.
April.

General Belliard to general Sebastiani.

The following communication, though equally referred to and necessary for information, goes farther, and, indeed, anticipates a fact which, however, to have been long before expected from the judgment and bravery of colonel Mayne, and the native troops under his command, had not even yet taken place, the possession of Alcantara by the enemy.

It moreover exhibits the Spanish general in the best extreme of the military character, with an adventurous rather than a vacillating, cold, indecisive, spirit.

Most excellent Sir,

The supreme junta of the kingdom orders me to state to your excellency, that, in the supposition of the troops which took Alcantara,

M. Cornet to general Cuesta. Seville, 20th April, 1809.

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1809.
April.

M. Cornet to
general Cuesta.

being on their march to reinforce Victor, it is to be inferred that they propose to put in execution the attack ordered by king Joseph, in the letter which I yesterday transmitted to your excellency.

His majesty, therefore, having consulted the general military junta, and in concert with the minister of his Britannic majesty, thinks it right that you should take up such positions as may appear most advantageous to your excellency ; that you should avoid a general attack ; disputing with the enemy their passage to those points, and towards this city ; that this measure appears to be pointed out by the consideration of your army being the salvation of the country, as that of Victor, is of the French ; and that your excellency, continuing the operations of your advanced posts, should prevent the enemy from annoying and plundering the villages ; that, with this understanding, the English minister has offered to apply, in the strongest terms, to the general-in-chief of the English forces, to march in force against Soult ; and, having beaten him, to proceed, without delay, with a respectable power, to Elvas, to settle the plan to be followed for the future ; and his majesty thinks it would be advantageous that your excellency should write to the general-in-chief, stating the importance of this measure to the common cause ; and the junta, likewise, thinks that,

as at present, the fortress of Badajoz has nothing to fear on its flank; and in case of Victor's attacking you, it should make a sally of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to annoy them, and draw their attention; and if your excellency thinks proper that the army of the centre should make any movement, that you should notify the same to Vanegas:—Finally, I transmit the accompanying letter to your excellency for your guidance, his majesty not doubting, if its contents be certain, that your excellency will be able to assemble such of the peasantry as have arms, whenever you shall think proper.

(Signed) CORNAL.

His Excellency Don Greg. de la Cuesta,

&c. &c. &c.

In the same frank and zealous manner did Mr. Frere also address the Spanish general on the delicate subject of altering the appointment, or posting, even of the superior officers of the Spanish army.

Sir,

In a letter which I addressed to sir John Cradock, and of which the junta have done me the honour to communicate a copy to your excellency, I give him reason to hope that a diversion will be

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April.
General Bel-
liard to general
Sebastian.

Mr. Frere to
general Cuesta.
Seville, 22d
April, 1809.

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1809.

April.

Mr. Frere to
general Cuesta.

made in the direction of La Mancha, a movement, of which it is unnecessary to particularize all the advantages. I have, however, refrained from touching upon a point on which, in my opinion, the good or bad issue of this operation must absolutely depend,—I mean, the choice of the person who is to conduct it.

I think that an army torn by factions, as well as by successive removals of its officers, and discouraged by adverse fortune, can have no hope of being speedily re-established, and conducted to victory, but by a general known to them by a successful battle, and who is personally popular in the army, as well as in the province in which he is to act. Among our disposable generals, the duke of Albuquerque is the only one who unites in his person all these circumstances. But, as he has also the happiness to enjoy the favour and confidence of your excellency, I did not think it right to take a step tending to withdraw and separate him from your immediate orders, without having previously obtained your consent, being fully aware that your excellency, satisfied like myself of the importance of the object, will have no objection to dispense with the services of the duke, when you think they may be more beneficially employed elsewhere. I am not competent to enter into discussions with your excellency con-

cerning the description and degree of military merit, which distinguished the duke de Albuquerque and M. de Vanegas; but, perhaps, your excellency might be of opinion, that the latter having served always under your orders, and not only near your person, but more immediately under your eyes, would be neither less useful, nor less vigorous, than the former, who, from other circumstances, seems to be more fit for a distant command.

It only remains to add, that, at this moment, I have no other means of influence upon the plans of our generals in Portugal, than by suggesting to them good reasons, and by raising hopes; and that your excellency would powerfully support me in both, if you should think proper to accede to the arrangement which I have the honour to make to you.

I request, &c.

(Signed) J. H. FRERE.

His Excellency General Cuesta.

Under all the circumstances, whatever the utility of the preceding suggestion, the following report is not only natural but dignified; and, at the same time, adds to the account, already desired by the commander-in-chief, of the enemy's plans, those of the Spanish army, which could not be considered by his excellency as less important.

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Mr. Frere to
general Cuesta.

BOOK IV.

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1809.

April.

Translation of a
report from ge-
neral Cuesta to
M. Cornel.
Head quarters,
Monasterio,
21st April,
1809.

General Cuesta, after acknowledging the receipt of his orders to avoid an action, says, "Being fully possessed with the same idea and views, I had already formed my plan of defence, in the points which I thought most convenient for stopping the enemy's passage to Andalusia, which it is very likely he will attempt upon this side with his late reinforcements.

I have established my most advanced post at Medina de la Torres, with 640 horse and 800 foot, most of them light troops, under the command of the Marques de Campo Don Pedro de Agn. de Echevarna, who spread their skirmishing parties in all directions, and follow the enemy close into Almendralejo.

State of the Spa-
nish army under
general Cuesta.

A little on this side of Fuente de Cantos, I have a corps of 1800 horse, under the command of lieutenant-general Don Juan de Henestrosa, to support and strengthen the above advanced post, and take advantage of any favourable opportunity.

A league more this way, where the Sierras begin, is stationed another advanced post of 3200 foot, and 650 horse, under the command of the brigadier Don Josef de Zagas, to assist and support the body of cavalry and first position, in case of their being attacked by superior forces, and obliged to retreat.

A league and a half in the rear, at this my head

quarters, I have posted the rest of my infantry, with about 900 horse, at the back of the village. No one of the above positions present great advantages, but I maintain them, for the sake of confining the enemy, and to support the retreat of the advanced post, which, in case of necessity, must unite here.

About a league in my rear the various fortified posts begin; and those which are most defensible as far as St. Olalla, and Ronquilla, which I have ordered to be manned with the battalions of infantry which are come from la Carolina, and with the division under the command of commodore Don Josef Lerreno Baldenebro.

Not being able to make use of cavalry in this broken country, I have directed that those corps, which arrived from Andalusia, should be cantoned beyond Ronquillo, in the villages nearest to the Arrecife, and where the ground begins to be practicable, and the broken country ends, a point in which I shall make my last resistance with the power of attacking the enemy with my whole force, as soon as he begins to descend into the plain.

Besides this, I have despatched a battalion to Guadalional, and 1000 men to Casella, to defend the passes of Guadalional and San Miguel de

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State of the Spanish army under general Cuesta.

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State of the Spanish army under general Cuesta;

Alaris, assisted by sharp-shooters and the armed peasants of that district.

I propose to write to the general-in-chief of the English army in Portugal, urging him, as soon as he has beat marshal Soult, to approach the borders of Estremadura, that we may combine our operations; but I look upon this assistance as very remote.

Be pleased to lay this before his majesty, for his information, and any change he may please to direct; assuring him on my part, that if my troops behave, as I hope they will, the enemy will not pass into Andalusia on this side, unless over the body of my army.

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

His Excellency Don Ant. Cornel,

&c. &c. &c.

General Cuesta thus expresses himself to M. de Cornel, in continuation.

Most excellent Sir,

Nothing new has occurred at the outposts of this army. The enemy remain with some force of horse and foot in Villa Franca, Fuente del Maestro, and St. Marta. The same who attempted to enter Gafra the day before yesterday,

A report from general Cuesta to M. de Cornel.

Head quarters, Monasterio, 23d April, 1809.

and failed, from the good resistance made by a strong guard of the king's regiment of cavalry, who had a serjeant and two soldiers killed, and three wounded; and from the fire of some peasantry, of the honorary militia of that town, who had two killed and four wounded; and, they assert, that the enemy suffered considerably in the attack and retreat.

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

His Excellency Don Ant. Cornel,

&c. &c. &c.

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1809.
April.

A report from
general Cuesta
to M. de Cor-
nel.

To the same effect is the following report of the Spanish officer, second in command to general Cuesta; while, in acuteness of examination, it appears infinitely beyond the scrutiny to which the conduct of their forces has been subjected, even by the most unfortunate of British commanders.

Most excellent Sir,

The captain of our reconnoitring party saw and pursued two enemies on the road, from Torrenueva and Santa Cruz, but could not overtake them.

The colonel, Don Josef Antonia de Sauz, who commands the advanced posts of the van-guard,

General Vene-
gas to M. de
Cornel.
Head-quarters,
St. Elena, 22d
April, 1809.

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April.

General Ven-
gar to M. de
Cornel.

reports, that, last night, seven cavalry soldiers, and a French officer, were at Viso, asking the Alcaide to conceal them, in order to surprise our reconnoitring party; that house was shewn them, in which the eight were all assassinated and buried. I doubt this report, because they give no account of the horses, and I shall ascertain it to-morrow.

A mail-bag has just arrived, which I have sent to the junta of La Carolina, to be forwarded immediately to the capital; the justice of Villa Manrique forwarded it to the post of Montezon, having been sent from justice to justice from that of Puebla del Principe, with the account that it was taken in Fillimusterre, by Francisco Moyan, of Morpart, and four companies, who killed the bearers. Another despatch came from Don Martin de Garay, which the M. de Campo, Don Pedro Grimarez, sent immediately, taking advantage, as he tells me, of the passing of the Courier with the post from Valencia, and wishing not to delay the accounts, which those who took it might give him. Having united in Montazon 4000 foot, and the regiment of dragoons of Granada, 4 cannon and howitzers, a van-guard has been formed, under the brigadier Don Diego Vallesteros; and troops have been advanced to Villa Manrique and Torre de Juan, to encourage the neighbourhood and

cover the villages from the inroads of the enemy. Brigadier Don Celendonia Emeteria Banedo, and the lieut.-colonel Don Josef Martinez, presented themselves to me to-night, with whom I have conferred upon the means of annoying the enemy with the body of 1,000 infantry and 400 horse, or what our force and circumstances admit; and we have agreed that the point of Montizon itself is the most proper for making sallies, increasing the troops in it, and supporting, in case of retreat, the advanced troops.

To-morrow I shall determine, positively, what is most convenient.

(Signed) FRANCISCO VENEGAS.

To this intelligence is to be added the following particulars to the subject:—

Confidential information respecting the state of the enemy's force in *Estremadura*.

Infantry, regiments 9, 24, 27, 43, 63, 94, 95, and 96.

Chasseurs a Cheval, regiments 2, 5, 10, and 26.

Dragoons, regiments 1, 2, 4, 9, 14, and 26.

Besides one regiment of the confederation.

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April.

General Venegas to M. de Cornet.

Translation of a statement of the French force in Estremadura, April, 1809.

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April.

Translation of a
statement of the
French force in
Estremadura.

Supposing the regiments of infantry not to exceed 2,000 men, their force would amount to

17,600

* Add to those which entered
by Alcantara, estimated at . . . 5,200

Total . . 22,800 Infantry.

It is asserted that the Cuirassiers, and Carabini-
niers, have returned to France.

The following report, tending only to shew the
temper of the Spanish officer, is inserted in repe-
tition :—

General Cuesta
to M. de Cor-
nel.
Head-quarters,
Monasterio, 23d
April, 1809.

Most excellent Sir,

Nothing now has occurred at the out-
posts of this army. The enemy remain with some
force of horse and foot in Villa Franca, Fuente
del Maestra, and St. Marta, the same who at-

French force
immediately op-
posed to the al-
lies.

* These regiments are since learnt to be the regiments 8, 14,
45, and 54, infantry ; and the cavalry, 5th dragoons and West-
phalian Chasseurs a Cheval, which, according to the above com-
putation, would make this corps amount to 8,800 infantry, and
1,000 cavalry ; and the total force in Estremadura would be 26,000
infantry, and 6,500 cavalry.

tempted to enter Zafra the day before yesterday, and failed, from the good resistance made by a strong guard of the king's regiment of cavalry, who had a serjeant and two soldiers killed, and three wounded; and from the fire of some of the peasantry of the honorary militia of that town, who had two killed and four wounded; and, they assert, that the enemy suffered considerably in the attack and retreat.

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

From the results of such inquiries as he could make with effect, sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to form the plan of his operations, thus announcing his excellency's reception of the command:

My lord,

I arrived here on the 22d instant, and having communicated with general sir John Cra-dock, he put me in orders on the 25th, and I have assumed the command of the army.

Lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, K.B. to
lord viscount
Castlereagh.
Lisbon, 7th
April, 1809.

The whole of the British army in Portugal, are assembled at Leyria and Alcobaca, with the exception of the 2d battalion of the 30th regiment in garrison at Lisbon; of the 16th dragoons, on its march to join the army, and of the 2d, 24th foot, and 3d dragoon guards, and 4th dragoons, just landed.

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April.

French force
immediately op-
posed to the al-
lies.

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April.

Lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, K.B. to
lord viscount
Castlereagh.

The corps of marshal Soult is still in the north of Portugal, occupying the city of Oporto, with his advanced posts at Ova: It is engaged with its left in an attack upon general Silveira, on the Tamaga, with a view to open the province of Tras los Montes, for its communication with Spain.

The corps of general la Pisse, which had advanced from Salamanca, and threatened an attack upon the province of Beira, has marched along the frontiers of Portugal to Alcantara, where it crossed the Tagus, and it is now joined with that under the command of marshal Victor, at Merida, upon the Guadiana.

This last corps has been upon the Guadiana since the defeat of the Spanish army under general Cuesta, with its advanced posts south of that river. General Cuesta is at Llerena; and I understand, by a communication from Mr. Frere to the secretary of state, a copy of which has been sent here, that the Spanish government are taking measures to reinforce that general, and that he will move to Portugal, if Victor should take advantage of the absence of the British army engaged in operations to the northward, to invade Portugal.

Under these circumstances I have determined forthwith to move to the northward, I propose to take 6,000 Portuguese troops with me, and the whole of the British troops now in Portugal,

with the exception of the 2nd battalion of the 30th, the 2nd battalion of the 24th; the brigade of infantry under the command of major-general Mackenzie, and the 3d dragoon guards, and 4th dragoons.

These troops, with about 7,000 of the Portuguese infantry and cavalry, will be left on the Tagus, to watch the movements of the enemy upon the frontier, and to guard the passes over that river between Abrantes and Santarem.

As soon as the enemy will have evacuated the north of Portugal, it is my intention to return to the eastern frontier of that kingdom, and to co-operate with the Spanish general Cuesta, against the army of Victor.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Nothing can more completely evince the extreme delicacy and anxious care required to the conduct of the campaign at this period than the following document:

In my despatch, says Mr. Secretary Canning, which I forwarded to Lisbon by sir Arthur Wellesley, a duplicate of which I herewith inclose, you are directed not to bring the question of Cadiz again under discussion with the Spanish

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1809.
April.

Lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, K.B. to
lord viscount
Castlereagh.

Mr. secretary
Canning
to the right hon.
J. H. Frere.
Foreign-office,
17th April,
1809.

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CHAP. II.

1809.

April.

Mr. secretary
 Canning to the
 right hon. J. H.
 Frere,
 Foreign-office,
 April 17, 1809.

government, until you shall receive notice from the commander of his majesty's forces in Portugal, of the actual evacuation of that country by the British army.

Upon consideration, however, of the time which may elapse before such notice can reach you, and of the disadvantages which might arise from the actual appearance of a British army off Cadiz a second time, without the certainty of being admitted, I am now to direct you to ascertain, with as little delay as possible, whether, in the event of our evacuation of Lisbon, the Spanish government would desire or accept the services of the British army, consisting at present of upwards of 25,000 men, including between 3 and 4,000 cavalry, and 1,200 artillery, at Cadiz; on the condition so often specified, of the admission of a part of that force into the garrison of that fortress.

I have so repeatedly stated to you the grounds upon which this condition is annexed to the offer, and have so fully explained the motives which induce a repetition of the offer at the present moment, after having been so distinctly refused, that I have nothing to add upon that subject.

You will not fail to communicate, with the utmost expedition, to his majesty's commanders at Lisbon, the result of your application to the Spanish government, in order that in the unfortunate event

of the evacuation of Lisbon, (to the possibility of which event alone this whole instruction applies), the British commanders may be timely apprised, whether it be, or be not, necessary, that they should carry the army to Cadiz, or whether they should at once carry it to such other destination, as his majesty may, in the alternative of its not being wanted at Cadiz, have assigned for it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

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1809.

April.

Mr. Canning to
Mr. Frere.

The following remarks form a mere public instrument of military diplomacy, on the delicate subject of obtaining possession of Cadiz by British troops on the part of their government, and on the desire of British detachments to serve with the Spanish forces on that of Spain.

His majesty's determination not to allow small detachments of his troops to be annexed to the Spanish armies, or to serve under the command of a Spanish general, was signified at a very early period to the government of Spain : yet, notwithstanding their knowledge of this determination, and of the cogent motives which dictated it, their applications for separate corps to be attached to the Spanish armies have been continually repeated.

Mr. secretary
Canning to the
right. hon. J. H.
Frere.
Foreign-office,
19th April,
1809.

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CHAP. II.1609.
April.Mr. Canning to
Mr. Frere.

After the retreat of the British army from Corunna, his majesty was still solicitous to support the Spanish cause, and was willing to appropriate a considerable body of British troops for service in that part of the Peninsula, which was likely to become the principal theatre of the war; but the unfortunate result of the campaign in the north, and the disasters which the British army had experienced in effecting their retreat through the open and defenceless town of Corunna, rendered it impossible for his majesty to expose his troops to a recurrence of similar calamities. It therefore became indispensably necessary for the British troops to obtain the temporary occupation of some strong fortress, in which, in the case of reverses, they might find a secure retreat, and keep open their communication with the sea, for the purpose of either receiving reinforcements, or, in the worst extremity, of embarking in safety. Although no satisfactory or distinct motive has been assigned by the Spanish government for their rejection of his majesty's offer to place a garrison in Cadiz, it is yet hoped that the motives which produced that offer cannot be misunderstood or misinterpreted. His majesty, on his part, does not think himself authorized, in any degree, to complain of its rejection. So long, however, as the Spanish government shall remain in-

sensible to what appears to be as much their interest as it would be essential to the safety of a British army in Spain, his majesty must adhere to his original determination; and, for the present, leave the struggle against France in Spain itself, to be carried on by the military efforts of Spain alone.

His majesty, nevertheless, though precluded, by the act of the Spanish government, from joining his military efforts to those of their own armies, will remain faithful to his engagement. His majesty is persuaded that the enthusiasm of the Spanish nation, for the cause of their legitimate sovereign, and of their national independence, continues unimpaired; but that spirit may, too probably, evaporate or exhaust itself to no purpose, in desultory and unproductive exertions, unless their government adopt a system of energy and decision, adequate to the magnitude and the dangers of the crisis in which they are placed.

No such obstacles as have prevented the assembling of a British force in Spain exist, in regard of Portugal. The large army which his majesty has directed to be collected in that part of the Peninsula, occupies the fortresses of that country; and, in the case of reverses, a secure port of embarkation is at his disposal. His majesty doubts not, that in the possession of these advantages, aided by the

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April.

Mr. Canning to
Mr. Froge.

BOOK IV.
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April.
Mr. Canning to
Mr. Frere.

efforts of the Portuguese nation, his army will be equal to the purposes; not only of providing for the immediate protection of Portugal, but in due time of effectually covering the adjacent provinces of Spain.

I am commanded to state these observations to you, in order that you may make such representations founded upon them to the Spanish government, as you may deem to be proper and seasonable. You will, however, most carefully avoid the expression of any sentiment which might have the appearance of resentment or reproach; and you will avail yourself of these observations only to induce the Spanish government to abandon the narrow system of policy upon which they are now acting, and to repose that unbounded confidence in his majesty's intentions to which, from the disinterestedness and magnanimity that have uniformly marked his majesty's conduct towards Spain, his majesty is justly entitled; and which, even if the intentions of his majesty could have been originally misapprehended, the sanction in the face of the world, by a solemn treaty of the engagements which his majesty has taken in behalf of the independence and integrity of Spain, might have been expected to secure to him.

In the following brief despatch is described the first advance of the army.*

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1809.

April.

My lord,

I have the honour to inform you, that, in conformity with the intention which I announced

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
Castlereagh.

* It is a matter of mere military curiosity, to insert the state of the British army, which had taken the field under the command of lieut.-general sir John Cradock, K. B. and K. G. and reached Leyrisk. Second in command, major-general Sherbrooke.

Cavalry, major-general Cotton.—Commanding officers of regiments.—14th Light Dragoons, colonel Hawker; 16th Light Dragoons, colonel Anson; detachment 20th Light Dragoons, major Blake; ditto 3d Light King's German Legion, captain Meyer.

FIRST LINE.

Brigadier-general Campbell.—1st Bat. Cold. Guards, lieut.-colonel Hulse; 1 ditto 3d Guards, colonel Stopford.

Major-general Mackenzie.—3d Batt. 47th Regiment, lieut.-colonel McLean; 2d ditto, 31st Regiment, major Watson; 1st ditto, 45th Regiment, lieut.-colonel Guard.

Brigadier-general Stewart. — 29th Regiment, lieut.-colonel White; 1 Batt. Detachments, lieut.-colonel Bunbury.

Major-general Tilson.—1 Batt. 3d, or Buffs, lieut.-colonel Drummond; 2 ditto 87th, major Cough; 1 ditto 88th, major Vandeleur.

Major-general Murray, and brigadier-generals Draberg and Langworth.—1st Line Batt. King's German Legion, major Ro-

BOOK IV.

CHAP. II.

1309.

April.

Lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, K.B. to
lord viscount
Castlereagh.
Coimbra, 7th
May, 1809.

to your lordship, on the 27th April, I have assembled the army at this place, with the exception of the 2d battalion of the 30th regiment, employed

deker; 2 ditto ditto, lieut.-colonel Brown; 5 ditto ditto, major Gerber; 7 ditto ditto, lieut.-colonel Low.

SECOND LINE.

Brigadier-general A. Campbell.—2d Batt. 7th, or Royal Fusiliers, lieut.-colonel sir W. Myers; 3d Ditto, 53d, lieut.-colonel Bingham.

Brigadier-general Sontag, 97th Regiment, lieut.-colonel Lyon; 2d Batt. Detachments, lieut.-colonel Copson.

Brigadier-general Cameron.—2d Batt. 9th Foot, lieut.-colonel Molle; 2d Batt, 83d, lieut.-colonel Gordon.

RESERVE.

Major-general Hill.—2d Batt. 48th, lieut.-colonel Duckworth; 5th Batt. 60th (Light) major Davey; 2d Batt. 66th, major Murray.

In garrison at Lisbon, 2d Batt. 30th Regiment, colonel Minnett.

Brigadier-general Howarth, commanding the Artillery.

Chief Engineer—Lieut.-colonel Fletcher.

Deputy adjutant-general—Lieut.-colonel Darroch.

Deputy quarter-master-general—Colonel Dunkin.

Deputy commissary-general—P. Rawlings, Esq.

Inspector of hospitals—Alexander Thomson, Esq.

PERSONAL STAFF OF THE COMMANDER OF THE FORCES.

Lieut.-colonel Reynell, 71st, Military Secretary.

Capt. Morris, 3d Foot; capt. Burgh, 92d Foot; ensign Freemantle, Coldstream Guards; viscount Ebrington, 9th Foot, aides-de-camp.

to garrison Lisbon, and the detachment on the Tagus under the command of major-general Mackenzie.

The whole were assembled here on the 5th inst. and, on the same day, a detachment consisting of one brigade of British infantry, and one squadron of British cavalry, and a corps of about 6,000 Portuguese troops, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, moved towards Vizea, under general Berestord, in order to operate upon the enemy's left, while I shall move upon his right at Oporto, with the main body of the British army, and two regiments of Portuguese infantry; the British advanced guard commenced its march this morning.

The enemy remained nearly in the same position, as well on the eastern frontier, as in the northern provinces of this kingdom, as he did when I wrote last.

No alteration whatever that I know of has been made in the positions of the French army on the Guadiana; and the only difference in this quarter is, that the Portuguese general, Silveira, has been defeated upon the Tamega, and that the French had obtained possession of the bridge of Amaranthe, on the 2d instant. This acquisition is important, inasmuch as it affords them the

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Lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, K.B. to
lord viscount
Castlereagh.

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1809.

April.

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
viscount Castle-
reagh.

facility of retreating through the province of
Tras los Montes.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

CHAP. III.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1809,
UNDER SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, (AFTER-
WARDS LORD WELLINGTON).

*Preparatory Circumstances and Detail.—Communica-
tions between the British Commander-in-Chief
and the Allies.—Active Politico-Military Ex-
ertions of the British Minister.*

MARSHAL BERESFORD had already com-
menced operations in his new character, and pre-
pared reinforcements for sir Robert Wilson, among
the mountains southward of Salamanca, as well as
an auxiliary force to general Cuesta, of between
two and three thousand men, for a post on the line
of the Thietar.

Operations of
marshal Beres-
ford.

He had also issued the following general orders ;
to which, whatever exception may occur, it falls
not within the present observation.

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April.

General orders.

“ His royal highness the prince regent of Portugal, having most graciously been pleased to entrust to field-marshal Beresford the command-in-chief of his armies; the field-marshal thinks it right, on assuming the command, to state and declare to his comrades in arms his sentiments on this occasion.

“ The field-marshal and commander-in-chief, during the time he served in the army which was sent by his Britannic majesty to support the admirable and prodigious efforts made by the Portuguese, to recover their liberty and independence so unjustly attacked, had an opportunity of becoming intimately acquainted with the military character of this nation; and although he thinks he has given the most effectual proofs of the high idea he had formed of that character, by accepting the above command, yet he declares, in a still more decisive manner, that the command-in-chief of the Portuguese army, *could not have possibly been confided to any other officer, so thoroughly convinced* of the innate military talents and disposition of the Portuguese, who want nothing but skill and uniformity of plan, in the direction of their warlike energies, to prove that they still are what they have always been, if not the best soldiers, at least equal to the most valiant and most intrepid troops of Europe. The field-marshal, commander-in-chief,

will therefore exert himself, with incessant zeal and application, to render those qualities as efficient as they are accustomed to be, when they are assisted by a strict and well-regulated discipline. It is universally acknowledged, that the Portuguese are loyal to their sovereign, obedient to their lawful authorities who represent him, and that they endure, without murmurs, those privations, and inconveniences to which armies are frequently obliged to submit. The patriotism, energy, and enthusiasm, of which they have but very lately given the most unquestionable proofs; the glory which they acquired in Roussillon, *and the successes which they obtained on the northern frontiers*, clearly shew their determined intrepidity and valour,—qualities which cannot but render them worthy of their ancestors, and as illustrious as they.

“No nation, ye men of Portugal, is therefore better qualified than you are, to become most excellent troops. The field-marshal, commander-in-chief, convinced of this trust, finds himself with the utmost pleasure identified with the Portuguese nation. He is a Portuguese officer, and confides to the Portuguese his character and honour, perfectly satisfied that they will be preserved unimpaired. The field-marshal, commander-in-chief, deems it necessary to assure you, that he will at all times consider it as one of his most important

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General orders.

duties, to raise and reward merit, whenever he shall meet with it; and that the only recommendation he shall notice, will be that derived from activity, skill, valour, and patriotism,—qualities which will at all times find in him a sure and zealous protector. The field-marshal, commander-in-chief, calls the attention of all the general and subaltern officers, to the present state and improvement of the army; and being convinced that the best method of introducing discipline, and a strict observance of duty in a military corps, consists in the example set by officers, he hopes they will never fail to give their men a lesson so necessary and important. The field-marshal, commander-in-chief, feels anxious to embrace the earliest opportunity of inspecting the different corps which have already taken the field, as well as the rest of the army; and he shall avail himself of all occasions which offer to promote the satisfaction, decorum, and advantage, of the officers and soldiers who are entrusted to his care.”

“ *Head-quarters, Lisbon, March 13th, 1809.*”

Under the circumstances also in which the commander-in-chief assumed his appointment, nothing could be more necessary than a frequent, however cursory, retrospect of the following details.

The total number of troops that embarked for service in Spain and Portugal, in the year 1808, shewing the numbers of those that have returned to Great Britain, and those remaining on service :

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April.

EMBARKED.	RETURNED OR RE-		DEFICIENCY.
	MAINING ON SER-	VICE.	
Field officers	137	131	6
Captains	404	390	14
Subalterns	1,158	1,109	49
Staff	273	259	14
Sergeants	2,234	2,133	101
Drummers	960	871	89
Rank and file	40,616	34,147	6,469

The stores shipped by the store-keeper-general for the use of the British forces serving in Spain and Portugal, according to official returns, were,

Camp equipage for 10,000 cavalry,
Ditto . . . for 48,000 infantry,

Purveyor's stores for 21,000 men for twelve months,
Ditto . . . for 35,000 men for six months,

Extra sets of bedding 500
Flannel waistcoats 50,000
Pairs of shoes 54,884
Pairs of boots, soles and heels 4,000
Shoes ditto 8,000

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Sets of accoutrements . . .	4,700
Extra pack-saddles and bridles . . .	100
Provision-marquees . . .	3

The money sent from this country to Spain and Portugal, from the first of May, 1808, amounted, according to an account laid before the house of commons, to £2,896,050. 12s. 9d.

The money obtained by the negociation of bills made payable in this country for the use of the inhabitants of Spain and Portugal, amounts to £220,434 14s. 3d.

And the total of the money lost, or taken by the enemy, during the campaign, is £77,950.

The medicines supplied to the troops are estimated at £11,000, exclusive of some instruments.

According to an account laid before the house of commons, the transports employed for the transportation of the army, stores, &c. to Portugal and Spain, in the year 1808, amounted to 806,—tonnage, 194,670,—expense, £1,292,783.

Supplies to Spain and Portugal.

The following is an official account of the expense incurred in furnishing arms, and other ordnance supplies, to the Spaniards and Portuguese, since May, 1808 ; prepared pursuant to an order of

the house of commons, dated March 27, 1809, **BOOK IV.**
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 £670,328 17 1.

SENT SINCE THE 1ST OF MAY, 1808.

Pieces of cannon 98 and 31,600 rounds of ammunition.

Howitzers . 33 7,200 ditto.

Carronades . 20 4,000 ditto.

Muskets . . . 200,177	Cloth . . yards 125,000
Rifles . . . 220	Calico . . do. 82,000
Swords . . . 61,391	Serge . . pieces 6,489
Pikes . . . 79,000	Cloth . . do. 4,015
Infantry accoutrement	Great coats . 50,000
sets . . . 39,000	Suits clothing . 92,000
Ball cartridges 23,477,955	Shirts . . . 35,000
Lead balls . . 6,260,000	Shoes . . . 98,600
Whole barrels of	Shoe soles . 15,000
powder . . . 15,408	Calico . . pieces 22,212
Specie . . . £1,934,903	&c. &c. &c.
Bills of exchange	Canteens . . 50,000
negotiated . . 220,409	Haversacks . 54,000
Camp equipage . 10,000	Hats and caps . 16,000
Tents . . . 49,000	Pouches and belts 240,000
Linen . . yards 118,000	Pieces sheeting 702

ON THEIR PASSAGE.

Cloth . . pieces 298	Shoes . . . 78,000
Shirts . . . 4,100	Shoe soles . 35,000
Pouches . . . 47,000	Boots . . . 8,100

TO BE SHIPPED AS SOON AS RECEIVED FROM CONTRACTORS.

Boots . . . 29,400	Pouches . . . 130,450
Shoes . . . 233,400	Cloth . . yards 125,000
Suits . . . 100	

The above account acquaints us with the quantity of articles sent, but neither informs us when they were shipped off, nor when they reached Spain.

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April.

Preparatory also to the useful combination of efforts on the part of the armies about to be allied, was the care of Mr. Frere, to produce on the part of the Spanish general a slower inclination for the attack, than had been evinced by general Cuesta, who was wanting in any thing rather than active bravery. It is thus communicated to his friend in power at home :—

Sir,

The right hon.
J. H. Frere to
Mr. Secretary
Canning.
Seville, 25th
April, 1809.

I profit by the detention of the Malta packet, to inform you, in addition to my despatch of last week, that the junta had been for some time exceedingly anxious to tie up general Cuesta's hands from any measure of general attack, to which it was apprehended he was too much inclined, it being the opinion of all military men, and confirmed by the event of the battle of Medellin, that, in the present state of the Spanish armies, a regular pitched battle would constantly be attended with the same results. It was agreed, therefore, that a defensive system should be made the subject of a specific argument, to which I, as his majesty's minister, was to be a party ; and which, of course, the general would not feel himself at liberty to break through. Conformably to this idea, I wrote the letter, of which the inclosed is a copy, to sir John Cradock, communicating the instructions

which had been transmitted to general Cuesta, and in which it is enjoined him to remain upon the defensive, with the main body of his army, in the understanding that the British army, after beating general Soult at Oporto, or driving him from that point, and shutting him up in Galicia, might come down in time to act upon the flank or rear of general Victor, in Estremadura, or pursue and profit by his weakness, after such a loss as he would experience in forcing a strong position, resolutely defended by a large army, however inferior in discipline. I at the same time forwarded the accompanying copies of intercepted letters, of which the latest appeared to point decidedly to an attack upon Andalusia. In order that the British might not be exposed to an attack from the combined forces of marshals Soult and Victor, who might march forward, after having routed general Cuesta; it was to be considered as a condition, that that general should, as far as possible, avoid an action.

A translation of this letter was communicated to the junta, and to general Cuesta, and I accordingly took an opportunity, at the end of it, of making an indirect answer to many solicitations and representations, which had been made to me on the subject of the 40th regiment.

In pursuance to the anxious wish which I have entertained, to see a diversion made on the side of

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April.

Right hon. J.H.
Frere to Mr.
Canning.

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April.Right hon. J.H.
Frere to Mr.
Canning.

La Mancha, under the command of the duke of Albuquerque, I took an opportunity, founded upon this communication, to write a letter to general Cuesta upon this subject. I have not yet received his answer.

The question of the direction in which the force at Alcantara had arrived, and which was still in doubt at the date of my last despatch, was, as you will see, sir, decided, by the intercepted letters above mentioned. I am sorry to add, that, by sir R. Wilson's account, the safety of this detachment, in so long and exposed a march, is to be attributed to the panic and negligence of the Portuguese, who retired immediately upon the approach of the enemy. Sir Robert's last letter is dated the 15th, from Castello Branco, from whence he was going to Thomar, upon a summons to confer with general Beresford; I earnestly wish that the result may be some immediate operation upon the right flank of the enemy, or, at least, upon his communications. The possession of Elvas, Badajos, and Alcantara, seems to afford every opportunity for efforts of this nature. In the mean time, however, we learn that marshal Soult has evacuated Oporto, but we are still at a loss as to the direction which he has taken, whether to unite himself with his garrisons in Galicia, or to come and join himself with general Victor; nor does the expression of Joseph Bu-

naparte, "That Victor is not to advance till he is joined by La Pisse, and till he receives news from marshal Soult," enable us to clear up the difficulty, though it seems rather to point to the latter conclusion.

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April.

Right hon. J. H.
Frere to Mr.
Canning.

I have the honour to inclose general Cuesta's report, received yesterday, and another of the 21st, in which he details the disposition of his force, and his plan of defence. It is, I am afraid, to be feared, that so much cavalry will rather prove an incumbrance, at least in the event which we must look to, of defending the narrow passes. The general appears so far aware of this, that he has ordered the further reinforcements of this army, which were coming to join him, to halt, beside the cavalry enumerated in general Cuesta's statement above-mentioned, and which amounts to 3,990. There are stationed in his rear at Gerona, Guillena, and Algaroba, the six regiments of Rey, Bourbon, Pavia, Saguntum, volunteers of Madrid and Seville, which may serve in case of extremity to cover the retreat of the army after being forced from the strong pass of Heradura, on this side of Ronquillo. The road from Guellena to St. Olalla, is one continued defile.

It is, perhaps, to be wished, that some part of the 3,990 cavalry, which would be cut off in case of the army being driven back into the strong imprac-

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Right hon. J. H.
Frere to Mr.
Canning.

ticable country, should be sent betimes into the rear, instead of being left to encumber the retrograde movements of the infantry, in a situation in which their service could not possibly be made useful. Their present utility in annoying and harassing the enemy appears too slight to justify so great a risk.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. H. FRERE.

A few days after, Mr. Frere thus communicates answers to the whole :—

My dear sir,

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to Mr.
Frere.
Villa Franca,
April 29, 1809.

I received yesterday your letter of the 21st instant, together with one from general Cuesta, and one from Don Martin de Garay. I send you the copy of the answer which I have written to the former, and my answer to the latter. According to my instruction, I think that I ought not to have any communication with the Spanish government, excepting through you, and if you should be of the same opinion, I request you to tell Don Martin, that I can communicate with him only through you, and acquaint him with my sentiments as contained in the inclosed letter.

I hope that the Spaniards will adhere to their determination of acting upon the defensive, till I

shall return to the eastward ; they should reinforce Cuesta as much as possible ; he has only 19,000 infantry, and 1,500 cavalry, as he tells me in his letter of the 23d. It will also be very desirable, that Cuesta should observe the motions of the French if they should enter Alentejo, and follow them. If their object should be to invade Portugal, which, however, is very improbable,—at all events, if they should invade Portugal, we shall not be without a force upon the Tagus, and in the passes of the mountain between Alcantara and Abrantes. I recommend that Cuesta should observe Victor's movements in Alentejo, because it is not impossible that he might enter that province, with a view to the invasion of Andalusia. It is very improbable, however, that in the present state of the French force in Spain he will move at all till he will have heard of Soult.

Ever yours, most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P. S. In respect to the 40th regiment, I certainly must have it ; but in the present state of affairs, I think it best it should remain at Seville till I shall be able to fix upon a safe route for it.

And upon these subjects, the closest of all, thus writes the commander-in-chief :

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April.

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to Mr.
Frere.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. III.

1809.

April.

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to M. de
Garay.
Villa Franca,
29th April 1809

Sir,

I have had the honour of receiving your excellency's letter of the 21st, and am happy to find that the plan of operations which I had adopted for the troops under my command immediately upon my arrival in this country, and upon which they have already marched; viz.—to remove Soult from the north of Portugal, is approved by the supreme junta. As soon as that operation will be performed, it is my intention to collect the whole of the army under my command on the east frontier of Portugal, and to co-operate by every measure in my power with Cuesta, in attack upon marshal Victor. In the mean time, I cannot sufficiently recommend a strict defensive in all quarters. In the present situation of affairs, we have every reason to hope, that in a short time we shall be able to co-operate in a vigorous attack upon the whole remaining force of the enemy, in which attack we have reasonable prospect of success, if we do not lose any of the valuable positions which we still possess, or the men which defend them, in fruitless attack of the enemy in the plains.

It cannot be a matter of such importance, whether they possess for a short time longer more or less of the plains of La Mancha, provided the Spanish troops do not incur the risk of sustaining a fresh defeat by the superior cavalry of the enemy.

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April.Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to M. de
Garay.

and by diminishing the strength and efficiency of the corps destined to defend the passes of the Sierra Morena, with the loss of those important positions, and of all that remains that is valuable.

I do not conceive that the enemy are now in a situation to undertake any thing of importance, particularly till they will hear of marshal Soult; and, if this be true, there is every prospect of ultimate success, if we should wait till all can join in the attack of Victor.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

His excellency continues more fully to the Spanish general with whom he is to co-operate.

Sir,

I had the honour of receiving yesterday your excellency's letter, of the 23d of April, and I assure your excellency, that it will give me the greatest satisfaction to co-operate with your excellency, as far as may be in my power, to defeat those forces of the enemy which threaten the cities of Seville and Lisbon. Your excellency must be aware of the state of the Portuguese army; a commencement has only lately been made to organize and discipline it; and although I have the utmost reliance on the valour, the zeal, and the loyalty, of the troops in Portugal. I cannot,

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to gene-
ral Cuesta.
Villa Franca,
29th April,
1809.

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Sir Arthur Wel-
esley to gene-
ral Cuesta.

at this moment, consider them in such a state of discipline as to confide to their exertions the safety of Portugal, which is especially committed to my care, against the further attempts which may be made upon it by the disciplined troops of France, which have already invaded and are in possession of an important part of this kingdom. Under these circumstances, my attention has necessarily been directed: In the first instance, to remove from Portugal the further evils with which both Spain and Portugal are threatened by marshal Soult; and the greatest part of the army, under my command, is now on its march for that purpose. A small detachment of British troops, with one of Portuguese troops, will remain upon the Tagus to watch the movements of the enemy, and to guard the passage of that river, in case the enemy should direct his attack upon this country. If I should succeed in removing marshal Soult from the north of Portugal, I intend to go forthwith with all the troops under my command, (consisting of about 25,000 men, of which nearly 4000 will, at that time, be cavalry,) to the eastern frontier of Portugal in the neighbourhood of Elvas, and I shall be happy to co-operate with you in any place which may be agreed upon for the attack of Victor. In the mean time a detachment of the garrison of Elvas has been directed to take the field in co-

operation with a similar detachment of the garrison of Badajos, to act as a corps of observation in that quarter; but I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of recommending, that this corps should not be exposed to the attack of the enemy, or to be cut off from the garrisons to which the parts of it respectively belong. In the present situation of affairs, all that we require is time, and that we should not lose our men, or any of the valuable positions which we still possess. In a short time we shall all be enabled to co-operate in a vigorous attack upon the enemy; and, till that period will arrive, it is not very material whether he acquires a little more of the open country, provided we do not lose any of the men who are destined to defend the valuable points and positions which remain in our hands. Your excellency is mistaken respecting the position of sir Robert Wilson's corps. He has been remanded to the neighbourhood of the Douro, to confine himself in that quarter. I consider the possession of Alcantara, however, so important at this moment, in respect both to the defence of Portugal, and to our future design upon Victor, that I will give directions that it should be occupied by a Portuguese, if it should be possible to form one fit for that purpose. I shall be obliged to you if you will give directions

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Sir Arthur Wellesley to general Cuesta.

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Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to gene-
ral Cuesta.

that any Portuguese or British corps, which may go to Alcantara, may be received there.

I have written to your excellency a long letter in English, understanding that you have officers under your command in your confidence, who can explain it to you, in which I have taken the liberty of giving you my opinion with great freedom. I hope that you will receive them as they are intended, as a mark of my sincere desire to be of use to you, as far as is in my power at present, which I hope and believe, from the situation of the enemy, I shall have still better opportunities of proving to you before much time will elapse.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

And, upon one of the most delicate of topics, thus easily writes M. de la Cuesta in his answer to Mr. Frere.

Most excellent Sir,

General Cuesta
to Mr. Frere.
Monasterio,
30th April,
1809.

I have considered the contents of your excellency's very polite letter of the 22d instant, (which I received yesterday by the common post, with the consequent delay,) which solicits my co-operation with your excellency, in order that general Vanegas may be replaced by the duke of Albuquerque, in the army of La Mancha, and that the former should come and serve under my

immediate orders, which your excellency thinks would be advisable, considering all that has happened in that army, and other reasons which you give.

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General Cuesta
to Mr. Frere.

Your excellency will allow me to declare, with my characteristic frankness, that I am, to a certain degree, forbidden to enter into them, considering that the supreme junta, upon mature consideration; and having brought him from such a distance as Valencia, named general Vanegas, to command the army of La Mancha, the duke of Albuquerque being at that time at Seville, which does not diminish his merit, but, no doubt, ought to make me abstain from entering upon the question you treat of, however well I may know the brilliant qualities which adorn the duke, and however sincere the affection which I profess for him. Above all, I regret that the circumstances which I mention deprive me of the particular satisfaction which I should have in obliging your excellency; and I wish for other opportunities of giving you proofs of the sincere esteem and regard with which I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) GREGORIA DE LA CUESTA.

Though the following document is rather political than military, yet it is, in one respect, so

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April.

closely connected with the history of the campaign, as to be identified with it. It decides a point in which the preceding book, and the narrative of the operations which formed its subject, are at issue; the confidence due to Mr. Frere, on those matters in which he so essentially differed from sir John Moore.

Mr. Secretary
Canning to the
right honour-
able J. H. Frere.
Foreign Office,
1st May, 1809.

“In my despatch,” says Mr. Canning, “written after the arrival in this country of Don Pedro Cevallos, as ambassador-extraordinary, from his Catholic majesty; and, in his royal name, from the supreme and central junta of Spain and the Indies, I stated to you, by his majesty’s command, that his majesty had not then determined whether this mission might, or might not, require a correspondent mission on his majesty’s part, of a minister invested with a similar diplomatic character.

“The continued stay of Don Pedro Cevallos in this country, induces the supposition, that the junta may possibly expect a return to the compliment which they paid to his majesty, and the probability that other powers of Europe, particularly Austria, may send a person of ambassadorial rank to Seville, appears to render it expedient, that the British mission, at that residence, should be placed forthwith on the highest footing, both in respect to personal rank and diplomatic character.

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May.Mr. Secretary
Canning to the
right honour-
able J. H. Frere

"From these considerations, his majesty has been graciously pleased to appoint the marquis Wellesley to proceed to Seville, with the character of his majesty's ambassador-extraordinary and plenipotentiary; and I am commanded by his majesty to direct you to announce to the junta the appointment of this nobleman, and to inform them, that he has received his majesty's command to repair to his post with the least possible delay.

"I am to direct you to continue in the exercise of your functions, until the arrival of the marquis Wellesley; and I am *especially commanded to REPEAT to you the expression of his majesty's most gracious approbation of your GENERAL conduct in that arduous and DELICATE situation, during a period of UNEXAMPLED interest, DIFFICULTY, and embarrassment.*

General appro-
bation of his
political mili-
tary conduct.

"I am, &c.

(Signed) "GEORGE CANNING."

Nothing can be more important than this declaration of approval from his majesty's government, of the conduct of Mr. Frere, after the severe scrutiny which it had undergone in parliament, and by almost every class of the public.

And the more so, because Mr. Frere seemed evidently to have satisfied both the government and people of Spain, during a period the most cri-

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May.

Mr. Secretary
Canning to the
right honour-
able J. H. Frere.

tical, when the British army appeared to have resigned, as entirely hopeless, the Spanish cause; and to have taken with advantage, and with the acquiescence of the new commander-in-chief, a more active part than ever in the discussion, and aid, of military operations, in the commencement of this campaign.

A degree of energy in the cause of active inquiry, and discriminative zeal, is evident through the whole of the preceding communications; and that freedom of action which, above all things, bounded by that *due* caution which will ever mark the projects of a great general, cannot fail to be advantageous even under the worst of circumstances.

CHAP. IV.

MARCH OF THE ARMY UNDER SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, AND DISPOSSESSION OF THE FRENCH FROM THE NORTH OF PORTUGAL.

British Line of Battle.—Rapid Advance of the Troops.—Stratagem of Marshal Soult.—Action at Oporto. — Destructive Pursuit of Soult's Army.—Rapid Return of the British Army to the Southward.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY having arrived at Coimbra on the 2d of May, with a reception worthy of the hero of Vimiera, a general peal of bells, fireworks, and illuminations, (to which the judicious commander did not fail to return the imposing homage of a numerous staff, and at the same time with every demonstration of amenity), as he passed through an acclaiming multitude, to the rich augustine monastery of Santa Cruz, appointed his

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March of the
army under sir
A. Wellesley.

head-quarters,—reviewed the army on the fine plain below the city, on the 6th of May. Nothing could be more satisfactory.

The Staff, as hath already been partly described, preceded the order of battle, as follows:—

Lieut.-gen. the right hon. sir A. Wellesley, K. B.
commander of the forces.

Lieut.-colonel Bathurst, military secretary.

Captains.—The hon. Fitzroy Stanhope,	} Aids-de camp.
Lord Fitzroy Somerset,	
George Bouverie,	
C. F. Canning,	

Major-generals Sherbrooke,	} Serving with local rank of lieut.-gene- rals.
Paine,	
Lord W. Bentinck,	
Hon. E. Paget.	
Cotton,	
Hill,	
Murray,	
Erskine,	
M'Kenzie,	
Tilson.	

Brigadier-generals A. Campbell,

H. F. Campbell,
R. Stewart,
Cameron,
Fane,
Drieberg,
Langworth.

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Colonel Donkin, colonel on the staff

Adjutant-general's department.

Brigadier-general the hon. C. Stewart, adjutant-general,

Lieut.-colonels Darrock, 36th regiment,

Lord Aylmer, Coldstream,

Edwards, Heimber, 68th regiment,

Elley, horse-guards.

Majors, Tidy, 14th regiment,

Williamson, 30th,

Berkely, and

C. Campbell,

Assistant-adjutant-generals.

Captains Cotton, Elliot, Dashwood, Graham,

Cockburn, Mellish, and During,

Deputy assistant-adjutant-generals.

Quarter-master-generals' department.

Col. Murray, 3d guards, quarter-master-general,

Lieut.-col. Delancey, dep. quarter-master-general.

Lieutenant-colonels Bathurst, Bourke.
Majors Blaquiere, and Morthey,
Assistant quarter-masters-general.

Captains Mercer, Sutton, Langton, Kelly, Haver-
field, Scovil, Waller, and Beresford,
Deputy assistant quarter-master-generals.

The army is brigaded, and will stand in line as
follows: viz.

CAVALRY.

Lieutenant-gen. Payne, and major-gen. Cotton,
14th light dragoons, colonel Hawker,
20th ditto. major Blake,
3d K.'s Ger. lt. hussars, lt.-col. Arentschild,
16th light dragoons colonel Anson.

GUARDS.

Brigadier-general H. F. Campbell.
1st battalion Coldstream, lieutenant-col. Hulse,
1st battalion 3d regiment, hon. colonel Stopford,
1st company 60th captain Haines.

INFANTRY.

1st brigade, major-general Hill.
3d or buffs, lieut.-col. Muter,

66th regiment, 2d bat. major Murray,
 48th ditto. lieutenant-colonel Duckworth.
 60th 1st company.

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3d brigade, major-general Tilson.
 60th, 5 companies, major Woodgate,
 88th, 1st battalion, major Vandeleur,
 1st battalion Portuguese grenadiers,
 87th, 2d battalion, major Gough.

5th brigade, brigadier-general A Campbell.
 7th, 2d battalion, lieutenant-colonel sir W. Myers,
 53d, ditto. lieutenant-colonel Bingham,
 16th Portuguese, 1st bat. lieutenant-colonel Oliver,
 60th, 1 company.

7th brigade, brigadier-general Cameron.
 9th regiment, lieutenant-colonel Molle,
 10th Portuguese, 2d battalion,
 83d regiment, ditto. lieutenant-col. Gordon,
 60th, 1 company.

6th brigade, brigadier-general R. Stewart.

* Detachments 1st battalion, lieutenant-col. Bunbury,
 16th Portuguese regiment, lieutenant-colonel Doyle,
 29th regiment, lieutenant-colonel White.

* The battalions of detachments were formed of those soldiers of sir John Moore's army who were left sick in Lisbon, or fell out from sickness in the march through Portugal to Salamanca, and the sick and STRAGGLERS during the retreat to Corunna.

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4th brigade, brigadier-general Sontag.

* Detachments 2d battalion, lieut.-col. Copson,
16th Portuguese.97th regiment, lieut.-col. Lyon,
90th, 1 company.

2d brigade, major-general Mackenzie.

27th regiment, 3d bat. lieutenant-col. Maclean,

45th ditto 1st, lieutenant-col. Guard,

31st ditto 2d, major Watson.

KING'S GERMAN LEGION.

Major-general Murray, with
Brigadier-generals Drieberg, and Langworth.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

Brigadier-general Howarth,
Lieut.-colonels Framlingham, and Robe.

In the following letter, addressed to his own minister, the Spanish general is, however, less scrupulous in his remarks, and these most painfully recall the memory to those scenes of the last book from which they have been deduced. This is compensated, however, in a great degree, by finding the defence of Alcantara, at least, omitted in

* See note to preceding page.

the acerbity of general Cuesta's remarks upon the other parts of the plan.

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May.

Most excellent Sir,

Nothing new has occurred to-day in the vanguard of this army. The enemy, who had left Merida, in the direction of Carecus, and had gone as far as the Casas De St. Antonio, have returned to the former place and its neighbourhood, where they continue fortifying themselves.

I have received to-day a very polite and attentive answer from sir Arthur Wellesley, dated Villa Franca, the 29th ultimo, by which he appears determined to march, with nearly the whole of his force, against marshal Soult, at Oporto, consisting of about 20,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, (for which place he was already on his march,) besides the Portuguese army, amounting to something less.

This operation completed, he has great hopes of making the French retire from thence; and, coming afterwards with his troops towards Elvas, to act in concert with me, and drive the enemy from Estremadura. By this I see that he has only in view the driving the French from Portugal towards Minho, by which operation we should gain little or nothing; for Soult would return and unite himself with the forces which he has in Galicia, and subject still more that kingdom, without the pea-

General Cuesta
to M. de Cornel.
Head quarters,
Monasterio, 3d
May, 1809.

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May.

General Cuesta
to M. de Cornet.Remarks on the
British system
under sir J.
Moore.

santry or the marquis of Romana being sufficient to hinder it. It appears to me that the object of the English general should be, to surround the French in Oporto, or place himself between that city and the Minho, to hinder such a retreat, considering the superiority of allies. By this position they would prevent, also, the arrival of succours which Soult may receive from Galicia. I know not whether the observation, which I propose making on this subject, will arrive in time, or, if they do, whether they will have any effect. *The system of the British appearing to be never to expose their troops, owing to which they never gain decisive actions by land, and sacrifice those in continued retreats and precautions, as happened to general Moore, from not having attacked the enemy in time at Sahagun and Placentia, before they were reinforced. He speaks again of a camp of observation between Elvas and Badajos, composed of a small detachment from each place; so that the retreat of neither could be cut off by the enemy.*

I do not see the utility of this, especially for us; this small corps not being able either to observe or resist the enemy. In like manner he says, that brigadier-general Wilson has been destined with the troops, under his command, to the banks of the Douro, though he thinks the bridge of Alcantara is of importance to be preserved, to which

point he will send a corps of Portuguese troops, if any capable of defending it can be formed ; and he requests to me to give orders, at the above place, for the admission of whatever English or Portuguese troops may arrive there, to which I can see no objection. He wishes, also, to persuade me not to undertake any thing against Victor, till he should return from his expedition to Oporto ; in which case he repeats, that he will come down upon Elvas, and act in concert with me, to drive them out of the province.

(Signed) GREGORIA DE LA CUESTA.

Mr. Frere, ever active, very early furnished ample details to the British general, as will appear from the following despatch :—

Dear Sir,

By information received last night, it appears certain that a body of French, calculated at about 15,000 men, have left Arragon ; they passed through the town of Alagon on the 4th ultimo, in the direction of Tudela, which they would reach on the 16th. By letters from Madrid, it appears that this force was understood to be marching to the assistance of marshal Ney, from whom no intelligence had been received for some time past. This agrees perfectly with a passage in an inter-

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General Cuesta
to M. de Cornel.

Mr. Frere to sir
A. Wellesley.
Seville, 4th
May, 1809.

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Mr. Frere to
sir A. Welles-
ley.

cepted letter from king Joseph to Sebastiani, dated Madrid, 9th of April, in which he says, "Je ne veux rien entreprendre sur Valence tant que je n'aurais des nouvelles du M. Ney, et que je ne sçaurais la destruction totale du corps de la Romana;" a combination of ideas, which does not appear so obvious or capable of explanation under any other supposition, as under that of the march of the army of Arragon towards Gallicia and Asturias.

It has been an object of constant anxiety with me to accomplish the destruction of the roads leading from Ponferrado and Villa Franca, into Gallicia. Orders have been given to that effect, and I have been assured, by intelligence from thence, that they have been carried into execution. Nevertheless, in order, if possible, to obtain a greater security since the news of the marquis of Romana's success at Villa Franca, I prevailed upon the government to send instructions to the authorities of those towns, for their complete and effectual obstruction. If this should have been effected, (and I should imagine almost in any case,) the same reasons, and much stronger ones, which gave rise to this march, for the relief of marshal Ney, would lead the enemy to proceed to the relief of the more competent corps under marshal Soult, exposed, as it is, to the arrival of the army

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May.Mr. Frere to
sir A. Welles-
ley.

under your command ; a circumstance, as I apprehend, originally out of the contemplation of the usurped government, and classed by them among the many illusive reports, by which the Spaniards endeavour to keep up the spirits of their countrymen. Our intelligence from the north is so tardy, and so precarious, that I can hardly venture to speak, with any degree of certainty, as to the amount of the reinforcements, which he may be able to pick up on his march ; but, except at Burgos and Zamora, I do not imagine that, upon any one point, they would find more than 1000 men.

The division which reached Alcantara, consisted of the whole of the regiments formerly at Salamanca. At Zamora, it was said there were 1500 infantry and 500 horse. From Burgos we have no intelligence ; but the general amount there has usually varied from 2000 to 600 men.

As I apprehend that the intelligence from Arragon may so far vary your plan, as to induce you to push with greater eagerness for the destruction of marshal Soult, instead of leaving him to retreat, with the possibility of uniting and becoming again a formidable force, by the addition of the corps of marshal Ney, and the division from Arragon, I shall prepare the government here for the probability of such a determination.

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Mr. Frere to
sir A. Welles-
ley.

Before the arrival of this intelligence, I had a discussion upon the supposition of your accomplishing the plan, which you communicated, of coming down upon Estremadura, to co-operate with general Cuesta, after having determined M. Soult to a retreat upon Galicia. With this view I insisted upon a plan, the utility of which is acknowledged by every one, and which has been already experienced, I mean an offensive operation on the side of La Mancha.

The partial success of such an operation, under the duke of Albuquerque, had the effect of retarding the plans of the enemy for upwards of a month; and, if he had not been withheld by positive orders, there can be little doubt that the southern campaign would have been still more completely disconcerted. It is obvious that success, on this side, menaces Madrid; and the example of count Cartaojal's defeat ought to set us at ease even to the consequences which might be apprehended from a repetition of the same misfortune. Not only the nature of the country, and the distribution of the enemy's force; but the intelligence which we constantly receive, and the intercepted letters of the enemy, particularly one from king Joseph to Sebastiani, "telling him that he is to attempt nothing till Victor is at Seville," are sufficient to shew that we have no real attack to fear, except

on the side of Estremadura. It is equally evident that the only real and immediate danger to the enemy, is on the side of La Mancha.

We have there, at this moment, 16,000 infantry, and 1300 cavalry, fit for action ; and, of the latter, a larger number disabled, for want of various accoutrements. Seven hundred are on their march : We have here, under the orders of the duke of Albuquerque, a force of 300 cavalry, considered as a part of the army of Estremadura, but which are obliged to remain on this side of Sierra Morena, from the impossibility of proceeding thereon with forage. Their situation, however, was not considered devoid of utility, at a time when it was apprehended Victor might risk an attack upon general Cuesta, in his defensive position, and force the different points which guard the entrance into Andalusia. It was considered that the cavalry, so stationed, might serve to cover the retreat of the infantry, and enable them to re-unite, with less confusion and dispersion, under the walls of this city ; since your arrival, however, an attack of this kind is no longer to be feared, as M. Victor had orders (before it was even expected) “ not to attack till he had been joined by the division from Salamanca, and had received news from M. Soult ;” and, even if it were, general Cuesta has

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Mr. Frere to
sir A. Welles-
ley.

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Mr. Frere to
sir A. Welles-
ley.

with him 4000 cavalry; and surveys of the country have been made, and precautions taken to enable them, as soon as the enemy should be engaged in the defiles, to retreat and form in the rear, for the purpose before-mentioned. We have, therefore, 3000 cavalry, who would be kept there without use or excuse, of any kind, and who might be most profitably and importantly employed in a diversion of 5000 cavalry, with a sufficient proportion of infantry, which, if the enemy refused to attend to it, would become a serious and, perhaps, a decisive operation. The real difficulty is this;—this division is under the command of Albuquerque; he has been successful in a similar command; he is adored by the army, and in the province, (La Mancha,) if the division were to be sent; the expedition could not, in justice, be entrusted to other hands, especially as he is a cavalry officer, which general Vanegas (who commands at Carolina) is not.

My fear is, that the military junta will separate this force of 3000 men, in order to leave the duke, with whatever part is detained here, in the most painful predicament possible, and send the other under the command of Vanegas, giving him, at the same time, discretionary, instead of positive, orders; a measure against which it is impossible to

object, without undertaking a responsibility for all the consequences : they will contrive, in this manner, to cripple and defeat the whole operation.

My opinion of these gentlemen is founded upon a general observation of their conduct, confirmed by the general voice of the public, and most particularly impressed on my own mind with respect to this very subject, by a long conference which he had with them yesterday. As it was my object to obtain a diversion in La Mancha, as the price of co-operation on your part ; and the impression which they received from colonel Alava's report was, that your intention was, after defeating or driving Soult into Gallicia, to come down upon Estremadura, to attack general Victor ; I was under some disadvantage, inasmuch as they imagined that the point, which I wanted to make a condition, was already conceded. This morning, however, the minister and section of war shewed me the inclosed letter, which they had received from general Cuesta, which seemed to have brought them a little to reason ; and will, I hope, have the same effect upon the gentlemen of the junta, above-mentioned. They seemed disappointed ; but I did not, under the present circumstances, expect any thing, but that you will maintain a defensive system in the north of Portugal, exposed,

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Mr. Frere to
sir A. Welles-
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Mr. Frere to
sir A. Welles-
ley.

as you are, to a force so much greater than that which you reckoned upon at the time of writing that letter, unless they will voluntarily, and, in the hopes of assistance from England, make those efforts which necessity, sooner or later, will oblige them to make; and employ the only person they have now disposable, who enjoys, in any degree, the confidence of the army, and the reputation of military skill and success.

When I speak above of an attack upon Victor, as a condition, which I thought myself authorised to offer, I follow nearly the expression of your letter to me; but I did not, by any means, express an expectation or a wish that the British army, under your command, should compromise itself any farther than by occupying a position on the north of the Tagus, together with Alcantara, a measure which would naturally oblige Victor to retreat by the bridge of Almaray, (if he could re-establish it,) exposed, as he would be, to all the difficulties arising from the situation of the two armies; if he wished to preserve his baggage and artillery, or abandoning both, by the bridge of Arzobispo, which he must reach by roads impassable to carriages, if not to cavalry, a situation very little removed from capitulation.

I took an opportunity to say to them, "Gentle-

men, the honour of the British army will be recovered by the defeat or capitulation of marshal Soult. The appearance of a British force will determine the retreat of marshal Victor, and relieve you from your present apprehensions, if you wish that this retreat should be ruinous, or that we should have the satisfaction of seeing a fourth French army capitulate in Spain ; the decision is in your hands : but you must not expect that we should make efforts, if you are unwilling to co-operate."

It was concluded that general Cuesta, to whose army the 3000 cavalry, before-mentioned, belong, should be written to. I have already mentioned my fear, that they would separate this force ; and, my persuasion is, that they will contrive that it shall be general Cuesta's doing ; to obviate this will require a determined declaration on your part, which I shall support and justify most steadily here.

I will now conclude this long letter, only wishing, if you see the two main points of it, an operation on the side of La Mancha, and the appointment of a proper person to conduct it in a less important view than I do, you would have the kindness, frankly, to tell me so, in order that I may not expose myself to the reflection of being more eager upon a point foreign to my profession,

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Mr. Frere to
sir A. Welles-
ley.

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Mr. Frere to
sir A. Welles-
ley.

than the person best acquainted with the subject, and most immediately interested.

Colonel Alva will have given you a very correct statement, as far as it was known here, of the force of the enemy in La Mancha and Estremadura. No change has to my knowledge, or that of the government, taken place since his departure.

I remain, &c.

(Signed) J. H. FRERE.

These details are additionally explained in the following despatch, to the right honourable George Canning :—

Right honour-
able J. H. Frere
to Mr. Secretary
Canning.
Seville, 8th
May, 1809.

I had the honour of receiving your despatches to No. 28, inclusive, by the messenger Meates, on the 30th ult. and those to No. 37 by the messenger Lyell, who arrived here on Friday morning.

Though a longer interval than usual has elapsed since the date of my last despatches, little of any interest has taken place in any quarter.

Both the armies of Estremadura remain in that state of inactivity, which it is so much our interest they should observe; in the mean time the peasantry, and irregular volunteer force, are beginning to swarm round the French army on the side of

Zafra; and, besides having repulsed the attack which was made upon that town, they have surprised some of the enemy's advanced posts, and are acting in concert and communication with general Cuesta's advanced guard, under general Echivari.

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Mr. Frere to
Mr. Cauning.

I received from sir Arthur Wellesley the letter, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, acquainting me with his arrival in Portugal, and his proposed plan of operations; and, in my answer, endeavoured to put him, as far as I was able, in possession of the military position of the country, both as to the strength of its armies, and the spirit of that part of the government here which is more immediately charged with the direction of them.

I am glad to find, by a subsequent letter from him, that he does not attach the same importance to the effecting a diversion at present on the side of La Mancha, as I had thought it might derive; and, in the discussion of which measure, I had occasion more particularly to remark that want of energy in the military junta of which I complained in my letter to him.

General Cuesta's answer to my letter, which was inclosed in my No. 51, and in which I took occasion to suggest the advantages which would result from such an operation, conducted by the

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Mr. Frere to
Mr. Canning.

duke of Albuquerque, has since reached me, in which he declines my proposal, which he could not carry into execution without interfering with the junta, who had appointed general Vanegas to the command of this army; and sir Arthur Wellesley's letters, both to general Cuesta and M. de Garay, are so strongly in favour of defensive operations, that there will, of course, be no more question at present of such a diversion.

General Cuesta is ambitious of uniting as large a force under his command, as he can collect; and I observe, that it is likewise recommended by sir Arthur Wellesley, that he should be reinforced as much as possible; but how far this opinion may have been influenced by the statement which general Cuesta gives him of his force, and which is very much below the returns government receive from him, I cannot judge. By accounts received to-day it appears, that the communication is again open with Ciudad Rodrigo. We learn through that channel, that the French have a force, in Salamanca, of 400 infantry and 600 cavalry, and nearly the same number in Zamora. They have withdrawn the posts which were stationed at Barco de Avila, Puente de Congesto, and one or two other points upon that line, and do not venture to maintain, upon any point, a force of less than 400 men.

It does not appear that the French have any other force in Arragon but that stationed at Saragossa, which is calculated at 12,000 men. The corps which I mentioned, in my letter to sir Arthur Wellesley, to have left that country in the direction of Tudela, and, probably, destined against the marquis of La Romana, or to the relief of Soult, has, by the last reports, been ascertained to have taken the road of Burgos; but the estimate of its strength, which was before reckoned at 15,000 men, is, by the same report, diminished to 12,000.

A very seasonable supply of 5000 stand of arms has arrived at Valencia and Alicante, from Sicily and Malta; and these, together with 2000 sent from hence to the former city, out of those last received from England, will enable general Blake to act with effect, as every musket which is sent will find a soldier ready to make use of it. General Blake, who has already 16,000 men under him, has been appointed to the chief command of the three provinces of Arragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, general Lazan being to act under his orders.

Beside the advantages which may be looked for, from placing so extensive a command under a person of such tried abilities as general Blake, it is to be hoped that it will put an end to the distrac-

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tions arising from the contracted views of those who directed the provincial junta, particularly that of Valencia, which have been so embarrassing to his predecessors.

We are told, likewise, to-day, that 4000 muskets have been received at Cadiz from Asturias.

I have been promised that 500 of these shall be sent to the inhabitants of Melina, who behave with the greatest courage. They have intercepted two mails, and cut off a convoy of cattle the enemy had collected; and these arms would put them in a situation to undertake an expedition in search of others, which are concealed in Arragon.

The people of Castile, in the neighbourhood of Burgos, are likewise in a state of insurrection; they, as well as those of Estremadura, style the war in which they are engaged, a crusade, and carry on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause.

Upon the whole, I may venture to say, that, at no period since the commencement of the war, the spirits of the country have been raised to a higher pitch, or more sanguine hopes entertained of their ultimate success.

The junta have determined to establish a school for cavalry at Ettrera, or Carmona, which is to be placed under the command of the marquis of Palacias. He has made that branch of military science his peculiar study, and is avowedly the

best qualified, both by his personal character and by his skill in his profession, for promoting the objects of such an institution.

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Nothing could more eminently illustrate the influence of the public mind upon this service, than the various censures from all quarters, on the commander and the army, which had dared to advance at once without mature deliberation against the enemy, and beat a marshal, and even duke, of France !

This, nevertheless, was absolutely the case ; for within a week after sir Arthur Wellesley received the command of the army, he was in Oporto, and a part of his army in advance from that city.

Lieutenant-general Payne, on the 8th, with the cavalry and infantry under major-generals Cotton and Hill, marched by Averro, where the infantry was to embark for Ovar, and turn the enemy's right by the coast. Marshal Beresford made a feint or diversion with his division, by Lameigo, on the upper Douro. The remainder moved towards Aveiro.

Marshal Soult, aware of his inequality to maintain Oporto against the united British force which was marching against him, had recourse to stratagy ; first, to enable him to withdraw his troops with safety, and next, if favoured by fortune, to endea-

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vour to draw after him, northward, sir Arthur Wellesley ; which would thus leave Victor the opportunity of marching the French force, that after the battle of Medellin, had remained stationary between Merida and Badajos, by the Tagus, into the south of Portugal.

Hypercriticisms
upon sir Arthur
Wellesley's de-
feat of Soult
considered.

But the judgment and vigilance of the British commander, and his active generals-of-division, precluded his accomplishment of either the one or the other ; and therefore, notwithstanding the hypercriticisms on the declarations contained in sir Arthur Wellesley's despatch upon the action which ensued, marshal Soult must be considered as having suffered signal defeat.

Stratagem of
Soult.

Soult having determined to evacuate Oporto, and pass through Leon to the French force in Gallicia, on the principle of concentration, took care to have it generally understood, that, certain of receiving due succours, and confident in his own strength, he was determined to defend Oporto to the last extremity. In the mean time, however, he manœuvred his troops about the city, and for that ostensible purpose sent out a considerable body in detachments, many of which never returned. Of the body which remained, however, the British troops left few to follow.

Nothing could be more steady or vigorous than the advance of the British army, according to every

account. Sir Arthur Wellesley thus describes the circumstances of the action to the British government :—

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My lord,

I had the honour to apprise your lordship, on the 7th, that I intended that the army should march on the 9th, from Coimbra, to dispossess the enemy of Oporto.

Lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, K.B. to
lord viscount
Castlereagh.
Oporto, May
12th, 1809.

The advanced guard and the cavalry had marched on the 7th, and the whole had halted on the 8th, to afford time for marshal Beresford, with his corps, to arrive upon the upper Douro.

Action at
Oporto.

The infantry of the army was formed into three divisions for this expedition, of which, two, the advanced guard, consisting of the Hanoverian legion, and brigadier-general R. Stewart's brigade, with a brigade of six-pounders, and a brigade of three-pounders, under lieutenant-general Paget, and the cavalry, under lieutenant-general Payne, and the brigade of guards, brigadier-general Campbell, and brigadier-general Sontag's brigades of infantry, with a brigade of six-pounders, under lieutenant-general Sherbrooke, moved by the high road from Coimbra to Oporto; and one composed of major-general Hill's, and brigadier-general Cameron's, brigades of infantry, and a brigade of six-pounders,

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under the command of major-general Hill, by the road from Coimbra to Aveiro.

On the 10th, in the morning before day-light, the cavalry and the advanced guard crossed the Vouga, with the intention to surprise and cut off four regiments of French cavalry, and a battalion of infantry and artillery, cantoned in Albagana Nova, and the neighbouring villages, about eight miles from that river, in the last of which we failed; but the superiority of the British cavalry was evident throughout the day. We took some prisoners and their cannon from them; and the advanced guard took up the position of Oliveira.

On the same day, major-general Hill, who had embarked at Aveiro, on the evening of the 9th, arrived at Over in the rear of the enemy's right, and the head of lieutenant-general Sherbrooke's division passed the Vouga on the same evening.

On the 11th, the advanced guard and cavalry continued to move on the high road towards Oporto, with major-general Hill's division, in a parallel road which leads to Oporto from Ovar.

On the arrival of the advance at Vendos Novas, between Santo Redondo and Grijon, they fell in with the out-post of the enemy's advanced guard, which were immediately driven in, and shortly afterwards we discovered the enemy's advanced

guard, consisting of about 4,000 infantry, and some squadrons of cavalry, strongly posted on the heights above Gijon; their fronts being covered with woods and broken grounds. The enemy's left flank was turned, by a movement well executed by major-general Murray, with brigadier-general Langwerth's brigade of the Hanoverian legion, whilst the 16th Portuguese regiment of brigadier-general Richard Stewart's brigade attacked their right, and the rifle-men of the 95th, and the flank companies of the 29th, 43d, and 52d, of the same brigade, under major Way, attacked the infantry in the wood and villages, in their centre. These attacks soon obliged the enemy to give way, and the honourable brigadier-general Charles Stewart, and two squadrons of the 16th and 20th dragoons, under the command of major Blake, in pursuit of the enemy, and destroyed many and took many prisoners.

On the night of the 11th, the enemy crossed the Douro, and destroyed the bridge over that river.

It was important, with a view to the operations of marshal Beresford, that I should cross the Douro immediately, and I had sent major-general Murray in the morning with a battalion of the Hanoverian legions, a squadron of cavalry, and two six-pounders, to endeavour to collect boats, and, if possible, to cross the river at Avintas, about four miles above Oporto, and I had as many boats as could be col-

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lected brought to the ferry, immediately above the towns of Oporto and Villa Nova. The ground on the right bank of the river at this ferry is protected and commanded by the fire of cannon placed on the heights of the Siena Convent, at Villa Nova; and there appeared to be a good position for our troops on the opposite side of the river, till they should be collected in sufficient numbers.

The enemy took no notice of our collection of boats, or of the embarkation of the troops, till after the first battalion, (the buffs,) were landed, and had taken up their position under the command of lieutenant-general Paget, on the opposite side of the river.

They then commenced an attack upon them with a large body of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, under the command of marshal Soult, which that corps most gallantly sustained till supported successively by the 48th and 66th regiments, belonging to major-general Hill's brigade, and a Portuguese battalion, and afterwards by the first battalion of detachments, belonging to brigadier-general Richard Stewart's brigade.

Lieutenant-general Paget was unfortunately wounded soon after the attack commenced, when the command of those gallant troops devolved upon major-general Hill.

Although the French made repeated attacks

upon them, they made no impression; and, at last, major-general Murray having appeared on the enemy's left flank, on his march from Avintos, which he had crossed, and lieutenant-general Sherbrooke, who by this time had availed himself of the enemy's weakness in the town of Oporto, and crossed the Douro, at the ferry, between the towns of Villa Nova and Oporto; having appeared on their right, with the brigade of guards and the 29th regiment; the whole retired in the utmost confusion towards Amaranthe, leaving behind them five pieces of cannon, eight ammunition tumbrils, and many prisoners.

The enemy's loss in killed and wounded in this action has been very large; and they have left behind them in Oporto,* sick and wounded. Brigadier-general the honourable Charles Stewart then directed a charge, by a squadron of the 14th dragoons, under the command of major Harvey, who made a successful attack upon the enemy's rear guard.

In the different actions with the enemy, of which I have above given your lordship an account, we have lost some, and the immediate services of other, valuable officers and soldiers.

In lieutenant-general Paget, among the latter, I have lost the assistance of a friend who had been

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Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh.

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* The numbers not ascertained, but supposed about 700.

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most useful to me, in the few days which had elapsed since he had joined the army.

He had rendered a most important service at the moment he received his wound, in taking up the position which the troops afterwards maintained, and in bearing the first brunt of the enemy's attack.

Major Harvey also distinguished himself at the moment he received his wound, in the charge of the cavalry on this day.

I cannot say too much in favour of the officers and troops. They have marched in four days over eighty miles of most difficult country, have gained many important positions, and have engaged and defeated three different *bodies of the enemy's troops*.

I beg particularly to draw your lordship's attention, to the conduct of lieutenant-general Paget, major-general Murray, major-general Hill, lieutenant-general Sherbrooke, brigadier-general the hon. Charles Stewart, lieutenant-colonel De Lancy, deputy quarter-master-general, and captain Mellish, assistant adjutant-general, for the assistance they respectively rendered general Stewart, in the charge of the cavalry, this day and on the eleventh; major Colin Campbell, assistant-adjutant-general, for the assistance he rendered major-general Hill, in the defence of his post; and brigadier-general Stewart, in the charge of the cavalry, this day;

and brigadier-major Fordyce, captain Curry, and captain Hill, for the assistance they rendered general Hill.

I have also to request your lordship's attention to the conduct of the rifle-men, and of the flank companies of the 29th, 43d, and 52d regiments, under the command of major Way of the 29th, and that of the 16th Portuguese regiment, commanded by colonel Machado, of which lieutenant-colonel Doyle is lieutenant-colonel, and that of the brigade of the Hanoverian legion, under the command of brigadier-general Langwerth, and that of the two squadrons of the 16th and 20th light dragoons, under the command of major Blake, of the 20th, in the action of the 11th; and conduct of the buffs, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Drummond; the 48th, commanded by major Murray, who was wounded; and of the squadron of the 14th dragoons, under the command of major Harvey, in the action of this day.

I have received the greatest assistance from the adjutant-general, and quarter-master-general colonel Murray, and from all the officers belonging to the departments respectively throughout the service; as well as from lieutenant-colonel Bathurst, and the officers of my personal staff; and I have every reason to be satisfied with the artillery and officers of engineers.

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Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh.
Action at Oporto.

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Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
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Oporto.

I send this despatch by captain Stanhope, whom I beg to recommend to your lordship's protection. His brother, the honourable major Stanhope, was unfortunately wounded by a sabre, whilst leading a charge of the 16th light dragoons, on the 10th instant.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

After the evacuation of Oporto by the French, the commander-in-chief took the laudable precaution to issue the following proclamation :

“ Inhabitants of Oporto !

Proclamation of
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, general-
in-chief of the
British army in
Portugal, and
marshal-general
of the armies of
the prince re-
gent.

“ As the French troops have been expelled from this city, by the bravery and discipline of the army which I command, I require from the inhabitants that they shall comport themselves with compassion and humanity towards the said troops who may be made prisoners. By the laws of war, they are entitled to my protection, and it is my duty to afford it. It would be very inconsistent with the generosity and magnanimity of the Portuguese nation to revenge upon unfortunate individuals the outrages and calamities which it has suffered ; I direct the inhabitants of the city to remain tranquil in the town, and that no person that does not belong to a military corps shall ap-

pear armed in the city. In case of this order being contravened, or of any attack being made upon the said individuals, such persons shall be punished as guilty of having disobeyed my orders—I appoint colonel Trant commandant of this city, unless the government of his royal highness shall object to this nomination. I order the commander to use all the means necessary to enforce obedience to this order, and to produce the effect of complete tranquillity and peace, for which I am so anxiously solicitous.”

(Signed) “ARTHUR WELLESLEY.”

“Head-quarters, Oporto, May 13, 1809.”

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Proclamation.

Nothing could be more judicious than this proclamation in the second city of Portugal, where, among the first objects which presented themselves, were the *stripped* bodies of the dead enemy.

The army was there received, as it had been every where, with the highest demonstrations of joy; and as on the march the officers had been received in the houses of the inhabitants, and the troops into the convents; so in Oporto, they were all received by the inhabitants with hospitality. The ladies graced their entrance by waving their handkerchiefs from the balconies; the aged wept and blessed them. And, indeed, though charges of this kind are successively made as of course, by

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every army which succeeds another, there was sufficient evidence that the French soldiery under Loison had so particularly degraded themselves, by enormities against the people of Oporto, as to hand his name down with the especial infamy of those transactions.

The French general Soult surprised,

Soult, notwithstanding his evident determination to evacuate Oporto, certainly did not count upon the rapidity of the British operations, and therefore fairly incurs the censure of being surprised. Having destroyed the bridge of Amaranthas, by which marshal Beresford was to pass, and despatched Loison there; he evidently counted upon a leisure which sir Arthur Wellesley denied him. Above a thousand sick were found in the hospitals.

The early mention of so many names in this first operation of the army has not escaped censure; but who that studies human nature, (and he that does not is ignorant of the highest art of a general,) can conceive a recognizance censurable, or even unnecessary, of those acts which in the outset of a campaign are of vital importance, not only for the ends to be immediately attained, but as inspirations to future and greater acquisitions.

The British army continued indefatigable in the pursuit of the French, of which there was every prospect of success. By a variety of feints, how-

ever, and forced marches, their general drew them towards the mountains.

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When I determined (says sir Arthur Wellesley) upon the expedition to the north of Portugal, against marshal Soult, I was in hopes that the Portuguese general Silveira would be able to hold his post upon the Tamaga till he should be reinforced, by which, and by the possession of Chaves, the enemy's retreat would have been cut off, excepting across the Minho; and I intended, if successful, to press him so hard, as that the passage of that river would have been impracticable.

Lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, K.B. to
lord viscount
Castlereagh.
Monte Alegre,
18th May, 1809.

The loss of the bridge of Amarantha, however, on the 2d inst. altered our prospects; I had then no hopes that marshal Beresford, who marched towards the upper part of the Douro on the 5th, and arrived at Lamego on the 10th, would be able to effect more than confine the enemy on that side, and oblige him to retire by Chaves into Galicia, rather than by Villa Real into Castille.

General Beresford, however, having obliged the enemy's posts at Villa Real, and Maisan Frien, to fall back with some loss; and, having crossed the Douro, drove in general Loisson's out-posts at the bridge of Amarantha, and again acquired possession of the left bank of the Tamaga on the 12th,

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Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
viscount Castle-
reagh.

the day which the corps, under my command, formed the passage of the Douro at Oporto.

Loison retired from Amarantha on the morning of the 13th, as soon as he had heard of the events at Oporto of the preceding day, and met the advanced guard of the French army at a short distance from the town, which general Beresford immediately occupied. I was unable to commence the pursuit of the enemy till the morning of the 13th, when the Hanoverian Legion moved to Valonga, under major-general Murray.

On that evening I was informed that the enemy had in the morning destroyed a great proportion of his cannon in the neighbourhood of Penafril, and had directed his march towards Braga.

This appeared to be the probable result of the situation in which he found himself, in consequence of general Beresford's operations upon the Tamaga; and, as soon as I had ascertained that the fact was true, I marched on the morning of the 14th, with the army in two columns, towards the river Minho.

At the same time I directed general Beresford upon Chaves, in case the enemy should turn to his right; and major-general Murray to communicate with general Beresford, if he should find, as reported, that Loison remained in the neighbourhood of Amarantha.

On the evening of the 14th I was certain, from the movements of the enemy's detachments in the neighbourhood of Braga, that he intended to direct his retreat upon Chaves, or Monte Alegre, and directed general Beresford, in case of the latter movement, to push on for Monterey, so as to stop the enemy, if he should pass by Villa de Ric. General Beresford had anticipated my orders to march his own corps upon Chaves, and had already sent general Silveira to occupy the passes of Tuivaes and Mellgassy, near Salomonde, but he was unfortunately too late.

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Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord viscount Castlereagh.

I arrived at Braga on the 15th, general Murray being at Guinaraens, and the enemy about fifteen miles in our front; and at Salomonde, on the 16th, we had an affair with the rear guard.

The guards, under lieut.-general Sherbrooke and brigadier-general Campbell, attacked their position; and, having turned their left flank by the heights, they abandoned it, leaving a gun and some prisoners behind them.

This attack was necessarily made at a late hour in the evening.

On the 17th we moved to Ruiveas, waiting to see whether the enemy would turn upon Chaves, or continue his retreat upon Monte Alegre, and on the 18th to this place.

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Disasters of the
retreat of the
French.

I here found that he had taken a road through the mountains, towards Orense, by which it would be difficult, if not impossible, for me to overtake him, and on which I had no means of stopping him.

The enemy commenced his retreat, as I have above informed your lordship, by destroying a great proportion of his guns and ammunition. He afterwards destroyed the remainder of both, and a great proportion of his baggage, and kept nothing, excepting what the soldiers and a few mules could carry.

Injurious effects
to an army of a
cruel warfare.

He has left behind him his sick and wounded ; and the road from Penafiel to Monte Alegre, is strewn with the carcasses of horses and mules, and French soldiers, who were put to death by the peasantry before our advanced guard could save them.

This last circumstance is one of the natural effects of the species of warfare which the enemy have carried on in this country.

Their soldiers have plundered and murdered the peasantry at their pleasure ; and I have seen many persons hanging in the trees by the sides of the road, executed for no reason that I could learn, excepting that they have not been friendly to the French invasion and usurpation of the government

of their country; and the route of their column, on their retreat, could be traced by the smoke of the villages to which they set fire.

We have taken about 500 prisoners. Upon the whole, the enemy has not lost less than a fourth of his army, and all his artillery and equipments, since we attacked him upon the Vouga.

I hope your lordship will believe me, that no measure which I could take was omitted to interrupt the enemy's retreat. It is obvious, however, that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and every thing which can strengthen it, and can enable it to act together as a body, and abandon all those who are entitled to its protection, but add to its weight, and impede its progress, it must be able to march by roads, through which it cannot be followed, with any prospect of being overtaken by an army which has not made the same sacrifices.

It is impossible to say too much of the exertions of the troops. The weather has been very bad, indeed, since the 13th; the rain has been constant, and the roads, in this difficult country, almost impracticable. But they have persevered in the pursuit to the last, and have generally been upon the march from day-light in the morning till dark.

Notwithstanding the desolation produced in the French army by this pursuit, the loss of the British

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to an army of a
cruel warfare.

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to an army of a
cruel warfare.

was, according to the best estimates, more trifling than could be admitted as probable, were it not that while the troops pursued with the utmost rapidity, they did not abandon any of the equipments or stores of their force as was constantly the case with the French.

The losses are thus estimated :—

On the 12th, at Albergaria Nova.

Wounded—1 officer, 2 rank and file.

Missing—1 rank and file.

11th, at Grijon.

Killed—1 officer, 18 rank and file.

Wounded—6 officers, 59 rank and file.

Missing—14 rank and file.

12th.—Killed—23 rank and file.

Wounded—10 officers, 86 rank and file.

Missing—2 rank and file.

From the enemy were taken :—

In the Field.

5 pieces of cannon.

Left in the Arsenal at Oporto.

59 pieces of cannon.

37 Tumbrils.

A great quantity of ammunition.

In the prosecution of the operations thus successfully conducted, sir Arthur Wellesley states his intelligence and consequent plans:—

After I had determined to discontinue the further pursuit of marshal Soult's army, and to return with the British troops to the southward, I heard that marshal Victor had broken up on the Guadiana, and had made an attack, and had carried Alcantara on the 14th.

Lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B. to
lord viscount
Castlereagh.
Braga, 20th
May, 1809.

A small garrison, consisting of the second battalion of the Lusitanian Legion, under colonel Mayne, and the Idanha Nova battalion of Portuguese Militia, had occupied that place since the army marched to the northward, which it was forced to evacuate with some loss, in consequence of this attack.

Defence of the
frontier by the
Lusitanian Legion.

An attempt was made to blow up the bridge over the Tagus, which failed, and the enemy's cavalry crossed immediately.

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Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord viscount Castlereagh.

My former despatches will have apprised your lordship of the measures which I had adopted, with a view to the defence of that part of Portugal, in case it should be invaded during the absence of the army to the northward; and I have now the honour to inform your lordship, that the army is in march to the southward, and the head of it will cross the Mondego before the end of this week.

The energies which had been displayed in the conduct of sir Arthur Wellesley, immediately upon his assuming the command of the army, were sufficient to produce an immediate extension of his instructions in respect to an advance into Spain. It is contained in the following letter.

Sir,

Upon referring to my instruction to you of the 3d of April, and of the course that operations may take, should Victor retire upon your moving towards the Tagus, I have received his majesty's commands, in order that you may be enabled the better to co-operate with the Spanish armies against the common enemy, to authorise you to extend your operations in Spain, beyond the provinces immediately adjacent to the Portuguese frontiers, provided you shall be of opinion that your doing so is material to the success of

Lord viscount Castlereagh to lieut.-general sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.
Downing-street,
25th May, 1809.

your operations, and not inconsistent with the safety of Portugal.

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I have, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

And the general approbation of his majesty's government, of the operations which have been described, was thus attentively expressed.

Sir,

I have received and laid before the king your despatch of the 12th inst. stating your successful commencement of the campaign in Portugal.

Lord viscount
Castlereagh to
lieut.-gen. sir
Arthur Wel-
lesley. K.B.

His majesty commands me to express his intire satisfaction in the decision and celerity of your operations; the excellence of your disposition, and the vigour of your attacks; by which you have been enabled to defeat the enemy in three actions, to pass the Douro in his presence, to recover Oporto, and to force the army under marshal Soult to retire with much loss, and abandon a great part of their ammunition and artillery.

You will make it known to the officers and troops under your command, that the conspicuous valour and intrepidity they have displayed is highly satisfactory to his majesty.

The conduct of the first battalion of the Buffs,

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Lord viscount
Castlereagh to
lieut.-general
sir A. Welles-
ley, K. B.

commanded by lieut.-general Paget, and afterwards, when he was obliged to leave the field, by major-general Hill, reflects the highest credit on that corps and the officers who led them.

Whilst his majesty is sensible of the loss his service must sustain by the absence from duty which the wound received by lieut.-general Paget must necessarily occasion, he feels great satisfaction to learn that there is a fair prospect of his speedy recovery.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

If the activity, energy, and politico-military judgment, exercised in the arrangements described in the preceding chapter, demanded praise, how worthily have the operations by which they were put into effect succeeded them! How consolatory and how animating!

It combines the vigour of command exercised at the outset of the campaign, which formed the subject of the second book, with the determined courage of the army, unhappily exercised in the affair which forms the close of the third; and opens a new prospect to the exertions of both, under circumstances and with results, at least quite compatible with the character of the British army and the dignity of the nation.

The desirable acquisition of the duke of Albuquerque, with the Spanish force under his command, was thus promoted by Mr. Frere.

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Sir,

I inclose a copy of a letter, which I send by this conveyance, to sir Arthur Wellesley. I trust that my having made the insinuation, there alluded to, will not be disapproved of, as the result must, at least, be free from any inconvenience.

Right honour-
able J. H. Frere
to Mr. secretary
Canning.
Seville, 9th
June, 1809.

I have the honour to be,

With great truth and respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. H. FRERE.

In addition to the despatches which I send open for your information, I forward an exact statement of general Cuesta's force, as he transmitted it to this government on the 30th of last month; since which time he has been reinforced by 2,300 infantry, having reason to believe that he somewhat understated it in a communication which he made to you before.

Mr. Frere to
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley.
Seville, 9th
June, 1809.

I have prepared the junta to expect that you would demand to be joined by a corps of Spanish cavalry, as a necessary addition to the British, for many services on which only natives can be em-

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Mr. Frere to sir
Arthur Welles-
ley.

ployed ; and that you might possibly pitch upon the division of the duke of Albuquerque, which is now in the rear, and which may easily be spared from such a force, as appears upon a statement which is inclosed.

Orders have been sent to Badajos, to procure the greatest number of mules and other beasts, for the service of the troops under your command.

Such is the progress of the operations connected with the affair of Oporto, in reference to the future views of the British general.

CHAP. V.

OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF
PORTUGAL. PASSAGE OF THE FRENCH IM-
PEDED TILL THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH
ARMY.

*Movements of the French, under Marshal Victor,
(Duke of Belluno).—Exposition of the admi-
rable Principles of the brave and loyal Lusitanian
Legion.—Excellent partizan Operations of that
Force.—Affair of Sir Robert Wilson, at Barba
del Puerco.—Views of the Petite Guerre, con-
ducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Grant.—Colonel
Mayne's Defence of Trajan's Bridge, at Alcan-
tara.—Desertions from the Enemy, and means
by which produced.—Remarks on the Re-orga-
nization of the Portuguese Forces.*

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SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY's allusion, in his
letter from Braga to lord Castlereagh, to the capture

Movements of
the French
under marshal
Victor.

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Frontier operations.

1st battalion
Lusitanian Legion.

of Alcantara by marshal Victor, naturally recalls attention to the operations which had taken place in that quarter, under sir Robert Wilson, now so justly celebrated, on the one hand, and the brave and intelligent colonel Mayne on the other.

The loyal Lusitanian Legion, after the circumstances which have been detailed of it in the first chapter of the present book, as it has been seen, was included in the orders of marshal Beresford, and, of course, almost immediately lost its character as a *party*, in the force under the general command of sir Arthur Wellesley.

There is, however, something in the conduct of this force, both as relates to the known activity and vigilance of sir Robert Wilson, and to the less prominent, but admirable, energies of colonel Mayne, and the vigorous and intelligent lieutenant-colonel Grant; which seems to call for a further notice of their operations, before the original character of the corps is dissolved in its subsequent change:— And, indeed, this notice deems further to be necessary to supply an hiatus in any account assuming the form of History of the Campaigns.

To do this, it will be necessary, very briefly, to recur to the earlier part of the period which has been already treated.

The extensive line of country occupied by the 1st battalion Lusitanian Legion, and the Spanish

troops and Portuguese cavalry by which it was reinforced, forming the advance of the corps of observation, left by sir Arthur Wellesley under general Mackenzie, at Abrants, extending from Almeida on the left, to the inaccessible Sierra de Franca, on the right, with a garrison of six thousand Spaniards at Ciudad Rodrigo, in their rear, made such a demonstration towards the enemy as could not but leave him in doubt,—a doubt, difficult to solve,—whether a force, by many multiplications more powerful, might not defend the whole eastern frontier of Portugal.

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In fact, not only every mean was strictly practised to preclude the enemy from ascertaining the real strength, or rather weakness, of the force employed; but even the allies had reason to conceive it very much greater than it ever was. For the advanced posts of the French were even attacked, and picquets surprised and captured, and every thing wore the appearance of offensive activity, so that the supreme junta of Spain placed under the chief command of sir Robert Wilson the whole of the Spanish troops in Leon.

The exultation of the French, on the embarkation of sir John Moore's army, was thus damped, by the unexpected prospect of another regular army in readiness to oppose it; and, as has been already

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described, nothing could have a better effect on the general cause.

The noble feelings and just views with which this little army was inspired cannot be so well described as by a sort of exposition of its leaders, made by one of themselves at the time, but which cannot fail to be useful and agreeable at any period of the war, which is indebted to it for admirable illustration. It is conveyed in a private letter from Ciudad Rodrigo, written on the 25th of January, by which period the Lusitanian Legion, by its success in impeding and annoying the marauders of the enemy, which scattered themselves on the frontier, had attracted to it colonel, afterwards general, D'Urban, and other enterprising and intelligent British officers, among whom were lieutenant-col. Wilson, major L'Estrange, and captain Charles of the royal artillery.

Exposition of
the conduct of
the Portuguese
Legion.

“Though, (says the writer to a Portuguese friend) at 200 miles distance from all British support, unaided even by your own supine government, and reduced to consult our personal safety, as all appears abandoned to France; we not only maintain our ground, but press on the enemy, even at the gates of Salamanca. Why do we act so rashly, perhaps you will say? Because we flatter ourselves that

our perseverance may mitigate the disasters of the times,—because we know, that, by constancy, the great and interesting cause to which Great Britain is pledged must finally prosper;—because we know that the enemy has not the means of achieving the conquest of a nation whose spirit inflames as the danger approaches;—and because we think it our duty to continue at our posts, while any utility can arise from it. From every quarter our news is excellent: the Arragonese contend with success. The out-posts of the duke de l'Infantado are at Aranjuez. Great armies are forming in Valencia and Andalusia. The enemy is obliged to detach himself from the most interesting points; and although he possess Salamanca, he is rather prepared to fly than to advance. Such is the true picture. It is, indeed, true, that the experienced battalions of France may beat the Spanish troops in the field; but who supposed that a peaceable people could in an instant assume a martial character,—that the levies of a moment should rival the Spanish infantry under Charles V. which the service of numerous campaigns alone had formed?

“It has been a great evil to the world that the sentiment of fortitude has not been cherished, as more essential to officers than animal courage.

“Have we not been sufficiently taught by that precipitation which has occasioned such catas-

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Frontier operations.
Admirable spirit of this little corps—an example to armies.

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Frontier operations.

trophes to Austria and Russia? Are we always to allow Buonaparte to boast, that wherever his eagles appear, his enemies regard them as basilisks, and become incapable of resistance!

“You have to blush for the lethargy of your country; but we shall have further cause to mourn, if Great Britain abandon the peninsula, because, forsooth, she could not in a moment reach the Pyrenees. Whether Galicia was the best point to start from, admits of discussion; and the battle of the world must be fought on Spanish ground, unless the nations who are still free mean to yoke themselves voluntarily in the train of the enslaved people. This is a favourable part of Spain to act in, because its defence covers the defence of Portugal: when we first came, Ciudad Rodrigo had some magazines; but the city was without troops, and in despondence. Now there is a formidable garrison,—every means of defence, a valiant spirit within the walls, and a resolute peasantry to protect the passes to them.

“The little affair which we had at Calpadella, within six miles of Salamanca, where we took at mid-day a post well defended in a house, (but unfortunately with the loss of captain Picaluga, a most accomplished gentleman and a brave officer), has ingratiated us with them highly, because they find that their own allies will cheerfully act with

them, and mingle in their combats with common zeal.

“ We have now marched forward 250 infantry, 2 guns, and *with great difficulty* we have obtained from Almeida 70 dragoons ; so that with 30 Spanish cavaliers, we have 100 horse ; and with this little force, aided by the peasantry, we hope to preserve the country between the *Tormes* and the *Agueda*, until the grand operations commence by the re-appearance of the British army in the field. The rest of the legion remains in their cantonments within the *Agueda*, where they were posted when we returned from Monte El Rigo ; and there we expect the 2d division, which was so long detained for its clothing, and which perhaps is now prevented from advancing by the selfish and miserable policy of the regency.

“ There is, however, some pride for us in the reflection, that our corps was formed in less than ten weeks,—a corps which was the only one that marched to the assistance of the allies, and which has appeared with some honour to its country ; I should rather say, honour to itself, and shame to Portugal ; for we had no especial assistance, and even the common means which the government had at its command were neglected. It is the knowledge of the good sentiments which have been so neglected, which renders me indignant.

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with the regency, and only entitles them to the protection of Buonaparte.

“Never did people behave better than the soldiers of the legion, and they are all in admirable order.

“With our second division, we are about 2,000 strong. We brought seven guns, notwithstanding the pretended impracticability. What are we to do with the corps, if France is to triumph, *nemine contradicente*? Shall we save this valuable wreck for the prince, and conduct it to Gibraltar? or shall we disperse them, in order that they may be collected by the French banditti, that they may garrison Italian towns? Our commander is without instructions, or security for the payment of the troops, although he has written for money long since. Sir John Cradock has done all in his power for us; he wished to establish the concerns of the legion on a most satisfactory footing; but sir John Moore’s retreat has discomfited every project, and may prove fatal to every thing; but we act under a *carte blanche* granted to our general, who acts according to his judgment, and that judgment will never bring us to trial for deserting our posts. It is not that or money that Europe wants, but perseverance. Outposts are at Bociles, where we expect to be to-morrow; and, the next day, if we can, within the enemy’s lines.”

To make any application of the principles of this interesting paper, would be but to weaken its effects, without any positive result; unless to confirm opinions which in another book have been, perhaps, unsatisfactorily declared.

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Some comments, however, may be admitted. They are the best, the simple, memoranda of a few early efforts of the Lusitanian Legion.

A small French force, forming an out-post at the village of Labobada, sir Robert Wilson with his British officers and some dragoons of the legion, galloped into it, surprized, and after a short resistance made the whole prisoners. Captain Picaluci, Lusitanian light-horse, acting aid-de-camp to col. Mayne, leading his men forward in the most gallant manner, received a ball through his heart. The arms of the prisoners were delivered to Spanish peasants, and themselves sent into the woods.

Surprise of a French out-post.

Irritated at the loss, the French sent a considerable body to redeem it, but without any other success than compelling the little party to retire, and taking lieutenant l'Estrange, 71st regiment, prisoner; who had mounted one of the captured horses, as superior to his own. General D' Urban and lieutenant-col. Grant, eminently distinguished themselves in this affair.

Intelligence being obtained that the French had made a very considerable requisition of money and

Anticipation of a French requisition, by these

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able partizans;
including strag-
glers from sir
John Moore's
army.

horses, from the town of Sedesma, on the Toures, under penalty of its destruction, with its magistrates; the same officers with a squadron of cavalry mounted on mules and horses, with an hundred infantry, (both including by the way, several stragglers of sir John Moore's army), proceeded to that town for the purpose of intercepting the enemy with his booty.

The junta were found waiting in state, with the requisitions in readiness, the rapacious plunderers not having yet returned for it, so that it was deemed best to transfer it into the safer hands of the junta of Ciudad Rodrigo, leaving instead sir Robert Wilson's receipt for the enraged enemy, who arrived within an hour afterwards, but was thus precluded from exercising any severities against the inhabitants,

A French garrison was in consequence immediately sent to occupy it; the out-posts of which, lieutenant-col. Grant almost immediately after surprised, and destroyed or dispersed, with a detachment of the legion, as they were sitting round their fires in the woods.

Those and similar affairs cleared the neighbourhood from the French marauders, who were intimidated by their active intrepidity, which excited also the spirit and vigilance of the Spanish peasants and Guerillas, and prevented the corps under

general La Pisse from entering Portugal by Almeida, in aid of marshal Soult against lord Wellington.

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When the occupation of Puerto de Baines became necessary to prevent the communication between that general and marshal Victor, opposed to general Cuesta, on the Tagus, at Almaraz, colonel Mayne with two battalions of the legion were employed on that service with similar effect. The colonel strengthened this pass by artillery, on the commanding points, and mining the roads through it. He also assisted in fortifying the town of Bejar; receiving in compliment from its inhabitants the celebrated ducal sword preserved there.

And, though last, not least, on this subject, among other passing captures was that of a large convoy with important despatches and Paris mails for Madrid.

Contents of a
French mail.

Of these, the first naturally were appropriated to the consideration and disposal of sir Robert Wilson; there were, also, of no less consequence, the seals of the soi-disant King Joseph's government; and there were also presents for the French officers, with a handsome watch for the intendant-general Danet, at Madrid, which, from the captor, colonel Mayne, having twelve years before become, by the

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accidents of war, both his prisoner and captor at sea, he will yet probably receive.

There were, also, innumerable love-letters, of the tenderest nature, from the Parisian fair, which must ever remain sacred; to say nothing of the effects of such *billets doux* on the vivid imaginations of generous partizans, wandering amid the lonely and romantic scenes of the lofty Sierra d'Estrella.

But among the tokens of imperial favour and affection, there was one which was neither exempt, reserved, nor sacred, though, as an object of domestic endearment, it might certainly claim a various tribute of regard,—it was French *butter* for the table of King Joseph, and was, by the laws of want and war, it is feared, entirely estranged from his pseudo majesty.

A subsequently-captured despatch of La Pisse to Victor, also, described his having marched a column of 6,000 men towards him, and its return in consequence of the occupation of Puesto de Baines.

His feelings on this subject were soon after demonstrated, by an attack on the post of major l'Estrange, at the bridge of Esla, in which that officer was made prisoner, and his force compelled to retire. And also in a severe attack upon the post of colonel J. Wilson, by general Hamerstein's

regiment of chasseurs à Cheval, which was, however, compelled to retire.

An attack on Ciudad Rodrigo succeeded by the force of 7000 men from Salamanca threatening assault, which lieut.-colonel Grant, with a detachment of the Legion and four guns, posted in front, received by a salute of artillery, and a reply of the governor, that accession was inconsistent with his duty. Upon which general La Pisse found it well to remonstrate gently on the impropriety of the Spanish general and Garus suffering themselves to be misled by British officers to resistance against his soldiers, plunder the *king of Spain*, &c.

To the repulsion of this tricking siege is to be added another brilliant affair with a French column at San Felices, on the Agueda, at the same time, in which lieut.-colonel Grant, as usual, eminently distinguished himself.

Of the latter action, a weak account of the French papers having described sir Robert as beaten by an inferior force, his luminous account of the affair is added.

It is only necessary previously to observe, that sir Robert had gone to Coria, to take the command of a corps sent by general Beresford, to be united with another detached by general Cuesta, to act on the rear and right flank of marshal Victor. On his way he received information that Cuesta

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Sir Robert Wilson to marshal Beresford.

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son to marshal
Beresford.

was retreating, and that the combination could not take place.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform your excellency, that I marched, on the morning of the 1st of April, with the detachment of troops, consisting of about 200 men of the regiment of Avila, 130 of the legion under my command, 60 Spanish and 30 Portuguese dragoons, with one howitzer and one field-piece, with the intention of surprising or carrying the posts of the enemy at Barba del Puerco.

When within a quarter of a mile of the village, I detached lieut.-colonel Wilson, with 80 Spaniards and some horse, to alarm the enemy in his rear, in case of resistance; the main body was close upon the village before the enemy's sentries perceived its approach; when lieut.-col. Grant, and lieut.-col. Don Carlos D'Espagne, aid-de-camp to his excellency the captain-general, galloped forward with the cavalry, and killed or secured such part of the enemy as could not reach in time the rocks in the descent of the mountains.

The commanding officer and 16 men were pressed so hard by the detachment under the command of lieut.-colonel Wilson, that they were unable to reach the bridge, and were obliged to

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son to marshal
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throw themselves into a cave at the base of the mountain, which was extremely difficult of access.

The Spaniards and a part of the legion went down the sides of the mountain, and I posted the remainder of the legion, with the howitzers, on the height commanding Barba del Puerco, and the road of San Felices; and I brought the gun through the village to the ridge of the path leading to the bridge, from which situations the artillery played, with very great effect, on the guards ascending the San Felices road, and the reinforcements which subsequently descended.

The enemy sent immediately forward from San Felices, where he had 3000 men, detachments of light troops, who took post on the side of the mountain opposed to us, and where they kept up a very brisk fire; which was as briskly answered, from eight o'clock in the morning until two in the afternoon, but with considerable loss on their part, from our activity, and the excellence of some of our marksmen, particularly some officers and chasseurs, peasants.

Finding that the enemy persevered in throwing more troops forward, and not having the means or intention to occupy the post of Barba del Puerco, especially as I was aware that he could and did, by single persons, pass and assemble a large force on

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son to marshal
Beresford.

this side of the bridge, who could divide and turn our position to right and left; I withdrew my guns from Barba del Puerco to its height; when the Spaniards re-ascended the hill, and formed on a height, about 400 yards from the village.

The troops of the legion maintained the ground obstinately against the tirailleurs of the enemy, who appeared on every side.

I gradually withdrew my guns and the Spanish infantry in separate divisions; then the cavalry, as the ground did not admit of its acting; and when the main body had thus descended the hill, and passed an intervening open space, extremely unfavourable to cross, under an enemy's fire from the height, I withdrew the troops of the legion; and, by keeping up a fire from behind the rock that favoured my skirmishers, I passed also the rear-guard, without any loss or the smallest disorder, to the rocky height beyond the plain, where, again making a stand in some strength, the enemy halted and retired up the hill.

The troops had directions to halt at Viella de Cervo, where I remained during the night, constantly patrolling to Barba del Puerco; and where I found that the enemy early at night had, from fear of an attack, withdrawn his forces, leaving only a small guard.

It is a painful circumstance to be under the ne-

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June.Sir Robert Wilson to marshal
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cessity of citing, even against the enemy, a most flagitious breach of faith and military honour; but it is not only to record a reproach, it is to save gallant officers, in the exercise of generous humanity, from perishing by similar treachery, that I am obliged to relate, that when informed of the officer and his party being in the cave, at whom the Spaniards were endeavouring to pour fire from every direction, I desired lieutenant Wilson to offer them their lives, on condition of surrendering; and lieutenant-colonel Don Carlos D'Espagne accompanied him, to prevent the Spanish infantry from firing.

Finding that the communication could not be made on this side of the bridge, these officers, joined by lieutenant-colonel Grant and lieutenant Charles, of the Royal British Artillery, passed the bridge, advanced with a white handkerchief, and proposed the terms I desired. The officers came forward, and said it was what they wished, and begged lieutenant-colonel Wilson to approach nearer. At the instant a volley was fired at him and the rest of the officers; and the fire was continued until they passed the bridge again. Unfortunately it happened at the moment that the enemy's detachments were descending the hill, so that the complete example could not be made which such conduct imperiously demanded; but most of the

Low treachery
of the enemy.

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son to marshal
Berestford.

assassins perished, and I am assured that only the officer and four men came out of the cave alive.

It is a more agreeable duty for me to add, that in this expedition I have had much to praise. All the officers attached to me did whatever bravery and judgment could achieve; and your excellency well knows, that both must have been required under our circumstances, in the conduct of new levies, naturally brave, but inexperienced.

This affair has cost the enemy dear, and it is another lesson that no occasion is omitted to attack him, and that he cannot, with impunity, presume in a country where his name is in abhorrence, and where his crimes daily augment the virulence of hatred and the fury of vengeance. Hitherto it is true that the character of the war, which I have been able to direct against him, has not been on the great scale of military operations; but it is one which has kept him in continual alarm, diminished his ranks, and, I trust, discomfited many of his objects.

It would be improper, at this moment, to notice publicly the patriotic zeal and valour of several peasants, who accompanied and served in yesterday's affair; but I have the honour to transmit for his majesty and the central junta, their names, and, among so many brave and worthy men, there is yet one to be particularly distinguished for his

most gallant conduct.—I have the honour to be,
your excellency's most obedient and humble ser-
vant,

ROBERT WILSON,
Brigadier-general.

Veilla de Cervo, April 2, 1809.

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Sir Robert Wil-
son to marshal
Beresford.

The co-operation and communication of the French general being cut off, and the peasantry of the surrounding country excited against him, he found himself impelled to make a sudden movement towards the south, for a junction with Victor's corps on the left bank of the Tagus, by crossing it at the bridge of Alcantara.

Retreat of Soult
to join Victor.

Colonel Mayne's division was thus brought into an embarrassing situation in his front. The resources of this excellent officer, however, did not fail him; he moved on Cacillas de Flores, and tried to gain the pass of Peralis, which headed the enemy's column, with the hope of arresting its progress, till a junction of every Spanish and Portuguese force could be effected; and, finding this in vain, endeavoured to cut off their detachment at Paio, and, though unsuccessful, made some prisoners. It, however, formed a junction at this place with colonels Wilson and Grant, to whom at night arrived sir Robert Wilson, who had made a considerable number of prisoners.

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June.Interesting
communications
of the Partizans
of sir R. Wil-
son's corps.

This whole force, with irregular additions, pursued the enemy, for two days, with every species of harassment, the enemy conceiving himself pursued by a large and efficient army.

There is a degree of interest in the operations of this period, which, as they will not individually appear after the present chapter, will warrant the introduction of the few following letters, which more eminently tend to shew the military qualities required in them than volumes of description.

Those of colonel Grant evince all the talents of an accomplished partizan, and all the prompt energy of a great general.

The mingled circumstances of the peculiar *petite-guerre*, which they describe, the passions excited, the disappointments which accrued on the most favourable expectations; the different lights in which the unhappy soldiery and peasantry, who formed the half-equipped troops employed, appeared on different occasions, all yield an insight to the war, which nothing else can give, and agreeably increase the stock of information on the subject.

Puertes de Banos, 25th February, 1809.

One o'Clock in the Morning.

Sir,

Major Ruman
to sir Robert
Wilson.

I have the honour to inform you, that I am just now returned from Turnebacas, and will lose no time in my report to you.

Turnebacas can be easily defended with 400 or 500 men, and an equal number of inhabitants ; the defile is very wide ; it is extended from the side of El Barro de Avila by two roads ; betwixt both is a rising ground, that commands them, and every approach from that side completely. The approach is not so difficult as in Banas or so steep. The entrance of the defile is one league from the village of Turnebacas ; and, if this entrance should be lost, the ground thence to the village affords a thousand opportunities to make the approach of an enemy almost impossible. The pass of Turnebacas cannot be turned. The mountain* that forms its west side, runs down to Almarez ;—the east is formed by the Sierra de Bejar. There is no other road between Turnebacas and Banos. Artillery can pass at Turnebacas, but with difficulty, and can get no farther. The road betwixt these and Xerte, is impracticable ; it would require the blowing up of rocks, and building of bridges, to make it otherwise. From Xerte to Cavesuela, 1 league, a tolerable good road, with the exception of one bridge ; the other 6 leagues to Placenzia ; and also the way to El Barro de Avila, I understand, is passable for artillery.

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Major Ruman
to sir Robert
Wilson.

* Siera de Beira.

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June.Major Ruman
to sir Robert
Wilson.

The road from here to Turnebacas is horrid; it leads on the highest mountain near this, and is almost impracticable for cavalry. Another road goes from

Banos		Banos	
Puertes	$\frac{1}{2}$	Eibash	1
Bejar	$1\frac{1}{2}$	Cavesuella	3
Besesas	2	Xerte	1
Salanna	3	Turnebacas	1
Turnebacas	3		<hr/>
			6
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	10		
	<hr/>		

Want of time has prevented me from reconnoitring this road.

No more than fifty of the inhabitants of Turnebacas are armed, six in Xerte; but the rest are willing to give all necessary assistance, and amount to about 400.

To ascertain the exact number of men that we may expect from the different villages, I have left a paper, directed to the Alcaldes, in the hands of a Spanish colonel; wherein I have desired them to give you the wished-for information. The colonel has promised to collect it from the greatest number of villages, as he is to receive the accounts from them, and to forward it to me from Bejar.

Forty French infantry which marched yesterday morning from Piedrohuts, for El Barco de Avila, were on the way, attacked by a party of Spanish soldiers and armed peasantry, who killed four and took five prisoners; four other French soldiers deserted the French, and joined the Spaniards. The Spaniards did not lose a single man.

I have picked up four French deserters, all Germans, two of them left this yesterday morning, in disguise, for Avilo.

I am at a loss if I can enlist the four men, who are all very anxious to enter the British service; all of them were in the Spanish service, taken by the French, and compelled to enter theirs. For want of clothing, the French have dressed them in the long coats of the Spanish cavaliers. Each has accounts of dates, as they arrived, with their arms and accoutrements. I shall want your farther orders about them, and, until then, keep them here with me. I wish we could keep them; they are stout, good-looking, men, and some of them have been trained to the guns.

Colonel Mayne has sent us a barrel of gunpowder and ammunition, so that we do not want any thing, but more men and flints, of which the detachment stands very much in need.

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June.

Major Ruman
to sir Robert
Wilson.

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June.Major Ruman
to sir Robert
Wilson.

Turnabacas from

LEAGUES.

Banos	6
Piedro hut	8
Avila	18
El Barco de Avila	5
Placencia	8
Varagona	12
Bejar	6

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

S. RUMAN,

Col. 97th.

Sir Robert Wilson, brigadier-general,

&c. &c. &c.

Major Ruman
to col. Mayne.

Turnabacas is lost! At 12 o'clock 300 French infantry, and about 20 or 30 horse, attacked it on the heights: we kept possession of the high road till 2 o'clock, when our right and left wing turned, retired through the village, and went to the mountains between Turnabacas and Testes. If I remain here the night—God knows. My detachment has behaved very ill.—To make them fight with any regularity was impossible; most of them are

* * * * * ! †

† Turnabacas was quickly recovered.

1 Portuguese corporal is dead,
2 Spanish soldiers dead.

MISSING.

S. E. P.

1 1 14 Portuguese.

2 2 36 Espagnols.

3 3 30 Valvons.

6 6 80

Farewell, yours,

J. RUMAN, Major.

15th March, half past 3, P. M.

My dear sir Robert,

Having communicated the contents of colonel D'Urban's letter to the governor, he agreed to the necessity of immediately sending the reinforcements you require, and desired me to attend the meeting of the junta, at twelve o'clock, when he should propose it for their approbation.

He says, he thinks they will not agree to the march of more than 400 men. It is, he is well aware of, the advantageous position in which they are to be placed, and that, should a retreat be necessary, they are as secure from being cut off as they would be in the town of Rodrigo.

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Major Ruman
to col. Mayne.

Guy l'Estrange
to sir R. Wilson.
Ciudad Rodri-
go, March 2d,
1809.

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June.

Guy l'Estrange
to sir R. Wilson.

I am determined, however, to apply for 600, and shall press it to the utmost of my power.

The captain of banditti who took the French mail, is here; he promises to join you to-morrow or on the following day, with 25 men, well mounted; this will be a very desirable reinforcement, under an enterprising and intelligent leader.

The governor says that 60 more cavalry are preparing to join you, but the want of people to make their saddles at present delays them; all possible despatch shall be used to equip them. Captain Lauda seems much hurt at a report which has been circulated about him, of the Portuguese dragoons not doing their duty yesterday; this has been communicated to the good people of the town, by letters from the Spaniards who were with you. Several people were acquainted with the affair, and discussed it in the Plaza, before I heard any thing of it.

There are in the stables here three Portuguese horses, which the junta represent as being an unnecessary expense, as said horses eat barley, though they do no work:—I have seen them, and agree in the opinion of the junta of Rodrigo, Laurda also confirms my sentence, which is, that they should either be shot, or sent to their regiment at Almeida; the latter seems the most just and perhaps the most merciful decision.

I have just returned from the junta, who are at this blessed moment in consultation as to the 600, and the result of their decision on this subject, as well as with respect to the horses for our dragoons, will be communicated to me at half past two o'clock.

They beg their congratulations to Grant, on his fortunate escape, by which they assure me they are convinced that the life of "a very valuable officer has been saved." When the governor communicates the result of their debates, I shall finish my letter.

The governor informs me that, after mature deliberation, the junta have decided on giving 300 men of the regiment of Avilla, and if it should happen that there are any men above that number remaining belonging to the same companies, they shall also accompany them. He says, the junta intend writing to you their reasons for not sending more men, and explaining the various corps, detachments, and duties, formed by the governor. He told me, he believed if we had not demanded more than 400, they would have limited their bounty to 200. The horses for the dragoons are ready, I have given a receipt for them, and they will be sent off immediately. His excellency begs that I may not deceive you as to the *hour* of their arrival, which he says is uncertain, as he has

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Guy l'Estrange
to sir R. Wilson.

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Guy L'Estrange.
to sir R. Wilson.

always great difficulty in getting his people out of the town; he has, however, ordered their major to send chosen men, and assures me he will hasten their departure by every means in his power. I shall go over to St. Estevan in the morning, to make myself as much acquainted as lies in my power, with your intentions as to the detachment, and shall return to Sfuto Espirito before their arrival.

Believe me, dear sir,

Your most faithful servant,

GUY L'ESTRANGE.

Major Ruman to
col. Mayne.
Turnavacas,
March 16, 1809.

P. S. Your letters to colonel Mayne, *via* Abad, Lisbon, and Seville, have already set out on their several journies.

Dear colonel,

A walloon, that was in the engagement of yesterday, has deserted the French this morning at El Barco, and arrived here at 11 o'clock: 300 infantry and 55 cavalry attacked us; infantry are foreigners, and willing to desert, but closely watched by the cavalry.

I inclose to you a parcel of papers which the French left in Los Casas de Puertos: how they came in their possession I cannot tell; they did not find them neither in mine nor in Terrerosy's portman-teau.

6 o'Clock, p. m.

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Major Rumant
col. Mayne.

I have just now received your note of the 16th instant. The French have left El Barco, and marched for Piedrohits, but promised to return very soon. I shall quietly expect their arrival, try my men once more, but at all events make good my retreat through the mountains. A good position can be taken at Sertos, another at Cave-suella; I'll take one after the other, and only consider Banos as my last retreat. This valley can be defended, inch for inch, with few troops,—but not with the kind that I have here.

My servant is in Banos, you will oblige me in sending him here; also the letters.

Sir Robert's box (No. 1.) is lost, with the rest of my baggage.

Another instance of the *bravery* of Spanish peasants. More than 100 of them arrived here to-day, offered their services to me, and promised to do every thing. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon we had an alarm, more than 100 peasants marched with us from hence,—but no more than 25 arrived on the heights: I no sooner left them for a few minutes, than every one disappeared.

I want ammunition and men. Pray what can you give me?

Money is very scarce with me: I have already borrowed from my officers:—What can be the

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Major Ruman
to col. Mayne.

reason of it, my tailors do not send me the blue jackets? they must be ready, and my men want them very much.

Where is the brigadier? and where is colonel D'Urban?

A cannonade towards Almaraz has been heard this morning by 9 o'clock, by some peasants, but not by me.

I hope you have got my letter of this morning.

Yours, &c. &c.

S. RUMAN.

My letter of this morning is brought back to me by a peasant, who says, that he cannot pass the mountains on account of the snow. I enclose it, and thank you to send it to the brigadier.

S. R.

My dear Ruman,

Col. J. Wilson to
major Ruman.
Penarada,
March 28, 1809.

Sir Robert Wilson directs me to acquaint you, that as the enemy seems to have made but a vain menace against Ciudad Rodrigo, and that it is probable he is about to retire; he wishes colonel Mayne and his division to move in the direction of the city, taking particular care to send an officer forward to Ciudad Rodrigo, as soon as you arrive at Perales, to inform the general of your approach.

Should you precede the division, you will leave

these instructions for colonel Mayne, at Perales, observing at the same time, to order the necessary provisions for the men as you advance.

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June.

Col. J. Wilson to
major Rumat.

It appears certain, that the Portuguese have had a cannonade with the enemy, under the walls of the city, and have conducted themselves very well.

Yours, most sincerely,

J. WILSON.

In Galicia, the Spaniards have taken Vigo, and Villa Franca del Bercio, where they made prisoners one of the best regiments of the French empire; they have also taken the town of Santiago, in which place was destroyed the division of general Ney, and himself killed: this was done by the marquis la Romana, and the inhabitants of Galicia; and in that province there are no French except in Corunna, and in Ferrol. We are also assured that Russia has declared war against France. The French at Oporto have desired to capitulate, but general sir Arthur Wellesley will not accept the terms they have proposed.

Intelligence
derived by
col. Crant.
Brozas, May 11,
1809.

The French have lost a great many men at Perros, and they have also lost some men at Molino de Aragon.

An insurrection appears to have taken place in Paris, where they have killed two generals. Cuesta

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gets every day new reinforcements, and he is forming an army of reserve.

The French have evacuated Merida, and are dying every day, to the amount of fifty and seventy.

I give every credit to the above.

J. GRANT,

Lieut.-colonel, L. L. Legion.

N. B. I inclose a gazette from Seville, of the 1st of May.

J. G.

My dear colonel,

Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.
Brozas, May 11,
1809.

Yesterday, on receipt of your favor; I was on my way to attack, if possible, the enemy's cavalry, they having entered Las Navas, two very short leagues in my front; on entering that village, I found they had again retired; there were only 30 of them. They ordered rations for 600 infantry and 200 cavalry, to be ready this morning.—60 cavalry of the enemy have just now entered the village of Las Navas, and I am quite prepared to receive them should they advance here; the legion are very well disposed, and I shall pay every attention to your instructions, either as to retreat or advance, 1,000 of them having only advanced to Caceres; we all of us are sufficient for them, if I should be forced back on you. I left yesterday four men at Las Navas, two of them have behaved very well; I shall report their names to you.

A peasant has just come in from Las Navas, and states, that the enemy have again retired, and that they had not seen any infantry.

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J. Grant to
col. Mayne.

I am not of opinion they mean to advance seriously on Alcantara, yet it is better to be prepared, taking care not to alarm the people, or allow them to think we mean to desert them, else we shall have no rations; all the people here have escaped into the country. Soon as I learn more of the enemy's motions, I shall send you immediate notice, and attend to your orders soon as possible in respect to the corps.

My dear colonel, excuse this scroll; I am in the field, and it is wrote on a wall.

Faithfully yours,

J. GRANT,

Lieut.-colonel, Lt. Legion.

Do me the favour to send me back the serjeant who delivers you this; he may be very useful to me.

C'est bien sensible jour cette junta, ce qui elle vienne de savoir par la lettre, qui vous lui faites l'honneur d'ecrire. Vos plaintes sur le resus des habitants de Miranda a le fournissement des rations pour les soldats du L.L.L. meritent de l'attention, et cette junta ne pourra pas se passer

Don Ramon
Blanco to col
Mayne.

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Don Ramon
Blanco to col.
Mayne.

de prendre sur le champ toutes les mesures possibles pour faire comprendre à Miranda le sacrè de son devoir à cet egard.

J'ai l'honneur de vous temoigner,

Monsieur le Colonel,

Toute ma consideration,

Come gouverneur president,

RAMON BLANCO.*

M. Le Colonel Mayne.

Brozas, 16th May, 1809.

My dear Colonel,

Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

The day before yesterday I patrolled to my front, by way of Las Navas, being there informed that a considerable quantity of shoes were collecting at Caceres for the enemy. Seven leagues

* It is very painful to this junta to hear, what it is informed of by the letter which you have done it the honour to write. Your complaints of the refusal of the inhabitants of Miranda, to furnish rations for the soldiers of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, merit every attention; and this junta cannot lose a moment to take every possible means of making Miranda comprehend the sacredness of its duty in this respect.

I have the honour to evince to you,

Colonel,

All my consideration

RAMON BLANCO,

Governor-president.

Colonel Mayne.

from hence I determined to seize them : by seven at night I was about to enter the town, but was informed it was already in possession of the enemy's cavalry, 60 in number, much on the alert, with fires in the street.

I encamped, during the night, within a short distance of the town ; at day-light I retired to Las Navas, and from thence here.

At six, yesterday morning, the enemy's cavalry retired, (taking with them some *new* saddles,) they returned back in one hour ; and, at two o'clock yesterday, 1000 men entered the village, viz. 600 infantry and 400 cavalry.

You may believe I keep my detachment on the alert, by patrols, and their intentions as yet I am not able to penetrate ; at all events, it is our occupying Alcantara and Brozas, and patrolling, has called their attention more immediately : They wish to protect Caceres, and to overawe the villages in the vicinity, from whence they draw provisions and other stores, and at the same time hamper us.

Caceres are in general French, and many of the villages in its vicinity in their favour, so that greater caution is requisite.

The enemy, say they, intend marching this way ; but I rather imagine they fear an advance on our part.

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Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

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Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

At all events I think it will be highly necessary, that I should have fifty more men of the legion, two officers, four serjeants, six corporals, and two drums, one of them legion; I must have always one drum on the main guard. The serjeants I have are without any species of arms, and hope you will send them *fire-locks*.

I, at the same time, find, amongst my militia, a considerable want of ammunition.

Do me the favour to send, by the detachment, a box of spare ammunition, flints, &c. the militia have only one each.

There is also a total want of blankets for the men; and I understand with the ammunition I should receive blankets.

In respect to the Alcaides of this village, he replies that he feels it sufficient to find provisions for the troops here; and that the Alcaide, mayor of Alcantara, has, under his direction, forty villages, he only this of Brozas.

I have sent to the Alcaide of las Navas, to enforce an order of your Alcaide, in respect to cattle, and I have no doubt but, in the course of to-day, you will receive some cattle from them.

I still hope, in some days, to fall in with some French shoes.

It is a most unpleasant circumstance that I have merely the name of cavalry; some of them want

even swords, many of them pistols; and I have no ammunition whatever that will suit for either their pistols or carbines. I rather think the Spanish ball-cartridges will suit better than the English. Send me one box of the former, or a proportion for thirty carbines. I shall send by the serjeant a return of what the Almeida heroes want, to be sent to Cox, with a strong letter from you on the subject. Indeed, it will be necessary to send a copy to general Mackenzie, Abrantes, stating the absolute inutility of cavalry wanting every equipment to meet an enemy.

Ciudad Rodrigo should also be wrote to, in strong terms, requesting cavalry; the cause is their own, and that city at present can well spare a considerable number. Do, my dear sir, remedy these evils as far as in your power; they, in existing circumstances, are extremely essential. Indeed, if general Mackenzie does nothing as to the cavalry, I must renounce the command of them; I know them; they will hardly meet an enemy when well armed. What will they do in their present state?

I have not as yet been able to reconnoitre the back, but will soon.

I have got a very good local map of this province. Do send me a pair of compasses, and, if

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Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

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Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

possible, the Spanish and English book I mentioned to you, or any other.

Is there any thing from sir Robert, or any word of my servant?

I send you a hare and two rabbits for dinner.

I had intimated being in Alcantara to-day; but I am anxious to ascertain something more of my friends in Caceres.

On this occasion I find our friend Ruman has forgot us as to information.

I send back by the serjeant some sick, having here no means of recovering them. A surgeon, I presume, at present, you cannot spare.

I have established a tolerable connexion with the Alcaides, in the way of Noticias.

There is a road along the river from Alcantara to Barca via Abconeta; it is no great distance from Caceres. There is another bank up the river, called Valdecanas, and no great distance from Truxillo.

I am just informed, from a very respectable channel, that there has been an action betwixt Cuesta and the enemy, decidedly in favour of Cuesta, the enemy losing very considerably both in cavalry and infantry; the French having retreated four leagues, and the artillery of the enemy that was at S. Servan, had also retreated back on Merida.

I am apt to give this news much credit, from 1000 of the French, having so unexpectedly entered Caceres; and the cavalry party, of 60, having so suddenly returned with them, having been gone only one hour. All the people I have sent out to gain intelligence, confirm the above statement: the battle is said, to have principally disputed in the vicinity of Fuentes de Cantos.

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Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

The enemy in Caceres have demanded a quantity of mortar so be carried to Truxillo, for the purpose of building some fortifications: this is still a further confirmation of Cuesta's having succeeded.

You will, perhaps, feel it necessary, by some means, to convey the whole of the above intelligence to head quarters, in which case pray *remember your humble servant*, as it will be useful, through our friend the quarter-master-general.

Money I find very useful here, and absolutely necessary to open an account against the public, for the purpose of gaining intelligence.

My dear sir,

Believe me most faithfully, your's,

J. GRANT,
Lieut.-colonel.

Colonel Mayne, &c. &c. &c.

Alcantara.

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June.Communication
of John Pink to
col. Mayne.

Sir,

On my arrival here I found that all that was written to you about the Pont de Congaspo, was but reports. Martha has sent two men from here to inquire; he doubts much that any French came there. I think it is useless my going there, it being four leagues hence instead of three, as we thought.

I remain here until nine o'clock, waiting for the post, which will bring the news from Cuesta's army, and Estremadura.

All the French at Salamanca took yesterday, a 4, p. m. the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, with 100 waggons, loaded with rations, ladders, and ropes; they were 6000 men strong. No other news.

I am,

Sir,

Your most humble servant,

JOHN PINK.

11 o'clock, p. m.

Brozas, 11th May, 1809.

My dear Colonel,

The enemy have not made their appearance since I wrote you in the morning.

They are anxious to gain intelligence in respect to us all, and our strength.

Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

The same division that entered Las Navas this morning, entered Roi Del Parco, last night, at eleven o'clock, and ordered guides for Brozas; but on their road turned off to Las Navas, and again returned about eight o'clock to Cáceres. I have sent after them to ascertain what they are about.

Another party of cavalry went still more to my right; they formed in some measure a circle. The reply made by the Alcaide, mayor of Las Navas, to their inquiry, was, that we were in Alcantara 5000 strong; at Brozas, 500 infantry and 100 cavalry. Soon as I can I shall attend to your orders in respect to the Barcas, and to your instructions in general; at the same time you must be well aware, that our out-posts are liable to so many casualties, that it is impossible to be correct in point of time on reports, or otherwise. Hitherto I have been always guided by circumstances and situation; at the same time I shall endeavour to comply, at least, with the spirit of your instructions.

I have seen a very spirited proclamation from the junta of Badajos, directing a general armament of the inhabitants of Estremadura; indeed, this province wants nothing to appear in arms but the sight of troops, to any respectable number.

With 3000 more regular troops, I am well con-

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Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

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Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

vinced this province would immediately join against the enemy.

One soldier from Almeida informs me, that eleven of our cavalry reported themselves ready for march to (Local) brigadier-general Cox, and that he ordered them to remain where they were.

And he had also the audacity to take from our cavalry the new swords they had received, and give them old, useless ones.

In short, the legion is no favourite with Mr. Cox. Why? because sir Robert has distinguished himself, and they have come out to reap the harvest.

I inclose a return of what is wanting in the cavalry; in short, they want every thing, and I have sent to general Bessair, even now appointed.

The whole of this, I think, should be represented to sir Robert, I think it an insult on us all; he is a very great man with his new elevation.

I have drawn from Las Navas, notwithstanding the enemy, for your use, twenty bullocks: I keep two of them here, and eighteen will be with you to-morrow by eleven o'clock.

The most friendly man I have found at Las Navas, and to whom I am very much obliged, in many respects, (and the same individual now sends these eighteen cattle,) is the very person you di-

rected me to make a prisoner of; but more of this when we meet. Meantime you may rest assured he is a good patriot.

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Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

I have just seen a gazette extraordinary, from Seville, stating our destroying the enemy's fleet in Basque Roads, and the arrival of general Wellesley, with 30,000 English troops.

I inclose you the substance of a letter, just now received by our Alcaide mayor, to which I give every credit.

Your serjeant has just arrived, but brought nothing from you. I need hardly again say, that another drum is necessary; it is impossible for two drums, alternately, to do this duty.

Collecting all this news in a body, you will probably think it necessary to send a courier to general Beresford, concerning the same, to general Machia, Abrantes.

Do send to the latter for some cavalry: in that case you are properly adequate to drum the enemy out of Caceres; this would be glorious!

The enemy's cavalry are of Westphalia, consequently not the better in the cause of France.

My dear colonel,

Your's, most faithfully,

J. GRANT.

Colonel Mayne, colonel of brigade,

Commandant, &c. Alcantara.

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Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

N. B. Russia has certainly declared, or is about declaring, war against France.—Every news good. You will be, &c. &c.

The cavalry officer is unwell, and I have ordered the ——— to join immediately. J. G.

My dear colonel,

Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.
Brozas, May 12,
1809.

All remains quiet here, nothing of the enemy since yesterday-morning, I have a spy in Caceres ; he observed the party of yesterday enter that village about 11 a.m. on their return.

I had patrols two leagues to the front during the night, and I have a corporal and four men in Las Navas, with regular rounds during the night, and the whole of the troops are under arms by day-light, and remain so until my last cavalry-patrols return and make their report.

I have inclosed the most recent news, and I believe you may depend on its being correct.

Only 500 men, including cavalry, are now in Caceres, and I rather 'imagine, they do not mean to remain long ; there would be an excellent opportunity for us ; Cox's infantry, the cavalry, and two guns, would force them to retire immediately. I shall watch their motions and numbers, and in the mean time you will probably think of a movement against them, and give me your opinion and directions to that effect.

I have sent this morning a small patrol to Garrillas, a village within a league of the bark of Albeoneta, with positive orders to the alcaide mayor of that place, to destroy the connection of the bark with this side of the river; I shall look at it myself as soon as I can leave this vicinity.

The cattle would have been with you this morning, but the weather is so warm that I was advised to defer it until the afternoon.

Believe, most faithfully yours,

J. GRANT,

Lieut.-colonel, L. L. Legion.

I wish the doctor would send my book and map by the bearer. Compliments to him and Mrs. Mellingen.

Do send back the bearer to-night, with any other of those fellows that may be skulking about in your city.

J. G.

N. B. My dear colonel, my corporal from Navas has just come to say that the enemy have evacuated Caceres, but adds, that the alcaide of Navas wishes me to be careful of admitting the bearer of this news (a priest,) into this post, as he believes his intention is, to ascertain our numbers and intentions; I have accordingly directed him to be stopped at the main guard, outside of the town,

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Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

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June.

and will detain him until the news he brings is confirmed or otherwise.

The result you will be made acquainted with as soon as I learn any thing certain.

Two days ago general Cuesta wrote to the governor of Badajos that he was convinced the enemy were preparing for a march, but that he intended to keep close in their rear; that a part of them had fallen back on Cordovilla, five leagues from Merida, and the enemy at Montego had already marched from thence towards the rear.

Cuesta had also sent to Badajos for 4,000 infantry and 700 cavalry, and directed them, at the same time, to prepare for him a bridge of boats, to be carried on mules, for the purpose of following the enemy, and tracing it across the Tagus, at Almarez, the French being in possession of a bridge there sufficient to cross themselves and their artillery; as in the event of their retreat, they will most likely destroy it, general Cuesta having previously done the same to the stone one.

The line of march of the enemy's left is Truxillo, Javaiceja, and Almarez, the right, in Cordovilla, and its vicinity.

At the bridge of Arzobispo, the French artillery cannot pass.

Within these few days Zafra was the head-quarters of general Cuesta.

Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.
Brozas, May 12,
1809.

I believe the above statement to be perfectly correct.

J. GRANT, lieut.-col.

L. L. Legion.

N. B. The enemy have again retired from
Caceres. J. G.

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June.

My dear colonel,

The enemy have certainly entirely left Caceres ; they had parties of cavalry out in every direction, and on the return of their cavalry from Las Navas yesterday at 12 o'clock, they immediately marched to Alcuéscar, on the Muida road, six leagues from Caceres, and two from Muida ; it was from Alcuéscar they originally came.

Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.
Brozas, May 12,
1809.

Medellin is again in possession of a post of Cuesta's army ; they also occupy Villa Franca. His head-quarters, sometimes Zafra, sometimes Monestered.

The enemy, when in Caceres, were not apparently in much spirits,—said nothing of the German war, but the Westphalians were not on the best terms with their French allies ; many of them had deserted.

I send this by a dragoon sent in charge of the cattle.

My dear colonel,

Always most faithfully yours,

J. GRANT, lieut.-col.

L. L. Legion.

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June.Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.

N. B. I am sorry to be under the necessity of stating to you, that on examining the militia under my command, as to ammunition wanting, to receive a return of 1007, several of them having none.

This is terrible; had we had occasion to have used them. I thought the colonel had reported them on all points complete. J.G.

My dear colonel,

What I stated to you last night in respect to the enemy having quitted Caceres, was correct. But I have now to inform you, that yesterday, at four in the afternoon, intelligence was received of 10,000 infantry, cavalry, with their artillery; (I imagine, light pieces.)

I have patrols out in every direction; this morning I have heard nothing of them; should I not see them by mid-day, their intentions are on some other object than Alcantara.

I shall give you immediate notice of their advance, and in force fall back with the cavalry to the village in my rear, sending you the infantry, excepting a few caçadores, that may annoy them a little amongst the walls, between the village and Alcantara. Did you fire any of your artillery last night?—Tell me if you approached.

I imagine, (if you find it necessary,) there will be plenty of time to draw your guns from the town.

Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.
Brozas, May 13,
1809.

I certainly think they do not mean passing this way :—It may have been influenced by some news.

Yours, faithfully,

J. GRANT, lieut.-col.

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The result of these little operations terminated as follows :

“ By advices from Alentejo it is confirmed that a column of the enemy, 11,000 strong, detached from the French army at Merida, attempted to pass the bridge of Alcantara, with the intention, as is supposed, of coming to assist Soult ; but about a thousand Portuguese, who were at the bridge, obliged them to fall back, killing 1600 of them. This number, so unequal, shews well the bravery of the Portuguese.”

Lisbon Diary,
May 20.

“ It is known that the French army of Estremadura, having abandoned the Guadarama, marched in the direction of Alcantara, to cross the Tagus. On the 12th instant the place was attacked by a division of from 10 to 12,000 men, commanded, as is supposed, by marshal Victor in person.—No other troops happened to be there than one battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, and the regiment of the militia of Idanha, with six pieces of cannon, and 150 horse of the regiment No. 11, all commanded by colonel Mayne, of the Loyal Legion, the troops not exceeding in the whole 1,800 men.

Lisbon Gazette,
of May 20.

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June.

Lisbon Gazette,
of May 20.

That valiant garrison, which had already disputed the ground with the enemy in Braga, occupied by its advanced parties, succeeded in obstructing the passage for six hours, in presence of an enemy vastly superior in number, and artillery, with some loss in men killed and wounded, yet without losing one single piece of ordnance. Major Grant deserves the highest praise on account of his conduct in this action."

Extract of a letter dated the 14th of May, at night, from the camp near Alcantara.

" This morning, at eight o'clock, three of the enemy's columns, with artillery and cavalry, attacked furiously our position on the height before this place ; the small force which the brave colonel Mayne of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, governor of the town, had, consisted of 1,200 men of the regiment of Idanha, and 600 of the first division of the Lusitanian Legion.

" The enemy had 10,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and 12 field-pieces. Our artillery and infantry fought with such fury, and such indescribable bravery until sun-set, that they maintained the pass against all the efforts of the enemy, whose superiority was so excessive."

" Since the battle of Alcantara, the French have

not yet advanced in that part of Spain ; they are in force in Valentia de Alcantara, and make inroads into the vicinity, yet without penetrating farther into the interior.

“ On the 19th and 20th instant, two Portuguese regiments of infantry of the line, one English regiment of foot, four squadrons of Portuguese horse, two squadrons of English cavalry, and an excellent Portuguese park of artillery, marched from this capital. These troops are proceeding, partly by water and partly by land, to Santarem, in order to form a junction with the corps commanded by lieutenant-general Miranda, and which, reinforced by the above troops, will be from 20 to 30,000 men strong. His head-quarters were removed on the 1st instant, from Thomar to Abrantes.”

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Supplement
to the Lisbon
Gazette of May
23.

The present narrative now arrives at the period at which sir Arthur Wellesley makes the allusions which conclude the last chapter.

As therein stated, the enemy under Victor made an attack on the small garrison of Alcantara, and carried it on the 14th of May.

1st attack of
Alcantara.

The inhabitants of this antient and renowned, though poorly fortified, city, endeavoured to obstruct the passage of the river, over which is a magnificent Roman bridge, built by the dignified

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June.1st attack of
Alcantara.

Trajan, and the last act of his grandeur in Spain. They excavated the road to the depth of near twenty feet, and also constructed a kind of abbatis across it. They then urgently solicited, by every means, a British force for its defence.

Colonel Mayne, under whose command the brigade at Alcantara remained, had already, on the 7th, issued the following orders :

Instructions of
lieut.-col. Grant,
commanding
the out-posts of
the garrison of
Alcantara, at
Brozas. Dated
May 7, 1809.

In the event of the enemy moving upon Alcantara in great force, you will order immediately the 200 infantry under your command to fall back to the heights of Alcantara, on the east side of the Tagus, remaining with the cavalry under your orders as long as you can in safety, for any information concerning the enemy's advance. I find the town of Alcantara so thoroughly indefensible, that it is out of the question to take any steps for its defence ; and the greater object being the pass of the Tagus, it must be abandoned ; but should the enemy come forward in small force, or in any numbers equal to our own, I should recommend a skirmishing retreat, falling back upon my force, which shall, in this case, be prepared to give them a very warm reception.

You will patrol on the line of Caceres, towards Aroyo de Puerco, and in the circle of Alcantara,

as your judgment may point out to you, keeping a watchful eye on the upper line of the Tagus.

You will send reports to my head-quarters every third day, of every thing that passes under your command; being careful in procuring and forwarding, immediately, every other information of greater importance.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c., &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM MAYNE,
Colonel, commanding the
brigade at Alcantara.

On the following day, general Cuesta thus addressed him for a co-operation.

Most excellent sir,

The news that I have received, that 2,000 troops have arrived under your command in the place of Alcantara, has given me the greatest satisfaction, and the more particularly so, as I understand these to be the advance of a large army of British troops, under his excellency general Wellesley, moving into Spain.

I should think marshal Victor with his army will make a disposition to enter Portugal from Estremadura, to relieve general Soult; and it will give me much pleasure to concert any plans for the impediment of the enemy's movement in the vicinity

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Col. Mayne to
col. Grant.

General Cuesta
to col. Mayne,
commandant of
the allied troops
at Alcantara.
Dated May 8,
1809.

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June.General Cuesta
to col. Mayne.

of Badajos and Elvas, the former place being now fortified and strengthened in the best possible manner. It is also probable, they may try to pass the Tagus at Alcantara, and to move on to Castello Branco, in Portugal.

Your excellency may depend upon every information that I can obtain ; and of my determination to pursue the enemy's movement in either case ; and to harass them by every means in my power.

I trust your excellency will have the goodness to inform me of all the circumstances that may transpire for the good of our common cause, and to believe that it will be my greatest desire to render every assistance to the allies, as captain-general of the province of Estremadura.

May God preserve your excellency !

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

The several juntas thus followed :—

The supreme
of Estremadura,
to col. Mayne,
commandant at
Alcantara.

This supreme junta has been very much pleased at the receipt of your despatch of the 7th instant, in which you inform them of your safe arrival, with the troops under your command, at Alcantara. They beg to send you their most cordial thanks for the energetic disposition that your military skill

and sound penetration has made, to put the position of Alcantara in a vigorous state of defence, and they are well persuaded that your presence, and well-directed measures, will prevent the wrongs that Alcantara has suffered, in its weak state, from being repeated; and that the enemy will be repelled with steadiness whenever they attempt to renew their invasion.

The honourable, faithful, and most cordial alliance, that so firmly unites the three nations, must reanimate the glorious cause in which all are so much interested; and the junta, confiding in your military knowledge, with all pleasure confer on you their full powers of government, for the defence of Alcantara and its dependencies.

God preserve your important life for many years!

(Signed) LOUIS MARIA DE MENDOZA,
JUAN CABRERA DE LA ROCHA.

In the name of the supreme junta of Estremadura.

Badajos, May 10, 1809.

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The supreme
junta of
Estremadura
to col. Mayne.

The junta of government and war of the citadel and town of Alcantara, and its dependencies, in full meeting assembled, having taken into consideration your military and political knowledge, of so much importance in any case of invasion from the enemy, and so useful and beneficial to the

Address from
the junta of Al-
cantara, to col.
Mayne, com-
manding the
brigade of Al-
cantara.

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June.Address from
the junta of Al-
cantara to col.
Mayne.

Spanish nation, and its ally Great Britain, beg leave to name you a member of it, and to request your presence at their councils, when your other occupations will admit of it, and to beg that you will allow them to distinguish you with the cross and medal * of the junta of the government and war, as worn by the members, and to present you with them.

God preserve you for many years !

(Signed) FERNANDO MARIA PANTOZA,
JULIAN ROMERO FLORES.

In the name of the junta of Alcantara.

Alcantara, May 12, 1809.

Letter from the
superior junta
of Castille.
dated Ciudad
Rodrigo, May
12, 1809, to
col. Mayne,
commanding
the brigade of
Alcantara.

The superior junta of Castille has received your communication; they are happy to hear that the good and valiant troops that were lately so successfully useful at Ciudad Rodrigo, are likely to be the same under your orders, for the defence of our grand cause, at Alcantara. The junta have lately received the agreeable news, that the most excellent general Cuesta has, upon late occasions, been very successful in his attacks upon the enemy, and that his operations are proving very injurious to them.

* A red cross with a pendant gold medal, one side, "Al Mérito;" the reverse, a right hand and eye, with the word, "Cuidado."

The junta are very sorry they cannot accord with your request, of placing, under the orders of lieut.-colonel Grant, the cavalry that he had with him in Castille, as they are actually now employed with a division of our army to the great inconvenience of the enemy at Bozan and Ledesma, or they would have had great satisfaction in complying, in every possible manner, with your wishes.

(Signed) RAMON BLANCO.

Govr. and President,

In the name of the superior junta of Castille.

Notwithstanding these views and hopes, to which the daring valour and discriminating zeal of this extraordinary little force had certainly given birth, Alcantara could not be saved. It was cannonaded and forced; and the determined spirit of the inhabitants, which would have inspired a generous enemy with respect, only produced the severe enormity of war.

That what could be done by the British force, there *was done*, will be amply seen from the following documents. The conduct of the affair is thus described in the Lisbon Gazette.

Most excellent sir,

I send these few lines to assure you of the regard and kind memory I owe to you, and

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Letter from the
superior junta
to col. Mayne.

The bishop of
Oporto, to col.
Mayne, of the
Loyal Lusita-
nian Legion.

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June.The bishop of
Oporto to col.
Mayne.

how much I participate in yours and sir R. Wilson's welfare, and admire the defence you are making on the frontiers of this kingdom, which I consider of the greatest advantage; and I am glad that you have a part to act in this defence equal to your valour and honour.

I shall profit of every opportunity in which I may have it in my power to shew with what high consideration,

I remain, &c. &c. &c.

May God preserve your Excellency,

(Signed) O'BISPO DO PORTO.

Account of the
battle of Alcantara;
from the Lisbon Gazette,
May 20, 1809.*

When the French army, in Estremadura, abandoned the Guadiana, they attempted to cross the

* *A Gazeta de Lisboa, Sattado, 20 de Maio.*—Consta que o Exército Francez da Extremadura abandonando o Guadianna se tem dirigido a passar o Tejo em Alcantara. No dia 14 do corrente foi esta Praça atacada por huma divisao de 10 a 12,000 homens commandada, ao que se suppoe, pelo marechal Victor em pessoa: achavo se alli unicamente hum Batalhao da Leal Legiao Lusitana, e o Regimento de Milicias de Idanha nova com 6 peças e 50 Cavallos do Regimento No. 11, tudo commandado pelo coronel Mayne da mesma Leal Legiao, nao excedendo ao rodo o numero de 1800 homens: estra valerosa guarniçao, que ja tinha disputado ao Inimigo o terreno em Brossas, a onde se achavao as suas avançadas, conseguiu embaraçar a passagem da ponte por mais de 6 horas, e retirar-se em presença do Inimigo para o Rosmaninhal a pezar da grande superioridade em numero e da Cavallaria, ainda que com alguma perda, trazendo toda a sua Artilheria. O major Grant da mesma Legiao mereceo pela sua Conducta nesta acçao os maiores Elogios, &c. &c.

Tagus at Alcantara. On the 14th inst. this place was attacked by a division of 10 or 12,000 men, commanded by marshal Victor, duke of Belluna, in person ; they were opposed by the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, with six pieces of cannon, the militia regiment of Idanhia Nova, and fifty horse of the 11th regiment of cavalry : the whole commanded by colonel Mayne, of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, whose force did not exceed 1,800 men.

This valiant commandant and garrison disputed the passage of the bridge of Alcantara for nine hours, and then retired in front of the enemy, so much superior to them, with all their artillery, to Lodiero.

The fire of the enemy, whose whole force was engaged, was tremendous beyond conception, although our loss was nothing in comparison with theirs, which at least amounted to 1,400 men.

Lieut.-colonel Grant, the second in command, gave the greatest assistance to colonel Mayne, and these two officers are entitled to the greatest merit for their bravery and conduct on this trying occasion. The enemy's cavalry followed them until dusk ; but, by their judicious management, the retreat was effected in the greatest order.

The courage of 1,800 Portuguese, at the battle of Alcantara, will remain a monument to posterity,

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Account of the
battle of Alcantara.

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Account of the
battle of Alcan-
tara.

and does not yield to the greatest actions of our ancestors.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, in the corps of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, in the battle of Alcantara.

Rank and File.

103 killed.—143 wounded.—15 missing.

Officers killed.

Captain Vallente.

Lieutenants Jose Louis de Brito.

Frederigo de Freitas.

Officers wounded.

Lient.-colonel Grant, slightly.

Captains Jeronimo Pereira, badly.

Felix Mendoza, ditto.

Joachim de Costa, slightly.

Lieutenant Beltron, badly.

My dear Mayne,

Copy of a letter
(without date)
from sir R. Wil-
son.

I have had no opportunity of answering your letter from Lodiero, or to congratulate you, Grant, and the Legion, on your distinguished services. “*Hei mihi, quòd domino non licet ire*

two!" Thank the officers and soldiers, in my name, in general orders. The promotion should be secured to the 1st battalion, and I recommend you to forward the names immediately to the adjutant-general.

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Copy of a letter
from sir R. Wil-
son.

I shall be at Thomar on the 5th of June, soon after which I hope to see you, &c. &c.

Believe me, ever your's,

Most faithfully, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. WILSON.

*To colonel Mayne, L.L.L.
commanding at Alcantara.*

Marshal Beresford, commander-in-chief of the Prince Regent's troops, takes the opportunity of noticing to the army the conduct of colonel Mayne, at the bridge of Alcantara, where the first battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion defended themselves against a force of 12,000 men, commanded by marshal Victor, in person.

General orders.
Marshal Beresford, commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army; dated Thomar, 27th May, 1809.

The army will see, that although troops are sometimes obliged to retreat, at the same time they may cover themselves with glory, and merit the greatest praise.

This battalion, and their brave commandant, made a noble defence, and then a firm retreat, in the greatest order.

The discipline and subordination of the corps

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General orders.

must be good. The individuals of it do not inquire why they advance, or why they retreat, but do as they are ordered; which gives the greatest satisfaction to the marshal, who, approving of their brave conduct, bestows upon them his greatest praise.—To colonel Mayne, major Grant, and to the officers and soldiers of the first battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, the commander-in-chief gives his thanks for their conduct at the bridge of Alcantara, and the marshal requests brigadier-general sir R. Wilson to let him know the names of the senior officers of each rank, that he may promote and recommend to the Prince Regent those who so well deserve it.

(Signed) BRITO MOZINHO,
Adj.-general.

Such was the active, spirited, and judicious conduct of a force formed, not merely for the brief purpose of but only the advanced line of a corps of observation.

It had, however, still other important merits, which, through probably without blame in any one, are lost in the general sweep of a large army; indeed, it embraced all the objects, as far as it might, of a regular army. The first of these to be particularised is an eminent success, in inducing deserters from the French ranks of the various nations, of which, under all the temporary circum-

stances of the continent, the French army was composed.

The means by which this was effected, at the moment, was principally by a diffusion of the following address, printed in the three languages most necessary; and also for general purposes in Latin; and the appointment of persons to second its invitation, and receive deserters. The following is an English translation.

“Germans, Polonese, Hollanders, Swiss, Italians, of the French army.

Austria and Turkey are about to declare war against France; the tyrant Napoleon must yield to this storm! You are destined, without resource to perish in the north, or in Spain! You have yet an asylum in our friendship. Mark the terms:—

Each soldier, who shall come and join the Spanish army, will receive 200 reals.

He who brings his musket with him, 300.

Cavalry will have the price of their horses!

Those who will not take arms against the French will be sent home by sea at our expense.”

The four were printing together.

Idioma Espanol.

“Alemanes, Polacos, Holandeses, Suizos, Italianos del ejército Frances:

La Austria y la Turquía están ya declaradas

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contra la Francia: el infame Napoleon va á ser destruido: no os queda otra esperanza que la de morir en Espana ó en el Norte: si quereis libraros de estra suerte, Espana os ofrece partido en sus banderas, y dara.

A cada soldado que se pase á ellas 200 rls.

Si se pasa con fusil 300

Al de Caballería se le pagará ademas el valor del caballo.

Al que no quiera servir en nuestras tropas se le enviará embarcado á su pais; ó al que elija para su residencia."

Idioma Latino.

"Germani, Poloni, Batavi, Helvetii, Itali, qui in Gallo exercitu arma geritis:

Jam Austriaci, et Turci belum contra Gallias indixêre, exitium tandem crudelissimo Napoleoni illaturi. In eo enim loco res sunt vestræ, ut vel ad ripas Danubii, aut in Hispaniâ pereundum vovis sit. Ergo una est salus, ad amicitiam Hispanorum animos inducere. Hispanos, amicos vestros, sequimini; in Gallos, immanissimos hostes vestros, arma convertite. En quæ Hispania, iis qui ad nostra signa transeant, jurejurando promitti:

Cuicumque militi 200 regalia,
(10 piastres.)

Illi qui secum arma ferat 300 regalia,
(15 piastres.)

Eques verò, præter ea quæ pediti promittuntur, prætium equi, si secum tollat, accipiet.

Qui autem nolint sub nostris signis militare, immò ad suos, vel alibi terrarum pergere cupiant, eo navi impositi, Hispanorum auxilio reddentur."

Idioma Aleman.

"Deutsche, Polacke, Hollannder, Schweicer, Italianer der Franzosischem armee.

Oestreich und die Turkey haben Frankreich den Krieg erklart=Jetzt wird der niedertrachtige Napoleon zernichtet, Euch bleibt keine andere Wahl, keine andere Hoffnung, als in Spanien oder in andere fremde Lander den Todt zu treffen wollt Ihr diesem Schicksale entgehen, so nehmet den spanischen Dienst an. Jeder Soldat der zu der spanischen armee uberkomme wird belohnt mit 200 Real oder 50 Francs.

Bringt finer sein Geuehr mit so erhalt er 300 Real oder 75 Francs.

Dem Cavalleriste wird sein Pferd uberdem verguttet.

Diesenigen welche kein Dienst in Spanien nehmen wollen, werden eingeschifft und nach Ihrem Vaterlande, oder nach dem Lande dafs sie mögen, gefuhrt."

Idioma Frances,

“ Allémands, Polonois, Hollandois, Suisses, Italiens de l'armée Française :

L'Autriche, et la Turquie viennent de declarer la guerre contre la France : Le tyran Napoleon doit succomber a cet orage. Vous êtes destinés sans retour à perir vers le Nord, ou en Espagne. Mais il vous reste encore un asile, c'est celui de nôtre amitié : En voilà les gages :

Chaque Soldes qui viendra prendre parti dans l'armée Espagnole touchera 200 reaux.

Celui qui portera son fusil avec lui 300 id.

Les Soldats de Cavalerie auront de plus le prix du cheval.

Ceux qui ne voudront pas prendre les armes contre les Français, seront transportés chez eux par mèra nos depenses.”

The form of this address deserves insertion, and might not be without its use on some other occasion, but the arrangements of printing prevent it. It is, however, in sidelong columns, with the heads of which, by way, perhaps, of asserting pre-eminence, or possibly, by chance, are in the language of the country in which they were issued.

The still superior merit, however, of the little force, and more particularly of the 1st battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, was that of inducing,

by its brave, loyal, and steady, example, that confidence in the capability of Portuguese troops, properly disciplined, and led by efficient officers; without which, under all the circumstances of the war, those brave bands that afterwards did honour to their country, would never have been enrolled in her cause.

For, not to diminish, as, indeed, who would or could diminish the justly-caused fame of general Beresford, in various schools of war,—that excellent and highly-distinguished officer, whom the injudicious zeal of poetic friendship has described, as self-devotedly taking upon himself *all the hazard of obloquy, which might arise from miscarriage in the important experiment* of training the Portuguese troops,—was enabled to form a perfect judgment, from the experience thus presented to to him, without which he would scarcely, whatever his own noble devotion to the cause, have incurred the waste of time, *and resources*, necessary to this project. His excellency would also, unhappily, derive the important knowledge of what was *chiefly* necessary to their efficiency from the extraordinary failure of baron Eben, who, with the 2d division of the Legion, 1200 strong, instead of joining and reinforcing the first by which its honourable principles might have been increased, marched against marshal Soult, who

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was at the head of *ten thousand* men, and saw nearly the whole dispersed and disarmed.

To both marshal Beresford and the officers, from whose judicious and gallant exertions the first Portuguese force owed its well-earned honours, sufficient had been imparted from the acute labours of Dumourier,* more than thirty years before, to leave little to fear from an army of the Portuguese, under officers able to direct and willing to lead them, without referring to the muse of Camoens for a picture of his countrymen,

When her bold troops the valiant shepherd led,
And, foul with routs, the Roman Eagles fled !†

And it was, doubtless, under sufficient impression from facts, that his majesty's government, as early as November, 1808,‡ three months before the arrival of sir William Beresford, to take command, authorised Mr. Villiers, the British minister, in Portugal, to engage for the pay and clothing of 10,000 Portuguese troops, of which the Lusitanian Legion formed a part. And, again, in February, the month in which his excellency arrived, the division of the legion, whose services

* See also *ante*, b. i. c. iii. 407.

† *Lusiad*, b. iii. as exquisitely translated by Mickle, vol. iii. 2.

‡ See *ante*, b. ii. c. 5. p. 460.

it has been here attempted to describe, *having supported itself*, so that it had left Great Britain almost unconscious of its existence, (rare indeed !)

Mr. Canning thus addressed Mr. Villiers again.*

As nothing has yet been heard from you of the progress of any levies in Portugal, nor any bills drawn by you on that account received here, it would be premature at present to specify the particular limit to which it is proposed to extend your authority to furnish pecuniary supplies.

But should the first 10,000 men have been raised, either at this time or when you transmit the information, you are not to consider yourself as restrained from proceeding, until you shall receive an answer from me to your communications, but may engage at once, in the confidence of such engagement being approved by his majesty, for defraying the expense of an addition of another 10,000 men. It would, however, be very desirable, that your estimate of the expense should be transmitted, with as little delay as possible, in order that parliamentary provision may be made for so much of it as can be precisely ascertained.

The result seems to have resolved itself into a more extensive plan, under which a loan was ne-

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Mr. secretary
Canning to the
right honour-
able John
Charles Villiers.
28th February,
1809.

* Correspondence relative to the maintenance of an army, &c. presented to parliament in 1810.

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Mr. Canning to
the right hon.
John Charles
Villiers.

gotiated, and general Beresford appointed marshal and commander-in-chief of the Portuguese armies.

Let the poet, then, ask—(“his eye in a fine *phrensy* rolling,”)

O, who shall grudge him Albuquerque's bays,

Who brought a race regenerate to the field ;

Rous'd them to emulate their fathers' praise !

Tempered their headlong rage, their courage steel'd,

And rais'd fair Lusitania's fallen shield,

And gave new edge to Lusitania's sword,

And taught their sons forgotten arms to wield.*

And be it answered, “Victorious Beresford !” But let not that poet, in an *historical* note, attribute to marshal Beresford, (whatever the clamours of party with which his ears may have been astounded,) a praise in the *exposure of his military reputation*, which, as a soldier, he could scarcely own ;—the brunt of moral dangers, which never had real existence ;—or the sole merit of a plan which was not only within the views of government, but which sir Robert Wilson had already put into execution ; and his officers, with colonel Mayne and lieutenant-colonel Grant at their head, demonstrated its value.

Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, sed magis amicus Veritas.

* Scott.—Vision of Don Roderick, xiv. p. 80 ; also note vi.

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ADVANCE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY INTO SPAIN.

Wants of the Army.—Advance to Abrantes.—Approval of these Operations by his Majesty.—Second Attack of the Enemy at the Bridge of Alcantara, and antient Inscription upon the centre Arch.—Instructions to the Van-Guard of the Army of Generals Campbell and Mackenzie.—Sir A. Wellesley's Intelligence of the Enemy; Colonel Grant's; Mr. Frere's.—Intercepted Despatches, containing Details of the Enemy's Operations.—Diplomatic Exertions of Sebastiani to win over the minor Spanish Generals from the Patriotic Cause.—Details of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and Spain, in Instructions to the Marquis Wellesley, preparatory to his Spanish Mission as Ambassador.—Symptoms of an approaching Battle.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, about to proceed to the eastern frontier, found not only that

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into Spain.

the impediments which had attended the return of his army from the north of Portugal, arose from not being able to get forward the necessaries required with sufficient rapidity, but from the absolute want of them in the capital; and that an early supply would not only be necessary, but, perhaps, indispensable to his progress towards Spain.

This, however, did not impede the operations of his capacious mind. In a letter from Coimbra, therefore, his excellency is enabled thus to address lord Castlereagh.

Lieut.-general
Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
viscount Castle-
reagh
Coimbra, 31st
May, 1809.

I have the honour to inform your lordship, that, since my letter of the 20th instant, the enemy has withdrawn the corps which had taken possession of Alcantara on the 14th, and his army is concentrated in the neighbourhood of Caceres, between the Jaqua and the Guadiana. The Spanish army, under general Cuesta, had advanced from its possession at Llerena, upon receiving accounts of the enemy's march from the Guadiana, and the advanced guard had attacked a fortified post which the enemy still held at Merida. But, by a letter from general Cuesta of the 20th instant, I find that he had discontinued the attack, owing to the difficulty of supporting it, in consequence of the swelling of the Guadiana. His head-quarters were, by the last accounts, at Fuente del Mistre.

General Mackenzie is in the mountains, behind Castello Branco; and he had been directed again to occupy Alcantara in such force as to be able to secure that passage over the Tagus.

The army is in march towards this place: the leading brigades have already arrived here, and I expect the whole in the course of a few days.

The march has been delayed in some degree, in consequence of the badness of the weather, and the general want of shoes by the troops; it having been impossible to bring up from Lisbon a sufficient supply before this time.

The arrangements, however, are all made for the early movement of the troops to the Tagus; and they will begin their march on the day after tomorrow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

This letter, at the same time, was accompanied with a request that directions might be given for a supply of 30,000 pair of shoes, for the use of the British troops, to be sent to Lisbon at an early period. It was also desirable (he added) that the storekeeper should give directions that these shoes should be of the best quality. It is to be regretted that such directions should be necessary. Sir Ar-

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Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

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British army
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thur Wellesley also begged lord Castlereagh to order, that 1,500,000 pounds of biscuits should be sent to Lisbon, for the use of the army, and 3,000,000 pounds of hay, and 3,000,000 pounds of oats. To this sir Arthur added:—

That, from every information he had received of the probable supply of money for bills upon England, it was his opinion that a sum, amounting to not less than 300,000 pounds sterling, ought to be sent to Lisbon at an early period.

Necessities of
the army on its
return from the
south of Portu-
gal.

This did not, however, impair the zeal of the army in its progress, and sir A. Wellesley, in recapitulating the circumstances which have been latterly detailed, was enabled to add the arrival of his van in Spain.

My lord,

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
Castlereagh.
Thomar, 7th
June, 1809.

Since I wrote last, marshal Victor has broken up in the neighbourhood of Caceres,* has removed his head-quarters to Trinsillo, and, as I understand, passed a division of his army over the Tagus by the bridge of Alcantara. It is probable that the whole are about to retreat.

A part of the army of general Cuesta's was, by the last accounts of the third inst. on the Gua-

* Of this movement intimation was given in the last chapter through a report of colonel Grant.

diana, near Medellin, and one division near Merida; the whole are, I understand, advancing towards that river.

A part of the troops, under my command, have arrived upon the Tagus, at Abrantes, and the remaining four brigades are following them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh

In the mean time the corps, under general Mackenzie, forming the advance, colonel Mayne, with a reinforcement to his legion, was appointed by him to command the van of the allied army* moving into Spain.

* Colonel Mayne was thus gratified in a wish he had expressed in his despatch to marshal Beresford, dated Lodiero, May 14th. —“ With respect to the Portuguese corps under my command, I have only to wish that their gallant conduct may prove them worthy of being joined to a British army.”

As this is nearly the last time in which mention will be made of this able officer, it will render a justice to him in this place, to introduce a document still more important, as evincing shortly the means by which every other people, as well as the Portuguese, may be rendered efficient troops.

It is an address which colonel Mayne received from the officers of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion.

“ The officers of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, who have had the honour of serving under the command of the *illustrious* colonel Mayne, in gratitude for the distinguished and reiterated marks of honourable praise which they have received under HIS ORDERS, and, for the KIND BENEVOLENCE which he has always EQUALLY

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“I then returned,” says that officer, with a laudable exultation, “to the post of Alcantara,”

EXTENDED to the officer and to the soldier, beg leave to request that he will receive a small testimony of their sincere regard, which, *although unworthy of his merit*, they hope he will consider as appropriate to the occasion.

A sword, with the following inscription:—“*Todos os officides do 1º batalho da Leal Legião Lusitana a offerecem ao seu estimado amigo o illustrissimo Senhor coronel William Mayne, cavalliero de Alcantara.*”

“Presented by all the officers of the first battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, to their esteemed friend, colonel William Mayne, knight of the military order of Alcantara.”

(Signed)

Joao Paes de Sande de Castro, tenente coronel.

Duclesiano Cabreira, major commandante d’artilheria.

Filippe Jacob Veloso Horta, capitao Mandante.

Jose Pinto Sá Vedra e Nevile, capitao.

Francisco de Paula Rozado, capitao.

Joa Pinto da Orunha Sá Vedra, capitao.

Joaquim Elias da Costá e Almeida, capitao-ajutante.

Francisco Joaquim Pereira Valente, capitao.

Thomaz Joaquim Pereira Valente, capitao.

Pedro Celestino de Barros, capitao.

José Estanisláo d’Almeida Rolin, capitao quartel-mestre.

Carlos José Francozi, tenente.

Joaquim Pinto e Souza, tenente.

Antonio Carlos Pereira da Silva, tenente.

Federico Cezar de Freitas, tenente.

Jorge da Fonseca, tenente.

André Camacho Jorge Barboza, tenente.

José Bernardino de Sou Castro, tenente.

José Cazimiro Pereira da Rocha, alferes.

José Ribeiro Pinto de Moura, alferes.

Joao José Gomes da Silva, capitao.

(that unfortunate town which the French, in their last visit, had rendered a scene of desolation,)—"the force as per margin, being under my command."*

The enemy at this time occupied all the villages in its vicinity, and patrolled within five miles of the town !

On the morning of the 10th of June, continues col. Mayne, we were again attacked by four columns of infantry, three squadrons of horse, and four pieces of artillery ! The cannonading continued on both sides a short time, when, in obedience to

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* The Legion
Artillery, six
guns.
First battalion
Loyal Lusitanian Legion.
Fifth Regiment
of Cassadores.
Second Regiment of Oporto.
The Covilhão Militia.
One troop of the Second Cavalry, Portuguese.
Fifty horse, 11th Regiment (Almeida Cavalry) Portuguese.

Brigada de Artilheria.

Manoel José Ribeiro, 1º tenente.

Cento Marques, 2º tenente.

Thomé Madeira, 2º tenente.

Joao Manoel d'Almeida, alferes.

Colonel Mayne's Answer to the Address of the Officers of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion.

Nothing can be more flattering to the feelings of a soldier than the approbation of brave men ! And the distinguished mark I have just received of yours is as highly gratifying to me as the satisfaction I shall always feel in reflecting that I have served two campaigns in Spain and Portugal with you and the brave soldiers of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion.

(Signed) WILLIAM MAYNE

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the orders I had received from marshal Beresford,* I blew up the centre arch of the bridge of Alcantara; "the last act of Trajan's grandeur, and the only one remaining, in that part of Spain!"

The melancholy tone of classic simplicity in this description, is highly complimentary to the military feelings of the writer, and confirms an opinion of him already given in a preceding book.

There is something like sacrilege in the idea of destroying the august remains of antiquity. Col. Mayne seems evidently to have felt this; he gives the order, and the confirmed order, of his superiors, for this necessary operation of war; and then, with pious care, as his only *atonement*, preserves the inscriptions on the grand arch of the bridge.

** General Beresford, from Coimbra, May 25th, 1809.*

You will cause an arch of the bridge on the northern side, (or two, if that be requisite to render it impassable,) to be immediately destroyed.

General Mackenzie, from Sobrera Fomoza, May 27th, 1809.

You will see that the steps you are taking for the destruction of the bridge at Alcantara are quite in unison with marshal Beresford's instructions.

The four centre arches of the bridge are eighty feet wide.

IMP:CAESARI:DIVI:NERVAE:F:NERVAE:
TRAIANO:AVG:GERM:DACICO:PONTIF:
MAX:TRIB:POTES:VIII:IMP:V:COS:V: P.P:

IMP:NERVAE:TRAIANO:CAES:AVGVSTO:
GERMANICO:DACICO:SACRVM:
TEMPLVM:IN:RVP:TAGI:SVPERIS:ET:
CAESARE:PLENVN:ARS:VBI:MATERIA:
VINCITVR:IPSA:SVA:QVIS:QVALI:
DEDERIT:VOTO:FORTASE:REQUIRET:
CVRA:VIATORVM:QVOS:NOVÆAM:
IVVAT:INGENTEM:VASTA:PONTEM:QVI:
MOLE:PEREGIT:SACRA:LITATVOR:
FECIT:HONORE:LACER:QVI:
PONTEM:FECIT:LACER:ET:NOVA:
TEMPLA:DICAVIT:SCILICET:ET:
SVPPERIS:MVNERA:SOLA:LITANT:
PONTEM:PERPETVI:MANSVRVM:IN:
SECVLA:MVNDI:FECIT:DIVINA:NOVILIS:
ARTE:LACER:IDEM:ROMVLIES:
TEMPLVM:CVM:CAES:DIVIS:
CONSTITVIT:FÆLIX:VTRAQVE:CAVSA:
SACRI:C:IVLIVS:LACER:H:S:F:ET:
DEDICAVIT:AMICO:CVRIO:LACONE:
IGAEDITANO.

With the view of inducing a similar principle in others, a principle so opposite to the conduct of the enemy in this war, notwithstanding its preva-

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lent affectation of regard for antiquity, the following hasty attempt towards a paraphrastical translation is added :—

It imports perhaps that the whole is,—
Sacred to the Imperial Cæsars : — Nerva ; and the son of Nerva, Trajan, (conquerer of the Germans and Dacians,* high priest, by the Tribunitian power, eight times,) his colleague in the consulate, —the most perfect administrator of public affairs.

That,—

To the emperor Nerva Trajan, the august Cæsar, conquerer of the Germans and Dacians, is consecrated an edifice, formed to connect the steep banks of Tagus ; the design of which was first derived from his judgment, its materials from the over-hanging groves : which, whether from himself having suffered hazard here, he vowed ; or that, lest, travellers, who were always his care, might stand in need of it ;—whatever the origin,—prodigious was its beauty and utility : but, by the wide-extending waste of waters the newly-formed bridge was consumed. As a remedy, piers were formed, with holy rites, and of great estimation ; and again destroyed ! Which bridge, so erected, and thus destroyed, as well as new temples

* A warlike people inhabiting the modern Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia : —suppose, Turks, Poles, and Hungarians. *Here liberty is said to have made her last stand against the Roman power. Life of Frontinus, (prefixed to Strategematicon, Engl.ed. 1811.) 61.*

dedicated on it, were indubitably at his own proper charge. Thence, after appeasing the gods by sacrifice, arose this bridge, which, from new accessions of science, may be presaged as permanent to the last ages of the world! So were shattered the temples of Romulus, also reared from the groves,—piles, sacred to holy rites and utility. To all these matters, it only remains shortly to add, that, in the calends of the peculiarly-honoured month of July, the dilapidations were restored, and the re-edification dedicated by the faithful governor of Cadiz.*

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Our shells, continues colonel Mayne, did this day some execution from the heights, dispersing two columns of infantry, and one of cavalry! when they were advancing on the town! But they discovered the destruction of the bridge! and they retired by the road of Brosas—never again taking a regular position more! What their object could be was not precisely known, beyond a surprise, and taking the bridge by a *coup-de-main*. I computed their numbers to be about 6000. After this the French withdrew, and I gave it as my opinion, in a letter to general M'Kenzie, that they were moving for the bridge of Almaraz, and for the corn-country about Talaveira de la Reyna.

* It may be added that the truly-divine Trajan, was, like Seneca, a native of Andalusia. (The writer has in vain hoped to obtain from his classical friends a close translation.)

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June.Gen. Campbell
to col. Mayne,
Castello Branco,
May 25, 1809,
5 o'clock p.m.

That this result was apparently but little to be expected, will be seen from the following orders :

Sir,

I conceive by your communication you are now falling back upon Castello Branco ; and without you receive further orders, in the event of this brigade being ordered to retire from hence, you will push for Moradal with the two battalions under your orders. On your arrival here you will receive further instructions. You will of course advance officers mounted, and on whom you can rely, in every direction, for information.

The enemy may be advancing hither towards Ciudad Rodrigo, or may have in view the destruction of the bridge ; it is very requisite you have all your faculties awake, and forward to me, *en route*, for general M'Kenzie, the earliest possible intelligence.

Your most humble servant,

W. CAMPBELL, Brig.-general.

I shall depend much upon you for information.

The same will be perceived from the following subsequent communication of the excellent major-general M'Kenzie. Sir Robert Wilson had now rejoined the legion, which was to be regularly attached to the army.

Dear sir Robert,

I am this moment favoured with your second letter of yesterday.—It seems evident the

Gen. M'Kenzie
to sir R. Wilson.
Sobriera For-
mosa, June 17,
1809.

French are crossing the Tagus in different places, from the accounts forwarded by colonel Mayne; and although I am of the same opinion with you that the object is the destruction of the harvest, yet, the destruction of our party at Alcantara may be connected with that object; and, as that post is so bad a one, I think the troops should be withdrawn to a place where themselves and guns are not risked. As to Zara, I am quite unacquainted with it, but from your description; but I would at present prefer a situation not so far in advance, until we can have the instructions of the commander-in-chief: a small post left in Alcantara will be sufficient till then. I think, also, it will be right for you to advance with the battalions, at least to support colonel Mayne, whose force seems to be much reduced by desertion. Ladoviro seems to be the position you think best for this purpose, and it appears to me to be so; but you will of course fix where you will give the best support to the position of colonel Mayne if you do not join him. As marshal Beresford will, I hope, be at Castello Branco to day, you will, of course, receive further instructions from him.

I have no more time than to add that I always remain, dear sir Robert,

Most sincerely yours,

J. R. MACKENZIE.*

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Gen. M^cKenzie
to sir R. Wilson.

* In the ensuing action the writer lost his life.

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Gen. M^cKenzie
to sir R. Wilson.

P. S. Pray have the 87th and 88th regiments yet arrived? The 1st dragoons of the King's German legion which ought to have been on the 15th at Corticada, (by their route,) are not yet arrived there. Two brigades of Portuguese artillery are now passing this place for Castello Branco, under major Dickson of the British artillery, in which last service he is a captain. I have sent a party, of a serjeant and two men, of the 31st regiment, with two of the 4th Portuguese regiment, to escort four prisoners of the 87th and 88th regiments to Castello Branco.—Pray order back this party as soon as they have delivered over the prisoners.

J. R. M.

2d P. S. Pray send two more dragoons to keep up the communication to Monte Corvo; the two there are completely knocked up. Be so good as forward the enclosed letters for captain Ruman and lieutenant Stanway.

Abrantes soon became a scene of activity in respect to observation, as will appear from the communications of the commander-in-chief.

My lord,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 25th instant, in which your lordship conveys to me, by his majesty's

Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord viscount Castlereagh.
Abrantes, 11th June, 1809.

command, an authority to extend my operations in Spain beyond the provinces immediately adjacent to the Portuguese frontiers. It does not appear to be quite certain that marshal Victor has retired, or has made any preparatory arrangements with a view to withdraw from the province of Estremadura; and the accounts which we receive of his movements are so contradictory, that I am not enabled to give your lordship any positive opinion upon the subject, or any satisfactory statement of facts which might enable you to form your own.

Upon my arrival at Coimbra, at the end of last month, I despatched lieutenant-colonel Burke and lieutenant-colonel Cadogan to general Cuesta's head-quarters, with a view to arrange with him a plan of operations for the British and Spanish armies, with a view to attack Victor, and oblige him to retire from the menacing position which he had assumed in relation to the seat of government of Portugal and Spain. I propose now to extend the objects of their co-operation, general Cuesta having expressed himself but little satisfied with the limits which I had assigned to it; but I fear that I must delay to make any movement whatever till the army shall receive a supply of money.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh.

Notwithstanding the important deficiency of

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June.Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, K.B. to
lord viscount
Castlereagh.
Abrantes, 17th
June, 1809.

money, however, the intelligence of the commander-in-chief thus continues :

My lord,

I have received information that the French withdrew on the 13th instant; the posts which they had in the conventical at Muida, and their out-posts in front of Medillen; and there is every reason to believe that their whole army is retiring across the Tagus and towards Madrid.

The Spanish troops under general Cuesta took possession of Merida, and crossed the Guadiana at Medellin on the 14th. I have had no intelligence from the Spanish head-quarters since the 14th.

I have had a discussion with general Cuesta respecting the plan of operations to be carried on by the British and the Spanish armies in the attack of marshal Victor. We have every reason to believe that the French army consisted of about 27,000 men, and that the defeat and retreat of Soult had deprived Victor of all support; and the Spanish army consisted of 30,000, of which 7,000 were cavalry; and the combined British and Portuguese force, which I was in hopes I should have been able to march upon this expedition, would have amounted to about 24,000 men, of which near 4,000 would have been cavalry.

The only practicable retreat for the French army was the bridge of Almaraz; and my proposition to general Cuesta was, that he should remain with

the Spanish army in a position in which, if attacked, he would have the advantage; such a one as that by which he had kept in check the French army so long, until I should move by Castello Branco and Placentia to Almaraz, and cut off the only practicable retreat the French had to Madrid.

It appears by the correspondence of lieutenant-colonel Burke, that general Cuesta had by no means a good position on the Guadiana; and the colonel expresses in strong terms his apprehensions of those of general O'Donaghues, that if the Spanish army should be attacked in that position, it would be defeated. At the same time, general Cuesta could not be prevailed upon to draw further back towards the Sierra Morena, although it was obvious that the consequence of any movement which should place the Spanish army in security while I should move round the enemy, would be most probable to cut off their retreat; and he pressed me in the most earnest terms to join the British army to that under his command upon the Guadiana.

Finding it impossible to induce general Cuesta to move his position, and that serious apprehensions were entertained for his safety, I consented to forego the execution of the plan which I preferred, and I promised to march to Badajoz, as soon as I should be able to move, by the arrival of money

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June.

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
Castlereagh.

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June.Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
Castlereagh.

from Cadiz or from England, and as the army had a few days to rest, and had received a supply of shoes.

In the mean time the French army having retired, probably upon hearing of the arrival of these corps upon the Tagus, I propose to continue on the right bank of the river, and to move towards Placentia.

The money expected from Cadiz arrived at Lisbon the day before yesterday; and I propose to commence my march as soon as it shall reach the army.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have received letters from general Cuesta and lieutenant-colonel Burke, of the 16th instant. The general was to move his head-quarters to Merida on this day. His advanced-guard is in Alcuescar and Albala. General Cuesta now wishes me to march by Placentia.

In the midst of this active vigilance, nothing could be more agreeable than the following testimony:—

Sir,

Your despatches of 15th, 18th, and 20th May, have been received and laid before the king.

His majesty has been pleased to express his gracious approbation of the whole of your conduct, during the late arduous service in which you have been engaged. The rapidity of your movements to the northward, if not attended with the complete reduction of Soult's corps, has, it is to be presumed, for a length of time, disqualified the remains of his army from acting offensively against Portugal, and left you at liberty to prosecute operations against Victor.

The decision and skill with which the British army has been led, and the animated bravery displayed by the officers and troops in the passage of the Douro, cannot fail to confirm the confidence which they are entitled to feel in their own superiority over the enemy, and to prepare the way to future successes. The result of the present operation, under the relative circumstances of the two armies, has in no respect fallen short of what might have been expected from the talents of the general and the gallantry of the troops.

Your determination not to follow Soult's army further to the northward, but to return towards the eastern frontier of Portugal, to watch and repel the enemy's advance on the Tagus has been entirely approved by his majesty.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

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June.

Lord viscount
Castlereagh to
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley, K.B.
Downing-street,
June 6, 1809.

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June.

From the post of the active and intelligent col. Grant, was added the following intelligence; as usual, acute and discriminating, but with particular interest, as relates to a small party of the allies:

My dear sir,

Col. Grant to
col. Mayne.
Areuchee, 28d
June, 1809.

I inclose you three letters, which will explain themselves. The enemy have not entered Placentia, but have recrossed the Tietar.

The battalion of Madrid volunteers have behaved most disgracefully,—retiring on hearing of the approach of the enemy on Placentia, Gaustea, and Corea, where they now are.

They never saw the enemy, although 1,000 strong,—the French column not exceeding 400 men, including some cavalry.

The volunteers of Beyo acted differently: 300 of them repulsed the enemy betwixt Placentia and Malpartido, on which the latter retired.

I intercepted a letter from a lieutenant commanding some cavalry that were annexed to the Madrid battalion, stating to the junta of Badajos the number of the enemy at near 5,000 men. He had made his escape to my post, and rather alarmed my Almeida's, but at the same time my patrols came in from Corea and Toneconalla, three leagues to my front and left flank, with accounts of a very different complexion.

General Cuesta is assuredly in possession of Al-
 marez, and on the 21st instant a reconnoitring
 party of his cavalry, 46, crossed the Tagus at Sere-
 dilla, and marched on towards Placentia and Mal-
 partilla.

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Col. Grant to
 col. Mayne.

A wounded soldier of Cuesta's army, now in
 Toneconalla, states, that the latter had attacked
 the enemy at Almarez, been successful, taken many
 prisoners; some cannon and baggage, with a con-
 siderable number killed on the part of the enemy.

This latter circumstance I do not give as certain.

In a few hours my patrol from Toneconalla will
 bring me information from Placentia, respecting
 any further movements of the enemy and Cuesta.

I shall probably march to-day to Coria, which
 will coincide with your directions in respect to the
 line of the Allegon.

May I request you will state to sir Robert, or
 some general-officer, that, from the dispersion of
 this Madrid battalion, they have given general
 alarm, and that it is difficult to ascertain by letter
 the correct position of the enemy, or their imme-
 diate movements, and request permission for me,
 with only four well-mounted dragoons, to move on to
 Placentia Malpartido, and reconnoitre the Tietar,
 by which means I could gain information to be de-

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pended on, my party remaining at Coria with the
ensign.

I have the honour to be,

Dear sir, sincerely yours,

J. GRANT, Lieut.-col.

The defection and weakness attributable to the volunteers of Madrid, and the cavalry which accompanied them, need not, by any means, excite surprise. It is not the first efforts of the volunteers of a capital from which much is to be expected, but those of the sturdy peasant and hardy mountaineer. Nor are colonel Grant's remarks to be attributed to surprise, but to his natural feelings on the embarrassing result.

We turn now to information from another quarter, in the communications of Mr. Frere to the government at home.

The letter, (says that minister,) which I receive at this moment from sir Arthur Wellesley, informs me of his intention of joining general Cuesta, and relinquishing the plan which he had formed for cutting off the enemy's retreat, by a movement upon Placentia, on the right bank of the Tagus. This determination is founded partly on the importunities of general Cuesta, and partly upon the utter impossibility of prevailing upon him to chuse

Right honour-
able J. H. Frere
to Mr. secretary
Canning.
Seville, June 16,
1809.

a secure position, or to concentrate his army, which, in its present distribution, and in the open country which it occupies, would infallibly be beaten if attacked by the concentrated forces of the enemy : an event which, under the present circumstances, sir Arthur Wellesley is very apprehensive may take place, even before his junction can be effected.

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Mr. Frere to
Mr. Canning.

And he thus continues :

Since the date of my last, the French have successfully evacuated all the points on this side of the Tagus, without loss on their side, and without any effectual attempt to annoy them on the part of general Cuesta. By his report of this day, it appears, that he was preparing to pass his vanguard over the river at Almaraz, and had already sent over a party of sharp-shooters to protect the establishment of the bridge of pontoons, the whole of which had not yet arrived from Badajos. As far as can be collected from a variety of concurrent reports, it should seem that the French are in decided retreat, and no other cause can be assigned for their neglecting the many opportunities they have had of turning upon general Cuesta's vanguard, which has been frequently advanced beyond the main body, at a distance which made it impossible for them to receive any effectual support from it. This circumstance relieves me in some

Frere to Mr. Secretary Can-
ning.
Seville, June 26,
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Mr. Canning.

degree, from the opinion expressed by military men, that the French may take advantage of the divided state of the army, before the passage of the river is entirely accomplished.

The same indefatigable minister supplies information, of the most important nature, on the 10th of the following month.

Right.hon.J.H.
Frere to Mr.
secretary Can-
ning.
Seville, July 10,
1809.

From two most curious despatches which have been intercepted from marshal Soult, it appears that he effected his retreat from Galicia, arriving on the 24th at the Cuebla de Sanabria. His letters, which are directed to king Joseph, contain a detail of his proceedings since the 2d, and of the whole of his retreat through Monforte, Montefurado, Bello. and Viana. This retreat was proceeded by an attempt to crush the marquis of Romana's force by an operation combined with marshal Ney; but it appears to have been defeated by the check which the latter received at Puerto de San Cayo, and which determined him to fall back upon Santiago.

The two generals appear to have been upon very bad terms, marshal Soult thought that the situation of his army, in consequence of the retreat from Oporto, was such as made it impossible to remain in Galicia, where there were no means of providing them the necessary equipments; and, in ad-

dition to this, he had another powerful motive, from the knowledge of sir A. Wellesley's march to the southward, to attack general Victor; and he plainly insinuates that marshal Ney failed in the co-operation intended to have been directed against Orense, with the intention of obliging him, marshal Soult, to remain in Galicia. Marshal Ney, on his side, has not admitted the justness of the calculation, according to which marshal Soult concluded, that it would be possible for him to maintain himself alone in Galicia. Soult's letter, though very cautiously worded, plainly indicates the disgust of a part of his army at the species of war which they had to carry on, and their weariness of the atrocities which they have been committing, and which have been followed, in some instances, by a terrible retaliation.

Marshal Barrios, who arrived yesterday from that province, and whose letter, respecting the destruction of the road from Villa Franco to Lugo, I before transmitted, told me, this morning, that, after repeated ineffectual remonstrances with general Ney, whom he describes, contrary to general opinion, as the more atrocious of the two, he himself gave orders for the throwing 700 French prisoners into the Minho, which was accordingly done.

Marshal Soult gives a very accurate idea of his own character, and that of the person whom he ad-

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dresses at the end of his shorter letter; and expresses, at the same time, the difficulty of finding instruments capable of executing their designs.

“ Car dans le genie de guerre que nous faisons, et avec l'espece d'ennemi quil y à combattre, il importe beaucoup au succes des operations, que les chefs que sont à la tête des troupes soient non seulement impassibles, mais quils aient une force d'arme que le mettre en toute circonstance au-dessus des evènements même les pleus facheurs.

“ J'ai l'honneur de prier V. M. qui elle même en est persuadée de daigner prendre en consideration le conseil que je me permets de lui faire, et qu'un zèle ardent pour le service de l'empereur en inspire.”*

General Franceschi, whom he mentions as the bearer of the letter, and as charged to communicate upon the subject of the several changes to be made in the army upon this principle, was made prisoner by a party of peasants, headed by a priest, and would have been put to death but for the idea that he might serve as a ransom for general Palafox. It is satisfactory to observe, from this correspondence, that the general, who has

* This is a remark to be found in several instances in the intercepted despatches of the French army, and they are painful illustrations every where.

been opposed to the marquis of Romana, does not appear by any means to entertain that opinion of him which has been current here; and M. Barrios, whom I have mentioned above, describes him in as good health and spirits, and acting with vigour.

It appears that marshal Ney left Corunna on the 22d, and had entirely evacuated the whole of the province on the 28th, the date of the marquis's last letter. The retreat was marked by atrocities, which he seems unwilling to dwell upon: the state of the country is, I am told, exactly as he describes it, the people being previously enraged against all those who are suspected of having favoured the French, or who have even remained passive.

As the devastations which have been committed have, in many instances, deprived the peasants of the means of paying what is due to the proprietors and to the church, a general spirit of resistance to all claims of this kind, has begun to shew itself.

I should hope that the Gallician army would be able to establish itself in Astorga, as soon as it is provided with the articles which marquis Romana mentions as wanting, and which may, perhaps, be more expeditiously forwarded from England. It appears that marshal Soult has already made the first

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movement upon Braganza, which is indicated in his letter to Joseph Buonaparte.

This government are desirous of withdrawing from Ferrol the ships which are there, and bringing them down to Cadiz, in order to prevent the possibility of their falling a second time into the hands of the enemy, and have desired me to request the assistance of his majesty's government for that purpose; and, accordingly, though I trust there is no immediate apprehension of such an event, I shall write to admiral Berkeley, by this opportunity, to that effect.

Intercepted
despatch of
marshal Soult,
duke of Dal-
matia, addressed
to his majesty,
the king of
Spain and the
Indies.

The intercepted despatch is, of itself, altogether, indeed, a most curious, eccentric, and important, document.

It exhibits the counter description of the operations which are the subject of the last chapter. It shews also the exquisite nicety of the French commanders with respect to certain individuals under them; it shews, moreover, that that "army, constituted like the French," can be so fallible as not merely to entertain cowards, but to advance them to the command even of brigades.

Sire,

I have the honour to inform your majesty, that the second corps of the army is collected

since last night at Puebla de Sanabaia, where I intend allowing the troops four or five days rest, in order to give them time to prepare necessaries for four days, and then I will order them against Zamora.

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marshal Soult.

On the 2d inst. as I had the honour to announce to your majesty, in my letter of the 30th of May, I went from Lugo to Montforte, where the divisions arrived on the 4th and 5th. Romana's corps had passed by there two days before, on its way to Orenses. With all the haste I could make, I could not come up with his rear, which had passed the Sil at various points, and had destroyed the boats; when the detachments, which I had despatched, arrived at St. Estevan de Gudin, Pacedella, and Taiber, all the inhabitants about Montforte had left their houses. I continued in my position till the 11th, during which time several demonstrations were made to pass the river. I gave notice that I should march to Orenso, for which the necessary preparations were made. I was supplied with six pieces of mountain artillery, ammunition, shoes, and a marching battalion, consisting of troops that I had left at Lugo. I have, besides, left at Lugo 947 sick, or unfit for duty, under the orders of adjutant-general Des Roches, who is to conduct them to Zamora as soon as they are recovered.

On the 11th I set out for the Val de Orres.

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The general of division, Loison, having, under his orders, the division of General Miollis, and the brigade of dragoons, commanded by general Lorge, met the insurgents, to the number of 2 or 3000, at the entrance of the Val de Unirago, and vigorously pursued them as far as Montefurado, where he found them again on the path across the rock, through the midst of which the Sil passes.

The 4th regiment of Light Infantry, and the 13th of Dragoons, routed them; and, on the 12th, in the evening, this vanguard took up its position on the rising ground of Larouca, where a detachment of the 13th Dragoons, and another of the 1st of Chasseurs Provisoires, had an opportunity of charging and signalling themselves.

On the 13th, in the morning, general Loison received orders to take the Puerto Bibey; to march towards Puebla de Tribes; to cause the bridge of La Navea to be occupied, and to push his vanguard towards El Burgo. The bridge over the Bibey was defended by 4000 men, who had posted themselves on the rock and the zigzags, which the roads make for climbing up on the left bank. The insurgents, who had been joined by one of La Romana's corps, had moreover cut down many trees, for the purpose of blocking up the bridge, which they were going to destroy, when the 2d regiment of light infantry, supported by the 30th of the line, under the orders of general de

Sarnet, presented themselves: the charge was made instantly, the obstacles were surmounted, and the enemies routed; they were pursued beyond the bridge of Navea, where they dispersed. In this affair, which does honour to the troops that were engaged, the insurgents lost a great number. We have only to regret four rank and file of the 2d killed, and fifteen wounded; among the latter is Mr. Coustade, captain of the Voltigeurs, who had his leg shattered, after passing the barricade of the bridge. General Mula had a horse killed under him: the brigade of general Lorge had some dragoons wounded, and some horses killed.

During this transaction general Francheschi, with his division of light cavalry, and the 47th regiment of the line, ascended again the left bank of the Bibey, took up a position in the front, and to the right of Botty, and sent his reconnoitring parties by the way of Vearow, towards La Gadina and Pato.

General Laborde, with his division, and general Caulincourt's brigade of dragoons, established himself at Larna, from whence he drove the enemy out of the whole Val de Orres, as far as the bridge of Domingo Flores.

The division of Marmont took up a position on the elevated plain of Laronia, and that of general Neudelet, which had been joined by the columns

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under the orders of general Ronger, from Lugo, was on its march in the direction towards Montefurado, which it did not reach before the 15th, at night. The brigade of dragoons of general Marise, commanded by general Lahoussaye, was attached to the division Houdelet, and under the orders of that general.

The insurrection of the Val de Orres consisted of the inhabitants of the Val de Quiroga; those of the Val de Orres, the jurisdiction of Botto, and the districts of Puebla de Tribes, St. Claudio, Castro do Cadelar, Coba, and the mountains of St. Mamet, forming, altogether, from 8 to 9000 men, all armed, under the direction of the curate of Casoyo, Don Jose Ramon Queroga, and Elira, whom Romana has appointed general, as well as of his brother Don Juan Elira, of the curates of Bendotto and Basco; of the justice of Botto, named Larason, and of the judge of the village of Pettin, near La Riva. After the affair of Montefurado, Larahouco, and Fuente Bibey, all the insurgents dispersed in the mountains; but the party remaining at St. Clodio, continued its attacks, and profitted of the situation of that village, which is on the bank of the Sil, opposite Maitin de Quiroga, to keep up a constant fire on the column that was obliged to defile at half-musket-shot on the right bank, so as to experience some loss.

General Loison, after passing the Navea, was ordered to send a detachment to St. Clodio, for the purpose of setting the village on fire, by way of punishment, for the infamous conduct of the inhabitants. He was also ordered to send another detachment to Castao de Caldela, in order to set there a similar example, as a punishment for the assassination of 85 chasseurs, of the 15th regiment of cavalry, which happened on the 2d of February ult. and in which the inhabitants of St. Clodio Puebla de Tribes, and Loba, took a part. The clothes of these unhappy men, which were found, were put together, and near them was posted up a bill, setting forth the motives of this just vengeance. General Loison pardoned the inhabitants of Puebla de Tribes, who came in a body to submit, give assurance of their repentance, and promise to behave better.

The demonstration which had been made to pass the Sil, and the march of general Loison through Puebla de Tribes, in pursuit of the rout leading from the Val de Orres to Orense, were sufficient grounds for the marquis de la Romana, who had halted and collected his troops in the latter town, to fear that he should be attacked there before he could have joined Carrera's corps, which was near Vigo and Ridondella. He departed with precipitation, and a strong reconnoitring party, which

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general Loison sent on the 16th, in the direction towards Villa Ricca Frio, learnt that his rear was already at Limafiaso, marching by the rout of Castilla, towards Gudina. Indeed a party which general Franceschi, on the 17th, sent to the latter place, by the way of Viana, met there his rear guard, and engaged it. On the 18th, a detachment of 100 of the enemy's cavalry reconnoitred on the left of the position, which general Franceschi occupied at Botto. We were informed that a corps of from 4 to 5000 men, commanded by Chia aria, had arrived at Porto; and the peasants, who had submitted after the insurrection of Botto, came to declare that they had received orders to prepare immediately for the reception of Romana's troops.

The moment that I heard these particulars, I judged that Romana was on his march, either to Puebla de Sanabria, with a view to obstruct my passage, or to return over the mountains of Ca-beria, into the vally of Ponferrada and Villa Franca, where symptoms of insurrection appear still to exist. I directed my army immediately to take the road of Viana, where, on the 19th, the vanguard and the division of Mermet, took up their position. The other divisions arrived there, successively, on the 20th. The detachment of Spanish cavalry, which had been seen the day before on the left bank of the Botto. was still perceived

at the moment, when the vanguard put itself into motion. It was pursued as far as Viana, without success. The enemy had 1800 infantry on the heights of Piuza, guarding the bridge over the Bibey, and shewed an intention to defend it. According to what we learnt from some inhabitants that had remained at Viana, the prepared provisions, in pursuance of the orders of La Romana, who had entered that town the night before, designing to attack us; the corps, which had marched towards Porto, was to penetrate on our left into the Val de Orres, re-establish the insurrection, and then act on our rear, while we should be attacked in the front. He also announced the arrival of a considerable reinforcement of English and Portuguese, and that his army was on the heights between the Gudina and Viana.

It was too late to attack on that day the enemy's detachment, which was on this side of Viana; but dispositions were made to drive it from its position on the 20th in the morning, and afterwards to reconnoitre that of the army to which I proposed to give battle, whatever might be its force, if it kept its position. By break of day, it was seen that the Spaniards had retired. Reconnoitring parties were sent after them, and we learnt that they had been passing the Gudina ever since midnight, and were advancing in great haste upon

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Monterey, having announced their intention to return to Orense. It was also understood, that there was a great defection among them; that they had many sick, and that they were in want of the greatest necessities, a situation which could not but be augmented by their precipitate retreat.

Under any other circumstances, I should have pursued La Romana, even though I should have been obliged to manœuvre a long time, for the purpose of falling in with and force him to fight; but, as I have had the honour of announcing to your majesty, in my letter of the 30th of May ult. I thought that, since my retreat from Portugal, my mission could not have for its object my stay in Galicia; where, besides, I did not find any means to re-establish the troops, and to supply them with what they must have, nor any place in which to leave the great number of sick that follow the regiments, and which I must have carried on the horses of the cavalry, unless I choose to go as far as Corunna or Ferrol. I also considered that the English army, which, since my retreat, pushed up to Cinso, and had suddenly re-entered Portugal, shewed a design of marching against general Victor, and advancing to Madrid, and might easily have made either movement, (for it was no longer seen on the frontiers of Galicia, and only a corps of 500 Portuguese had joined La Romana;) and that, on this supposition, it was of

greater importance for me to march to Zamora, for the purpose of contributing with the troops that are between the Douro and the Tagus, towards covering Madrid, either by preventing the enemy from taking that direction, or by manœuvring on his flank or rear, if he should have already commenced his march. I likewise thought that I could not avoid approaching some place of safety, where I might leave my sick, receive supplies, and take a fortnight's rest, in order afterwards to continue the operations, and act according to circumstances. This was my intention on the 30th of May, when I wrote to your majesty, having agreed with marshal Ney on our mutual operations. According to this arrangement, the sixth corps was to re-take Vigo, and send a column to Orense, with a view to the opening of a communication with me. If this movement had taken place, Romana's corps would have been much embarrassed: but marshal Ney wrote me from Santiago, on the 10th instant, that, having pursued the enemy to the bridge of Sampago, he had found him entrenched upon the left bank of the Caldejar, after he had broke down the bridge, and that he appeared to be from 10 to 12,000 men strong, of whom 3 or 4000 were of the line, and the remainder peasants; the whole under general Norona, who styles himself general-in-chief of the

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army of the Minho, and under generals Marillo and Carrera; that the English had, in the bay of Vigo, two sail of the line, and three frigates, the crews of which had been landed, and were ordered to defend the place, and the entrenchments which they have made at the point of Randa; and, finally, that, in this situation, he had not thought it prudent to push forward, or despatch to Orense, the column about which we had agreed; but that falling back upon Santiago, he placed his advanced posts at El Radron, guarding the bank of the Ulla. He then advised me to continue in Galicia, and represented to me that dangerous consequences might result to him if I were to quit it.

This proposal surprised me, and I thought that marshal Ney conducted himself ill in obliging me to remain in Galicia; for, certainly, nothing prevented him from manœuvring upon Orensa, while I was acting against La Romana, after whose retreat he might have advanced against the rear of Curera, have taken his troops, or have obliged them to embark precipitately; but he did the reverse. From that moment, therefore, I judged it much more incumbent upon me than before to follow my first plan, and continue the movement, which had been settled betwixt us.

Accordingly, as soon as I knew that the general of the enemy hastened his retreat upon Montery,

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and that part of his corps was ill-affected, I made my arrangements for giving battle, taking the road of Castila, the right being at La Gudina, and the left at Col de Lobiau, while I had advanced posts on guard on the several debouches leading to Portugal. On the 23d I ordered my left to march against Puebla de Sanabria, from whence, at the approach of the head of the column led by general Loison, the corps of Chaiaararia, composed of 3000 men, of different detachments, that had returned from Oporto, retreated, after having spiked pieces of large calibre, which are at La Puebla. On the same day this corps dispersed, part of it crossing the mountains to the frontiers of Portugal, (going, it is said, to Ciudad Rodrigo,) and the rest wandering about the country. I will endeavour to pick up some of them, if they can be got at.

On the 24th, all the troops of the corps d'armée were collected in the neighbourhood of Puebla de Sanabria, where I intend allowing them some rest for three or four days, during this time they will prepare subsistence, mend their shoes, and shoe their horses, while I again menace Portugal. I may, perhaps, even order a detachment to make an incursion towards Braganza, in order to obtain a diversion, which cannot but produce some good effect.

Thus, then, I shall not set out before the 29th:

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or 30th inst. and on the 1st or 2d of July, I shall arrive at Zamora. I wish very much that your majesty may have been pleased to send me thither orders as well as the succour, which I had the honour to request in my despatch of the 30th of May last. Before I conclude this report, I shall take the liberty of presenting to your majesty some observations on the present situation of Gallicia. This province is still in a state of fermentation: the threats of death and conflagration, employed by La Romana; the numerous agents acting in his name; the executions which he orders; the devastations which have inevitably taken place from the frequent movements of the troops; the ruin of most of the inhabitants; the absence of every authority which might represent your majesty, the influence of the priest, who are very numerous, and the great majority of those that are against us; the money which the English distribute; the distress of the French generals, who, for want of means, are often incapable of paying the emissaries whom they employ; all these causes contribute, from day to day, towards increasing the number of enemies, and rendering the war, in this country, very murderous, exceedingly disagreeable, and of remote issue. We must fight much longer before your majesty can reap any advantage from it, unless your majesty adopt the system of fortify-

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ing seven or eight important posts, capable of containing a garrison of from 3 to 800 men, an hospital, and provisions for four months, in order to keep in check the people, and close and guard the principal *debouches*, of which the enemy would then no longer be able to avail himself; as also, in order to offer to the columns that should act in the province, points of support, whatever direction they might follow; thus, they might receive assistance and deposit their sick. This last consideration is a very powerful one, and I must not conceal it from your majesty; that it has a great effect upon the minds of the soldiers, who, in the present state of things, are liable to perish through misery, or under the blows of the peasants, if they have the misfortune to be wounded, or attacked by a fever, and to find themselves at a distance from a place of safety to seek for assistance.

Gallicia might, I think, at the expense of one million,* be put into a state of defence; and, assuredly, no money would ever be employed to better purposes, so much the rather, as in the sequel, the number of troops which now are ne-

* Of livres, of course, £41,666:13:4 sterling. This, by the way, is a matter of deep consideration to those who enter into the minutia of such subjects.

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cessary there might be diminished. Under this impression, I have prevailed on marshal Ney to cause Lugo to be fortified, and to order the construction of three block-houses on the line of Villa Franca, the places of Tuy, Montforte, Monteroy, Viana, and the Puebla de Sanabria, all of which are capable of containing ordnance, and have an inclosure, together with other fortifications; at the same time they might easily be restored, and would perfectly answer the purpose. There are, if wanted, some other posts fit to be made instruments of defence, without causing any great expense.

If this measure, which I consider as urgent and of certain result, be not adopted, it will become necessary to send reinforcements to marshal Ney, were it only with a view of supplying his losses, and keeping open the communications. Though at present he may be strong enough to resist the united corps of Romana and Carrera, if they were to present themselves in a line, yet, as their system is that of harassing continually, and avoiding a general affair; they would, in the course of time, waste the strongest army, and would, at length, even destroy it, without fighting, if it were not supported, and the loss of men would be incalculable, while the point aimed at had not been carried.

It may probably not fall any more to my lot to

discourse with your majesty on the subject of Galicia; I have, therefore, thought it my duty to communicate to your majesty the observations which my stay in this part of your majesty's states, and the knowledge I have acquired of the temper of its inhabitants, have enabled me to make. And I have the honour to supplicate your majesty to have the goodness of excusing this digression, in consideration of the motives which have dictated it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA.

While this complete view of the state of the principal Gallo-Spanish army was obtained, intelligence of a description, not less important, occurred in a correspondence, by which, as usual, the French endeavoured to supply a want of military unison and success by the efforts of military diplomacy.

Of the correspondence which these efforts produced, four letters shall be given to shew the nature; two of Sebastiani, with their answers. They do ample credit to the finesse of the French general, and immortal honour to the Spaniards from the manner in which they were received: they are, therefore, worthy to be recorded, as examples of true and patriotic love for a country which an un-

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principled invader is endeavouring to lull into a dangerous security, while his hordes are creating, in every direction, new terrors to war, new enormities to vice.

Sire,

I have the honour to inform your majesty of the orders which I have given to general Franceschi, to march from Puebla de Sanabria, with the division under his command, and to proceed with it to Zamora, where he will cross the Douro, and establish himself on the left bank of that river, on the road which leads to Ciudad Rodrigo, and wait for fresh orders.

As soon as general Franceschi shall have effected this purpose, he will hasten to present himself to your majesty, in order to deliver to you the despatches with which I have charged him, to lay before you all the details of this corps of the army, and of its operations, that you can desire, and to have the honour to receive your commands.

I entreat your majesty to receive, with kindness, general Franceschi, to assure him even that you are satisfied with the signal services he has performed during the campaign, and to send him back as soon as possible, his presence being necessary for the re-establishment of the division entrusted to his command. Captain Anthonius, my

Marshal Soult to his (soi-disant) majesty the king of Spain and the Indies.

Dated Puebla de Sanabria, June 25, 1809.

aid-de-camp, accompanies general Franceschi, and will also have the honour of receiving your majesty's commands.

This brave officer has behaved himself with great distinction, during the campaign, and I cannot speak too much in his praise.

I shall be preceded on my rout to Zamora, where I expect to arrive on the 2d of the next month, by the commissary-general of the army, M. Linoble, in order that he may procure the necessary provision for the troops, and prepare the hospital which is to receive the numerous invalids in the rear of the regiment. He is also to apply to the intendant-general of the army, for every thing that may be wanted, such as clothing, boots, shoes, medical officers, military conveyance, money for paying the soldiers, and extraordinary expenses, &c. &c. I have the honour, humbly, to beg your majesty will deign to give such orders as will be attended to, as my wants are very great.

I entreat you also to give similar orders to the commandant of the artillery of the army, in order that the demand which general Dulauloy (whom I have sent for that purpose to Zamora) make respecting the service, may be completed. On the 1st of this month, I wrote to marshal Jourdon, to beg he would solicit permission to form a junction at Zamora, with a train of field-artillery, to be at

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Spain.

my disposal. My letter was to have been delivered to him by general Bizane, aid-de-camp to your majesty. I presume, also, to request your majesty will have the goodness to order all the detachments belonging to the corps of the army which are in Spain, all the depots and transports, for clothing, which are at various places, to join me at Zamora, unless your majesty prefers sending them to Salamanca, in the case of its entering into your views, that I should proceed with the corps of the army to that point, to be better able to concur in the general operation, even while I am occupied in the re-establishments of the troops.

Your majesty is informed, that, for more than five months, I have received no orders, no tidings, no succours; and, consequently, that I must be in want of many things, and even be ignorant of the general dispositions which are to be executed. Upon this subject I have also the honour to entreat, that duplicates of the orders which are missing may be sent to me, and I will conform to them. In my despatch of the 30th of May last, I communicated to your majesty, that I had given up to marshal Ney brigadier-general Rouger; but this general, who has great zeal, having remained several days at Lugo, without employment, and finding that I could make him useful, I have brought him back. It was he who conducted the

last detachment, which is arrived from Lugo with the light artillery. M. Valannes, general of brigade, was very much fatigued, and pretended, before my departure from Lugo, to be more indisposed than I conceived him to be; but, having observed in him a moral debility, I desired him to retire, and to go to your majesty's major-general to receive his commands.

At this period I also wished to have been able to send away generals La Houssaye and Mermet, who have not always done what was in their power, for the success of the operations; but I preferred waiting till my arrival at Zamora. In order not to give authority to the reports of intrigues or conspiracies which had taken place on quitting Oporto, in which they had no share, and of which I have transmitted an account to your majesty, these reports being now entirely gone by. I think it proper, for the good of the service of the emperor, that another destination should be given to these two generals, whom it is not necessary for the present to replace. The reduction of the cavalry admits the suppression of one-fourth of a division of dragoons; and general Loison, who is without a division, or general Teray, in whose favour I have applied for the rank of general of division, might very well supply the place of general Mermet, at Zamora. I shall make arrangements

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Marshal Soult
to the king of
Spain.

Cowardice of
French officers
—“of an army
constituted like
that of France!”

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Marshal Soult
to the king of
Spain.

in consequence, and I entreat your majesty to approve them.

There would still be some changes to make in regard to the promotions of the generals. I have charged general Franceschi with the honour of consulting with your majesty about them, the good of the service requires it, and that is a motive too powerful for the emperor not to give his consent to ; for in this kind of war, and with the sort of enemy with whom we have to contend, it is of great importance to the success of the operations, that the chiefs, who are at the head of the troops, be not only of an unyielding nature, but that they possess that strength of mind which places them in every case above events, even the most unfortunate. I have the honour to entreat your majesty to take into consideration the remarks which I allow myself to make, and with which I am inspired by an ardent zeal for the service of the emperor.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) M. DUC DE DALMATIA.

To his Excellency Don Gaspar De Jovellanos.

Correspondence
of general Se-
bastiani with
Messrs. Jovel-
lanos and Saave-
dra, and gen.
Venegas.
(No. 1.)

Sir,

The reputation you enjoy in Europe, your liberal ideas, your love for your country, and the desire to behold it happy and flourishing, ought to

make you abandon a party which is contending only for the inquisition, prejudices, the interests of some grandees, and of England. To prolong the struggle is to augment the calamities of Spain. A man like you, recognised by your talents and character, ought to know that Spain may promise herself the happiest result by submitting to a just and enlightened king, whose genius and generosity ought to attract to him all the Spaniards who desire the tranquillity and prosperity of their country. Constitutional liberty under a monarchical government, the free exercise of your religion, the removal of all obstacles which, for ages, have impeded the regeneration of this noble nation, will be the happy result of the constitution which the vast and sublime genius of the emperor has given you.

Torn in pieces by factions, abandoned by the English who had never any other project than to weaken you, rob your fleets, and destroy your commerce, rendering Cadiz another Gibraltar, you cannot be deaf to the voice of the country, which demands from you peace and tranquillity. Labour to this end in union with us, and let the energy of Spain evince itself solely in cementing her true felicity. I offer you a glorious career. I do not doubt that you will embrace with joy the means of being useful to king Joseph and your fellow citi-

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Correspondence
of general Se-
bastiani.

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bastiani,

zens. You know the strength and number of our armies. You know that the party you have embraced has not obtained a glimmering of success; you would one day have deplored it, if victories had crowned your efforts with success; but the omnipotent, in his infinite mercy, has delivered you from that calamity.

I am ready to open communications with you, and give you proofs of my high consideration.

HOBACE SEBASTIANI.

General,

(No. 2.)
Answer.

I do not embrace a party. I embrace the just and holy cause of my country, which have unanimously adopted, who had received from her hand the august charge of defending and governing her, and which we have all sworn to embrace and sustain at the expense of our lives. We do not contend, as you pretend, for the inquisition, or for absurd prejudices, or the interests of the grandees of Spain. We are contending for the precious rights of our king, our religion, our constitution, and our independence; and do not believe that the desire to preserve these is at a distance from that of destroying whatever obstacles may be opposed to this end. On the contrary, and to make use of your phrase, the desire and purpose to regenerate Spain, and raise it to the degree and

splendour it once enjoyed, and will henceforth possess, is considered by us as one of our principal obligations. Perhaps no long period will elapse before France and all Europe will acknowledge that the same nation, which knew how to sustain, with so much valour and constancy, against an aggression so much the more unjust, as they could least expect it from those who called themselves their first friends—possesses also sufficient zeal, firmness, and wisdom, to correct those abuses which insensibly led the country to the horrible fate prepared for it. There is not a feeling heart which does not deplore the atrocious evils which this aggression has shed over an innocent people, to whom, after a pretence to degrade them by the infamous title of rebels, that humanity has been denied, which the rights of war allow, and which the most barbarous enemies grant. But, to whom are these evils to be imputed? To those who cause them, by violating all the principles of nature and justice? or to those who nobly strive to defend themselves from them, and avert them for ever from the great and generous nation? Do not, general, suffer yourself to be deceived. These sentiments, which I have the honour to express, are those of the whole nation, there not being a single good man, even among those whom your arms oppress, who

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of general Sebastiani.

does not feel in his breast the noble flame which burns in it for his defenders.

To speak of our allies would be irrelevant, if your letter did not oblige me to declare to their honour, that the purposes you attribute to them are as injurious as they are opposed to the generosity with which the English nation offered her friendship and her succours to our empoverished and disarmed provinces, at their solicitation, from the first commencement of the oppression with which they were threatened by their friends.

In fine, general, I shall be well disposed to respect the humane and philosophical principles, which, as you say, your king Joseph professes, when I perceive that, departing from our territory, he recognizes that a country, which is at this instant laid waste in his name by your soldiers, is not the fittest theatre for displaying those principles. This would, indeed, be a triumph worthy of his philosophy; and you, general, were you penetrated with the sentiments which it inspires, ought to glory in concurring in that triumph, that you might share also in our admiration and gratitude.

It is only for this purpose that my honour and sentiments permit me to make those communications which you propose, if the supreme central junta shall approve of it. In the mean while, ac-

cept, general, the expression of my sincere gratitude for the honour you personally shew me, assured of the consideration I profess for you.

GASPER DE JOVELLANOS.

Seville, April 24.

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Correspondence
of general Sebastiani.

To his excellency Don Francisco de Saavedra.

Sir,

You are animated by the love of your country; you desire its felicity; you are far from wishing to see it suffer any longer under the trammels of feudality, and the inquisition which oppose its regeneration; your sentiments are too noble, too worthy of a true Spaniard, to permit you to be the instrument of foreigners or fanatics, who delight in nourishing discord. This opinion, which I entertain of your character and intelligence, induces me to propose to you to terminate at once the evils of Spain, which would be aggravated by a long resistance. After so long a conflict, which unpleasant circumstances have occasioned, is not the time yet come to permit your province to enjoy, with the rest of the nation, all the advantages which are offered by the liberal constitution, which has been given it by his majesty the emperor, and which is guaranteed by the just, loyal, and generous character of his august brother, king Joseph.

(No. 3.)

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of general Se-
bastiani.

It is easy for you, sir, to acquire the justest, in the eyes of humanity, the fairest title to the gratitude of your country, by employing the influence which your character and talents give you, to induce your country to enjoy immediately all those advantages. Draw that country to a monarch, whose qualities merit all his confidence, and its government assures them that honour and prosperity have been hitherto the object of its desires and efforts.

Believe me, it is my sense of your true interests, as well as the esteem which your country professes for your person, which induces me to take this step, and that I shall deem myself happy if I succeed in attaining the end I propose.

Let me know whether, as I hope, you are disposed to this.

You must, nevertheless, be sufficiently aware of my character, to believe that I shall not on this account cease to march, and that nothing can detain the progress of our armies, whose successes are assured by the omnipotent genius of the emperor, to whom God has confirmed victory over all his enemies.

Accept, sir, the expression of my perfect consideration.

HORACE SEBASTIANI.

General,

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of general Se-
bastiani.

(No. 4.)
Answer.

I have received the favour of your excellency's letter, dated at Damiel, the 12th inst. and cannot omit returning my sincere thanks for the good opinion with which you honour me, and which I should certainly not merit if I assented to what you propose. Your excellency does not err in saying that it is the love of my country which animates me, but it is that love and the confidence which the Spanish people have reposed in my principles, inviting me to share in the administration of public affairs from the commencement of this afflicting war, which are the guide of all my proceedings. I believe I am maintaining the cause of justice; and, inwardly impressed with this opinion, I shall, under the influence of those loyal principles, and that honour which has directed all the actions of my life, constantly pursue the path I have resolved never to abandon, even should the uncertain fate of arms reduce me to extreme calamity. Approaching the end of my career, rewarded by the love of my fellow citizens, I shall not hesitate a moment to sacrifice myself by returning that love, though I saw suspended over my head the sword of vengeance.

Besides, general, does your excellency think that if it was possible that I could forget the dictates of my reason, and embrace the part you

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bastiani.

propose, that I could reconcile those who are opposed to such a conduct? All I should gain by this would be to bring shame on my grey hairs, and draw on me, for such unlooked-for desertion, the indignation of all good Spaniards. The enthusiastic opposition to the change of dynasty is not peculiar to Andalusia, whither the French armies have not yet prevailed. It exists also in the provinces still occupied by the troops of the emperor. This truth cannot have escaped the deep penetration of your excellency. In such a situation, my conduct is not merely the consequence of my private opinion, but of the general will of Spain; and I can never oppose the irrevocable decision of my beloved country. Accept the homage of my high consideration, &c.

FRANCISCO DE SAAVEDRA.

*Seville, April 24, 1809.**To the general of the army of Carolina.*

General,

(No. 5.)

The glory of giving peace and tranquillity to his country, ought to be preferred even by a general of an army to that which he can expect to gain by battles. Let us then, general, understand each other, in order to make the evils cease which press upon Spain, and stop the effusion of blood. We both owe this to the troops we command; you es-

pecially owe it to your country, in return for the confidence it reposes in you.

The frank, loyal, and beneficial character of king Joseph, is to you and your countrymen the surest pledge of what you have to promise yourselves. For my part, I shall be happy if I can be a useful medium between the king and his people, in procuring them, by a prompt peace, the tranquillity of which they stand in need, after so many tempests, and the felicity they may reckon upon under such a monarch. These views induce me to do myself the honour of writing to you, and waiting your answer. This step must appear to you the more sincere, because our advantages are so decisive, that there can be no doubt of the success of the war, and because no man can arrest the designs which are planned by the omnipotent genius of the emperor, to whom God has assured victory over all his enemies. Accept, general, the expression of my high consideration.

SEBASTIANI.

General,

I received, in due time, your letter of the 12th of last month, and I should not have failed to answer it without delay, if I had not depended upon a government to whom I was bound to give information, before I entered into correspondence

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(No. 6.)
Answer.

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bastiani.

with you. Authorised now to answer you, I have the honour to assure you, that in this we are agreed, that nothing is more grateful than to give peace and felicity to nations; the glory of which I shall always consider as beyond any thing the fate of arms could give.

Spain was enjoying that unspeakable felicity, and could not expect her loss, or her sufferings, or the effusion of her blood from allies for whom she has made such vast sacrifices, with that characteristic fidelity which other nations have never denied to her. But a boundless ambition, added to modes of warfare unknown among cultivated nations, have emerged her in an abyss of misery, from which the valour of her sons has to deliver her.

The character of your king Joseph may be as loyal and beneficent as you please to style it; let those virtues be exercised in countries where he is called to reign by the rights of his family, or the will of the people. With respect to myself, I shall never acknowledge any other king than him whom the laws of my country, established by my ancestors, in the plenitude of their liberty, have designated. I am satisfied there is not one of my countrymen who is not animated by the same spirit, however it may be attempted to deceive distant nations by the publication of oaths and acts of homage as voluntary, which have been extorted

by terror and the sword, and every species of violence.

Convinced, as you, general, ought to be, of this undoubted fact, and persuaded that you would, as you assure me, be happy to contribute to the restoration of a speedy peace, and the tranquillity which our kingdoms need after so many tempests, I implore you to avail yourself of the favour you enjoy under your emperor, in order that, withdrawing his armies from the peninsula, and restoring us our lawful king Don Ferdinand the VIIth, the Spanish nation may enjoy that felicity which it promises itself under his government, these being the bases on which we may receive your propositions.

Besides, the fate of arms has been in all times changeable and uncertain; and when, in the first campaign, I contributed to the glories of my country in the fields of Mengibar and Baylen, I did not, therefore, flatter myself that I should have only to offer her my blood in the battles of Bribiesca and Ucles. General, the constant triumphs of your armies are not so certain as you suppose; nor do I believe that the omnipotence of your emperor is a pledge of further victories; and far from believing that the divinity can protect, as you assure me, so unjust a cause, I, on the contrary, rely that his unalterable justice will ever

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bastiani.

declare itself in favour of the most holy war which is to be found in the history of nations, and the favourable issue of which we already begin to see realized.

“ Chosen by the supreme government, to lead my countrymen in this sacred conflict, it shall ever be my resolution to save my country, or perish with it.

Accept, general, &c.

FRANCISCO VANEGAS,

Santa Elena, May 5, 1809.

The present chapter, which leaves the British commander in a state of uncertainty with respect to the motions of the enemy, shall be concluded with some documents, which, though merely diplomatic, are necessary to that knowledge of the state of political relations between Great Britain and Spain, and throw light on the military operations of the allies.

The first has been referred to in a former book, to ward off that censure which would otherwise seem to attach itself to the irregular understanding between the two countries. The whole is equally interesting and important.

The marquis Wellesley, upon grounds which regularly appear, was appointed to an important mission to Spain, where Mr. Frere, whom he suc-

ceeded, but not *superceded*, had made himself so eminently useful. Among his excellency's first operations, therefore, the following communication became necessary.

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Despatch from
Mr. secretary
Canning to the
marquis Wel-
lesley.
Foreign-office,
27th June, 1809.

I enclose (says Mr. Canning) to your excellency, a copy of the treaty of peace, friendship, and alliance, between his majesty and Spain, concluded here in the month of January of the present year.*

The stipulations of this instrument are so clear and simple as to require little to be said in explanation of them. I, however, think it my duty to accompany the communication of it to your excellency, with such a statement of the reasons upon which the different articles are founded, as may serve to guide your excellency hereafter in any discussion that may arise, respecting either the effect of the treaty itself or any ulterior negotiation to be founded upon it.

I have first to state to your excellency the motives upon which it was thought right by his majesty to give to his majesty's connexions with Spain the form of positive treaty.

These motives are to be found, partly in the obvious and natural adherence to that ordinary course by which the conclusion of a state of hostility between two countries, and the restoration of a state

* The treaty itself being, after this intelligent illustration of it, purely political, is here omitted.

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of peace, are uniformly consigned to a written record and agreement: but partly also to the peculiar circumstances of the case, which, while they made the negotiation of a treaty with a government in the state in which that of Spain was, and still continues, peculiarly difficult, rendered it at the same time peculiarly important, that the extent of his majesty's pledges and undertakings with respect to Spain should be accurately defined, and should be compensated in a certain degree by reciprocal obligation.

The sudden and simultaneous burst of resistance to French tyranny and oppression, which broke out in the different kingdoms and provinces of Spain, afforded as little opportunity as there was inclination for weighing minutely the terms and conditions on which assistance was to be afforded by this country to an effort, the character and tendency of which were such, as at once to demand all the assistance that could be afforded to it.

This assistance was therefore given at once, largely and unconditionally, without any other question than how it could be most beneficially applied. But it soon became necessary that the desultory and divided efforts of the separate provinces, which were, perhaps, best adapted to the beginning of such a war, inasmuch as they were calculated to distract the attention and dissipate the force of the enemy, would, when that enemy recovered from his

first surprise, and was enabled to concentrate his force and act upon system, become wholly inadequate to an effectual and a continued resistance. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance, that a central government should be formed ; and the temptation of a closer and more regular relation with Great Britain was held out (perhaps not without effect,) to induce the Spaniards to hasten the formation of such a government.

What might have been the decision of his majesty in respect to the establishment of such more intimate relations with the Spanish government, if it had assumed a shape, and adopted principles decidedly different from those of the antient monarchy, is a question which is, fortunately, not necessary to discuss.

The early and unanimous adoption on the part not only of the juntas, but of the people throughout Spain, of those principles which reconcile loyalty with a spirit of independence, and a desire to maintain their country free, with a determination to support its laws and its legitimate sovereign, left nothing to be questioned on this head, and made it a matter of undoubted policy to encourage a government founding itself on such principles, by early acknowledgment, and by the offer of an intimate connexion.

This was of itself a sufficient motive for the

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conclusion of a treaty which should define, in precise terms, the relation between Great Britain and the existing government of Spain. But further, as both nations were engaged in war against France, it was clearly desirable that the two governments should be not only so firmly, but so publicly, united, as to make any attempt to divide them, by separate peace, hopeless; and to give to each in the most indisputable manner, and according to the formal practice of nations, the right which his majesty took upon himself to exercise on the overtures from Erfurth, of claiming the admission of the other to any negotiation with the common enemy.

It remains for me to point out to your excellency such parts of the articles of the treaty as require any particular notice.

“ In the first article, the stipulation of an entire and lasting oblivion of all acts of hostility done on either side, in the course of the late wars in which they have been engaged against each other,” though an ordinary stipulation in treaties of peace, was peculiarly desirable in this, from the remembrance and resentment which were understood to be cherished by some of the leading statesmen in Spain, in respect to the manner in which the last war was begun, a transaction entirely justifiable under its circumstances; but which, in the actual relation of the two countries, it was undoubtedly


more advisable to avoid the discussion than to establish the propriety.

The second article has the effect of confirming and making reciprocal an engagement, which his majesty had gratuitously taken by his order in council, of the 4th July, 1808, for the restoration of all Spanish vessels captured after that period.

The justice and generosity which dictated his majesty's conduct on this occasion are happily so far rewarded as that the only cases which have yet arisen under this article, the stipulations of which appeared, and were believed, to be perfectly gratuitous on the part of his majesty, are two cases of captures of British vessels in the ports of Spanish America; the particulars of which captures your excellency will find in my correspondence with Mr. Frere, and for the release of which vessels, your excellency will follow up the application which Mr. Frere will, no doubt, have made, founding yourself on the faith of this second article.

The third article, in addition to the general engagement of his majesty for assistance to Spain, and that of Spain, not to cede any territory to France, of which I have already spoken, contains a promise in his majesty's name, "not to acknowledge any other king of Spain, and the Indies thereunto appertaining, than his catholic majesty, Ferdinand

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VII. his heirs, or such lawful successor as the Spanish nation shall acknowledge.

The object of this stipulation is, to avoid the inconvenience of his majesty being called upon to decide between the conflicting claims of the candidates for the crown of Spain, in the event, not wholly out of probability of Ferdinand VII. and his immediate family being removed by deaths.

Into the examination of this question, it is not necessary now to enter; but the treaty could not have defined the successor whom his majesty was to profess his readiness to acknowledge, without either deciding this question, or qualifying the engagement as it is here qualified, by reference to the previous acknowledgment of the Spanish nation.

The fourth article is formed on the obvious policy of connecting the efforts and interest of the two countries, and of preventing any arrangements between Spain and the common enemy which his majesty shall not be a party, or which, if concluded without his participation, should not release his majesty from his engagement.

I reserve what I have to say on the separate articles annexed to the treaty for another despatch.

Mr. Canning thus continues :

The additional article to the treaty of peace,

friendship, and alliance, which additional article was signed on the 21st of March, defers the negotiation of a treaty of commerce till a more favourable opportunity ; but stipulates, in the mean time, for mutual facilities, to be afforded by temporary regulation on principles of reciprocal utility.

I have, therefore, only at present to desire, that your excellency will make it your business to ascertain and collect all the different regulations or orders which may have been passed since the institutions of the central junta, in favour of British commerce, and transmit them to me, with such observations which may occur or be suggested to your excellency by Mr. Duff, or others of his majesty's consuls or commercial agents in Spain; and that, with a view to future arrangements, you should lose no opportunity of endeavouring to do away the prejudices which exist with respect to the restrictions upon the intercourse with the Spanish possessions in America.

And he adds :

The first separate article annexed to the treaty of peace, friendship, and alliance, between his majesty and Spain, is of the utmost importance, and relates to a subject upon which it will be necessary that you should* with the greatest delicacy, but at the

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lesley.• *Sic in orig.*

same time, with the utmost vigilance and circum-
spection.

This article was added to the treaty, because it was foreseen that the securing the fleets of Spain,* of France, in case of such reverses as might expose the ports of Spain to the occupation of a French army, would be a matter of great difficulty, on account of the jealousy manifested by the Spaniards whenever it has been proposed to introduce a British force into any of the maritime fortresses; and at the very moment when this article was in negotiation, the fate of Ferrol, and of the ships in that harbour, sufficiently evinced the necessity of such a precaution.

This article, by making public the object for which alone the British troops would be introduced into Cadiz or Carthagena, and the pledge of good faith implied by such publicity, that the occupation, if permitted, would not be abused to any other purpose, would, it is hoped, secure the consent of the Spaniards to their introduction, in case of absolute necessity, or of confessedly approaching danger.

But, at all events, on the faith of this article, his majesty has a right to require that every preparation which can previously be made for the removal of the fleets, on such an emergency, shall be diligently made by the Spanish government itself. Accounts

have been received here, which represent the precautions already taken as very inefficient for this purpose, and as being apparently calculated rather to resist an attack from the sea than to facilitate the withdrawing of the ships from within the reach of a force which may occupy Cadiz.

Your excellency will have an opportunity, on your landing at Cadiz, of verifying these representations; and, if you find them true, you will not fail to remonstrate against a neglect, so prejudicial to the interest of both countries, and against an appearance of distrust so little merited by his majesty's disinterested conduct towards Spain.

You will take the earliest opportunity of making the same inquiries with respect to Carthagea, and will report to me as early as you conveniently can, the result of your inquiries, for his majesty's information.

The instructions on this subject thus continue :

The second separate article annexed to the treaty of peace, amity, and alliance, between his majesty and Spain, refers to the future treaty to be subsequently negotiated for the specification of the nature and the amount of the succours to be afforded by his majesty to the Spanish government.

The Spanish government has not pressed the ne-

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gotiation of such a treaty, and there is no reason on his majesty's part, in the present state of Spain and of Europe, for wishing to recall their attention to it.

The circumstances in question necessarily resolve themselves into, 1st, arms, ammunition, clothing, &c.—2dly, pecuniary assistance;—3dly, military co-operations.

With respect to the objects comprehended under the first denomination of assistance, arms, stores, and clothing, &c. the absence of any specific engagements has not prevented, and will not prevent, his majesty from furnishing such supplies as have been, or may be, required for the Spanish armies to the utmost possible extent. But this is obviously a species of assistance, not susceptible of minute and accurate specification beforehand.

The ground on which his majesty's consent to make it the subject of treaty was obtained was no other than to gratify the desire expressed by the Spaniards, that all the expenditures of Great Britain on their account should be considered rather in the nature of loan than of gift, and that, therefore, some record might exist of the value of the articles for which they would stand indebted to his majesty.

The enclosed letter will put your excellency in possession of the amount of articles actually

furnished to Spain.—But I am not to instruct your excellency to revive the question of valuation and repayment, or to recur to it on any other occasion, or for any other purpose, than for that of insisting that the amount of the value of these stores shall be taken into account in any statement of subsidiary aid from this country to Spain, when ever (if ever) the government of Spain shall voluntarily require such a statement to be made out. The supplies in kind are not only the most convenient, but, in fact, the only mode by which his majesty's subsidiary aid to Spain could, under the present circumstances of the world, be continued to any considerable extent.

Among these supplies, at the same time, it is necessary to make an exception, with respect to the article of muskets; the power of supplying which is unavoidably limited by the amount of the stock in hand, and the extent of the means of manufacturing them in this country.

My despatches to Mr. Frere, of the ———, will have shewn to your excellency, that the extent to which it was proposed to engage for pecuniary assistance if a treaty on this subject had been negotiated, was ten millions of dollars, including in that sum the specie which was consigned to Mr. Frere at the time of his departure, and sent to Cadiz, amounting to about two million three

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Mr. secretary
Canning to the
marquis Wel-
lesley.

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hundred thousand dollars, or about five hundred thousand pounds sterling; and including also the value of arms and stores sent to Spain, from the period of the installation of the central junta.

After some of these instructions were given, however, a variety of circumstances concurred to render the execution of them at once unimportant and impracticable.

1st.—The influx into Spain of specie from America, which has fortunately made Spain in a great degree independent of external assistance.

2dly,—The continued dearth of specie in this country, which makes the exportation even of a very small sum a matter of the most serious difficulty and embarrassment.

So much have these two circumstances together changed, or rather inverted, the relative situations of the two countries, that we must now (and until a supply of specie can be obtained from America) rely in a great measure upon the Spanish government for silver to pay the expenses of our army in the peninsula, purchasing that silver by bills on the treasury; with respect to which operations I shall have occasion to speak more particularly to your excellency in another despatch.

3dly,—In the third place, the breaking out of the Austrian war, while it has relieved Spain in a considerable degree, from the immediate pressure

of the enemy, has created a new demand upon the pecuniary resources of this country ; a demand, which it would be impossible to meet in any degree, if so large a portion of our disposable means had been appropriated by treaty to the use of Spain.

It is on this occasion a great satisfaction, not only that no positive stipulation has been made, but that the feelings of the Spanish government with regard to Austria have been found to be such as to induce them to consent, that any consideration of their convenience should be postponed to that of the more pressing and urgent necessities of the court of Vienna.

This statement your excellency will have seen expressed in a late despatch of Mr. Frere, as what he collected from M. Garay in his conversation upon the subject of loan, proposed here by Don Pedro Cevallos. The amount of the loan which Don Pedro Cevallos proposed to raise was, as your excellency will have seen, no less than ten or twenty millions, not of dollars, but of pounds sterling.

The extravagance of this proposal, if it is not to be considered merely as an unauthorised effort of zeal on the part of Don Pedro Cevallos himself, affords a proof how little satisfactory the more limited aid of ten millions of dollars would have been likely to prove to the Spanish government.

It is on this ground, therefore, as well as on

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others, fortunate that that suggestion has not been brought forward as the basis of a treaty; and your excellency will find in the amount of Don Pedro Cevallos' proposal, and its consequent impracticability, as well as in the wants of the Austrian government, and the immense importance of that diversion to Spain, sufficient reason for avoiding to entertain any discussion for a precise or definite pecuniary engagement on the part of his majesty at the present moment.

You will, however, not decline to receive any propositions which may be made to you on this subject, for the purpose of transmitting it home; and you will (as already instructed) profess his majesty's readiness to continue his supplies in kind, to the utmost extent that Spain can require and this country can furnish.

But your excellency will understand it to be generally a most desirable and important object to teach Spain to rely upon her own pecuniary resources, and particularly so at the present crisis, when not only the wants of Austria (as already stated) are infinitely beyond what this country can relieve; but when the very successes of that power may, at any moment, by encouraging other nations of the continent to rise against France, produce new calls on the liberality of Great Britain, which it is as much the interest of Spain herself as of

Germany, of Great Britain, and of all Europe, that we should be enabled to answer.

3dly.—The third species of assistance, and that to which the stipulations of treaty have been more particularly applicable, is that of military co-operations. Your excellency will be aware that the treaty of January was concluded and signed at the time when we were yet uncertain as to the issue of sir John Moore's campaign; that accounts have been received here from the commanders of the unfriendly reception of his army by the Spaniards, and, of what appeared to him, the general want of spirit in the Spanish nation, and the utter hopelessness of the Spanish cause.

In this state of things, it was determined not to hazard another British army in Spain, without such previous stipulations for its reception, and for its secure retreat, in case of necessity, as might effectually prevent the repetition of similar causes of complaint, and of the disasters which were then apprehended.

The war in the north of Spain then appearing hopeless, the admission of British troops into the fortress of Cadiz was the condition stipulated for the transfer of the British army to the south.

Your excellency will have seen, in the correspondence which has been submitted to your perusal, the progress of the discussion on this subject, and

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the difficulties which were started by the junta with respect to admission of British troops; difficulties, which must be admitted to have been not wholly imaginary.

You will have observed, however, that these discussions have been conducted on both sides without the smallest degree of ill humour; and that although the result was not to admit a British force, and, consequently, not to send a British army to the south of Spain, there is no ground to apprehend that this result has produced in Spain any alienation from this country; and it certainly has produced here no diminution of interest for Spain.

In this state of things, a treaty for adjusting the terms of military co-operation has become unnecessary.

This illustrative commentary upon the treaty, and the various discussions which followed it, will clearly shew the relations between the British army and the allies at this period, and amply explain those shades of difference which seem to impede the co-operation so necessary to the united cause.

The circumstances described in it should be kept in view during the important occurrences which will take place in the next chapter, and, indeed, the whole of the present book.

Mr. Canning winds up the instructions on this occasion, by giving to the ambassador the absolute controul, in course, of all the persons who had hitherto performed independent functions in Spain.

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I enclose to your excellency (says he) a list of all the agents, civil and military, employed in the service of his majesty in Spain; to all of whom instructions will be given to correspond directly with your excellency, (sending copies of these letters home, in cases where there proximity to England affords the means of their intelligence arriving here more speedily than through your excellency,) and to attend to your excellency's suggestions and directions, to the extent of even returning home, if at any time your excellency shall think it necessary for the public service so to direct.

Mr. secretary
Canning to the
marquis Wel-
lesley.
Foreign-office,
June 27, 1809.

In the state of incertitude in which the allies remained, even the following despatch appeared important; but it was really so in one respect, that of declaring an additional circumspection on the part of general Cuesta.

Most excellent sir, (said he,) when my vanguard

General Cuesta
to don Antonio.
Head-quarters,
Bridge of Al-
maraz, June 26,
1809.

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General Cuesta
to don Antonio.

passed the Tagus I received notice that the enemy's whole force was at a short distance between this and Oropesa, and a great part of them in ambuscade in the woods, hoping to surprise and cut off my vanguard, in case of its advancing incautiously. This intelligence has made me more circumspect, and I have suspended the passage of the river, and am occupied in repairing the bridge, having, in the mean time, formed my infantry and artillery on the left bank, in order to protect the retreat of the vanguard in case it should be obliged to effect it.

We have no intelligence of the enemy having abandoned the bridge of Arzobispo, nor is it to be supposed they will do so as long as they continue in the above project : on the other hand, their delay may be of advantage to us, by affording time for the arrival of the British army, which I consider is already advanced on its march to the banks of the Tietar.

(Signed) GREGORIA DE LA CUESTA.

The whole of the circumstances of this period, though in their immediate results not decisively important, afforded strong presages of the active operations about to ensue, like the first distant motion of a tempest; and prepared the British

army fully to expect a grand struggle with the enemy, in which the character of the allied troops and the value of their co-operation would be evinced, and the nature of the campaign at least decided.

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OPERATIONS WHICH LED TO THE BATTLE OF
TALAVERA.

Movements of the Enemy indicative of a general Battle.—Relative Circumstances of the Allies.—Amicable military Communications between the British Minister, Mr. Frere, and the British Commander-in-Chief.—Reports of the Spanish Generals.—Communications between Sir Arthur Wellesley and the British Government.—Improved Views of the Campaign.—Instructions in respect to an Advance into the Interior of Spain, and the Appointment of a British Commander-in-Chief to the Allied Army.

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Indications of
an approaching
conflict with the
enemy.

THE advance into Spain soon marked the character of the general who now headed the gallant army, whose prowess was only impeded, not abated, when under the chilling influence of a state of long inactivity.

The van has already shewn itself in the affairs of the last chapter, and the first communications of the British general, as he passed the eastern frontier of Portugal, were, therefore, of an enemy embarrassed at his approach, and necessitated to fly, that he might preserve the communication of his armies.

That enemy also soon discovered that he was no longer to experience the torpidity of a doubtful campaign, that if, as might be, he had no reason to expect a *rapid* general operation, he would at least have to prepare against the annoyance of an active cunctation.

In aid of this spirit the facilities of intelligence were greatly increased, both on the part of the Spaniards and the British minister, whose diligence and judgment in that respect can never be too highly appreciated.

On the 1st July, sir Arthur Wellesley informs lord Castlereagh that the enemy's corps, commanded by marshal Victor, have continued their retreat from the Guadiana across the Tagus, at Almarez, and along the river towards Talavera, while the corps commanded by Sebastiani had likewise retired towards the Tagus. The retreat of both these corps has been gradual, and they have sustained no loss; although the former has

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an approaching
conflict with the
enemy.

Lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
viscount Castle-
reagh.
Castello Branco,
July 1st, 1809.

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Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
Castlereagh.

been followed by the army of general Cuesta, and the latter by that of general Vanegas.

General Cuesta's advanced guard crossed the Tagus at Almarez, on the 24th June, and the main body were to follow as soon as the bridge of boats should be completed. General Vanegas' corps were, on the 22d, the last day on which I heard of them, at Villarta.

The British army broke up from the camp and cantonments on the Tagus, on the 27th June, and are on their march into Spain, by Zanza Major, towards Placentia; the advanced guard will be at Zanza Major on the 3d.

I have the honour to inform your lordship that I have heard that general Robert Crawford arrived at Lisbon, with his brigade, on the 28th.

Since I closed my despatch to your lordship of this day's date, adds his excellency, I have heard from colonel Roche, who has relieved lieutenant-colonel Bourke, at general Cuesta's head-quarters. It appears that Joseph Buonaparte had arrived at Toledo on the 22d, with a corps consisting of about 5,000 men, and he had crossed the Tagus, and had proceeded as far as Moras, to join Sebastiani, apparently with a view to fall upon Vanegas' corps: he had, however, returned to Toledo, as I under-

stand colonel Roche, with Sabastiani's corps, and the troops he had brought with him; and he was on his march towards Talavera, where the French were in considerable strength.

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Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
Castlereagh.

The whole of the army of general Cuesta had crossed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 29th, excepting three divisions, amounting to about 10,000 men, which were higher up the river, at and in the neighbourhood of Arzobispo, on the left bank, and his advanced posts were at Naval moral, on the right bank, and he occupied some villages still nearer to Talavera. The general had determined, however, upon hearing of the collection of the French troops at Talavera, to recross the Tagus; and colonel Roche expected that that operation would be completed by that night.

I have recommended to general Cuesta to throw his bridge over the Tagus, at a place below the junction of the Tietar with that river, in order that I might join him or he may join me, if the enemy should move against either of the corps, and that Vanegas' corps should be kept in a place of security near Villarta, in which position it threatens Toledo and Madrid, and the enemy's rear, in the event of his moving to this quartier.

The indications of an approaching general battle soon received an important accession from the

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communications of Mr. Frere to the government at home. This vigilant and intelligent minister, notwithstanding the extraordinary conflict in which he appears to have been placed, in respect to former operations, thus continuing to yield, with laudable perseverance, his talents, whenever they could be serviceable to the cause in which he was embarked ; at the same time, no less the cause of the world. He thus, with reference to the despatch of Cuesta, commences the information of the present state of Spanish affairs.

Right honour-
able J.H. Frere
to Mr. secretary
Canning.
Seville, 3d July,
1809.

The apprehensions which I expressed in my last despatch, respecting the danger to which general Cuesta was likely to expose his army, by pushing forward a part of it to the other side of the Tagus, before the arrival of the British army under sir Arthur Wellesley, were relieved the following day by the receipt of the report which I have the honour to enclose, and which indicated his apprehensions of such an attempt on the part of the enemy. It seems, however, that they were founded upon movements made by them with the sole view of covering their retreat, assembling their troops between Naval moral and Oropesa ; and this circumstance determined general Cuesta to complete the bridge and effect the passage of the army, (as is stated in another re-

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July.Mr. Frere to
Mr. Canning

port, dated the same day,) and, at the same time, to take possession of the Piente del Arzobispo, which the enemy had abandoned. It appears, by the report of the following day, that intelligence was then received, that Joseph Buonaparte had entered Toledo on the 23d, agreeably to the intelligence which I before mentioned, of his intention of leaving Madrid about that time; that, on the same day, a body of cavalry proceeded to Mora, a movement which, combined with that before-mentioned, appeared to threaten an attack against the army under general Vanegas. On the same day, general Cuesta's light troops pushed on as far as the Calzada de Oropesa; on the following day there was a slight skirmish, in which the French lost a few men at Calera, but revenged themselves by setting fire to the village. At the same time, their division, which had crossed the Tietar, was withdrawn in the direction of Talevara and Arenas.

On the 29th, having learnt that Joseph Buonaparte (who, it seems, had proceeded from Toledo to La Mancha, with the 6,000 men before-mentioned) had returned to that city with the same force; and that Victor's cavalry had besides returned from Toledo to Talavera. General Cuesta became apprehensive of being attacked before the arrival of the British, (who were not expected to

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Mr. Frere to
Mr. Canning.

reach Zara before the 3d or 4th,) and under the circumstances of having his army divided between the bridges of Almaraz and Arzobispo, a distance of nine leagues, he determined, therefore, after finishing his bridge, (the completion of which had been delayed by some negligence or mistake in the arrival of a part of the pontoons,) to pass his army to the left bank.

In his last reports of the 30th, general Cuesta states that his whole force was again on this side of the Tagus, with the exception of the light troops who were stationed at the bridge of Arzobispo, and who were in possession of both sides of the river, had had orders to defend it to the last extremity. It is in fact a point of the utmost importance, and the neglect or impossibility of occupying it before, had been the origin of all the calamities attendant upon the invasion of Estremadura. If the enemy, who still remained encamped between Talavera and the Albercho, should determine to retreat, general Cuesta would be able to follow him without loss of time; at the same time that he is secure from any attack, except at the bridge of Arzobispo, from which point the roads are impracticable for any force, except a mere body of infantry, unsupported by cavalry or artillery, such as, in a former instance, unfortunately succeeded in turning the position

of the Spanish army at Mirabelle. General Cuesta's conduct, in abandoning that post under such circumstances, was much blamed at the time, and there can be little fear that such an attempt should again be successful under circumstances so different, in case of attack on the retreating army, followed by ill success. General Cuesta's intention would be to re-cross the Tagus instead of falling back upon Placentia, where the country would be insufficient for the subsistence of his army. From what is stated above, and from what appears of the disposition manifested by the enemy, there seems little reason to fear but that the junction between general Cuesta and the British army will be safely effected.

Great apprehensions had been entertained of some desperate attempt being made against the army of general Vanegas, which was inferior in numbers, and too far removed to receive any effectual assistance from general Cuesta. It was even imagined that the enemy proposed to himself to force a passage through the Sierra, and to plunder Andalusia, before the British army, or that under general Cuesta, could arrive to defend the capital. It was even said that general O'Farrel had obtained an entire influence over the mind of Joseph; and that, in the true spirit of an exile, he had determined to hazard every thing

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by a desperate blow, combined with intelligence which he was suspected to have of the part of the country between Cordova and Jaen. A letter, which implied the existence of such a plan, that was found some time ago in a church-porch, where it was supposed to have been dropped by a person in the dress of a beggar, who had passed the night there, was considered as a confirmation of the existence of such a project, and the direction of the French towards Ciudad Real, which leads to two passages, one by Puerto Llano, Puerto Moehueli, and Pozo Blanco, and the other by Fuen Calimata, was looked upon with a great degree of alarm by some persons. General Vane-gas, in consequence of these movements, which he considered as threatening an attack upon the army under his command, determined to retire to his position in the Sierra.

A few days after Mr. Frere continued this intelligent detail, with a military view, of the relative state of the Spanish armies, which forms an admirable specimen of that minister's judgment, in the particulars of which he treats, much as that judgment had been impeached by the officer in aid of whose command it had before been offered.

It is no less pleasing to perceive the manner in which Mr. Frere offers his military remarks

than that in which they are received by sir Arthur Wellesley.

“I only trust,” says Mr. Frere, “that the military suggestion, which I had the presumption to offer, will not be thought to have been given on any other footing than that which I have distinctly and studiously expressed;” and this diffidence, by no means, surpasses the noble amenity of sir Arthur Wellesley.

The following is the letter, containing the remarks which may be deemed positively military :

Dear sir,

I inclose a duplicate of my last despatch, which I shall be obliged to you to forward to Lisbon by your next opportunity ; since that time nothing has occurred in the north-eastern provinces, except that it appears that the siege of Gerona is pressed with great vigour by the enemy. Without troubling you for the detailed information mentioned in your note of the — as having been received by colonel Roach, I can easily conceive the state of things which we would have had to report, and the embarrassment to which he must be exposed, by the accumulation of a vast force, of the description which he and your other informants must have witnessed.

An army of 35,000 undisciplined troops ap-

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To Mr. Can-
ning.
11th July, 1809.

Mr. Frere to sir
Arthur Welles-
ley.
Seville, July 3,
1809.

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pears to me, according to those vague notions which a civilian may be allowed to entertain of military matters, much too great for immediate and con-joint co-operation in a day of action, with a force such as you have under your command. I should apprehend that a military body, of much less force, might be, in many respects, preferable, as it would be more likely to assume the spirit, and follow the example of troops of a superior description, would be less liable to fall into the disorder to which their present character exposes them, and less likely to communicate the effects of their bad example to an auxiliary body, which they would not greatly out-number.

If as it should seem, and as you appear to apprehend, the enemy should make a shew of resistance on this side of Madrid, might it not be useful to detach a corps, in the first instance, in the same direction which you proposed to take with the British army; for instance, through the Puertal de Arenas to Oula, Orevalo, and Segovia, menacing the rear of Madrid, and the retreat of the enemy? In this case would not the main army be obliged either to retreat or to detach; and, in either supposition, would not the result of the operations of the corps separated, in order to produce this effect be attended with more beneficial consequences than any which would be ex-

pected to arise from their presence in a day of action, with an army constituted as the allied force, is a present, and opposed to the united force of the enemy in a fixed position?

I take the liberty of suggesting this idea merely, because it has struck me very forcibly, and upon the same footing, that I should have done, if circumstances would have allowed me the satisfaction of a private conversation with you, and as I might equally have ventured to do, if I had been residing here casually in a private character.

There are circumstances, however, which make the detachment of a part of the force, at present united, under the order of general Cuesta, exceedingly desirable under another point of view.

It is a matter of general suspicion, and has been so for some time past, that general Cuesta meditates some serious plan of vengeance, in resentment of the affronts and disgusts which he experienced about half a year ago on the part of the central junta. The dispersion and ruin of general Blake's army has removed one great obstacle to such a project on his part, and has increased the alarm of those who apprehend it.

The army of general Vanegas, it is thought, might be depended upon, but it is much inferior in number; and the obvious remedy seems to be, to detach from his army under the command of

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some chief, who might acquire sufficient reputation and confidence among the troops put under his command, to enable him to stand out against any violent measure on the part of the commander-in-chief.

I have reason to apprehend that many of the junta would not venture to propose such a measure, which proceeding from them, in the first instance, would appear obviously to have originated in political and not military views, would be very glad to have some plan of the kind which I have mentioned, viz. a separate force detached from the main body, suggested to them by you as a military plan; and that, in that case, they would venture to give orders for its execution.

General Vanegas himself does not appear possessed of that military reputation or commanding character, which would be necessary to counterpoize a man of general Cuesta's authority and decided temper.

General Blake's army has dispersed, and the individuals have generally escaped; but what would have been the fate of an English auxiliary body which might have been acting in conjunction with them?

If the Spanish government cannot give (as they certainly cannot) a perfect security against the repetition of the same disgraceful scene on the part

of their troops, they are bound at least to give us every possible security which can arise from the choice of officers, distribution of troops, &c.

Upon any point of this kind, I should think it my duty to support any representation coming from you, in the strongest manner possible, conceiving that it is our duty not to suffer the risks and hardships to which a British army must necessarily be exposed for the services of the common cause, to be unnecessarily augmented in the slightest assignable degree, in compliance with any partiality or jealousies, or feelings of an inferior order, by which this government, like all others, might be actuated, if left to themselves.

We have this moment, by the concussion of all the world, only two men who are capable of commanding even a small body of troops in a military manner, general Blake and the duke of Alberquerque, and they both find themselves without an army. Blake, by a misfortune to which it is impossible to attach any blame; and Alberquerque by a misfortune, for which he is still less accountable, that of having given umbrage to the junta, by the circumstances of his birth and fortune, and of exciting the jealousy of general Cuesta, by his reputation and popularity among the troops, motives which I fear may lead to the

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sacrifice of his reputation, and to the loss of his services to the public cause.

It would be my wish to see general Blake reinforced in time, to prevent the fatal consequences which must otherwise follow, whenever the fall of Gerona lets loose general St. Cyr's army, consisting of not less than 20,000 men, to complete the destruction of the northern provinces.

This, I should conceive, might be done by a detachment from the army of Vanegas, which would be replaced by an equal number from that of general Cuesta.

The duke of Albuquerque would have no higher ambition than that of commanding any body of Spanish troops, which you might demand to have, either directly attached to the British army, or placed under your immediate orders, for any separate enterprize which you might deem advisable.

Colonel Whittingham is, I understand, with you, and, I trust, that his report will have given you as favourable an opinion of the duke's character and abilities, and of his conduct under the treatment which he has experienced, as any which you could conceive from a detail, with which it would be superfluous to trouble you.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. H. FRERE.

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July.Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to Mr.
Frere.

The following is the answer:—

My dear sir,

I received your letter of the 8th, at general Cuesta's head-quarters, whither I went on the 10th, in order to settle the plan of our future operations. I stated to the general my opinion, that the principle attack upon the enemy posts on the Alberché, ought to be made by the united force of the British and Spanish armies under his command; that it would be desirable to detach a corps of 10,000 men on our left, towards Avila, to turn the enemy's right; and that Vanegas, after having driven Sebastiani's corps across the Tagus, by which, alone, he is understood now to be opposed, should turn to his right and cross the Tagus, either at Arranjuez or Fuente Duenas, and threaten Madrid by the enemy's left.

The general proposed that I should make the proposed detachment to Avila from the British army, which I declined, on the ground that the British troops, to act with advantage, must act in a body, and that I thought the detachment might, with more propriety and advantage, be made from the Spanish army, which already appeared to me to be more numerous than was necessary for the operations on the Alberché, or than would be

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lesley to Mr.
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Placentia, 13th
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found convenient, in reference to its state of discipline.

I then proposed that this Spanish detachment should march by the Puerto de Bânas; that by Arenas and the Puerto de Pico being deemed impracticable for artillery.

General Cuesta declined to make any large detachment from his army, but offered to send two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry, to join sir Robert Wilson's Portuguese brigade, and march upon Arena, and thence to Escalona, on the Alberché, in communication with the left of the British army.

He adopted, however, the remainder of the plan proposed, which we shall begin to carry into execution on the 18th instant.

General Cuesta having declined to send any large detachment to the quarter proposed by me, I, of course, had no opportunity of proposing, that the duke of Albuquerque should have the command, to which I certainly should have been disposed, as well on account of your recommendation as from his own character.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Viscount Castlereagh to
lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wellesley.
Downing-street
11th July,
1809.

His majesty (says lord Castlereagh) has been graciously pleased to approve of the whole of your proceedings, as communicated in your despatches :

and hopes the arrival of the reinforcements will have enabled you to act with effect, in consort with general Cuesta, against the enemy.

The scarcity of specie has become a subject of much anxiety; the supply sent out by the Rosamond and Niobe, (which left this country early in June,) arriving so immediately after that you received from Cadiz, will have relieved your wants for the present; but it becomes a subject of the most serious consideration for you to concert with the commissary-general how you can realize the funds necessary for your army, in the peninsula, by bills on England.

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Viscount Castlereagh to sir Arthur Wellesley.

Nothing more completely shews the unformed state of the economy of a British army than the necessity of the preceding hints on the very elements of military operation. Sir A. Wellesley sufficiently occupied with their higher principles had scarcely time or space of mind to those merely financial; and, notwithstanding the acknowledged talents existing in the commissariat, it must be confessed that it had not hitherto eminently distinguished itself in the creation of resources for this army.

It is to be recollected, however, that a British army had yet entirely to learn that dextrous art by which, according to the principles of early as well as of recent warfare, a body of troops were to be pro-

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Viscount Castlereagh to sir
Arthur Wellesley.

vided; that it was yet encumbered by the scruples of an exact probity; and, above all, that it was peculiarly situated in Spain.

How far some new and important principles, to be derived from the experience of this war, may operate in future on the prosecution of similar projects will remain to be seen.

At the same time, unaccustomed to move in vast bodies on a continent, the mobility of a British army, that art, by which it shifts with rapidity and correctness, disjoins, unites, prepared for every occurrence, confines, and easily provides its own wants, is yet far backward, and requires a discipline, exercised with judgment and firmness, to form and direct.

To aid in the provision of this army, in the interim, by his political weight, as well the other objects of such a mission, the succession of the marquis Wellesley to Mr. Frere, long expected, was again thus complimentarily announced to that minister.

“I write, by this occasion only, to inform you that the delay of the marquis Wellesley’s departure has been produced by a severe indisposition, which has latterly, and till within these two days, confined him to his bed.

“The day before yesterday he was able to quit his bed; and I am allowed by his physicians to entertain the most confident expectations, that he will

be in a state to set out for Spain in the course of the ensuing week. It is to be hoped that this unlucky, but unavoidable, delay will not create any ill impression at Seville.

I am commanded by his majesty to express to you, his majesty's entire reliance on your conduct in carrying on his majesty's service, so long as you remain at Seville, a reliance in which his majesty has been confirmed by the strong testimony received from the Spanish government, of the zeal which you have uniformly manifested in the execution of the duties of your mission, and the confidence which you have succeeded in inspiring.

The intelligent commencement, already given in the despatch of the British minister, of the presage towards a general engagement, was immediately followed, and confirmed by reports from every quarter; of these the duke del Parque thus writes to the Spanish secretary-at-war:—

Most excellent sir,

Yesterday morning I received notice from Salamanca, that the French, who were in that city, were preparing to march, during the night and this morning. I have received advice from various points, that 2400 infantry, with two pieces of cannon, had marched, and the cavalry was pre-

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Duke Del
Parque to M.
de Cornel.
Ciudad Ro-
drigo, 10th July,
1809.

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Parque to M.
de Cornel.

paring to set out to-day: they had demanded rations for 5000 men, in addition to those who were there. About 400 had entered, and the rest were in the neighbourhood, when general Millet received a courier, in consequence of which he ordered the return of the 5000, and the evacuation of Salamanca.

It is asserted, that these troops took the direction of Valladolid; some say they are going to Madrid, others, to take up a position at Samosierra; and various of their officers, who evinced considerable discontent, confidently assured several of the inhabitants of Salamanca, that the real object of their march was to return to France, in consequence of the bad news they had received of their armies on the Danube, by which Napoleon was placed in very distressing circumstances.

I have directed various persons, in my confidence, to follow the movements of the enemy, as well on the side of Salamanca as towards Salvatierra, in case any of the divisions, which are in the district of Alba, should propose to proceed towards the Puerto do Banos, with the intention of marching into Estremadura, that I may receive early advice of their movements, in order to communicate it, without loss of time, to general Cuesta and sir Arthur Wellesley, who is in Placentia.

I likewise caused a company of lancemen to march yesterday evening on the road to San Munoz, in the direction of Salamanca, and gave orders to the commanding officer of about 100 horse, who are at the Fuente de San Estevan, to support them, leaving sufficient force there to protect their retreat, if necessary.

To-day 94 horse, of the volunteers of Ciudad Rodrigo, followed by two companies of the cavalry regiment de La Reyna, which, from the weakness of the regiment, do not exceed 80 horse, set out towards Salamanca, by Ledisma.

I have given orders to the respective commanders, to over-run the country in both directions, preventing the enemy's small parties entering the villages, and robbing, burning, and desolating them, as they are accustomed to do in taking their departure. That they shall advance carefully even to Salamanca, avoiding any engagement with superior forces, and to enter that city in the event of finding it entirely abandoned by the enemy; to assure the inhabitants of the protection of this army, and to encourage the timid, that they may not quit the country with their property, and follow the French, and to express generally, that those only will be punished who have openly and positively been guilty of assisting the enemy. Your excellency will be aware that the quickness

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Presages of an
approaching
battle.

Duke Del
Parque to M.
de Cornet.

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with which this operation requires to be executed, and the nature of the country, do not admit of my making use of an infantry force; the more so, as it would only fatigue and expose them to no purpose; and that, in case this retreat should only be feigned, I have taken measures to support the cavalry, who are to retire to this fortress.

(Signed) EL DUKE DE PARQUE.
CASTRELLA,

Sir Arthur Wellesley thus continues his communications to lord Castlereagh.

My Lord,

Lient.-general
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
viscount Castle-
reagh.
Placentia, 15th
July, 1809.

After I had written to your lordship, on the 1st instant, Joseph Buonaparte crossed the Tagus again, and joined Sebastiani with the troops he had brought from Madrid, and with a detachment from marshal Victor's corps, making the corps of Sebastiani about 28,000 men; with an intention of attacking Vanegas's corps, Vanegas, however, retired into the mountains of the Sierra Morena; and colonel Lacy, with his advanced guard, attacked a French advanced corps in the night, and destroyed many of them.

The French troops thus returned again to the Tagus, which river Joseph Buonaparte had crossed with the reinforcement which he had taken to Se-

bastiani's corps; and this last corps, consisting of 10,000 men only, was on the left bank of the Tagus, about Madridlegos, in front of Vanegas, who was again advancing.

The last accounts from that quarter were of the 8th.

The French army under Victor, joined by the detachment brought by Joseph Buonaparte from Sebastiani's corps, and amounting in the whole to about 35,000 men, are concentrated in the neighbourhood of Talavera, and on the Alberché: general Cuesta's army has been in the position, which I informed your lordship that it had taken up, since I addressed you on the 1st instant.

The advanced guard of the British army arrived here on the 8th; and the troops, which were with me on the Tagus, arrived on the 10th. The 23d Light Dragoons, and the 48th, arrived yesterday. The 61st regiment will arrive to-morrow.

I went to general Cuesta's head-quarters at Almaraz, on the 10th, and stayed there till the 12th; and I have arranged with that general a plan of operations upon the French army, which we are to begin to carry into execution on the 18th, if the French should remain so long in their position.

The following is agreeably addressed to the Spanish adjutant-general, or rather, perhaps, chief of

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Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord viscount Castlereagh.

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the staff. It is very explicit, and perfectly accordant with the principles of mobility and subsistence.

Dear sir,

Sir Arthur Wellesley to general O'Donoghue.
Placentia, July
16th, 1809.

The officer who was sent to examine the road by Majados and Tallaymella, has reported, that it will answer for artillery, so that, in consequence of your letter of the 14th, we shall march by it. My head-quarters will be on the 18th at Majados, on the 19th at Continello, and on the 20th at Oropesa. I am sorry to say that we shall march but ill provided with many articles which we require, owing to the deficiency of the means of transport in our possession; and this country is either unable or unwilling to supply them.

I have sent a commissary to Gata and Ciudad Rodrigo, but he has not been able to procure one mule, and I fear that he will not be more successful at Bejar, as there appears a general disinclination to give that assistance to the army, which every army require, more particularly in a country unprovided with magazines or strong places.

Nothing shall prevent me from carrying into execution the arrangements which I settled with general Cuesta, when I had the pleasure of seeing him, although to do so will be attended with the greatest inconvenience, on account of the defi-

ciency of the means of transport, which I then hoped that this country and Ciudad Rodrigo would have afforded; but I think it but justice to the army, under my command, and to his majesty, to determine, that I will undertake no new operation till I shall have been supplied with the means of transport, which the army requires, and but fair and candid towards general Cuesta, to announce to him this determination at the earliest moment. The British army does not require much assistance of this description. None for the baggage of individuals, and what is wanted is to be applied solely to the transports of provisions, ammunition, money, and medical stores.

All countries in which an army is acting are obliged to supply these means; and, if the people of Spain are unable or unwilling to supply what the army requires, I am afraid that they must do without its services.

I shall be obliged to you if you will lay this letter before general Cuesta, for his information, and tell him that I send a copy of it to Mr. Frere, for the information of the government. I beg you, at the same time, to inform general Cuesta, that I am convinced that Don Lozano de Iares, as well as colonel O'Lowler, have done every thing in their power to procure for the army the means of transport which we have required.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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Sir Arthur Wellesley to general O'Donoghue.

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Enclosed communications to the Spanish general, sir Arthur Wellesley writes to the British minister with a momentary strength of feeling, which it were to be wished had not been expressed.

My dear sir,

Sir A. Wellesley
to J. H. Frere.
July 16, 1809.

I enclose a letter which I have written to major-general O'Donoghue, which I beg you to communicate to the government.

It is impossible for me to express to you the inconvenience and risk which we incur from the want of means of conveyance, which I cannot believe that the country could not furnish if there existed any inclination to furnish them.

I cannot but observe, however, that although to me personally there has been much civility from all classes of the inhabitants since I came into Spain, this has not been the case with the army in general; the officers complain, and I believe not without reason.

The country gives unwillingly the supplies of provision we have required, and I have been obliged to promise that they shall be replaced from our stores in Portugal; and we have not procured a cart or mule for the service of the army.

This does not look promising, and I certainly will not persevere if our prospect of good treatment does not improve.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

P. S. We really should not be worse off in an enemy's country, or indeed so ill, as we should take by force what we should require.

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There is one thing to be taken into consideration from this postscript; Spain at this moment could scarcely, *even to its own troops*, be regarded any otherwise than as a country inimical to any thing that should tend to drain it further in its impoverished state: and this without taking into the account the local influences, from various circumstances, unfavourable to the war.

The enclosed communication rather approaches to a similar tone.

I am sorry to say (says sir Arthur to general O'Donoghue,) that we shall march but ill provided with many articles which we require, owing to the deficiency of the means of transport in our possession, and this country is either unable or unwilling to supply them. I have sent a commissary to Gata and Ciudad Rodrigo, but he has not been able to procure one mule, and I fear that he will not be more successful at Bejar, as there appears a general disinclination to give that assistance to the army which every army requires, more particularly in a country unprovided with magazines or strong places. Nothing shall prevent me from carrying

Sir A. Wellesley
to major-general
O'Donoghue.
Placentia, July
16th, 1809

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Sir A. Wellesley
to major-general
O'Donoghue.

into execution the arrangements which I settled with general Cuesta when I had the pleasure of seeing him, although to do so will be attended with the greatest inconvenience, on account of the deficiency of the means of transport, which I then hoped that this country and Ciudad Rodrigo would have afforded; but I think it but justice to the army under my command, and to his majesty, to determine I will undertake no new operation till I shall have been supplied with the means of transport which the army requires, and but fair and candid towards general Cuesta to announce to him this determination at the earliest moment.

The British army does not require much assistance of this description, none for the baggage of individuals; and what is wanted is to be applied solely to the transport of provisions, ammunition, money, and medical stores. All countries in which an army is acting are obliged to supply these means, and if the people of Spain are unable or unwilling to supply what the army requires, I am afraid they must do without its services.

I shall be obliged to you if you will lay this letter before general Cuesta for his information; and tell him that I send a copy of it to Mr. Frere, for the information of the government. I beg you at the same time, to inform general Cuesta, that I am convinced monsieur Sagana de Torres, and colonel

O'Lawler, have done every thing in their power to procure for the army the means of transport which we have required.

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If it were not from a previous knowledge of the superior activity of the British general, there is a querulousness in these letters which would threaten something of the indecision and despairing temper which had been manifested with such disadvantage in a former campaign. It was, however, to be otherwise accounted for, by the certainty of an approaching engagement, under circumstances but little promising.

I asked Cuesta (observes the general on the next day) to secure for me the passes of Banos and Perales, and he has occupied the former, but he has left the latter to be occupied by the duke del Parque. I wish that you would send somebody to see how the pass is occupied, and that, at all events, you will have an eye to that pass ; it will make me quite secure, and will render me the greatest service that, in their present situation, the Portuguese troops could render. I do not think that the French would like to venture through that pass in the present situation of affairs.

The bridges of Alcantara and Almaraz being impassable, they would be in a *cul de sac*, and would

Sir A. Wellesley
to marshal Beresford.
Placentia, July
17, 1809.

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have no exit, excepting through a desert on the frontiers of Portugal.

Whatever momentary doubts might have been excited upon the subject of sir Arthur's complaints, they were quickly dispelled by his vigilance and activity.

The following account of it is preferred, in the despatches of Mr. Frere.

Right hon. J.H.
Frere to Mr. se-
cretary Canning.
Seville, July 19,
1809.

In answer to the letter, the copy of which was transmitted in my No. 85, by the last messenger; I have received the enclosed, in which sir Arthur states, that he had agreed with general Cuesta to make an united attack with the British and Spanish troops, on the enemy's posts on the Albuche; that at the same time he had proposed the plan of detaching a large corps in the direction of Avilla and Segovia, to which general Cuesta objected, upon the scale that was proposed of 10,000 men, but had agreed to furnish sir Robert Wilson with two battalions of infantry, and some cavalry, in addition to his Portuguese brigade, which corps was to march upon Escalona, on the Albesché, in communication with the left of the British army; and that Venegas, after driving back Sebastiani's corps, which is the only one now opposed to him, should cross the Tagus, at Aranjuez, or Fuente

Duenas, in order to threaten Madrid, on the enemy's left.

The arrangements above-mentioned were settled by the intervention of general O'Donoghue.

By a letter just received, dated the 16th, from general Cuesta, it appears that nothing of any importance had passed, but that a small party of the enemy who had pushed forward on the left bank of the Tagus, from the bridge of Talavera, had been driven back again by the duke of Alburquerque's corps, and pursued as far as the bridge.

General Vanegas writes on the 16th, from St. Cruz de Mudela, whither his head-quarters had been transferred from Santa Elena, that he proposed the next day to advance them to Manzanaus, and to make an attack upon a detachment of the enemy, at Villambia, if they should still remain in that position; after which, he proposed to advance upon Consuegra and Madrilejos.

I enclose a report from that general, of the 14th, by which it should appear that Joseph Buonaparte was expected at Madrid, on the 12th, with 4,000 men, who were expected to return with further reinforcements from that town; other troops were expected there who would relieve the garrison.

The enclosed letter from the duque del Parque, at Ciudad Rodrigo, and which is dated the 10th, makes no mention of the appearance of marshal

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Mr. Frere to
Mr. secretary
Canning

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July.Mr. Frere to
Mr. secretary
Canning.

Soult's forces, but only states, that the French appeared to be on the point of evacuating Salamanca.

It is said, however, that they expected the arrival of 5,000 men, of whom 400 had already arrived when despatches were received, in consequence of which the evacuation of the town was ordered.

What is said of the return of the troops that were on their way thither, if understood correctly, should seem to imply, that they could not belong to the army of Soult, which could not, under any circumstances, be expected to make a purely retrograde movement, as their way, even to France, would not be through Zamora. It appears, however, that the duke is on his guard, and aware of the necessity of keeping a good look out, and conveying immediate advices to sir Arthur Wellesley and general Cuesta, of the advance of any of the enemy's force in their direction.

The despatch is thus continued :

By the account received this evening from general Cuesta, and dated the 20th, from Calzada de Oropesa, it appears that the English vanguard, followed by the rest of the army, had that day entered the town of Oropesa, general Cuesta pro-

posed to pass the night in that town, and proceed to Pelavonegas the next day.

The English troops, who were fatigued with two long days march, were to rest the 21st, at Oropesa, and, on the 22d, they were to move forward to the neighbourhood of Talavera, in conjunction with the Spaniards.

The general opinion here seems to be, that the French will not wait for an attack; and the confidential reports state, that they are sending forward their heavy baggage, and even a part of their artillery, to Madrid.

On the evening of the 19th, I received the enclosed letter from sir Arthur Wellesley, and, on going to the junta the next morning, I was agreeably surprised to find that they had already taken measures to remedy, as expeditiously as possible, the want of carriage which was complained of in that letter which I had to communicate, and of which, the enclosure to colonel O'Donoghue had been already transmitted by general Cuesta. Four officers had been appointed, and were to set off this morning with 30 men each, and with orders to put in requisition one-third of the mules and other animals on this side Santa Ollala, and two-thirds in all the country beyond, with which they were to proceed to the British camp.

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Mr. Frere to
Mr. secretary
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Mr. Frere to
Mr. secretary
Canning.

From a correspondent, whose accounts have generally proved correct, and who writes from the mountains, in the neighbourhood of Toledo, it appears that the French had 4,000 men in that town, 1,000 in Aispin and Mara, and 4,000 in Madrilejos.

General Vanegas had advanced successively from Santa Cruz, to Valdepanas and Manzanares, and writes, on the 20th, from Membrilla, from whence the army was to move upon Villambia, Villarta, and Arenas.

I send enclosed the reports from general Vanegas and Cuesta, of the 18th and 19th.

From these correct transcripts of the state of the allied war, attention is naturally turned to the reports of the army in alliance, though not very particular.

General Cuesta
to Mr. Cornel
Casas del Puer-
to, July 18,
1809.

Most excellent sir, says general Cuesta to the Spanish secretary-at-war, nothing has occurred at our advanced guards to-day: all the troops in this camp passed the Tagus this morning, and will take up their quarters to-night in the neighbourhood of Almaraz, in order to proceed to-morrow to Naval Moral, to which place I shall remove my headquarters. The English army is to-night on my left, at Majada, and will advance to-morrow to

Continello. On the 21st, the troops which are at the bridge of Arzobispo will march to Calzada: my army has commenced this march without barley, and with only provisions for the day; the measures I adopted, and the steps taken by the commissary to procure them, not having met with the desired effect.

I leave a detachment at the bridge, in order to guard and protect it; it may serve during the summer, that is to say, until the end of September, and beginning of October, at which time the rains commence, against which it will not be able to resist, and this communication, so necessary to us, will be cut off. In order to avoid this evil, I wrote immediately on its being established to the provisional junta of Estremadura, pointing out to them the necessity of repairing the carriage-road from Truxillo to the bridge of Arzobispo, the only certain communication; but I do not perceive that they have hitherto taken any steps to effect it; and the point is so interesting as to merit the consideration of the supreme junta of the kingdom.

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

The same general continues to state as follows to the Spanish secretary-at-war.

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General Cuesta
to Mr. Cornel.

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I have arrived at the head-quarters of Naval Moral, with all the army from Almaraz, which is encamped in this neighbourhood. To-morrow I proceed to La Calzada de Oropesa. The English are to-night at Centinello, two leagues on my left, and will march to-morrow to Oropesa.

To the same effect were the communications of general Vanegas, of which the first states as follows :

Most excellent sir,

General Vanegas to M. de Cornel.
Santa Cruz de Mudela, July 18, 1809.

Being persuaded that the enemy, in consequence of what passed yesterday with their vanguard, would endeavour to reconnoitre Daymiel, I ordered brigadier-general don Luis Lascy to advance his cavalry, and surprise them if possible : he did so, advancing an hour before day-break with his whole division, in order to render the blow more certain ; but, having remained in this position until nine, he received advice of the enemy's having quited Villarmbia, and retired towards the Vintas de Puerto Lapiu ; and perceiving that a detachment of from 60 to 80 of those remained as a rear guard, he ordered lieutenant-col. Gbarra to pursue them, and annoy them if he could get up with them, while Lascy remained to ascertain

the true rout of the enemy, who said, in Villarmbia, that they were going to take up a position where they should wait for us.

Conceiving that they are going to retire, I have ordered that the regiment of horse-grenadiers of Ferdinand III. and the squadron of Lancemen of Ulera, with two pieces of horse-artillery, to advance immediately to La Membrilla, under the orders of major-general the viscount Zolina, and at day-break I shall set out with the 4th division for Valdepenas, and I shall take the necessary measures according to the intelligence I shall receive to pursue them ; advancing, perhaps, all the cavalry and horse-artillery, and following as soon as possible with the divisions of infantry.

(Signed) FRANCISCO VANEGAS.

The second of these communications is also as follows :

Most excellent sir,

By the courier, who arrived at these head-quarters this morning, I have received the royal order of the 17th instant, communicated to me by your excellency ; and desiring me to advance as far as Madrilegos, but not to proceed farther without positive intelligence of the advance of the general-in-chief, with whom I am to com-

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General Vanegas to M. de
Cornel.

General Vanegas to M. de
Cornel.
Valdepenas,
July 19, 1809.

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General Vane-
gas to M. de
Cornel.

municate as frequently as possible, and to be certain first, that the enemy have not increased in number, whereby I should be exposed to a dangerous retreat before I could take up any position favourable to a defence; always understanding that as well in order to advance to Madrilegos, as for any subsequent movement, I am to be guided by circumstances, in all my operations; all which I shall punctually comply with; and whilst I am acquiring, in every possible way, certain intelligence of the true intentions of the enemy.

The fourth division will set out at midnight for Membrilla, to which place I shall remove my headquarters, placing myself in a line with the other divisions, in order that I may be able to issue to them the necessary orders without the least delay. The fifth division, commanded by major-general don Thomas Lorain, which is at Corral de Casaque, I have directed to advance to Ciudad Real, in order to cover our left flank, pushing on his advanced parties to the passes of Quente del Qresm and Malagon.

(Signed) FRANCISCO VANE GAS.

Such is the final state of the preparations for the conjunct operations of the allies, which was confirmed by a fact of high importance, as evincing a new degree of confidence on their part, and a new

bond of union between the allied armies. In a despatch of Mr. Canning, he acquaints the minister, that the Spanish minister at Lisbon has applied to Mr. Vellius, in consequence (as he represents) of orders from his government for the assistance of the British naval force in the Tagus, with such additions as may be necessary for bringing away the Spanish ships of war in the harbour of Ferrol, and transferring them to Cadiz, in order to remove them out of the reach of the danger of a second occupation of Galicia by the French.

This application was received here the day before yesterday, and not a moment was lost in sending out directions to admiral Berkley, and to captain Hotham, who commands the squadron of his majesty's ships off Corunna, to afford every assistance in their power to the accomplishment of an object so important to both countries. Any additional means that may be necessary for equipping the ships will be furnished from hence, the moment that the extent of the wants of the Spanish arsenals is known.

The prudence of the precautions adopted by the Spanish government, in this instance, cannot be too much commended.

It is a satisfaction to his majesty to have been called upon to fulfil the obligation of the first ad-

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Mr. secretary
Canning to Mr.
J.H. Frere.
Foreign-office,
July 19, 1809.

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ditional article of the treaty, of January ; and he trusts that the promptness of the compliance on this occasion will encourage a similar resort to British assistance on any future emergency of the same nature.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

As was natural, this led to new demonstrations of attachment, particularly on the part of the intelligent officers attached to the Spanish government ; of whom the utility was no less evident in the communication of whatever of interest was advanced by the Spanish general-in-chief in relation to the circumstances and conjoint operations of the armies.

General O'Donoghue to lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B.
Navalmoral,
19th July,
1809.
12 o'clock, P.M.

This is evinced by a note of general O'Donoghue, in which he says, "I shall do myself the honour of showing to you to-morrow what general Cuesta has represented to government, in consequence of your well-grounded complaints of the people of the country being unable or unwilling to procure the necessary transports of the army under your command ;" and there are several of a similar tendency in the papers presented to parliament.

This approximation, with other circumstances which belong not to military affairs, seems to have

directed the views of the British cabinet, on the mission of the marquis Wellesley, to a more efficient prosecution of the campaign; and also to that necessary object of it, a chief command of the allied armies, of which the advantage had before been lost.

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On these subjects, addressing himself to the marquis Wellesley, Mr. Canning thus observes:—

Mr. secretary
Canning to the
marquis Wel-
lesley.
18th July,
1809.

Your excellency will, without exciting any expectation of any immediate reinforcement of the British army in the peninsula, endeavour to ascertain on what footing a British army would be received in the *interior* of Spain, and whether there would be any disposition *to confide the chief command of the Spanish forces to the commander-in-chief of a British auxiliary army?*

The accounts which have been received here of the dispersion of general Blake's corps, and of the consequent resignation of that officer; of the intended recal of the marquis de la Romana, and of the jealousy entertained by the junta with respect to the designs of general Cuesta, appear to leave *no officer* of great note, or possessing *much confidence, in the way* of such an arrangement.

But your excellency will understand that you

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are not to suggest, much less to solicit it; but merely to receive and transmit home, for his majesty's consideration, any solicitation or suggestion which you may receive from the Spanish government upon this subject."

So cautiously did his majesty's government feel it imperiously necessary to act, in an operation, which was the last that remained to attempt for the salvation of Europe.

These are the operations which led to the battle of Talavera, which, with all its relations and circumstances, form exclusively the subject of the ensuing chapter.

CHAP. VIII.

THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

Affair at the Spanish Outposts.—Arrangement of the British and Spanish Generals.—Unexpected Decampment of the French.—Situation of the British Army, as portrayed by its General, inferior in Respect to Provision to that under sir John Moore.—Details of the Spanish Generals in advance.—Communications and Opinions on the State of the British Army.—Memoir of sir Arthur Wellesley, and other Accounts of the Action.—Immediately subsequent Operations.—Comparative Remarks between the Situation of the British General and that of sir John Moore.

OF the battle of Talavera, so much praised and blamed, and of the complicated circumstances by which it was accompanied, it is not intended to

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form, in any respect, one regularly connected detail, but to place before the military reader; firstly, those communications between the British general and minister, with their own government and the allies, and those of the allied commanders; secondly, the public memoirs of the commander himself, of that striking affair; and, lastly, a view of those comments which arose out of the most material facts. In this arrangement will be included such new facts as the present writer was enabled to collect from the spot, and which he deemed of sufficient interest and importance for insertion.

That no action was ever more critical or peculiar than the battle of Talavera must be acknowledged by every one, in all its circumstances and relations.

Whoever has perused the facts of the preceding books will not weigh what was contemplated, or what was effected by the ordinary scale of military projects or results. It will be there seen how both the political management and the military operations of the war were cramped and disjointed by circumstances, over which no acumen of diplomatic skill, no judgment in the art of war, had control, but which form a new, and let it be said glorious, incident in the history, both of the one and the other.

The following details of the Spanish general, Cuesta, very naturally introduce the commencement of the action, in a letter to the war-minister of his government.

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Most excellent Sir, (says he, on the 22d,) this morning early the enemy appeared in force at our vanguard, posted in the village of Gamonal, apparently with the intention of attacking it, and commenced a brisk fire upon our outposts, which was kept up for a considerable time. Our troops advanced to support the vanguard, and charged the enemy with such spirit that he commenced his retreat with precipitancy, and they entered together into Talavera, our people pursuing them to the banks of Alberché, with considerable loss on their part; and some were killed and wounded on ours, the numbers of which I cannot yet state to your excellency. While the vanguard, under the command of brigadier-general Don Jose de Zaisy, was thus defeating and pursuing the enemy, the vanguard and English army, which last night quitted Oropez, arrived, and passing through Talavera, advanced as far as the Alberché, taking post on the left of the road, in which position they will remain to-night. One army, formed into columns, marched likewise through the town in the midst of the acclamations

General Cuesta
to M. de Cor-
nel.
Talavera de la
Reyna, 22d
July, 1809.

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General Cuesta
to M. de Cor-
nel.

of the inhabitants, and will pass the night on the road leading to the bridge of the Alberché, where the enemy have fortified themselves with some pieces of artillery. To-morrow we shall endeavour to dislodge them, if they do not decamp to-night.

On seeing the brilliant English army pass this morning, our troops were filled with valour and enthusiasm, and evince an ardent desire to attack, although they are overcome with fatigue.

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

On the following day he adds :—

Translation of a
letter from ge-
neral Cuesta to
M. de Cornel.
Talavera de la
Reyna, 23d
July, 1809.

I have spent this morning with general Wellesley, reconnoitring the position of the enemy, who has collected all his forces on the opposite shore of the river Alberché, determined to defend the passage. We are, however, resolved to attack him to-morrow, at day-break; and I have this evening detached my 5th division, with 300 horse, to the ford at Cardial, distant three leagues from the bridge, where they are to pass the river to-morrow at the dawn of day, and attack the enemy on his right flank, while the English and Spaniards pass at the different fords, and attack the whole in front. The enemy's position is rather strong, but is accessible; and the impossibility of

finding provisions for both armies here has determined us to make the attack.

I have just received advice, that an overflow of the Tagus has rendered the pontoon bridge at Almaraz useless for some days, and I have given orders that they shall replace it as soon as the waters descend. The arch of the stone bridge, which was blown up, is, from one pile to the other, 120 feet wide, which renders it impossible to lay planks across it, as your excellency proposes.

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

And, on the next day, the important day, as were to have been conceived, general Cuesta thus details :—

Most excellent sir,

This morning, when the allied armies approached the river Alberché, in order to attack the French, we were surprised to discover that they had decamped with all possible silence and promptness. We have pursued them by different routes during the whole morning, and with difficulty have our advanced parties been able to come up with them. It is now one, P.M. and I am just arrived at this village, (del Bravo,) which I find entirely deserted; and I have received notice, that

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Simplicity of engineering operations of the Spanish secretary-at-war.

Truján's bridge, at Alcantara.
(See ante, 292.)

Great simplicity of the Spanish general on the decampment of the French !
Translation of a letter from general Cuesta to M de Cornet. Head-quarters, del Bravo, 24th July, 1809

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Great simplicity
of the Spanish
generals.

a few hours ago there was still a French division in Santa Olalla, distant two leagues. We are uncertain which is the exact route they have taken, and whether it is to Toledo or to Madrid, as my troops passed the whole of last night under arms, and have marched five leagues to-day, I cannot advance more. The divisions and the vanguard are in Cabolla, and the reserve and a division of cavalry are with me. The English army is in Capolegas and St. Roman; and its vanguard and my outposts are at St. Olagu.

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

These simple details, however, give way to the more important and eloquent despatches of the British general, which had to commence a picture, unfortunately, in some respects, similar to those depicted by sir John Moore.

My lord,

Lieut.-general
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
viscount Castle-
reagh.
Talavera de la
Reyna, 24th
July, 1809.

According to the arrangements which I had settled with general Cuesta, the army broke up from Placentia on the 17th and 18th instant, and reached Oropesa on the 20th, where it formed a junction with the Spanish army under his command. Sir Robert Wilson had marched from the Vinta de Baragon, on the Tietar, with the Lusitanian Legion, a battalion of Portuguese Chas-

seurs, and two Spanish battalions, on the 15th; he arrived at Arenas on the 19th, and on the Alberché, at Escalona, on the 23d.

General Vanegas had also been directed to break up from Madrilegos on the 18th and 19th, and to march by Trenbleque and Orana, to Fuente Duenas, on the Tagus, where that river it crossed by a ford, and thence to Arganda, where he was to arrive on the 22d and 23d.

On the 22d, the combined armies moved from Oropesa, and the advanced guards attacked the enemy's outposts at Talavera. Their right was turned by the 1st Hussars and the 23d Light Dragoons, under general Anson, directed by lieutenant-general Payne, and by the division of infantry under the command of major-general Mackenzie; and they were driven in by the Spanish advanced guard, under the command of general Sargus and the Duc D'Albuquerque.

We lost eleven horses by the fire of the cannon from the enemy's position on the Alberché, and the Spaniards had some men wounded.

The columns were formed for the attack of this position yesterday; but the attack was postponed till this morning, by the desire of general Cuesta, when the different corps, destined for the attack, were put in motion; but the enemy had retired at about one o'clock in the morning to St. Olalla, and

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Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
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lesley to lord
Castlereagh.

thence towards Torrijos, I conclude, to form a junction with the corps under general Sebastiani.

I have not been able to follow the enemy as I could wish, on account of the great deficiency in the means of transports with this army, owing to my having found it impossible to procure even one mule or cart in Spain. I inclose the copy of a letter, which I thought it proper to address upon this subject to major-general O'Donoghue, the adjutant-general of the Spanish army, as soon as I found that this country would furnish no means of this description; and I have since informed general Cuesta that I should consider the removal of the enemy, from his position on the Alberché, as a complete performance on my part of the engagement into which I had entered with him in his camp on the 11th instant, as that operation, if advantage was duly taken of it, would give him the possession of the course of the Tagus, and would open his communication with La Mancha and with Vanegas.

Within these two days I have had still more reason for adhering to my determination to enter upon no new operation, but rather to halt, and even to return to Portugal, if I should not be supplied as I ought; as, notwithstanding that his majesty's troops have been engaged in very active operations, the success of which depended no less

upon their bravery and exertions than upon the example they should hold out, and the countenance they should give to the Spanish troops; they have been in actual want of provisions for the last two days; and even if I could have been willing, under such circumstances, to continue my co-operations with general Cuesta, I am unable to do so with any justice to my troops.

General Cuesta is, I believe, fully sensible of the propriety of my determination; and, I understand, that he has urged the central junta to adopt vigorous measures to have our wants supplied. It is certain that, at the present moment, the people of this part of Spain are either unwilling or unable to supply them, and in either case, and till I am supplied, I do not think it proper; and, indeed, I cannot continue my operations in Spain.

I ought probably to have stipulated, that I should be supplied with the necessary means of transports before the army entered Spain. I did require and adopt the measures necessary to procure those means, which I conceived would have answered, considering *the large supplies of the same kind which the army, under the command of the late sir John Moore, procured*; and as I could not engage to enter upon any operation in Spain, which should not be consistent with the defence of Portugal, I did not think it proper to make

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Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to lord
Castlereagh.

Ill effects of the
apparently un-
due regulations
of sir John
Moore.

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lesley to lord
Castlereagh.

any stipulations for the advantage of the troops, which stipulations, after all, did not appear to be necessary, in order to enable me to procure what I wanted.

I have great hopes, however, that, before long, I shall be supplied from Andalusia and La Mancha, with the means which I require, and I shall then resume the active operations which I have been compelled to relinquish.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Nothing can be more interesting than to add to the preceding document of the British general to his government at home, that addressed to the minister abroad :—

My dear sir,

Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley to Mr.
Frere.
Talavera, 24th
July, 1809.

I conclude that general Cuesta apprised the government of the success of the first operation of the combined armies. We intended to attack the enemy this morning at day-light, in his position on the Alberché, and all the arrangements were made, and the columns formed for that purpose; but the enemy retired towards Santa Olalla in the course of last night. General Cuesta has since marched towards Cebolla, and I do not know whether he intends to halt there, or what are to

be his future operations. I have been obliged to intimate to him, since my arrival here, that I should consider that I had performed the engagement which I had made to him, as soon as I should have removed the enemy from the Alberché, and should thereby have given him possession of the course of the Tagus, and should have laid open to him the communication with La Mancha, and with general Vanegas's corps; and that I could attempt no farther operations till I should be made certain of my supplies, by being furnished with proper means of transports, and the requisite provisions from the country. This intimation has become still more necessary within the last two days, in which I am concerned to say, that, although my troops have been in forced marches, engaged in operations with the enemy, the success of which, I must say, depended upon them, they have had nothing to eat, while the Spanish army had plenty, notwithstanding that I have returns of engagements made by the Alcaldes of villages, or the Vua de Placentia, to furnish this army before the 29th of this month, with 250,000 rations.

I certainly lament the necessity which obliges me to halt at present, and will oblige me to withdraw from Spain, if it should continue. There is no man who does not acknowledge, even general Cuesta himself acknowledges, the propriety of my

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conduct, in halting now or in withdrawing eventually; and I can only say that I have never seen one so ill treated in any country, or, considering that all depends upon its operations, one which deserved good treatment so much. It is ridiculous to pretend, that the country cannot supply our wants. The French army is well fed, the horses of the cavalry in excellent condition, and the soldiers who are taken in good health, and well supplied with bread, of which indeed they left a small magazine behind them. This is a rich country in corn, in comparison with Portugal; and yet, during the whole of my operations in that country, we never wanted bread, but in one day on the frontiers of Galicia. In the *Vua de Placentia*, there are means to supply this army for four months, as I am informed, and yet the *Alcaldes* have not performed their engagements with me. The Spanish army has plenty of every thing; and we alone, upon whom every thing depends, are really starving. I am aware of the important consequences which will attend the step I shall take in withdrawing from Spain. It is certain that the people of England will never hear of another army entering Spain, after they will have received the accounts of the treatment we have met with; and it is equally certain that, without the assistance, the example, and the countenance of a British

army, the Spanish armies, however brave, will never effect their object. But no man can see his army perish by want, without feeling for them; and most particularly must he feel for them, when he knows that they have been brought into the country in which this want is felt by his own acts, and on his own responsibility, and not by orders from any superior authority.

I shall be obliged to you if you will make known to the government my sentiments upon this subject. I have reason to believe that the enemy are in full march towards Madrid: they had their rear guard in St. Olalla this day, and I have just heard that general Cuesta was marching to that place instead of to Ceballo. I am only afraid that he will get himself into a scrape; any movement by me to his assistance is quite out of the question.

I advised him to secure his communications with Vanegas, and the course of the Tagus, while measures should be taken to supply the British army with means of transports. If the enemy should observe that we are not with him, he will be beat or must retire; and, in either case, he may lose all the advantages which might have been derived by our joint operations, and much valuable time, by his eager desire to enter Madrid on an early day. The enemy will make this discovery

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lesley to Mr.
Frere.

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this day, if Cuesta should make any attempt upon the rear guard at Santa Olalla.

Believe me, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Series of Cu-
esta's details.

On the topic of the advances toward a general battle. General Cuesta's details thus continue :—

Most excellent sir,

Translation of a
letter from ge-
neral Cuesta to
M. Cornet.
St. Olalla, 25th
July, 1809.

After I had announced to you yesterday evening my arrival in El Bravo, I continued my march to St. Olalla with the reserve, and the divisions of cavalry, and found already there the 1st and 2d of infantry, and the vanguard. The enemy was in Alcabon, distant one league, and in Torrigos, distant two; but, in the course of the night, he decamped towards Toledo, having previously pillaged both these villages. My light parties, who never lose sight of them, avail themselves of their carelessness and fatigue, to annoy them. My troops having yesterday marched seven leagues; after passing the whole day and night under arms, obliges me to remain here until the evening; and also to give the English army, which is in Casalejas and St. Romana, and very short of provisions and means of conveyance, time to come up with me.

The enemy exclaim, that they are going to await us in the plains of Toledo; but I neither believe nor expect it. I know nothing of Madrid, nor of general Vanegas, who, if he has followed my instructions, will throw fresh embarrassments in the way of the enemy's flight. I am assured there are scarcely any troops in Toledo; nor have I any news of Sebastiani, who, I imagine, will join with Victor, and continue their retreat by Aranjuez.

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

To this succeeds the following detail, on the same day:—

Most excellent sir,

I this morning announced to your excellency my arrival at St. Olalla, with part of the troops under my command, and that I proposed to give them a little rest, in order to continue my pursuit of the enemy; but I have since learnt that the two armies of Victor, and Sebastiani, are assembling in the neighbourhood of Toledo; that Joseph Napoleon left Madrid three days ago, with 10,000 men, for Casalegas; but that, on leaving the retreat of general Victor, he turned from Navalcarnero, towards Toledo, and arrived to-day at Bergas, a village two leagues distant from that

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Translation of a
letter from ge-
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Translation of a
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city. Our outposts announce from Torrijos, that, this evening, about 400 horse were approaching that town, and that they proposed to resist them, in order to secure that point.

General Wellesley, who, as I have already stated to your excellency, remains on the banks of the Alberché, tells me that the scarcity of bread, and means of conveyance, prevented him from joining me so soon as he wished, but that he was making all possible efforts to effect it.

In consideration of all these circumstances, I find myself obliged to act with more circumspection, and not to move from this until the arrival of the English army; as, according to the most authentic advices I receive, the enemy will collect about 48,000, and they propose to resist and attack us; it would not, therefore, be right that they should find us separated. If, therefore, my suspicions, that they will endeavour to attack me, should be confirmed, previous to the arrival of the English, I shall think it better to retire and join them, than to await the enemy with my force alone.

In order, however, to avoid this retreat, I am doing all in my power to persuade the English of the necessity of their putting themselves in motion.

GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

Of his out posts having been driven in, his vanguard being engaged, and his change of position towards the English army, is the following account :

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Most excellent sir,

I last night advised your excellency of my fears of being attacked in St. Olalla, the enemy knowing that I was at five leagues distance from the English army. In effect, I this morning received notice from the commandant of the vanguard of the enemy, to the number of 5,000 horse, and some columns of infantry, having entered Torrigos, driving in our out-posts, and that he was marching to meet them with the whole vanguard, but that he required a reinforcement. I immediately ordered the duke of Albuquerque to reinforce him with his division, of upwards of 3,000 horse; but on his arrival, the vanguard was already losing ground, having sustained a considerable shock, in which we lost an officer of Calatrava, and brigadier-general the baron de Armendaris, colonel of the dragoons of Villaviciosa, besides some men, the number of which I do not yet know. Our artillery did great havock among the enemy. As soon as the duke of Albuquerque arrived, he not only checked the enemy, but, on the first charge, he put them to flight, retreating afterwards in good

Translation of a
letter from gen.
Cuesta to M. de
Cornel.
Camp, on the
Alberché, July
26th, 1809.

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General Cuesta
to M. de Cor-
nel.

order with the vanguard of brigadier-general Zayas, according to the instructions which I had given them. While this was passing at the vanguard I arranged the retreat of the army to this left bank of the Alberché, in order to join the English, who are on the opposite side with their vanguard, in Casalejas, and in this position, with little variation, I shall wait till the allied army be provided with every thing necessary to enable us to advance together, as we have settled. I have great doubt of the enemy's coming here to attack us; the more so, if the report be true, of their having detached 15,000 men towards Madrid, repenting of having left that point so much uncovered.

(Signed) : GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

General Cuesta's details thus proceed toward the completion of the affair.

Sir,

Translation of a
letter from gen.
Cuesta to M. de
Cornel.
Talavera, July
28th, 1809.

The night before last I informed your excellency, from the left bank of the Alberché, of my apprehensions of being attacked by the force which the enemy had collected in Toledo, if I remained separated from the English.

This consideration made me repass the river yesterday morning, and take up the position agreed upon, with general Wellesley, both armies forming

one line in front of Talavera, taking advantage of the palisades, and other advantages of the ground.

We had scarcely formed our line in this position, when, at five yesterday evening, the enemy presented themselves, as we judge, from 35 to 40,000 strong, of which 5,000 were cavalry, and immediately attacked our line with the greatest obstinacy, directing their principal force against the left, which is occupied by the English, striving to turn their left wing.

The attack and defence were equally obstinate; so much so as to come to the bayonet; but at length the enemy were twice repulsed, with great loss in killed and wounded: the action having lasted till half past eight in the evening: the English have likewise suffered, particularly in officers.

Our loss has not been considerable; and, generally speaking, our troops behaved with gallantry and firmness, except three or four corps, which committed some faults, and of which I shall speak more at leisure.

This morning, very early, the enemy renewed their attack, which still continues, at seven in the evening; but they have been constantly repulsed, and I hope they will continue to be so. Joseph Napoleon was present till this evening, when we know that he retired with his guard, towards Santa

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nel.

Olalla, and that 98 waggons of wounded passed the Alberché with him.

I have no room to enter into further particulars, having been for three days in the field of battle with all my troops under arms, in total want of food and resources, as the commissaries and their dependents, in this branch, absented themselves from both armies as soon as they heard the first fire.

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

The Spanish general thus concludes his account of the battle.

Most excellent sir,

Translation of a
letter from gen.
Cuesta to M. de
Cornel.
Talavera, July
29th, 1809.

Yesterday, in the evening, at 7 o'clock, I informed your excellency, from the field of battle, that the attacks of the enemy and our defence were continued with obstinacy. Hostilities ceased as soon as it grew dark, but the enemy did not leave their positions till a little before day-break, when they began their retreat, and they have repassed the Alberché, in the direction of Casulejus and Santa Olalla, having already abandoned all hopes of being able to rout or even move us from our position.

They have left the ground which they occupied

strewed with dead bodies and wounded, which they had neither time nor means to remove. They have suffered a terrible loss, which would have been still greater, if fatigue and want of provisions had not incapacitated our troops from pursuing them. The English have likewise suffered much, through the loss of three generals, many subalterns, and some soldiers; but they cannot be denied the praise of having fought with much valour and discipline, and having convinced the French that they will not give way to them in any engagement, especially if led and commanded by their judicious, active, and valiant general, sir Arthur Wellesley.

The Spanish troops, particularly those corps which had most opportunity, left me nothing to wish for from their valour and intrepidity.

The terrible and well-supported fire of our infantry, frustrated the repeated attacks of the enemy, and the assault of our cavalry caused much havoc among them.

The regiment of the King, in particular, has covered itself with glory, and has, together with the English, taken from them some cannon, and made prisoners a general, a colonel, and several officers. Although I reserve to myself to speak of the rest, in order to point out those who have distinguished themselves and deserve to be rewarded, I request, immediately, that the colonel of this re-

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giment, namely, the brigadier don Josef Mariade Lestres, may be promoted to the rank of major-general, for having proceeded to the attack at the head of his regiment, thereby setting the best example.

From the information of prisoners, we know that the attack of yesterday morning was made in part by the whole of Joseph Napoleon's guard, in which he founded all his hopes, but the moment he saw it driven back and routed, he betook himself to flight towards Santa Olalla.

I have just learned that his army, full of consternation, directs its march towards Toledo, without any provision or means of subsisting.

Finally, for want of time I can only add, that this has been the most glorious and important battle of the whole war, and which I hope will open to us the road of the Ebra, the moment we shall be in possession of what is most necessary for victualling the troops.

God preserve your excellency many years,

(Signed) GREG. DE LA CUESTA.

Head-quarters, camp of Talavera, July 29th, 1809,

At ten in the morning.

Of this latter despatch it is neither necessary nor is it the time to say any thing here.

The whole have been given in succession as a

good prelude to the memoir of the British commander-in-chief, :—an arrangement which certainly forms no bad compliment to the army of the allies.

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Something farther, however, will be requisite, previously to the insertion of that memoir, to the illustration of the actual state of the British army.

By the following letter of the brave and intelligent general Mackenzie, of whom more *reliques* were to have been desired, sir Robert Wilson's corps again attracts attention in the provisions for its safety.

Dear sir Robert,

The French have united their forces, (said to be 45,000 men) and are advancing on Cuesta, who is retiring behind the Alberché. I have been called even here to join general Sherbrooke, and am directed by him to say, that the divisions of the British army here will also fall back to join the rest of the army behind the Alberché, so that you will make such movement as may correspond with this ; and ensure the safety of your detachment. Every thing promises a general action soon.

J.R. Mackenzie
to sir R. Wilson.
Casalegas, July
26th, 1809, half
past 11 o'clock.
A. M.

Always most faithfully yours,

J. R. MACKENZIE.*

* In this action, sincerely regreted, the writer fell.

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The safety of the whole British army, also, appears to have been equally involved, for, at this critical moment, the British minister was compelled thus anxiously to write to the Spanish secretary-of-state on its account.

Sir,

Mr. Frere to
M. de Garay.
Seville, July
27th, 1809.

I have received to-day a letter from general Wellesley, dated the 24th, in which he tells me that his army had then been absolutely without food for two days. This circumstance appears the more unaccountable, as the Spanish army was supplied with every thing, and the French prisoners which had been taken were well fed, and in good health, and even their horses in good condition. As a necessary consequence of this state of things, general Wellesley informs me, that he was obliged to desist from the pursuit of the French army, already retreating, and, of course, in the most disadvantageous situation. He likewise tells me that he is much afraid he will be obliged entirely to quit Spain, if the necessary means, not only for its future advance, but also for his subsistence in the position which he now occupies, continue to fail him.

This state of abandonment is the more sensible to him in a country comparatively rich, and abounding in the articles necessary for the sub-

sistence of an army, when contrasted with the treatment which this same army met with in Portugal,—a country, in itself, much less abundant; besides that, it has been ruined by the continued exactions of the French. The want of means was, however, made up for by good-will; and in all the rapid and almost unforeseen marches of the English army, during its short campaign in Portugal, there was only one day on which it had to complain of a want of the necessary means of subsistence.

It is impossible for a foreigner, nor would it perhaps be easy for a Spaniard, to point out positively the cause of the evil; but a simple relation of the facts will suffice, in order to prove the existence of a great responsibility with regard to the Spanish nation, and, indeed, to all Europe.

Neither shall I attempt to point out the remedy which it would be proper to apply. Experience has shewn me, that the most decisive and positive orders may be given, even when dictated with the best intentions, without the effects resulting from them which one had a right to expect. But I must observe, that when the common interests of two governments are at stake, they both of them become responsible for the exaction of the orders which they give, and for an exact obedience on the part of their respective subjects; and that, although

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Mr. Frere to
M. de Garay.

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M. de Garay.

the transmitting of papers and despatches may serve in exculpation of the individuals who are charged with them, the one government is still responsible towards the other, for the consequences which shall result from them, it being, in fact, with respect to foreign powers, the only representative acknowledged by the nation, and speaking in the name of the people, whose obedience is taken for granted.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. H. FRERE.

This appeal was immediately referred to the junta by its secretary.

Most excellent sirs,

M. de Garay
to the junta of
Badajos.
Seville, July
27th, 1809.

The supreme ruling junta of the kingdom having learnt that various juntas of the district of Placentia have received orders from the commissary appointed to supply the English army, to procure them provisions, and the means of conveyance; which orders they have not fulfilled, notwithstanding the preservation of the country depended on their fulfilment, since the armies are prevented from executing their marches with that precision which would enable them to come up with, and route, the enemy. In order that these troops may, for the future, be supplied with all the articles

in which they stand in need. His majesty has been pleased to determine, that your excellencies shall immediately despatch two members of your body, first, to secure the persons of those whose ill-will has occasioned the want experienced by the English army; and, secondly, that, residing in that district, they shall place, at the disposal of the commissary, all the wine, meat, and bread, flour, and other provisions, which may be necessary; as also the means of conveyance they may require. Your excellencies are to be careful that these commissioners be persons capable of performing this important service with that energy and activity so necessary at this moment; and his majesty will most particularly attend to the merit they will acquire by this commission, and to the exact execution of the most important service which can be performed for the country. By his majesty's command, I make this resolution known to your excellencies, requesting you will inform me of the persons you shall appoint for the execution of this commission.

(Signed) MARTIN DE GARAY.

P. S. All the carts, waggons, and other objects, required by the army that can be collected, should likewise be sent to it.

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M. de Garay
to the junta of
Badajos.

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In consequence of the preceding appeal, the following orders were immediately sent to the Spanish general.

M. de Cornel
to gen. Cuesta.
Seville, July
27th, 1809.

Most excellent sir,

In a note of this day's date, which I have received from don M. de Garay, he states, "that in consequence of the magistrates in the district of Placentia having neglected the orders which had been issued to them, to supply provisions and means of conveyance to the army of our allies, these troops are in a state of want, very prejudicial to the salvation of the country, and particularly, as it obstructs the movements and rapidity of the march of the combined armies. It is the desire of the junta, that the English troops should be supplied, in preference to our own, with all kinds of provisions, and with means of conveyance, so that they shall not be in want even of the smallest article. It has, therefore, been resolved, that general Cuesta shall summons the commissary appointed to attend the allied armies, and express to him, that as every possible assistance of this kind, of which it may stand in need, ought to be provided for it, the government will hold him responsible for any want it may experience: and general Cuesta, considering the honour of the nation and the interest of the public cause, will take the proper

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M. de Cornel
to gen. Cuesta.

steps to announce to the army of our allies, during its stay in Spain, such treatment as is due to its valour, its generosity, and the importance of the assistance it affords us. For this purpose he will adopt such measures of rigour as he shall find necessary towards the corregidors and magistrates who are wanting in the smallest matter, in this most important business; and the junta relies on the zeal and wisdom of that officer for the supply of our allies, particularly in those parts where the enemy was enabled to procure them. By his majesty's commands, I communicate this to your excellency, (as I have likewise done to the junta of Badajos,) that you may make it known to general Cuesta, without the least delay, of the non-execution of these orders."

I transmit this to your excellency, that you may adopt the necessary measures for its exact fulfilment.

(Signed) CORNEL.

While orders were forwarded, through general Cuesta, to remedy the evil, the following communication was made directly to the British general:

Most excellent sir,

Mr. Frere, his majesty's minister, hath just past a note to the supreme junta, in which he

M. de Garay to
sir A. Wellesley.
Seville, July
27th, 1809;

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M. de Garay
to sir Arthur
Wellesley.

states, that for want of provisions and transports, the auxiliary army delays its march, and leaves general Cuesta to follow the enemy alone. A piece of news so unexpected has surprised (as might be supposed) his majesty ; the more so, as it is the first account which has reached him of the English army being in want of the necessary articles for active operations.

He knew, indeed, that the means of transport were not abundant, and instantly commanded various parties of soldiers to procure what were to be had, who, if they have not done it already, will very soon conduct them to the English troops. The same would have been done with respect to the other articles, had it been known in time, and it is felt, certainly, very sensibly, that the first notice of these particulars should be accompanied by the extraordinary resolution announced by Mr. Frere, which, if it is adhered to, will, doubtless, destroy the combined plans which have begun so happily to be carried into effect.

Your excellency's penetration will easily see, that if the French, knowing the separation of the two armies, should fall upon ours and beat it, the loss which such a defeat would cause could never be repaired.

On the other hand, what would be the effect of such a separation in the eyes of Spain, of England,

and of Europe? The supreme junta conjures your excellency, for the common good of all the allies, for the honour of the two nations, and for your own glory, not to persevere in so prejudicial a resolution:—your excellency's troops shall want for nothing;—this very day the most peremptory orders are repeated, and the strongest measures are taken for that effect, with the intention that our own soldiers shall rather want necessaries than the English soldier any one of the articles to which he has been accustomed.

The junta hopes, that this difficulty being removed, your excellency will follow the path of glory opened to you, and that, shewing it to our troops as well as to your own, you will not rest till, by the common efforts of both, the French are driven beyond the Pyrenees.

I communicate this to your excellency by order of the junta, and am happy in this opportunity, &c.

(Signed) MARTIN DE GARAY.

A similar communication was made to the British minister.

Sir,

Having communicated to the secretary-of-state for the war-department, (in order that he

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M. de Garay
to sir Arthur
Wellesley.

M. de Garay to
Mr. Frere.
Seville, July 29,
1809.

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M. de Garay
to Mr Frere.

might adopt the measures necessary in consequence,) the note which you addressed to me on the 27th instant, making known to me the complaints of general Wellesley, on the wants he experienced of the most necessary articles, for the maintenance of his army, that minister has replied to me in the following terms:—

“I return your excellency the note from the English minister, which you transmitted to me yesterday, and have to state to your excellency, that, in consequence of general Don Greg. de la Cuesta's having sent, under date of the 17th inst. the copy of a letter from sir Arthur Wellesley, in which he mentions his being without means of conveyance for his provisions, ammunition, and hospital-stores, it was immediately arranged, that four cavalry officers should set out from this city, with orders to collect in all directions, and send to the army, two-thirds of the horses they found in the villages beyond Santa Olalla, loading them with barley, which article was wanting in the army; the commissary-general of the army was desired, at the same time, to collect a third part of the carts at present in this city, for the same purpose, and in the villages between this and Santa Olalla; and an order was, in like manner, transmitted to Don Francisco de Saavedea, relative to provisions, who has adopted the most active mea-

tures to supply any want in this branch, as he has informed me in a note of the 21st inst. By last night's messenger an order, of which the inclosed is a copy, was transmitted to general Cuesta, relative to the means of supplying the English army with provisions; and, in consequence of the note of his British majesty's minister, the necessary instructions have been given both to that general and to Don Francisco Vanegas, relative to the future operations of our troops, in case the march of the English army should be suspended.

At the same time that I thus transmit this letter to you, sir, I have also the honour to inclose the royal order, above-mentioned, and avail myself of the opportunity to renew the assurances, &c.

(Signed) MARTIN DE GARAY.

P. S. I transmit also a copy of the note, which I have addressed to the junta of Badajos, for your information, and for that of your government.—G.

Such were the circumstances on the part of the British army, which preceded the memoir of its general on the battle of Talavera.

Still, previously to the insertion of that document, there are some observations on the preceding operations, which, in the view of the

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present writer, are no less useful to the future general than interesting, in a certain degree, to the public. They are contrasted with those of the same respectable journalist, which accompanied the despatch of sir Arthur Wellesley to lord viscount Castlereagh.

Despatch from
sir Arthur Wel-
lesley.

The first despatch from our commander, (says the remarks,) is dated the 15th of last month, and begins by describing the operations of a Spanish corps, with which we were not then acting, but which appears to have been very properly directed. After this, we are made acquainted with the relative force and positions of the armies of Victor and Cuesta; and here we shall ask, whence it is that the numerical force of the French and Spanish armies are thus given and placed close to each other, the former said to consist of 35 and the latter of 38,000 men, whilst no notice is taken of the aggregate amount of the British troops? Of the motives which have led to this, we know nothing. Sir Arthur is, unquestionably, too honourable a man to have acted from insidious ones; but the consequence resulting from such a statement is, that a charge will be insinuated against Cuesta for not attacking an inferior enemy: whereas the British force was equal in numbers to that of the Spaniards, and still that army was not either now, or at any subsequent period, attacked

by the British general more than by the Spanish. Our troops in Spain have never been estimated, even by those whose object it was to diminish their number, at less than 26,000 men: they probably amount to 30,000; and of these, so far as we can gather from sir Arthur's first letter, he had the whole with him on the 16th, except general Craufurd's brigade. The troops from the Tagus had arrived on the 10th; the 23d light dragoons and the 48th on the 14th; and the 61st on the 16th: and, when it shall be observed, that though that Spanish army had been ostentatiously displayed as amounting to 38,000 men, (whereof 7000 were cavalry,) yet that it afterwards creeps out that general Cuesta had only 24,000 men in the camp with him, we think the inference most undeniable, that he had not a greater body of troops than sir Arthur himself: and we do not say this with the view of imputing blame to either general for not attacking the enemy singly; on the contrary, we are of opinion, that, as the attack was likely to be more effectual after their junction, it was better to wait for that event. Yet we may be excused for endeavouring to guard the public against a too obvious inference, by shewing that general Cuesta, with his nominal 38,000 men, did, in abstaining from the attack of Victor, only adopt

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sir Arthur Wel-
lesley.

that line of conduct which was sanctioned by the practice of the British officer; and that, therefore, if one is faulty both are so.

We come now to the second of sir Arthur's letters, dated July 24th; and this does, indeed, relate what is perhaps, in the history of wars, not a very singular, but yet to us a most provoking, occurrence—the escape of the French marshal from the united troops and wits of the British and Spanish generals. An immense concentration of force having taken place on their part, not only by the junction of the two principal armies, but likewise by the accession of a Portuguese corps under the indefatigable and brave sir Robert Wilson, and of a Spanish one commanded by the cautious Vanegas, the advanced posts of the enemy were actually driven in on the 22d. On the 23d the columns were again formed for the attack: when the engagement is suspended: and why? Because Cuesta refused to fight? By no means: Sir Arthur Wellesley does not say this: what he says is in effect, that it was postponed through his own compliance with the desire of Cuesta, that it should be postponed till the next day: but, in the mean time, Victor having no desire to wait their leisure, thought proper to decamp in the night. This, therefore, is the plain

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lesley.

statement of the case, (and it matters not with which of the generals the motion for postponement originated,) that they were both outwitted by the Frenchman: for, if the penetration of sir Arthur had at all dived into the probable motions of Victor, let us look in what situation he will then stand, even according to his own account: he will have complied with the desire of his fellow-commander, to let their joint enemy escape; and none but a base mind can suppose a gallant British officer capable of so base an act. But, that neither of the generals had the least notion of the enemy's intention is obvious from what follows: for they both unsuspectingly drew up "the troops destined for the attack on the next morning;" when, oh! most ludicrously lamentable! We can conceive how Victor would laugh at the idea of that vacant, who-would-have-thought-it kind of stare, which they would naturally give each other, on finding the birds flown. And here we see the consequence: we have no doubt that each accuses the other, to his own government, of originating the procrastination of the engagement; though, as to any merit which either of them may derive from disproving his title to the first suggestion of delay, we do not think that the possessor of that merit is thereby

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entitled to the preference, by one snap of a finger.

Of the reasons which Cuesta gave, for making this imputed request, that the action might be postponed till next day, we know nothing from sir Arthur's letters. His friends in England, well-judging ones they must be! have said, that the 23d being a Sunday, the Spaniard did not like to fight on that day. Now, if any thing could tend to render their patron more ridiculous than another, it must surely be the propagation of such a report as this; according to which, if it were true, he would not only have granted the most prejudicial request of his joint commander; but a request, too, for making which no rational motive whatever, none but the most absurd and foolish in nature, was assigned. So that if sir Arthur means to admit his indulgence of Cuesta's desire, he will, we apprehend, at least prove it to have sprung from principles, or even prejudices, more rational than this with which we are here presented.

The conclusion of the whole is, that Victor has fallen back, and formed a junction with Sebastiani; and that the concurrence of the British force in the farther pursuit is now more than ever doubtful: indeed, we cannot but shudder at the probable result of the advance of our troops

into the heart of Spain under the existing circumstances ; for, exclusive of the difficulties of conveyance, and the want of proper supplies, both complained of in the last despatches, there is evidently disunion between the chief commanders of the two nations, both of whom are likewise as clearly opposed by generals of pre-eminent dexterity and address ; and, under these disadvantages, we know not whether British valour, and Spanish enthusiasm, if enthusiasm still exist in the peninsula, may not both be doomed to spend their force in vain.

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sir Arthur Wel-
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The mind, however, will revert (says the observations of the London Gazette Extraordinary) with pleasure to the perusal and contemplation of achievements so honourable to our countrymen and so beneficial to our allies. We shall, therefore, recal to observation the transactions which we have before enumerated, placing, if possible, in a clearer light, the occurrences we have before described, and adding fresh lustre to the heroism which we almost adore.

The enemy having returned with the number, as we specified, of almost 50,000 men, under the command of three of their most celebrated officers, and under the eye of Joseph Buonaparte himself, drove back general Cuesta's advanced guard on

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the 26th, and, from that moment, every thing indicated the approach of a general engagement. The great body of the Spanish army was stationed on the right, at once secure, and confined by their position; but a part of their infantry defended the road from the bridge of Alberché, and occupied the town of Talavera, which was never forced. Ours was the post of chief difficulty and danger. Our left was commanded by an eminence, of which general Hill understood the value too well not to maintain it against the repeated and almost incessant attacks of a superior force; and on our right, between ours and the Spanish army, there was a redoubt in an unfinished state, whereon brigadier-general Campbell was stationed. The whole intervening line extended about two miles.

After the advanced guard of general Mackenzie was withdrawn, not without considerable loss, but with the display of great bravery and conduct, the first attack was made by the French cavalry upon the Spanish infantry, which we before stated to have been stationed upon the road from the Alberché. This attack, sir Arthur Wellesley says, completely failed: or, in other words, the Spanish foot beat back the French horse. Their horse and foot were every where beaten by the English. General Hill drove them from the

height on the left; but their repeated attempts to gain this position, rendered it necessary for the commander-in-chief to strengthen it, by an accession of Spanish force, namely, Albuquerque's cavalry. Next followed their general attack upon our whole line, which was chiefly met and frustrated by the charge of the British bayonet. General Sherbrooke's division was upon our left and centre; and general Campbell, as we before stated, upon our right. The brigade of guards upon his left, having unluckily pursued the enemy too far, was exposed to a dreadful fire from the hostile columns retreating; and likewise from a battery; and here it was that sir Arthur evinced the talents of a real general, by foreseeing their difficulty, and ordering general Cotton's brigade of cavalry to cover their retreat. Major-general Campbell most successfully repulsed the enemy from the redoubt on the right, being supported by Spanish cavalry, and two battalions of Spanish infantry. This is the general description, and we hope no unintelligible one, of the battle. But while we are endeavouring to assign to each their proper honour, we must not overlook the brave Germans in our pay, whom we have not hitherto mentioned, on account of their forming a component part of the British army. The 1st German Light Dragoons took a conspicuous part in the charge and

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repulse of the hostile force which was intended to seize the eminence occupied by general Hill; and the whole body of them appear with honour in various other parts of the engagement.

Of the battle itself, we can say no more than we have done already; it is an affair that reflects transcendent glory, not only upon the heroes who were engaged in it, but upon the country which sent them forth; and they greatly, and we believe, too, intentionally err, who suppose, that either on this or on any other occasion, where he deserves it, we are disposed to withhold our tribute of applause from the commander-in-chief.

Despatches, of which the following are copies and extracts, received at the office of the lord viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, from lieutenant-general the right honourable sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B.

Talavera de la
Reyna.
July 29, 1809.

My lord,—General Cuesta followed the enemy's march with his army from the Alberché, on the morning of the 24th, as far as Santa Olalla, and pushed forward his advanced guard as far as Torrijos.

For the reasons stated to your lordship in my despatch of the 24th, I moved only two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry across the

Alberché to Caselegos, under the command of lieutenant-general Sherbrooke, with a view to keep up the communication between general Cuesta and me, and with sir R. Wilson's corps at Escalona.

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lesley to lord
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It appears that general Vanegas had not carried into execution that part of the plan of operations which related to his corps, and that he was still at Damiel, in La Mancha; and the enemy, in the course of the 24th, 25th, and 26th, collected all his forces in this part of Spain, between Torrijos and Toledo, leaving but a small corps of 2,000 men in that place.

His united army thus consisted,—of the corps of marshal Victor, of that of general Sebastiani, and of 7 or 8,000 men, the guards of Joseph Buonaparte, and the garrison of Madrid, and it was commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, aided by marshals Jourdan and Victor, and general Sebastiani.

On the 26th, general Cuesta's advanced guard was attacked near Torrijos, and obliged to fall back, and the general retired with his army on that day to the left bank of the Alberché, general Sherbrook continuing at Caselegos, and the enemy at Santa Olalla.

It was then obvious that the enemy intended to try the result of a general action, for which the

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best position appeared to be in the neighbourhood of Talavera; and general Cuesta having consented to take up this position on the morning of the 27th, I ordered general Sherbrooke to retire with his corps to its station in the line, leaving general Mackenzie, with a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, as an advanced post in the wood, on the right of Alberché, which covered our left flank.

The position taken up by the troops at Talavera extended rather more than two miles; the ground was open upon the left, where the British army was stationed, and it was commanded by a height on which was in echelon, and in second line, a division of infantry, under the orders of major-general Hill.

There was a valley between this height and a range of mountains still further upon the left, which valley was not at first occupied, as it was commanded by the height before-mentioned; and the range of mountains appeared too distant to have any influence upon the expected action.

The right, consisting of Spanish troops, extended immediately in front of the town of Talavera down to the Tagus. This part of the ground was covered by olive trees, and much intersected by banks and ditches. The high road, leading from the bridge over the Alberché, was defended by a

heavy battery in front of a church, which was occupied by Spanish infantry. All the avenues to the town were defended in a similar manner; the town was occupied, and the remainder of the Spanish infantry was formed in two lines behind the banks on the roads which led from the town, and the right, to the left of our position.

In the centre, between the two armies, there was a commanding spot of ground, on which we had commenced to construct a redoubt, with some open ground in its rear.

Brigadier-general Alexander Campbell was posted at this spot with a division of infantry, supported in his rear by general Cotton's brigade of dragoons, and some Spanish cavalry.

At about two o'clock on the 27th, the enemy appeared in strength on the left bank of the Alberché, and manifested an intention to attack general Mackenzie's division.

The attack was made before they could be withdrawn; but the troops, consisting of general Mackenzie's and colonel Donkin's brigades, and general Anson's brigade of cavalry, and supported by general Payne, with the other four regiments of cavalry, in the plain, between Talavera and the wood, withdrew in good order, but with some loss, particularly by the 2d battalion 87th regiment, and 2d battalion 31st regiment, in the wood.

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On this occasion the steadiness and discipline of the 45th regiment, and of the 5th battalion 60th regiment, were conspicuous ; and I had particular reason for being satisfied with the manner in which major-general Mackenzie withdrew his advanced guard.

As the day advanced, the enemy appeared in larger numbers on the right of the Alberché, and it was obvious that he was advancing to a general attack upon the combined army.

General Mackenzie continued to fall back gradually upon the left of the position of the combined armies, where he was placed in the second line, in the rear of the guards, colonel Donkin being placed in the same situation further upon the left, in the rear of the King's German Legion.

The enemy immediately commenced his attack in the dusk of the evening, by a cannonade upon the left of our position, and by an attempt with his cavalry to overthrow the Spanish infantry, posted, as I before stated, on the right. This attempt failed entirely.

Early in the night, he pushed a division along the valley, on the left of the height occupied by general Hill, of which he gained a momentary possession ; but major-general Hill attacked it instantly with the bayonet, and regained it.

This attack was repeated in the night, but failed, and again at day-light in the morning of the 28th, by two divisions of infantry, and was repulsed by major-general Hill.

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Major-general Hill has reported to me in a particular manner the conduct of the 29th regiment, and of the 1st battalion 48th regiment, in these different affairs, as well as that of major-general Tilson, and brigadier-general Richard Stewart.

We have lost many brave officers and soldiers in the defence of this important point in our position; among others, I cannot avoid to mention brigade-major Fordyce and brigade-major Gardner; and major-general Hill was himself wounded, but I am happy to say, but slightly.

The defeat of this attempt was followed, about noon, by a general attack with the enemy's whole force, upon the whole of that part of the position occupied by the British army.

In consequence of the repeated attempts upon the heights on our left by the valley, I had placed two brigades of British cavalry in that valley, supported in the rear by the Duc d'Albuquerque's division of Spanish cavalry.

The enemy then placed light infantry in the range of mountains on the left of the valley, which were opposed by a division of Spanish infantry under lieutenant-general De Bassecourt.

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The general attack began by the march of several columns of infantry into the valley, with a view to attack the height occupied by major-general Hill. These columns were immediately charged by the 1st German light dragoons and 23d dragoons, under the command of general Anson, directed by lieutenant-general Payne, and supported by gen. Fane's brigade of heavy cavalry; and although the 23d dragoons suffered considerable loss, the charge had the effect of preventing the execution of that part of the enemy's plan.

At the same time, he directed an attack upon brigadier-general Alexander Campbell's position, in the centre of the combined armies, and on the right of the British.

This attack was most successfully repulsed by brigadier-general Campbell, supported by the King's regiment of Spanish cavalry, and two battalions of Spanish infantry; and brigadier-gen. Campbell took the enemy's cannon.

The brigadier-general mentions particularly the conduct of the 97th, the 2d battalion 7th, and of the 2d battalion 53d regiments; and I was highly satisfied with the manner in which this part of the position was defended.

An attack was also made at the same time upon lieutenant-general Sherbrooke's division, which

was on the left and centre of the 1st line of the British army.

This attack was most gallantly repulsed, by a charge with bayonets, by the whole division; but the brigade of guards, which were on the right, having advanced too far, they were exposed, on their left flank, to the fire of the enemy's battery, and of their retiring columns; and the division was obliged to retire towards the original position, under cover of the 2d line of general Cotton's brigade of cavalry, which I had moved from the centre, and of the 1st battalion 48th regiment.

I had moved this regiment from its original position on the heights, as soon as I observed the advance of the guards, and it was formed in the plain, and advanced upon the enemy, and covered the formation of lieutenant-general Sherbrooke's division.

Shortly after the repulse of this general attack, in which, apparently, all the enemy's troops were employed, he commenced his retreat across the Alberché, which was conducted in the most regular order, and was effect during the night, leaving in our hands 20 pieces of cannon, ammunition, tumbrils, and some prisoners.

Your lordship will observe by the enclosed return, the great loss we have sustained of valuable officers and soldiers, in this long and hard-fought

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action, with more than double our numbers That of the enemy has been much greater. I am informed that entire brigades of infantry have been destroyed, and, indeed, the battalions that retreated were much reduced in numbers. By all accounts, their loss is 10,000 men. Generals Lapisse and Morlot are killed ; generals Sepastiani and Boulet wounded.

I have particularly to lament the loss of major-general Mackenzie, who had distinguished himself on the 27th ; and of brigadier-general Langworth, of the King's German Legion ; and of Brigade-major Beckett, of the Guards.

Your lordship will observe, that the attacks of the enemy were principally, if not entirely, directed against the British troops. The Spanish commander-in-chief, his officers and troops, manifested every disposition to render us assistance, and those of them which were engaged did their duty ; but the ground which they occupied was so important, and its front at the same time so difficult, that I did not think it proper to urge them to make any movement on the left of the enemy while he was engaged with us.

I have reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the officers and troops. I am much indebted to lieutenant-general Sherbrooke, for the assistance I received from him, and for the manner in which

he led on his division to the charge with bayonets.

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To lieutenant-general Payne, and the cavalry, particularly general Anson's brigade, to major-generals Hill and Tilson, brigadier-generals Alexander Campbell, Richard Stewart and Cameron, and to the divisions and brigades of infantry, under their commands respectively, particularly the 29th regiment, commanded by colonel White, the 1st battalion 48th, commanded by colonel Donnellan, afterwards, when that officer was wounded, by major Middlemore; the 2d battalion 7th, commanded by lieutenant-colonel sir William Myers; the 2d battalion 53d, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Bingham; the 97th, commanded by colonel Lyon; the 1st battalion of detachments, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Bunbury; and the 2d battalion 31st, commanded by major Watson; and of the 45th, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Guard, and 5th battalion 60th, commanded by major Davy, of the 27th.

The advance of the brigade of guards was most gallantly conducted by brigadier-general Campbell, and, when necessary, that brigade retired, and formed again in the best order.

The artillery, under brigadier-general Howorth, was also, throughout these days, of the greatest service; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the

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assistance I received from the chief engineer, lieutenant-colonel Fletcher; the adjutant-general, brigadier-general the honourable C. Stewart, and the quartermaster-general, colonel Murray, and the officers of those departments respectively; and from colonel Bathurst, and the officers of my personal staff.

I also received much assistance from colonel O'Lawlor, of the Spanish service, and from brigadier-general Whittingham, who was wounded when bringing up the two Spanish battalions to the assistance of brigadier-general Alexander Campbell.

I send this by captain lord Fitzroy Somerset, who will give your lordship any further information, and whom I beg leave to recommend.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Return of the Number killed, wounded, and missing, of the Army under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B. in action with the French Army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, in person, in front of the Town of Talavera de la Rena, on the 27th July, 1809.

General Staff—1 officer killed.

14th Light Dragoons—1 rank and file wounded.

1st Light Dragoons King's German Legion—
2 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 1 rank and file,
wounded; 1 rank and file missing.

Royal British Artillery—2 rank and file wounded.

Royal Engineers—1 officer wounded.

1st Battalion Coldstream Guards—1 officer
killed; 1 officer, 2 rank and file, wounded.

2d Battalion 24th Foot—1 rank and file killed;
6 rank and file wounded; 5 rank and file missing.

1st Battalion 29th Foot—10 rank and file killed;
1 officer, 12 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and
file missing.

2d Battalion 31st foot—1 officer, 1 serjeant, 22
rank and file, killed; 4 officers, 3 serjeants, 85
rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file missing.

1st Battalion 45th foot—4 rank and file killed;
1 officer, 13 rank and file, wounded; 7 rank and
file missing.

1st Battalion, 48th foot—8 rank and file
wounded.

2d Battalion, 48th foot—3 rank and file
wounded.

5th Battalion 60th Foot—3 rank and file killed;
1 officer, 4 rank and file, wounded; 1 drummer,
18 rank and file, missing.

1st Battalion 61st Foot—3 rank and file killed;
1 officer, 3 rank and file, wounded.

2d Battalion, 87th Foot—1 officer, 26 rank

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and file, killed ; 10 officers, 3 serjeants, 124 rank and file, wounded ; 1 serjeant, 33 rank file, missing.

1st Battalion 88th Foot—2 officers, 7 rank and file, killed, 25 rank and file wounded ; 30 rank and file missing.

1st Battalions Detachments—1 officer, 1 serjeant, 13 rank and file, killed ; 2 serjeants, 38 rank and file, wounded ; 3 officers, 13 rank and file, missing.

1st Line Battalion King's German Legion—2 rank and file killed ; 7 rank and file wounded.

1st and 2d Light Battalions, ditto—4 rank and file killed ; 2 officers, 2 serjeants, 23 rank and file, wounded ; 5 rank and file missing.

2d Line Battalion, ditto — 3 rank and file wounded.

5th ditto, ditto—6 rank and file killed ; 2 serjeants, 32 rank and file, wounded ; 11 rank and file missing.

7th ditto, ditto—19 rank and file killed ; 1 officer, 5 serjeants, 1 drummer, 43 rank and file, wounded ; 1 drummer, 76 rank and file, missing.

Total—7 officers, 2 serjeants, 122 rank and file, killed ; 24 officers, 17 serjeants, 1 drummer, 465 rank and file, wounded ; 3 officers, 1 serjeant, 2 drummers, 202 rank and file, missing.

Names of the Officers killed, wounded, and missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B. in Action with the French Army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, in Person, in front of the Town of Talavera de la Reyna, on the 27th of July, 1809.

KILLED.

General Staff—Captain Fordyce, 81st Regiment, deputy-adjutant-general.

Coldstream Guards—Lieutenant-colonel Ross.

2d Battalion 31st Foot—Captain Lodge.

1st Battalion 88th Foot—Lieutenants Graydon and M'Carthy.

1st Battalion Detachments—Lieutenant M'Dougal, 91st regiment.

2d Battalion 87th Foot—Ensign La Serre.

WOUNDED.

1st Light Dragoons, King's German Legion—Lieutenant Heimbruck, severely in the arm.

Royal Engineers—Captain Boothby, severely in the thigh.

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1st Battalion Coldstream Guards—Captain and adjutant Bryan, severely.

29th Foot—Lieutenant Popham, severely.

2d Battalion 31st Foot—Captain Coleman, lieutenant George Beamash, severely ; ensigns Gamble and Sorden, slightly.

1st Battalion 45th Foot—Lieutenant-colonel Guard, severely.

5th Battalion 60th Foot — Captain Wolf, severely.

1st Battalion 61st Foot—Major Cogan, ditto.

2d Battalion 87th Foot—Captain Macrea, severely ; captain Sommerfall, slightly ; lieutenant Kavanah, ditto ; lieutenants Bagnall, Kingston, Johnson, and Carroll, severely ; ensign Moore, slightly ; ensigns Knox and Butler, severely.

Rifle Corps King's German Legion—Captain During, slightly ; lieutenant Holle, severely.

7th Line King's German Legion — Adjutant Delius, severely.

MISSING.

1st Battalion Detachments — Captain Poole, 52d Foot ; captain Walsh, 91st Foot ; and lieutenant Cameron, 79th Foot.

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Return of the Number of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B. in Action with the French Army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, in Person, at Talavera de la Reyna, on the 28th of July, 1809.

General Staff — 4 officers killed ; 9 officers wounded.

3d Dragoon Guards—1 officer, 1 rank and file, wounded ; 1 rank and file missing.

4th Dragoons—3 rank and file killed ; 2 serjeants, 7 rank and file, wounded.

14th Light Dragoons—3 rank and file killed ; 6 officers, 6 rank and file, wounded.

16th Light Dragoons—6 rank and file killed ; 1 officer, 5 rank and file, wounded ; 2 rank and file missing.

23d Light Dragoons—2 officers, 3 serjeants, 44 rank and file, killed ; 4 officers, 2 serjeants, 1 drummer, 43 rank and file, wounded ; 3 officers, 7 serjeants, 2 drummers, 96 rank and file, missing.

1st Light Dragoons King's German Legion—1 drummer killed ; 2 officers, 1 serjeant, 2 drummers, 29 rank and file, wounded ; 2 rank and file missing.

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Royal British Artillery—1 officer, 7 rank and file, killed ; 3 officers, 21 rank and file wounded.

Royal German Artillery—1 serjeant, 2 rank and file, killed ; 3 serjeants, 27 rank and file, wounded ; 1 rank and file missing.

Royal Engineers—1 officer wounded.

Royal Staff Corps—2 officers wounded.

1st Battalion Coldstream Guards—1 officer, 33 rank and file, killed ; 8 officers, 11 serjeants, 1 drummer, 239 rank and file, wounded.

1st Battalion 3d Guards—5 officers, 4 serjeants, 45 rank and file, killed ; 6 officers, 11 serjeants, 1 drummer, 249 rank and file, wounded ; 1 rank and file missing.

3d Foot, or Buffs—1 serjeant, 25 rank and file, killed ; 2 officers, 5 serjeants, 102 rank and file, wounded ; 7 rank and file missing.

2d Battalion 7th Foot—1 officer, 6 rank and file, killed ; 3 officers, 1 serjeant, 2 drummers, 51 rank rank and file, wounded ; 1 rank and file missing.

2d Battalion 24th Foot—2 serjeants, 42 rank and file, killed ; 10 officers, 13 serjeants, 255 rank and file, wounded ; 21 rank and file missing.

1st Battalion 29th Foot—1 serjeant, 25 rank and file, killed ; 6 officers, 98 rank and file, wounded ; 2 rank and file missing.

2d Battalion 31st Foot—1 serjeant, 20 rank

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and file, killed ; 3 officers, 5 serjeants, 97 rank and file, wounded ; 5 rank and file missing.

1st Battalion 40th Foot—7 rank and file killed ; 1 officer, 2 serjeants, 47 rank and file, wounded ; 1 rank and file missing.

1st Battalion 45th Foot—9 rank and file killed ; 2 officers, 4 serjeants, 130 rank and file, wounded ; 1 officer, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 10 rank and file, missing.

1st Battalion 48th Foot—22 rank and file killed ; 10 officers, 3 serjeants, 132 rank and file, wounded ; 1 rank and file missing.

2d Battalion 48th Foot—1 Serjeant, 11 rank and file, killed ; 2 officers, 3 serjeants, 50 rank and file, wounded ; 1 officer missing.

2d Battalion 53d Foot—6 rank and file killed ; 2 officers, 1 serjeant, 29 rank and file, wounded ; 1 rank and file missing.

5th Battalion 60th Foot—1 drummer, 6 rank and file, killed ; 6 officers, 1 serjeant, 24 rank and file, wounded ; 2 serjeants, 10 rank and file, missing.

1st Battalion 61st Foot—3 officers, 1 drummer, 42 rank and file, killed ; 10 officers, 10 serjeants, 183 rank and file, wounded ; 16 rank and file, missing.

2d Battalion 60th Foot—1 serjeant, 15 rank and file, killed ; 11 officers, 5 serjeants, 83 rank

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and file, wounded ; 1 serjeant, 10 rank and file, missing.

2d Battalion 83d Foot—4 officers, 1 serjeant, 37 rank and file, killed ; 11 officers, 11 serjeants, 2 drummers, 189 rank and file, wounded ; 28 rank and file missing.

2d Battalion 87th Foot—1 serjeant, 8 rank and file, killed ; 3 officers, 3 serjeants, 40 rank and file, wounded ; 5 rank and file missing.

1st Battalion 88th Foot—1 officer, 1 serjeant, 11 rank and file, killed ; 3 officers, 60 rank and file, wounded.

1st Battalion 97th Foot—6 rank and file killed ; 25 rank and file wounded ; 1 officer, 24 rank and file, missing.

1st Battalion Detachments—26 rank and file killed ; 9 officers, 6 serjeants, 1 drummer, 159 rank and file, wounded ; 1 drummer, 1 rank and file, missing.

2d Battalion Detachments—7 rank and file killed ; 13 rank and file wounded ; 1 rank and file missing.

1st Line Battalion King's German Legion—2 officers, 1 serjeant, 36 rank and file, killed ; 10 officers, 13 serjeants, 1 drummer, 227 rank and file, wounded ; 1 rank and file missing.

1st and 2d Light Battalion ditto—6 rank and file killed ; 3 serjeants, 34 rank and file, wounded.

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2d Line Battalion ditto—4 serjeants, 57 rank and file, killed ; 14 officers, 14 serjeants, 3 drummers, 271 rank and file, wounded ; 24 rank and file missing.

5th Ditto, ditto—3 officers, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 25 rank and file, killed ; 6 officers, 3 serjeants, 1 drummer, 109 rank and file, wounded ; 1 drummer, 100 rank and file, missing.

7th Ditto, ditto—2 serjeants, 15 rank and file, killed ; 4 officers, 7 serjeants, 28 rank and file, wounded ; 3 serjeants, 2 drummers, 19 rank and file, missing.

Total—27 officers, 26 serjeants, 4 drummers, 613 rank and file, killed ; 171 officers, 148 serjeants, 15 drummers, 3072 rank and file, wounded ; 6 officers, 14 serjeants, 7 drummers, 418 rank and file, missing.

*Return of Ordnance, &c. taken in the Battle of
the 28th July.*

4 eight-pounders, 4 six ditto, 1 four ditto, 1 six-inch howitzer, 2 tumbrils, complete in ammunition ; taken by brigadier-general A. Campbell's brigade.

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6 pieces of ordnance, 1 six-inch howitzer, left by the enemy, and found in the woods.

1 standard, taken by the 29th regiment; 1 ditto, destroyed by ditto.

3 standards, taken by the King's German Legion.

CHARLES STEWART, Brig.-gen.
Adjutant-gen.

Names of the Officers killed, wounded, and missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B. in the Action with the French Army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, in Person, at Talavera de la Reyna, on the 28th July.

KILLED.

General Staff—Major-general Mackenzie, and brigadier-general Langworth.

Coldstream Guards—Captain Beckett, brigade-major to brigade of guards.

43d Foot—Captain Gardner, brigade-major to brigadier-general R. Stewart.

23d Light Dragoons—Lieutenants King and Powel.

1st Battalion Coldstream Guards—Ensign Parker.

Royal Artillery—Lieutenant Wyatt.

1st Battalion 3d Guards—Captains Walker, Buchanan, Dalrymple; ensign Ram; adjutant Irby.

2d Battalion 7th Foot—Lieutenant Beaufoy.

1st Battalion 61st Foot—Major F. Orpen, captain H. James, lieutenant Daniel Haimes.

2d Battalion 83d Foot—Lieutenant-colonel Gordon, lieutenants Dahman, Montgomery, Flood.

1st Battalion 88th Foot—Captain Blake.

1st Light Battalion King's German Legion—Captain Versalle, captain Henry Hodenberg.

WOUNDED.

Major-general Hill, slightly.

Brigadier-general A. Campbell, slightly.

Ditto H. Campbell, severely, but not dangerously.

13th Light Dragoons—Captain Whittingham, deputy-assistant quarter-master-general, slightly.

91st Regiment—Captain Blair, brigade-major to general Cameron, severely.

Coldstream Guards—Captain Bouverie, aid-de-camp to sir Arthur Wellesley, slightly.

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92d Foot—Ulysses Burgh, ditto ditto.

1st Battalion Line, King's German Legion—
Captain Zerssen, aid-de-camp to general Lang-
worth, severely.

Sicily Regiment—Captain Craig, aid-de-camp
to general Sherbrooke, slightly.

3d Dragoon Guards—Captain Bryce, severely.

14th Light Dragoons—Colonel Hawker slightly;
captains Chapman and Hawker, severely; lieu-
tenant Ellis, ditto; lieutenants Wainman and
Smith, slightly.

16th Ditto—Lieutenant Bence, slightly.

23d Ditto—Captains Howard and Frankland,
severely; lord William Russel, slightly; cornet
Dodville, ditto.

1st Light Dragoons King's German Legion—
Lieutenant Poten, severely; Cornet Tents, slightly.

Royal Engineers—Lieutenant Stanway, slightly.

Royal Brit. Artillery—Lieutenant-colonel Fra-
mingham, slightly; captains Taylor and Baynes,
ditto.

Royal Staff Corps—Captain Todd, slightly;
lieutenant Shancham, ditto.

1st Battalion Coldstream Guards—Lieutenant-
colonel Stibbert, and sir William Sheridan, severely,
but not dangerously; captains Milman and Chris-
tie, ditto; captains Collier and Wood, slightly;

captain Jenkinson, severely ; ensign Sandilands, ditto, but not dangerously.

1st Battalion 3d Guards—Lieutenant-colonel Gordon, slightly ; major Fotheringham, ditto ; captain Geils, ditto ; ensigns Atcheson, Towers, and Scott, ditto.

1st Battalion 3d Foot or Buffs—Lieutenant-colonel Muter, severely, since dead ; major Drummond, brevet lieutenant-colonel, slightly.

2d Battalion 7th Foot—Lieutenants Kerwan and Muter, severely ; adjutant Page, slightly.

2d Battalion 24th Foot — Lieutenant-colonel Drummond, severely ; major Popham, ditto ; captain Collis, ditto ; captain Evans, ditto, since dead ; lieutenant Vardy, slightly ; ensigns Grant, Skene, and Johnson, severely.

2d Battalion 24th Foot—Ensign Jessamin, severely ; adjutant Topp, slightly.

29th Foot—Captain Gauntlett, severely ; lieutenants Stanns, Leslie, and Stanhope, ditto ; lieutenant Nicholson, slightly ; captain Newbolt, ditto.

2d Battalion 31st Foot — Captain Nicholls, slightly ; lieutenant Girdlestone, slightly ; lieutenant A. Bemish, severely.

2st Battalion 40th Foot—Captain Colquhoun, slightly.

1st Battalion 45th Foot—Major Gwyn, slightly ; lieutenant Cole, ditto.

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1st Battalion 48th Foot — Lieutenant-colonel Donellan, severely; brevet-major Marston, slightly; captains Wood and French, ditto; lieutenants Drought, Page, and Chesslyn, severely; lieutenants Giles and Cuthbertson, slightly; ensign Vandermeulen, severely.

2d Battalion 48th Foot — Lieutenant Johnson, slightly; ensign Kenny, severely.

2d Battalion 53d Foot — Major Kingscote, slightly; captain Stowell, ditto.

5th Battalion 60th Foot — Captain Garliff, brigadier-major, slightly; captain Andrew, ditto; lieutenants Zulke, Ritter, and Mitchell, severely; ensign Alienstein, ditto.

1st Battalion 61st Foot — Captains Furnase, Laing, Goodsman, and Hartley, slightly; lieutenants M'Lean and Tench, ditto; lieutenant Collins, severely; lieutenant Gwan, slightly; ensign Brackenbure, ditto; adjutant Drew, severely.

2d Battalion 66th Foot — Captain Kelly, slightly; captain Stuart, severely; captain Adams, brevet lieutenant-colonel, ditto; lieutenants Morriss, Dudgeon, Humbly, and Steele, severely; lieutenant Shewbridge, slightly; lieutenant Morgan, severely; ensign Cotter, ditto; ensign M'Carthy, slightly.

2d Battalion 83d Foot — Captain Summerfield,

slightly ; captain Reynolds, leg amputated ; lieutenant Nicholson, severely ; lieutenants Baldwin and Johnson, slightly ; lieutenant Abell, severely ; lieutenant Pyne, slightly ; ensigns Boggie and Carey, severely ; ensign Letoller, slightly ; adjutant Braham, ditto.

2d Battalion 87th Foot—Major Gough, severely ; lieutenant Rogers, slightly ; ensign Pepper, ditto.

88th Foot—Captain Brown, severely ; lieutenant Whittle, ditto ; ensign Whitelaw, ditto.

1st Battalion Detachments—Major Ross, 38th Regiment, severely ; captain M'Pherson, 35th ditto, ditto ; captain Bradley, 28th ditto, slightly ; captain Chancellor, 38th ditto, ditto ; lieutenant Gilbert, 28th ditto, severely ; lieutenant M'Beth, 42d ditto, ditto ; lieutenant Fullerton, 38th ditto, slightly ; lieutenant Munroe, 42d ditto, ditto ; lieutenant Brown, 43d ditto, ditto.

1st Battalion Line King's German Legion—Major Bodeker, severely ; captain Marshall, ditto ; captain Saffee, slightly ; captain Petersdorf, ditto ; lieutenants Gorben, (sen.) Ernest Hodenberg, and Frederick Hodenberg, severely ; lieutenants Saffee, and Schlutter, (sen.) slightly ; ensign Allen, ditto.

2d Line Battalion King's German Legion—Lieutenant-colonel Brauns, severely ; major Bel-

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laville, slightly; captain Bergman, severely; captain Heldrith, slightly; captain Sharnhorst, severely.

2d Line Battalion King's German Legion—Lieutenants Beauerman, Winkstern, Wessell, Week, Holle, severely; ensign Tinch, slightly; ensigns Schmidt, Billeb, Blumenhagen, severely.

5th Battalion Line King's German Legion—Captain Hamelberg, severely; captain Gerber, slightly; lieutenants Linsingen and During, severely; ensign Brandes, slightly; ensign Kohler, severely.

1st Battalion King's German Legion—Major Berger, slightly; lieutenant Volgee, ditto; lieutenant Freytag, severely; ensign Offen, ditto.

23d Dragoons — Captains Allen and Drake, wounded and missing; lieutenant Anderson, ditto.

45th Foot—Captain Leckey, brigade-major, missing.

48th Foot, 2d Battalion—Ensign Reeves, missing.

97th Foot—Lieutenant Shipley, ditto.

Return of the Number of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B.

*in an Action with the French Army, commanded
by Joseph Buonaparte, on the 27th and 28th of
July, 1809.*

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27th July, 1809.

Killed—7 officers, 2 serjeants, 122 rank and file.

Wounded—24 officers, 17 serjeants, 1 drummer, 465 rank and file.

Missing—3 officers, 1 serjeant, 2 drummers, 202 rank and file.

28th July, 1809.

Killed—27 officers, 26 serjeants, 4 drummers, 613 rank and file.

Wounded — 171 officers, 148 serjeants, 15 drummers, 3072 rank and file.

Missing—6 officers, 14 serjeants, 7 drummers, 418 rank and file.

Total.

Killed—5 general staff, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 1 major, 7 captains, 15 lieutenants, 3 cornets or ensigns, 1 adjutant, 28 serjeants, 4 drummers, 735 rank and file.

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Wounded—9 general staff, 10 lieutenant-colonels, 12 majors, 53 captains, 71 lieutenants, 34 cornets or ensigns, 6 adjutants, 165 serjeants, 16 drummers, 3537 rank and file.

Missing—5 captains, 3 lieutenants, 1 cornet or ensign, 15 serjeants, 9 drummers, 620 rank and file.—Total 5367.

*Return of the Horses killed, wounded, and missing,
on the 27th and 28th July, 1809.*

27th July, 16 killed, 9 wounded, 2 missing.

28th July, 195 killed, 65 wounded, 157 missing.

General Total—211 killed, 74 wounded, 159 missing.

*Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant-general the
Right Honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B.
to Lord Viscount Castlereagh, dated Talavera,
August 1, 1809.*

Since I had the honour of addressing you on the 29th of July, the enemy have continued to

keep a rear guard of about 10,000 on the heights on the left of Alberché.

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The extreme fatigue of the troops, the want of provisions, and the numbers of wounded to be taken care of, have prevented me from moving from my position.

Brigadier-general Craufurd arrived with his brigade on the 29th in the morning, having marched 12 Spanish leagues in little more than 24 hours.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant-general Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Viscount Castlereagh, dated Talavera, 1st August, 1809.

When I addressed you this morning, I had not received the report from the outposts. It appears that the enemy withdrew the rear guard, which was posted on the heights on the left of the Alberché, last night at eleven o'clock, and the whole army marched towards St. Olalla: I conclude with an intention of taking up a position in the neighbourhood of Guadarama.

The following private account of this memorable achievement of British valour and discipline, was

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written by an officer who was a principal actor in the glorious scene :

On the 25th July, the French army had retired in every direction. On the 26th, they faced about, and attacked the vanguard of the Spanish army. On the evening of the 26th, they were skirmishing with the advanced posts of the British. On the morning of the 27th, they advanced in strong columns on the road to Talavera. General Sherbrooke commanded the advance, at Casas Leguas. The advance consisted of general Sherbrooke's division, general Mackenzie's ditto, and general Anson's cavalry.

General Sherbrooke drew out his force on the high ground above that town (Casas Leguas,) with a view to give them battle, and check their advance. He received an order from sir Arthur Wellesley to retire, and take post about two miles in the rear. He did so, covering his retreat with the brigade of light cavalry, colonel Donkin's brigade of infantry, and the sharp shooters. This was executed in the most masterly manner.

After taking up his position, perceiving the British army was not advancing to support him, (for it was lying encamped at six miles distance,) he determined to retire further behind the river Alberché. The cavalry, *in toto*, passed over the

river to support Anson's brigade, and cover the retreat of the division of infantry.

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The enemy continued to advance. The British continued to retire, and crossed the river at two different fords. The enemy passed rapidly forwards, and followed close. General Mackenzie's division, posted in a wood on the back of the river, was attacked, and a desperate action ensued,—our brave fellows were compelled to give way to numbers. They retired to a plain, where the other troops endeavoured to cover and support them. The enemy's artillery advancing rapidly, compelled the whole to retreat. This being effected, the enemy followed rapidly to the town, in front of which the Spaniards were placed. Part of the enemy entered the town pell-mell, with the Spaniards, baggage, &c.

It was getting dusk : The retreat of the baggage, &c. through close vineyards and olive-grounds was confused and horrible. At this moment the enemy commenced a furious attack on the left. The left was posted on a very high hill, in a line with the town of Talavera. Between these two points our line extended.

This attack was more furious than the oldest soldier ever remembered; for a moment it succeeded. However, the exertion and gallantry of every individual in the position succeeded in re-

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pulsing the enemy. They left the peak of the hill covered with their slain.

The night came on, and the firing ceased. A most fearful night was passed by the British under arms:—our out-posts driven in,—the enemy at the point of our bayonets,—almost in our position, well acquainted with every inch of ground,—the town of Talavera, on our right, in his possession, as we believed, though afterwards we found he had left it in the night.

There was a valley on our left, under the high hill of our position, beyond its heights, alternately in possession of ours and the enemy's riflemen.

Day-break at length appeared. Five minutes after, a tremendous fire of cannon and musketry succeeded, and continued without intermission. It ceased;—and immediately came an order for the cavalry to advance along the valley, to charge the scattered columns of the enemy who had been repulsed. This was immediately attempted, but the enemy had got off.

Our loss in these two attacks was so great, that we could do no more than maintain our position, which the providence of Almighty God had left in our possession.

About three in the afternoon the enemy again advanced to the attack; he brought forward his whole force. He was determined to storm the

glorious height which had successfully defied his attempt. He passed three strong columns into the entrance of the valley which flanked our position. He advanced to the hill and upon the centre with enormous masses of men. All was still, except the enemy's guns in the valley and a few of ours upon the hill.

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The whole army remained in the most awful suspense. The enemy advanced with unparalleled steadiness. At this moment an order arrived for Anson's brigade to advance, and charge the solid columns of the enemy; the order was promptly obeyed. The brigade moved forward, in sight of both armies, in the finest order. Generals Payne, Anson, and their staff, were at their head. Loud shouts from both armies rent the air!

When the charge was sounded, none but those who were present can conceive the interest of this scene. Tremendous volleys of cannon and musketry were poured among our ranks. A deep unseen ditch crossed our front, into which numbers of men and horses, who had not fed for two days, fell. Nothing could daunt the transcendent valour of our brave 22d: they passed all obstacles! rode nobly up.—made a most desperate charge at a solid square and double close column of infantry, and were almost annihilated. The heavy brigade advanced to the support of their brave comrades,

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and assisted in bringing off the remnant of this gallant regiment, who, upon mustering them, appeared only to amount to 119 men and horses. Such was the glorious conduct of the 23d dragoons. The British army which witnessed its exploits will ever bear testimony of its glory; and history will record the achievement in the brightest page of the annals of the English army.

Though this noble charge failed in breaking the enemy's columns, it produced this advantageous effect, that seeing himself attacked and threatened by a large body of cavalry on his left, and experimentally feeling what sort of stuff that cavalry was composed of, he was afraid to form his line; so that the heights which were now covered with dead, dying, wounded, and completely worn-out troops, were left untouched, and the enemy confined his attack to the centre, where they were vigorously repulsed; and, after cannonading us for some time, they retired, completely beaten, leaving in our possession the field of battle, 13 pieces of cannon, (8 having been taken the preceding night,) some eagles, and all his dead and wounded. He retired in the night behind the Alberché, over which he will never again pass.

Farther elucidatory particulars.

Of this important and memorable battle, add the following remarks:

Lord Wellington, aware of the enemy's intention to attack the combined armies, had posted the Spanish troops in front of the town of Talavera, on the right of the British line, and flanked by the river Tagus. He should have occupied the height, on the left of the British line, and a valley between it, and a range of mountains still more to the left, in sufficient force to maintain so strong and important a position, and not have left it unoccupied, save by a Spanish picquet.

The importance of this position to the British has been sufficiently proved, and most certainly was the salvation of the combined army; indeed, its importance was evident to every soldier on the ground, from the moment the enemy shewed a disposition to move in that direction, who, with his usual ability, took advantage of this oversight in the British, and pushed forward a small force along the valley on the left, and thereby obtained this important post, without opposition.

Then it was that this error appeared to the commander, and it was determined to regain possession of the height at any sacrifice. Accordingly, general Hill's division (till then quietly reviewing the enemy's progress, and exposed to the fire of their artillery) most gallantly attacked and drove the enemy from the hill; but not without considerable loss:—a loss, which would have been,

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perhaps, avoided, if one brigade of English infantry had been posted on the height and in the valley on its left, in the first instance, and before the enemy had commenced the attack.

This oversight (to give it a mild name) is the more to be wondered at, from the enemy's having proved a disposition to form his right wing in that direction, at four o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th; and this attempt was made by him to get possession of the height, till eight o'clock at night.

To this error is attributed the list of killed and wounded, on the evening of the 27th July. And it is certain, that many fell by the hands of our own troops; who, in the confusion, and owing to the darkness of the night, at one time could not distinguish friend from foe.

Major Fordyce,

It was upon this occasion that major Fordyce, (acting adjutant-general to general Hill's division,) a most valuable officer, fell;—deeply regretted by the army in general; but, in particular, by the gallant general Hill, whose brigade-major he had been previous to his promotion to the adjutant-general's department. The body of this brave officer was recognized, by an intelligent young officer of the 48th regiment, (lieut. Pardey,) among the killed and wounded of the enemy, near the summit of the hill; and, from the position of the body, the head pointing downwards, and the breast and neck covered

with wounds, it was evident he received the contents of many of the enemy's muskets, levelled at him while leading on the British troops to the charge.

His remains, together with the other brave fellows who fell on this night, were covered up on the side of the hill, as well as the darkness of the night and the pressure of the moment would admit.

From some unaccountable circumstance, the ground occupied by the left wing of the British line, and the intermediate space between that and the right wing of the French line, had not been reconnoitred previous to the action, or, if any reconnoissance had been made, it was but partial : although there had been time sufficient for that purpose, from the 24th to the 27th July, the period the British army halted at Talavera. Indeed, sufficient time was given to make the necessary reconnoitres ; and, while the enemy were passing the Alberché, and moving on their ground, it would have been well if lord Wellington, having made choice of ground, had guarded against, or, at least, made himself acquainted with any thing that might impede the movement of any part of his force during the engagement.

This neglect was sincerely felt on the course of the 28th July, in the morning, in the want of cavalry in the valley, between the height and the

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hills, to followed up the defeat received by the division under Lapisse, in the attack on the height; to check the enemy's columns from advancing by the valley to the assistance of the retreating division, and afterwards, when the cavalry were posted in the valley, an attempt was made by the 23d light dragoons and 1st German Hussars, and supported by the heavy brigade of cavalry, to charge the enemy, who were deploying into line, with an intent of once more attacking the troops posted on the height; at this moment, a deep ravine, till then unnoticed, entirely checked the advance of the 1st hussars and heavy cavalry, and threw the 23d dragoons into great disorder; the consequence of which was, the brave fellows who had cleared the ravine, were exposed to the fire of a solid square, and very soon fell victims to their unsupported courage. Although a few of those brave fellows cut their way through the square, (among whom were a captain Drake and lieutenant Anderson, who were wounded and taken prisoners, but afterwards effected their escape,) it was evident, that, even with the advantage of ground, a charge of cavalry could but little effect a well-disciplined body of this description. And it is worth remarking, that the enemy, on this occasion, resumed the charge with great steadiness, and took such deliberate aim, that but few of their opponents

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escaped. The brave soldiers who fell here were much disfigured, owing to their proximity to the enemy's guns; and it was found necessary to examine the clothing, in order to identify them.

It is certain that neglect or ignorance was attached to some department in this arrangement, or the brigade of light dragoons would not have been led by general Payne into the ravine, whereby any effect that could be expected from the charge was frustrated. Where this neglect is chargeable is difficult to ascertain. From the multiplicity of arrangements to be made by a commander-in-chief, he must necessarily depend on the staff of the army for great assistance, and particularly on the departments of adjutant-general and quartermaster-general. But, while situations on the staff are filled up by young men of interest, and favourites of general-officers, in preference to experienced officers and men of ability, we cannot expect that their duties will be conducted with that coolness, precaution, and steadiness, which is essentially necessary, where the success of a measure or the life of the soldier is endangered.

Arrangements in regard to the staff-officers, extremely judicial, and pretty universally practised, took place after the battle.

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The position taken up by the Spaniards, in front of the town of Talavera, was, naturally, strong; and, from its situation, in an olive grove, protected, in a great measure, from the enemy's fire. Lord Wellington describes this ground important, and *its front so difficult*, that he did not think proper to urge the Spanish army to make any movement on the left of the enemy. While he was engaged with the English, of course, the difficulties to be surmounted in any advance of the Spanish army, operated in the same degree against the enemy, and made any attempt of his to attack the Spanish post equally hazardous. Now, if twenty-four thousand British protected, with effect, the centre, and left of the line formed by the combined army, it is natural to suppose, 26,000 Spaniards more than necessary to maintain the right of the line, and the more particularly, as this post had greater advantages, as a position, than any other part of the alignment. It therefore remains to be accounted for, why 8 or 10,000 Spanish troops (who, lord Wellington says, manifested every disposition to render the British assistance) were not brought into action, on the centre or left of the line, at any of the times the English troops were so pressed by the enemy? and when their appearance alone on the left of the line would have had the effect of deterring the enemy

from so repeatedly attacking the height, by which such immense loss was experienced in this quarter? Had 8 or 10,000 Spaniards acted as a moving column in the rear of the line, and moved as the exigency of the time required, it would have been of considerable advantage to the English in this hard-fought battle, (in which 5,000 British soldiers bled); and 18,000 Spaniards, under Cuesta, would have been a sufficient force to defend the right of the line from any attack of the enemy, if any such should be attempted.

Probably this circumstance, of the Spaniards not being employed where their exertions would be serviceable, had some effect on the misunderstanding which at the time subsisted between the commanders of the combined armies. General Cuesta was desirous that his force should be employed, whereby he might participate in the honour obtained by the English commander. To this misunderstanding are attributed many of the evils which attended the victory of Talavera. The abandonment of the sick and wounded, through which thousands died, — the subsequent retreat over the mountains of Castile, and the loss sustained by the army while cantoned in Spanish Estremadura, the infirmary of that country.

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In the annals of history, says the private

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Might not inferior medals be given to inferior grades?

communication, before quoted, there can be nothing traced to surpass the bravery which the British troops evinced in this battle, where 24,000 British stood the attack, and defeated such superior numbers of French, headed by generals of known celebrity, after two days and nights hard fighting. The despatches, and the letter of thanks from his majesty to the troops after the battle, will shew how highly the government appreciated the valour of the army; and medals were struck off and presented to commanders of regiments, holding the rank of lieutenant-colonels. This partial distribution of honour was received with much dissatisfaction by the junior classes of the army. Some lieutenant-colonels (one in particular who commanded a corps of detachments, and who, it is said, found it difficult to get his name inserted among distinguished men) received this badge, where majors and captains who commanded regiments also, and *bravely fought them*, received no recompense, because it was their misfortune not to hold the rank specified in this partial order for the distribution of medals, as a reward for good conduct at the battle of Talavera.

It is a circumstance worth mention, because it proves the coolness and intrepidity of the troops, that, during the action of the 28th, and at the time

the enemy's guns were playing on the left of the British line with great effect, a solitary hare was started on the plain and valley on the left of the height, by a shell accidentally bursting near the cover of the affrighted animal, who, being discovered by the divisions on the height, and in the valley, a *halloo* was set up by the men, much to the annoyance of the general officers, who, however, could not prevent them enjoying the chase in fancy, until the timid creature, unable to extricate itself, (the artillery playing from every direction in which it attempted to retreat,) was shot with a bullet by a soldier of the rifle battalion of the 60th Regiment. The diversion this chase afforded to the soldiers, says the friend of the writer, who narrates the incident, sufficiently proves that their minds could not have been overpowered by fear. We may say with the Spartan, addressing the eulogist of Hercules, who ever blamed them on this score? and we may add, that he who observed it with so much interest could not be wanting in the faculties he praises.

During the second day of the battle, the face of the ground changed from straw-colour to black, the power of the sun having parched the ground, together with the weed and stubble, then its only produce. The explosion of a shell instantly fired

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young soldiers.

it; and on reaching the pouch or magazine of the wounded, who were unable to assist themselves, would either blow up the sufferer altogether, or irretrievably injure him.

The effect of a shell, (it need not be stated, except to young officers,) when exploding in a proper range, is terribly destructive, twenty men falling under the influence of this combustible in a second. Sometimes it will make its way through an entire column; and, in one instance, where a shell exploded in the centre of a French column, the whole were thrown into entire disorder. A ricochet-ball having struck an English tumbril near the height, blew up its contents and killed brigade-major Gardiner, of general Stewart's brigade, and badly wounded some officers of the 60th Regiment:—the 48th Regiment and Buffs received much damage in the same way; and one shell fell on the height on which lord Wellington placed himself, and destroyed a tumbril, four horses, and all the people near it at the time.

Col. Gordon,
83d Regiment.

Colonel Gordon, 83d Regiment, after being previously wounded, and in the act of being removed from the field in a blanket, was (together with those around him) blown to pieces by a shell, which, in a most unhappy manner, rolled after him. This officer had the respect of his re-

giment, and considered by all to be a great loss to the service.

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Colonel Muter, 3d Buffs, was struck by a shell on the head, while sitting, among a number of officers, on the side of the height, remarking upon the enemy's movement. He was universally esteemed, and deeply regretted by the Buffs.

Lieutenant-colonel Charles Donnellan, 1st Batt. 48th Reg. Among the many brave officers who fell, or received mortal wounds, at Talavera, none is to be more regretted than this officer, who received a wound in the knee, which proved mortal, while leading his battalion to the charge, in support of the Guards, who were thrown into confusion from having advanced too far after the enemy. Colonel Donnellan was one who governed his regiment without flogging; and sir David Baird publicly declared the 2d Battalion 48th Regiment, when on the Curragh, of Kildare, in 1808, as fine a regiment, and in as high a state of discipline, as he could desire to command. The abolition of flogging, of course, gained him the affection of the privates; and although he frequently spoke harshly to the officers, he never would injure them by unnecessary courts-martial, or stopping their promotion: and,

Death of col.
Donnellan.

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Anecdote of
the true affec-
tion with which
a commanding
officer who does
his duty may
inspire his in-
feriors.

with the name of a very severe commanding officer, he was looked upon as a father by all, and familiarly styled Charley, an appellation by which he frequently heard himself commented on in the tents or barrack-rooms, by the men, unconscious of his proximity at the moment. He was promoted to the 1st battalion in Gibraltar, and joined it early in the year 1809; his removal was deeply regretted by the soldiers of the 2d. Their affection for their old colonel was strongly evinced upon an occasion, when the Spanish general, Cuesta, reviewed the British troops at Oropesa, previous to the battle of Talavera. A short time before this, the 1st battalion had joined the army in Spain, under the command of the lieutenant-colonel, and he had not been seen by the men of the 2d battalion, who were a very steady regiment, under arms, and had been particularly cautioned on this occasion, in order to exhibit to general Cuesta a specimen of high British discipline. When the Spanish general, accompanied by lord Wellington, arrived before the regiment, nothing could exceed their steadiness, until the men discovered old Charley, (as they styled colonel Donnellan,) riding with the staff, when an extraordinary degree of confusion took place, and it was with difficulty they preserved any appearance of discipline, reiterating the expressions, "*Did you see old Charley.*" The

congratulation passed like lightning through the men, much to the chagrin of the commanding officer, who piqued himself on their general order.

On the day of the battle, the colonel was dressed according to his regimental order, for a garrison town—stiff leather breeches and long boots, hair powdered, &c. and expressed much displeasure against the enemy, who wounded two of his horses with their (as he expressed himself) “long muskets, made to shoot from two miles off.” On receiving his wound, he was in front of the battle; it was very severe, and seemed to disable him at once. He, however, took off his hat, and, gracefully bowing, called major Middlemore to take the command. If there had been surgical assistance in time, and his leg and part of his thigh amputated, he might have lived; but, in three days, symptoms of mortification appeared, and he was left in Talavera, where he almost immediately died; on his death-bed, he desired to be particularly remembered to all his brave officers, and begged, if he had offended them, that they would excuse his hasty temper, when he was no more.

This brave officer was buried by the French grenadiers of the regiment in Talavera, on or near the spot where he received his wound, with the real honours of war.

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“ How sleep the brave who sink to rest,
By all their country’s wishes blest !
When Spring, with dewy fingers cold,
Returns to deck their hallow’d mould,
She then shall dress a sweeter sod
Than fancy’s feet have ever trod ;
By fairy hands their knell is rung,
By forms unseen their dirge is sung ;
Then HONOUR comes, a pilgrim grey,
To bless the turf that wraps their clay ;
And FREEDOM shall awhile repair,
To dwell a weeping hermit there.”

To the ensuing volume must be referred the accounts of the enemy, and the views of the future campaign.

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